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
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# CONFEDERATE MILITARY HISTORY

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
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JED. HOTCHKISS

VIRGINIA  
BY  
MAJ. JED. HOTCHKISS.



## CHAPTER I.

### VIRGINIA IN 1860—HER SEVEN GRAND DIVISIONS—GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS, CLIMATE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS—HER POPULATION—POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE.

**V**IRGINIA was, in 1860, in nearly all the particulars of area, resources, productions and population, one of the leading States of the Union, just as she had been from colonial and revolutionary times. Her influence in the councils of the nation was very great, if not even paramount, and she was looked up to, not only as "the mother of States and of statesmen," but as the ardent defender of the Union, in the formation of which she had taken the leading part. One-sixteenth of the native population of the United States, in 1860, claimed her soil as their birthplace; and it was said that a majority of the members of Congress, at that time, were either natives of Virginia, or the sons or grandsons of those who had been born within her borders.

The geographical position and general relations of Virginia gave her a commanding position. Classed as one of the Middle Atlantic States, situated midway between Maine on the northeast and Florida on the southeast, she was, in reality, the representative mid-coast State of the Union; having, in consequence of her position and variety of land relief, many of the characteristics of the States lying both to the north and south of her. Because of her great extension, of over 500 miles, from the Atlantic across the Atlantic highlands to the Ohio, she had many of the features and adaptations of the States lying to the west as well as of those on the northwest and southwest. She was also the eastern one of the central belt of States, as the latitude of the entrance to Chesapeake bay very nearly corresponds to that of the Golden Gate of California.

In extent of surface Virginia was one of the greatest of the States east of the Mississippi river, her area then

being about 68,000 square miles, while New York had 47,000, all of New England 68,348, and Georgia but 59,000. Her greatest breadth from the North Carolina line to the northern end of the "panhandle," within 90 miles of Lake Erie, was about 430 miles; her greatest length, from east to west along the North Carolina and Tennessee lines, from the Atlantic to Cumberland gap, was 440 miles. Her outline was varied and richly developed. On the east the Virginian sea of the Atlantic and Chesapeake bay—with its many tidal rivers and estuaries, some penetrating her territory fully 150 miles, dividing it into numerous large and small peninsulas and furnishing more than 1,500 miles of tide-washed shore line, with numerous harbors of unsurpassed capacity and depth—permeate over 11,000 square miles of her tidewater country. The navigable Ohio belonged to her all along her northwestern border, receiving numerous navigable tributaries that drained the larger part of her Trans-Appalachian territory.

The relief characteristics of the State were noteworthy and remarkable. These divided it into seven natural grand divisions, each differing from the other in soil, adaptation to production, climate and other characteristics, and each equal in area to some of the States of the Union:

1. The Tidewater, about 11,000 square miles in area, is the great low-lying plain that extends from the Atlantic border westward from 150 to 200 miles, rising from sea level to an elevation of about 200 feet at the head of the tide, where it meets the granitic step, or "Coast ridge," at the borders of the Midland, at the first falls of the rivers, where are situated the commercial and manufacturing cities of Alexandria, Fredericksburg, Richmond and Petersburg. Many of the most important battles of the war of 1861-65 in Virginia were fought along this "Coast ridge," generally a sharply-defined line of escarpment.

2. The Midland is the undulating higher plain of the Atlantic slope, somewhat triangular in form, that extends from the eastern rim of the "ridge" westward to the broken range of hills and low mountains called the coast range of the Atlantic. Its area is about 12,500 square miles. It is intersected by many eastwardly flowing rivers; its surface is rolling or uneven, and deeply

carved into stream valleys with intervening watershed ridges. It rises from an altitude of from 150 to 200 feet on the east to one of from 300 to 500 on the west.

3. The Piedmont is the greatly diversified region lying between the eastern foot of the Coast range mountains and the eastern foot of the Blue ridge. Its area is nearly 7,000 square miles; in altitude it rises from an average of nearly 400 feet along its Midland border to one of nearly 1,000 feet along its Blue ridge border, while its included mountain ranges and Blue ridge spurs vary in altitude from 1,000 to 4,000 feet. It is a genuine piedmont, or foot-of-mountain country, that extends for a distance of over 300 miles along the eastern side of the Blue ridge from the Potomac to the North Carolina line, with an average breadth of nearly 25 miles. Its greatly varying forms of relief make it one of the most attractive and picturesque portions of the State.

4. The Blue ridge is a many-branched mountain chain, with swelling domes and considerable plateaus, extending for some 300 miles entirely across the State, from the northeast to the southwest, varying in elevation from about 1,000 feet near the Potomac to over 4,000 feet in the plateau in the southwest, on which are the three Blue ridge counties of the State. This is not only a striking feature in the landscape, from both its eastern and its western sides, but is one of the most important military features of the State. It played an important part in the many engagements of the Confederate war that took place in or near the passes that cut or cross it. Its area, as a grand division, is about 2,000 square miles.

5. The Great Valley, or the valley of Virginia, is the elevated plateau-like country lying between the western base of the Blue ridge and the eastern one of the North mountains—Kittatinny as a whole—of the Appalachian system. Its length is over 300 miles and its average breadth about 20 miles, giving it an area of about 7,600 square miles of the most fertile and productive portion of Virginia. It is her part of the great limestone valley that extends, for 1,500 miles, from near the mouth of the St. Lawrence far into Alabama. It is composed of a series of river basins, those of the Shenandoah and parts of those of the James, the Roanoke, the New river and the headwaters of the Tennessee. Its altitude varies from 500 to 2,600 feet. Its surface is diversified by hills and



detached mountain chains and ranges that render it one of the most remarkable fields for military operations in all the country, as is attested by the numerous battles that took place within it in Virginia and its extensions into Maryland and Tennessee.

6. Appalachia, or Appalachian Virginia, is the mountain belt, some 350 miles long, that extends west of the Great Valley entirely across the State; wedge-shaped in form, some 60 miles wide in the northeast and narrowing to 20 in the southwest. It is traversed by a large number of parallel ranges that vary in altitude from 2,000 feet to about 5,000, with long and generally narrow valleys between these mountain ranges running parallel with them. Within these mountain ranges and running with their valleys, are the principal tributaries of the Potomac in the northeast, of the James and the Kanawha in the central portions, of the Tennessee in the southwestern portions, and in the northwestern, the easterly branches of the Monongahela; all of which, in finding their way out, break through the successive ranges of the mountains and thus furnish ways through them. In 1860, Virginia's portion of Appalachia was divided into eighteen counties. The larger portion of this territory was covered with forests. As a whole, it was a most difficult region for the conduct of military operations, of which it was largely the theater during the first year of the war.

7. Trans-Appalachian Virginia, or Trans-Alleghany, as it was often called, is the region beyond the Appalachian or main mountain ranges; it is the inclined table-land that slopes to the northwest from the eastern outcrop of the great conglomerate rock border of the Trans-Appalachian coal-field to the Ohio, descending from an average elevation of nearly 3,000 feet along its eastern border, in the great Flat-top mountain and its extensions, to one of about 600 along the Ohio. The streams have deeply eroded its long westward slope, leaving it in high relief with long and narrow stream valleys separated by intervening ridges, generally rugged in character. The valleys widen and the between ridges sink as they approach the Ohio. This great region was divided into forty-one counties, nearly every one of which is underlaid by coal of highly-useful varieties, making it, intrinsically, one of the most valuable portions of the State; while a large part of its surface was covered with virgin forests.

The waters of Virginia are among the most striking of its characteristics. Its tidal waters are very remarkable and inviting, by their extent and character, to commercial enterprises, in which Virginia took a fair part during all her history up to 1860, and in consequence of which she is now rapidly advancing, in the growth of her commercial ports, to the position she is entitled to from her large facilities for engaging in commerce. Her fluvial waters are numerous and full volumed, draining and watering every portion of the State, and furnishing numerous water powers. In 1860, those in her Trans-Appalachian territory, the Ohio and its tributaries, were the avenues of a large internal commerce. Virginia early embarked in the improvement of many of her fluvial waterways by canals and slack-water navigation, especially patronizing the Chesapeake & Ohio canal, to open a highway to the West by the Potomac and the Monongahela, and the James River & Kanawha canal, for a commercial highway up the James and down the Kanawha to the Ohio farther to the south. The State as a whole is undoubtedly one of the best watered regions in the United States.

Virginia is unique in geological characteristics. She has within her borders, large areas underlaid by the rocks of every geological formation found in North America. This means that she possesses nearly every variety of soil and most kinds of valuable economic rocks and minerals, especially the best of granites, slates, brownstones, sandstones, and other building rocks; great deposits of the ores of iron, zinc, lead and copper; a wide belt of gold-bearing rocks extends through the length of the midland; limestones in the greatest abundance, especially in the valley and throughout Appalachia; and, surpassing all others in value, she had, in 1860, over 17,000 square miles of bituminous and semi-bituminous coals, mostly in Trans-Appalachia, but with a considerable area in the midland near Richmond, that in the number of beds and the variety of adaptation were unsurpassed by those of any State in the Union.

The climate of Virginia presents a great variety in consequence of her position in relation to the ocean, and especially because of the relief of the surface of the State, from the low levels of tidewater, where grow and flourish the long-leaf pine, live-oak, cotton and other

warm-temperate productions, to the high levels of the Blue ridge, the Valley, Appalachia and Trans-Appalachia, where are broad areas over 4,000 feet above the sea level, and to the still higher ridges of the southwestern Blue ridge and of western Appalachia, where flourish the pines, the balsams and the larches of the cool-temperate regions of the United States. Her high mountain chains intercept and turn aside the great storm waves of the northwest, but taking from them their moisture, while they intercept the vapor-laden winds from the ocean on the southeast, and from them draw tribute of a larger precipitation. As a whole, it is a State with perennial rains, long growing seasons, and a climate of means rather than of extremes.

Her adaptation to productions, both animal and vegetable, are great and varied. Of the 31,117,036 acres of her land embraced in farms, in 1860, 11,437,821 acres were improved, and 19,679,215 acres were unimproved, leaving an area of over 13,000,000 acres not included in farms, which was mostly embraced in the great patents, embracing much of the Appalachian regions, which were covered with original forests. The cash value of the land embraced in farms at that time was \$371,761,661. Of the other States, only New York, Illinois and Ohio had more acres of land under cultivation, and none but Texas had more unimproved land embraced in farm boundaries. Virginia ranked fifth in the cash value of her farms, being only exceeded by Illinois, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Her agricultural productions embraced all the cereals, tubers, pulse, grass and grass seeds of the temperate region, to which were added great quantities of tobacco, considerable cotton and hemp, a large amount of sweet potatoes, the products of the warm-temperate regions, besides all temperate fruits in profusion. She ranked among the leading States of the Union in the production of all the great staples of the country except the rice, cotton and sugar of the far South. She was the leading State in the production of tobacco, and ranked fifth in that of wheat and sixth in Indian corn and oats. Virginia ranked high also in the numbers and quality of her domestic animals, her breeds of all which were among the best in the whole country.

The people of Virginia were of almost unmixed nativity, the foreign-born of her population in 1860 being but

35,058, or less than one-fortieth of the whole. The basis of her white population was mainly English and Scotch, with Germans (mainly in the Valley), French Huguenots (mainly in Midland), and some Irish. Her negroes were mostly the descendants of imported Africans, but among them were numbers that had been sold into her borders from Northern States previous to the emancipation of slaves in those States. The condition of her people was, as a whole, as happy and contented as could be presented by any of the States of the Union. Cultivable lands were plentiful and comparatively cheap. Nearly all articles needed to supply human wants were abundant and held at reasonable prices. Labor was well paid, especially that of a skilled character. The great body of the people was prosperous and steadily improving in circumstances. Kindly relations existed throughout the commonwealth, not only between the races, but between the rich and the poor. The laws were respected and justly and ably administered by an incorruptible judiciary, from the gentlemen justices of the peace of the counties up to her distinguished judges of the circuit courts and the court of appeals. Crimes affecting persons and property were rare, and the churches of the leading religious denominations of the country, the Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians, this order representing their comparative numbers, were everywhere distributed, well attended and cared for by able and zealous preachers of the Gospel. She was among the first of the States to establish asylums for the insane and an institution for mutes and the blind.

While Virginia did not have in 1860 a public school system under State control, as she now has, she made ample provision for all those desiring to be educated. In nearly every neighborhood throughout the State were private schools, generally well taught, to which all had access, the State paying the tuition of all who asked such assistance. Academies and preparatory schools, most of them classical and taught by well-educated gentlemen, were found in all parts of the State. Many of these, conducted by men of high social standing and with numerous assistants, were not only locally patronized but drew large numbers of pupils from other States, especially those of the South and Southwest. Her military institute, attended by appointed students from every por-

tion of the State, was widely known, from the character of its training, as the "West Point of the South." Numerous denominational colleges, some of them dating from colonial times, with able faculties, were established at various places in the State, while the university of Virginia, of which Jefferson was the father and which was liberally subsidized by the State, was, beyond controversy, the leading university of the United States in the character of its professors, its methods of instruction and training, and its large attendance of students from Virginia and States of the South and West. From its schools of law, medicine, science and literature, had been graduated a large proportion of the leading professional men not only of the Southern but of many of the Western States, even to the shores of the Pacific. The State patronized a medical college at Richmond, and from the Union theological seminary of the Presbyterians, near Hampden-Sidney college, and from the Episcopal theological seminary, near Alexandria, many able divines came to the churches throughout the same extensive regions. Female schools of a high order were established in many portions of the State, which were widely patronized from the same regions as were the colleges and the university.

Contrary to the general belief, the training of the negroes was not neglected. For, although the teaching of them in public was prohibited for prudential reasons, the right of their owners to teach them was not abridged, and very many were taught the elements of reading, etc. Their religious instruction was generally well provided for, and large numbers of them were members of the same churches as were their masters and mistresses, while they had numerous churches of their own, built by the liberality of the whites and supplied by preachers of their own race, but very often by those of the dominant one. They had another sort of education which has been rarely recognized. It is a fact that there were in Virginia thousands of technical schools, properly so called, for training the negro race, in the days of slavery. Every plantation where there was any considerable number of slaves was a well-organized and self-contained colony, in which each member of the community, from the youngest that was able to perform any light labor to the oldest who was not helpless, had an assigned duty to per-

form, under the direction of the master and the mistress, or the trusted overseer, either in the household and its surroundings or in the fields. Each of these home communities had its own mechanics, or trades people of nearly every kind, from the carders, spinners, weavers, knitters, seamstresses and trained servants of the household and its attached flower and vegetable gardens, to the shoemakers, blacksmiths, wagonmakers, and other craftsmen of the home shops, and the wagon and cart drivers, plowmen, cattle and sheep herders, and others who conducted all the different labors of the large plantations. Especially were there large numbers of highly-skilled laborers on the great tobacco plantations, who, under but light supervision, pitched, cared for, cut and cured the large crops of tobacco, for the quantity and quality of which Virginia was famous in all parts of the world. One need not hesitate to say, that a better trained, better ordered, better cared for, happier and more contented laboring population nowhere existed within the limits of the Union.

The occupations of the people of Virginia were greatly varied in consequence of the great variety of the surface features of the State and their adaptations. Her oceanic waters abounded in shell and scale fish, and gave employment to large numbers of oystermen and fishermen. The large plantations of Tidewater were devoted to the production of wheat and corn, and those south of the James to peanuts and cotton; the cultivation of sweet potatoes was a specialty in the more easterly regions. Eastern and Central Midland raised large crops of wheat, from which a superior quality of flour was manufactured, especially at Richmond, for the South American trade. Western Midland, then as now, added the production of large quantities of tobacco. The Piedmont country in its northeastern portion, within the limits of the growth of natural grasses, was devoted to the production of cereals and the rearing of cattle and horses, while the large plantations of the central and southwestern parts not only produced corn and wheat, but great quantities of what is known as heavy shipping tobacco. The elevated pasture lands of the Blue ridge were mainly given up to grazing and dairying. The Great Valley, from the Potomac to the Tennessee line, the paradise of the farmer, the grazer and the dairyman, produced bountiful crops of all the cereals, especially wheat and corn; large numbers of

cattle and horses were reared, and much attention was given to dairying as well as to general husbandry.

It should be borne in mind that in 1860 there was no sea-board connection in Virginia with the great prairie States. The Baltimore & Ohio railroad had but just opened communication by rail with that region. None other of the railways of Virginia had then crossed the Appalachians, consequently there was none of that destructive competition which has now made farming unprofitable in the Atlantic States. The wheat from Virginia, much of it ground into flour by local mills, especially in the Valley and in Alexandria, Fredericksburg, Richmond and Petersburg, found good markets, notably in Baltimore and Richmond, for the West Indies and South America, or the grocery trade of the United States, which then had its best entrepôts at Norfolk and Baltimore.

The people in the valleys of the Appalachian country and on the sloping uplands of Trans-Appalachia, were mainly engaged in the rearing of cattle, hogs, horses and other animals, which were driven eastward, either as young cattle to be sold to the farmers of the Valley and Piedmont for fattening from their ample corn-fields, or were driven direct, as fat cattle, to the eastern cities, sometimes as far northward as New York. There were also many dwellers in cabins, surrounded by a few acres of cleared land, within these mountain regions, who had little or no occupation beyond fishing and hunting. But these were the breeding places of hardy folk, who were constantly drifting westward as they grew to maturity, to form a considerable element in the great populations of newer States. Virginia, peopled with land-hungry Anglo-Saxons, made the great mistake, from the earliest days of her history, of parceling out her magnificent domain into great patents, some of them including a half million acres, and many of them from 50,000 to 100,000 acres, at the nominal price of but a few cents an acre. This policy prevailed, as population advanced westward, from the Atlantic to the Ohio, until these patents, often overlapping and loosely located, covered a large area of all the Appalachian and Trans-Appalachian country, left no land to be divided into parcels of moderate size for the use of the home-builder, and introduced uncertainty of land titles, all greatly detrimental to the peopling of that very desirable and intrinsically rich region,

across which and from which, largely because of this uncertainty of title and of the tempting parceling out of the great prairie States into sections and fractions of sections of land, the population of Virginia, from the seaboard to the mountains, drifted westward, leaving only stranded fragments of good stock along the way which ignorant writers describe as "poor whites" of a different origin from the main sturdy stock of the Virginia people.

The northwesterly portion of the Trans-Appalachian country and the broad bottom lands of the Ohio and its tributaries, early attracted from the eastward a thrifty and intelligent class of people, who made that a highly-productive grazing and agricultural region, which found markets for its products on the hoof eastward, or in flat-boats westward on the flood tides of its numerous rivers. The manufacture of salt at various localities, especially on the Great Kanawha, was one of the leading industries of that section, supplying much of the Mississippi valley with its prime necessity of human life. Coal mining was also becoming an important industry on the Kanawha, the Monongahela and along the Ohio, the product of the mines finding markets in Cincinnati, Louisville, and even New Orleans. The distilling of petroleum, from cannel coal, had assumed very considerable proportions, especially along the Kanawha, when the discovery of natural petroleum, near 1860, by the boring of wells on the waters of the Little Kanawha, marked the beginning of the trade in petroleum, which has become one of the largest and most profitable in the whole world.

Of the 297,354 of Virginia's white population reported as engaged, in 1860, in gainful occupations, 108,958 were farmers and 30,518 were farm laborers; showing that a very large proportion of her people were engaged in farming or planting. Of the so-called professional classes, there were 3,441 lawyers, 2,467 physicians and 1,437 clergymen. Her population was mainly rural in habitation; she had no cities of large size. Richmond contained but 37,910 inhabitants; Petersburg, 18,266, and Norfolk and Portsmouth but 24,116; Wheeling, the metropolis of northwestern Virginia, contained but 14,083. The manufacturers of all kinds were comparatively few in number; they were mostly the blacksmiths, bricklayers, carpenters, shoemakers and wheel-



wrights of the towns and villages throughout the commonwealth.

Her military population, the white men of the State between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, was 196,587; a striking contrast to the 1,099,855 at that time within the limits of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, States to the west of her borders that had, by her own action, been cut from her territory, and a very large percentage of whose population was of Virginian origin; and yet her fighting population was considerably larger than that of any other Southern State except Missouri. The available number of Virginia's arms-bearing population in 1860 was so decreased by the Union element and the secession from the State by West Virginia that she had not more than 150,000 fighting men to respond to her call for troops after the secession from the Union in 1861.

Prior to the first census Virginia had 10 representatives in the United States Congress; the first census, that of 1790, gave her 19, the second 22, the third 23, the fourth 22, the fifth 21, the sixth 15, the seventh 13, and the eighth, that of 1860, 11. The center of population of the United States at each of the five decades, from 1810 to 1850, was within her borders. Her density of population in 1860 was about 25 to the square mile.

From the historical standpoint, Virginia occupied an enviable position. From the threshold of 1860 she looked back upon an heroic and glorious past. Her Capt. John Smith—leader, diplomat, fighter, explorer, geographer, historian and adventurer—would have been a notable figure in any age. In 1619, before the establishing of any other English colony in America, she assembled an elected house of burgesses and entered upon a representative career which, from that time forward, stoutly maintained the rights of her people to govern themselves; and even in submitting to the Cromwellian parliament in 1652, she secured a continuance of her representative law-making privileges. Proud of her loyalty in the restoration of 1660, she hesitated not to rebel, in 1676, against the usurping authority of the royal parliament, and against that of the royal governor who failed to obey her orders and protect the colony against Indian outrages, and endeavored to rule without consent of the people. Her Governor Spotswood, who came in 1710, was by far the most prominent figure of his time in the American col-

onies. In 1714 he established the first blast-furnace for the manufacture of iron, on the bank of the Rappahannock, within the afterward famous battlefield of Chancellorsville. He was the first, in 1716, to lead an expedition across the Blue ridge into the famous Shenandoah valley, and in 1730 became the deputy postmaster-general of all the colonies.

When the French and Indian war of 1750 began, and France claimed the territory drained by the Ohio, Virginia had a young Washington to send on a diplomatic errand to the French, at the head of that river; to lead her citizen soldiery, in 1754, in the unequal combat of the Great Meadows, and in 1755 to save from complete disaster the British regulars under Braddock. When England attempted taxation without representation, in 1765, her Patrick Henry fired the colonies to resistance. In 1769 she called a revolutionary convention, which denounced the acts of the British parliament. In 1774 she sent representatives to the first Continental Congress, in the persons of Peyton Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, George Washington, Patrick Henry, Richard Bland and Edmund Pendleton, all men of mark, who helped, then and there, to lay the foundations for a Federal union. In 1774 her brave and hardy men of the Great Valley and the mountains beyond, the fighting Scotch-Irishmen under the leadership of Lewis, met the combined Indian power of the Northwest, in a fierce struggle at the mouth of the Kanawha on the bank of the Ohio, and not only established Virginia's claim to the Northwest, but broke up the combination that, by Indian invasions in the rear, would have defeated the contention of the colonies with the mother country, if it had succeeded.

In 1775 the elected delegates of her people assembled in convention in Richmond, and resolved to put the colony in a state of defense against the aggressions of the crown, and followed these resolutions by ordering the enlisting and drilling in companies of soldiers throughout the commonwealth. A troop of these from Hanover, led by Patrick Henry, compelled the royal governor to pay for the powder of the colony that he had unlawfully removed from Williamsburg to shipboard. When the second Continental Congress met, in 1775, Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was again chosen to preside over it;

and when that body, moved to action by the conduct of the British troops in Boston, formed a Federal union under the name of the United Colonies, and authorized the raising of a Continental army, her George Washington was chosen its commander-in-chief and took command at Cambridge, Mass., on the 2d of July, 1775.

The Virginia people again met in convention on the 17th of July, 1775, and chose a committee of safety to take charge of the affairs of the colony, ordered the enlistment of troops, passed laws for the raising of money, the procuring of arms and military supplies, and for the conducting of elections by loyal voters. The story of the revolution need not be repeated. Virginia's Washington, after seven long years of arduous struggle and endurance, brought it to a successful termination, at her Yorktown, in 1781. But it is well to recall that it was Virginia, the most conservative of the colonies, which in the convention of 1776, on the 6th of May, instructed her delegates in Congress to propose "to declare the United Colonies free and independent States;" and that this resulted in a Declaration of Independence, on the 4th of July, 1776, which was drawn by her Thomas Jefferson.

## CHAPTER II.

### SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA—THE AGITATION OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION—DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVES IN THE STATE—JOHN BROWN'S INVASION.

**W**HILE the war of 1861-65 between the Union, or Northern and non-slaveholding States, and the Confederate, or Southern and slaveholding was not fought by the South as a whole, and certainly not by Virginia, for the perpetuation of slavery, nor by the North, at least in its inception, for its abolition; yet every candid student of the history of the colonies and the States must admit that the slavery question, often under the name of "State rights" of one kind or another, was a dominant factor making issues that led to the temporary disruption of the Union. The history of Virginia during that war would be incomplete without a brief review of the story of her prior connection with African slavery.

Slaves were introduced into Virginia by Dutch merchantmen in 1619; from that time the importation of African negroes was engaged in by nearly all the commercial nations of Europe, especially by the Dutch, Spanish, French, Portuguese and British. In 1646, a ship from Boston was the first from the American colonies, so far as known, to engage in this traffic, which from that time until 1808 was more or less shared in by the commercial Northern States. In 1670 there were 2,000 slaves in Virginia. At the breaking out of the revolution, slavery extended over the North American continent wherever settled by Europeans. In 1774, Rhode Island, which up to that time had been considerably engaged in the slave trade, interdicted the importation of slaves into her borders. In 1778, Virginia, the second of the States to act, prohibited the introduction of slaves from abroad. Other States followed and gradual emancipation began in many of the Northern States. When Maryland refused to sign the articles of confederation of 1777, unless Vir-

ginia would give up to the confederation the great Northwest Territory beyond the Ohio, which all concede belonged to her by rights of charter, conquest and treaty, Virginia generously granted the request and conveyed that great region to the Union in 1787, only providing, that it should eventually be divided into four or five States, to be admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen; that she should have land there, in designated localities, to distribute to her revolutionary soldiers, and that slavery should be forever prohibited from that region, but that slaves fleeing there from other States should be returned to their owners. By this deed of gift Virginia did more to draw the line of actual separation between the North and South on the question of slavery than did any or all other States combined; for the great and populous States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and part of Michigan, which were created from that territory, were the strongest factors in sustaining the North during the civil war,\* and in eventually saving the Union.

The federal convention of 1787, which framed the Constitution of the United States, provided, as one of its compromises, that the slave trade should not be abolished by Congress until 1808. This was opposed by Virginia, who desired its immediate prohibition; but it was adopted by a vote of the New England States joined with South Carolina and Georgia. Virginia was the author of the compromise upon the question of negro representation in the convention of 1787, and probably saved that body from disruption and secured the adoption of the Constitution. South Carolina determined to leave the convention if her negroes were not counted for her representation in the Congress, and it was evident that Georgia and North Carolina would follow her example; in which event the number of States to ratify the action of the convention would be wanting. Virginia proposed and carried through, as a compromise, the provision that five negroes should be counted as equivalent to three white people in making up Federal representation.

As one after another of the Northern States abolished slavery and the States carved from the Northwest Terri-

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\*It is difficult to give the proper title to the war of 1861-65. It was not technically civil war, because it was not waged among citizens. Strictly speaking, it was not "Confederate," as it was not instituted by the Confederacy. The term civil is now commonly used.—[EDITOR.]

tory were organized as free States, the agitation of the slavery question continued. In 1820 another compromise was adopted upon the admission of Missouri as a State, which provided that slavery should not be allowed in any State of the Union north of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ , the latitude of the southern boundary of Missouri. In effecting this compromise, Virginia took a prominent part, acting as mediator between the two sections.

The agitation of the slavery question continued not only between the States of the Union, but within the limits of Virginia herself, as nearly one-third of her territory, mainly the Trans-Appalachian region, was practically a free State, and its citizens, many of whom were from the adjacent States of Pennsylvania and Ohio, constantly demanded special legislation on questions of representation in the general assembly, in consequence of the large preponderance of negroes east of that chain of mountains. Many citizens of the Great Valley and of Appalachia were much in sympathy with this feeling, and in 1823 the State came very near adopting gradual emancipation, a large number of the most influential men in every portion of the commonwealth favoring it. The chief hindering cause was the question, still unanswered, "What shall be done with this great body of negroes when emancipated?" About that time the abolitionists throughout the free States became very zealous in the propagation of their peculiar views upon the subject of slavery, and deluged Congress with petitions against it and flooded the country with abolition publications. This provoked a reaction in sentiment in Virginia and the other Southern States, which again led, in 1838, to the adoption of "State rights" resolutions by Congress, reaffirming that the Federal government had no right to interfere with slavery in the States where it existed. This for the time being quieted the agitation, but the question came up again in 1845, when it was proposed to annex Texas; and was again settled by a compromise agreement, that four new States might be formed out of that great country, those north of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  to be free States, and those south of it either free or slave as their citizens might elect.

The propagandists of the North and the ultra slaveholders of the South, as contending factions, still continued the agitation of this question. The three leading

religious denominations of the United States divided into northern and southern churches. In 1849 the question of the admission of California again brought strife on this subject into the Congress. After a long contention, the compromise measures of 1850, introduced by Henry Clay, were adopted, the majority of Virginians favoring them; but the question of the rights of the separate States in the territories was still left open. Then began "the irrepressible conflict," which could only be settled, as it subsequently proved, by a gigantic war.

The execution of the fugitive slave law, one of the compromise measures of 1850, soon became a flaming fire-brand waving between the free and the slave States. In 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska bill brought to fever heat the question of the control of slavery in the territories by those living therein; but, in spite of bitter opposition, a bill favoring the claims of the South was passed by a majority of nearly two-thirds of the Senate and 13 in the House, although representation in Congress at that time was Northern by a large majority. This result was largely brought about by the influence of Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, who contended that under the legislation of 1850 the citizens settled in the territories had the right to decide the question of slavery for themselves.

A reign of terror followed in Kansas, in 1855, when the two factions, each aided by extremists from either section of the Union, met in conflict, and opposing territorial governments were organized. In 1856, John Brown, a fanatical abolitionist, backed by others of that faction, mainly in New England, took an active part in these contentions in Kansas, leading a night attack against his pro-slavery neighbors. Riots occurred in Boston when a United States marshal attempted to enforce the fugitive slave law, and New England sent men, money and arms for the Kansas conflict.

In 1856 the question of the right of the owners of slaves to carry them into the territories came before the Supreme court of the United States for a decision, in the case of Dred Scott. The court held that the "Missouri compromise" was unconstitutional, that the territories were the common property of all the States, and that the Federal government was bound to protect the slaves as well as the other property of citizens settling in these territories. This added fuel to the flame of abolitionism. In the presi-

dential election of 1856, a Free Soil or Abolition party, under the name of the Republican party, engaged in the contest for the presidency which resulted in the election of James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, a Democrat. The Congress that met in December of that year was organized with a Southern speaker, Orr, of South Carolina, and the struggle as to whether Kansas should be admitted as a slaveholding State was continued with ever-increasing bitterness until it caused a split in the Democratic party.

About this time appeared one of the most remarkable romances, under the name of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," by Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, that was ever published. Its overdrawn and highly-colored picture of Southern slavery greatly intensified anti-slavery feeling throughout the North, and even provoked strong criticism of the Southern States in foreign lands. This, and its results, naturally provoked strong resentment throughout the South and increased the growing alienation between the two sections.

Among the sixteen States and territories of the Union that were slaveholding in 1860, Virginia held a commanding position. Of the 384,884 slaveholders in the United States, 52,128, or about one-seventh of the whole number, lived within her borders. She ranked first in the number of this class of citizens; Georgia second, with 41,084; Kentucky third, with 38,645, and Tennessee fourth, with 36,844; these four States containing nearly one-half of the whole number of slaveholders in the Union. Virginia also owned more slaves than any other State. Of the 3,953,743 enumerated in the census of 1860, her citizens held 490,865, or about one-eighth of the whole number. Georgia was second, with 462,198; Mississippi third, with 436,631, and South Carolina fourth, with 402,406; the four States holding nearly one-half the whole number of slaves in the United States.

While Virginia had more slaveholders among her citizens than did any of her sister Southern States, she strikingly differed from them in the distribution of the ownership of her slaves, showing thereby that within her borders slavery was a peculiarly "domestic institution;" for while she had more slaveholders than any other State, yet, as a rule, the holdings of the individual were smaller. The details of ownership are worth considering. Of her 52,188 holders of slaves, 11,085 of these owned but one



each; 5,989, but two; 4,474, but three; 3,807, but four; 3,233, but five each. These figures show that about one-fifth of her slaveholders owned but a single slave, and that of three-fifths of them, each owned five or less. Those owning six each were 2,824; those seven, 2,393; those eight, 1,984; those nine, 1,788. The owners of from ten to fifteen each were 5,086; from fifteen to twenty were 3,088; from twenty to thirty were 3,017; from thirty to forty were 1,291; from forty to fifty were 609; from fifty to seventy were 503; from 70 to 100 were 243; from 100 to 200 were 105; from 200 to 300 were but eight, and from 300 to 500 but one.

The distribution of slaveholders, slaves and free negroes among the seven natural grand divisions of Virginia in 1860, is suggestively presented in the following table, showing numbers of slaveholders and of negroes (slave and free) in Virginia in 1860, by grand divisions of the State, and number of counties in each grand division:

	Counties.	Slaveholders.	Slaves.	Free Negroes.
1. Tidewater,	30	14,862	149,018	28,646
2. Midland,	25	17,841	190,489	15,746
3. Piedmont,	14	9,182	88,690	5,206
4. Blue Ridge,	3	331	1,284	99
5. The Valley,	17	6,235	41,376	5,803
6. Appalachia,	18	2,444	13,211	1,465
7. Trans-Appal'a,	41	1,522	6,797	1,081
Totals,	148	52,128	490,865	57,374

The following table presents the same facts for the portions of the State in 1860 that were organized into the State of West Virginia, December 31, 1862, and admitted into the Union as a State, June 19, 1863:

	Counties.	Slaveholders.	Slaves.	Free Negroes.
1. The Valley,	2	967	5,610	797
2. Appalachia,	9	1,132	6,060	922
3. Trans-Appal'a,	39	1,506	6,706	1,054
Totals,	50	3,605	18,376	2,773

These tables furnish a key to many of the political and military happenings in Virginia during the civil war. They show that the slave population of Virginia was mainly confined to the region east of the Appalachian mountains. In Tidewater, where slavery was first planted within the limits of the Union, there were

numerous large plantations, but many of the slaves of that region and many of its large number of free negroes were found within its commercial and manufacturing cities. The area of Midland was but little more than that of Tidewater, but its slaveholders and slaves were considerably more numerous, for in its industries slave labor was profitable. The Piedmont country, the fourteen counties east of and adjacent to the Blue ridge, was throughout a prosperous agricultural region, while most of its counties southwest of the Rappahannock basin were extensively engaged in the production of heavy tobaccos, hence slave labor was there found profitable. The three elevated counties upon the plateau of the Blue ridge were mainly devoted to grazing; consequently their slave population was small. The seventeen counties of the Great Valley of Virginia were all famous for the production of cereals, and for their dairying and grazing interests, while large crops of tobacco were grown in all the counties southwest of the valley of the Shenandoah. Its people were thrifty, and a few slaves were owned upon most of its large farms. The Appalachian country, while traversed by many ranges of mountains, was also striped with fertile valleys, in which lived prosperous graziers, most of whom held families of slaves. Virginia's forty-one Trans-Appalachian counties were mainly a forest-covered and thinly-peopled region, and few slaves were there held except in the valley of the Big Kanawha and along the Ohio below the mouth of that river. In proportion to the population, the number of slaves was extremely small, and especially was this true in the part of the State which extended northward between Ohio and Pennsylvania, almost to Lake Erie.

The people of the two Valleys and of the nine Appalachian counties that were subsequently embraced in West Virginia, remained, by a large majority, loyal to the State during the war; and, in a large degree, the same may be said of the Trans-Appalachian counties in and southwest of the Big Kanawha basin. The West Virginia secessionists, those that by act of Congress, when its membership was almost exclusively Northern, seceded from Virginia in 1861, were mainly confined to the Trans-Appalachian counties of Northwestern Virginia, where there were but few slaves and still fewer slaveholders, and where the larger portion of the population was more in

sympathy with the adjacent States of Ohio and Pennsylvania than with the rest of Virginia. These people, by mere act of Congress and without her consent, deprived Virginia of over one-third of her territory and nearly one-fourth of her population.

The humane and kindly character of African slavery in Virginia was eloquently attested by the fact that during the war, almost without exception, the slaves remained faithful and loyal to their masters; that none rose in insurrection, and that but few, if any, were guilty of crimes against person or property when, owing to the absence of a large portion of the white male population of the State in the Confederate armies, the country and the helpless portion of its population were entirely at their mercy. The kindly relations of the two races in Virginia are forcibly illustrated by the large numbers of free negroes, descendants of former slaves, that were allowed to live peacefully and contentedly, prior to 1860, in every part of the commonwealth.

In the winter of 1857-58, John Brown, who had been a leader in and a promoter of lawlessness during the troubles in Kansas—undertaken, as he himself confessed, for the purpose of inflaming the public mind on the subject of slavery, that he might perfect organizations to bring about servile insurrections in the slave States—collected a number of young men in that territory, including several of his sons, and, with the use of funds and arms that had been furnished for his Kansas operations, placed these men under military instruction, by one of their number, at Springdale, in Iowa. In the spring of 1858 he took these men to Chatham, in Canada West, where, on the 8th of May, he assembled a "provisional constitutional convention," made up of those he brought with him and a number of resident free negroes. On the day of its assembling, this convention adopted a "provisional constitution and ordinances for the people of the United States," the preamble of which began: "Whereas slavery, throughout its entire existence in the United States, is none other than a most barbarous, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war of one portion of its citizens upon another portion. . . . Therefore, we, citizens of the United States and the oppressed people who . . . are declared to have no rights which the white man is bound to respect . . . ordain and establish for our-

selves the following provisional constitution and ordinances, the better to protect our persons, property, lives and liberties, and govern our actions." On the 10th, after appointing a committee with full power to fill all the executive, legislative, judicial and military offices named in the constitution adopted, this convention adjourned, *sine die*, and Brown took his Kansas party to Ohio, where he disbanded them subject to call, but sending his Capt. John E. Cook, of Connecticut (who was subsequently executed), to stay at Harper's Ferry, Va., and make himself familiar with the surrounding country and its citizens, and especially with the negro slaves, for the information of his leader.

Brown, under the assumed name of Isaac Smith, appeared in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry about the 1st of July, 1859, and there is evidence to show that he extended his examination of the country for future strategic purposes, as far up the Shenandoah valley as Staunton, concealing his purposes by giving out that he was a farmer from New York, with his two sons and a son-in-law, desiring to rent or purchase land. Soon after his arrival at Harper's Ferry he rented the small Kennedy farm in Maryland, some four and a half miles from Harper's Ferry, where he did some little farming, and, to explain his secret movements, said he was accustomed to mining operations, and expected to find valuable mineral deposits in that mountain region. In the meantime he kept two or three of his party, under assumed names, at Chambersburg, Pa., who there received arms, ammunition and other military stores, which had been collected for use in Kansas, and forwarded them from time to time to Brown's habitation.

On October 10, 1859, from "Headquarters War Department, Provisional Army, Harper's Ferry," John Brown, commander-in-chief, issued his "General Order No. 1," organizing "the divisions of the provisional army and the coalition," providing for company, battalion, regiment, brigade and general staff organization. It is probable that at the time of issuing this order Brown had with him, at the Kennedy farm, his whole band of followers, including his spy Cook, and there formulated his final plans of invasion; and that soon thereafter he removed to a schoolhouse nearer Harper's Ferry, the hundreds of carbines, pistols, spears or pikes, and a quantity of car-

tridges, powder, percussion caps, and other military supplies, that he had gathered for arming the negroes when they rose to insurrection in response to his call and movements.

About 11 p. m., Sunday, October 16, 1859, Brown, accompanied by 14 white men from Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Maine, Indiana and Canada, and 5 negroes from Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York, some 20 insurgents, all fully armed, crossed the Potomac into Virginia at Harper's Ferry, overpowered the watchmen at the Baltimore & Ohio railroad bridge, the United States armory and arsenal near the Baltimore & Ohio, and the rifle factory above the town on the Shenandoah, and placed guards at those points and at the street corners of the town. Brown established himself in the thick-walled brick building at the armory gate, one room of which was the quarters of the watchman and the other contained a fire-engine; he then sent six men, including the spy Cook, under Captain Stevens, to seize the principal citizens in the neighborhood and incite the negroes to rise in insurrection. This party broke into the house of Col. L. W. Washington, about five miles from Harper's Ferry, about 1:30 a. m. of the 17th, and forced him and four of his servants to accompany them to Harper's Ferry, he in his own carriage and followed by one of his farm wagons, which they seized. On their way back, at about 3 a. m., they captured Mr. Allstadt and six of his servants, placing arms in the hands of the latter. On reaching Harper's Ferry, Cook and five of the captured slaves were sent with Colonel Washington's four-horse wagon to bring forward the arms, etc., deposited at the schoolhouse in Maryland.

In the meantime Brown halted, for a time, an east-bound passenger train on the Baltimore & Ohio, one of his men killing the railroad guard at the bridge; he also captured, as they appeared on the streets in the early morning, some 40 citizens of Harper's Ferry, whom he confined, with Messrs. Washington and Allstadt, in one room of the gate or engine house which he had selected as his fort or point of defense.

News of these occurrences spread rapidly, and citizens and citizen soldiery, with arms, hastened from all the surrounding parts of Virginia and Maryland to resist this high-handed invasion of their homes and States. About

11 a. m., of the 17th, the Jefferson Guards, from Charlestown, arrived, soon followed by the Hamtramck and the Shepherdstown troop, from Shepherdstown, and Alburdis' company from Martinsburg. These, under the command of Col. R. A. Baylor, forced the insurgents within the armory enclosure, which they surrounded by a cordon of pickets. Brown then withdrew his men into the gate house, which he proceeded to loophole and fortify, taking with him ten of the most prominent of his Virginia and Maryland captives, which he termed "hostages," to insure the safety of his band. From openings in the building the insurgents fired upon all white people that came in sight.

After sunset of the 17th, Capt. B. B. Washington's company from Winchester, and three companies from Frederick City, Md., under Colonel Shriver, arrived; later came companies from Baltimore, under Gen. C. C. Edgerton, and a detachment of United States marines, commanded by Lieut. J. Green and Major Russell, accompanied by Lieut.-Col. R. E. Lee, of the Second United States cavalry (with his aide, Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, of the First United States cavalry), who, happening to be at Arlington, his home, near Washington, had been ordered to take command at Harper's Ferry, recapture the government armory and arsenal, and restore order. Colonel Lee halted the Baltimore troops at Sandy Hook, about a mile and a half east of Harper's Ferry, directed the United States artillery companies (ordered from Fort Monroe) to halt in Baltimore, then crossed to Harper's Ferry with the marines, disposed them in the armory grounds so as to prevent the escape of the insurgents, and awaited dawn of the 18th before attacking Brown's stronghold, for fear of sacrificing the lives of the "hostages" in a midnight attack.

Soon after daylight of the 18th, after having posted the volunteer troops so as to completely invest the armory grounds, and prepared for an assault upon Brown's fort by the marines, Lee, under a flag by Lieutenant Stuart, made a written demand upon Brown to surrender himself, his associates and the prisoners they had taken, with the assurance that "if they will peaceably surrender themselves and restore the pillaged property, they shall be kept in safety to await orders of the President. . . . That if he is compelled to take them by force he cannot

answer for their safety." Stuart was instructed to receive no counter propositions from Brown, and to say that if they accepted the proffered terms they must immediately give up their arms and release their prisoners. As Lee expected, Brown spurned the offered terms of surrender. At a given signal to this effect from Stuart, Lee ordered forward twelve marines, led by Lieutenant Green, that he had put under cover near the engine-house, three of them supplied with sledge hammers to break in the doors, to attack Brown's party with bayonets, taking care not to injure the citizens held captive, nor the captured slaves unless they resisted. The storming party quickly attacked the doors, but Brown had barricaded them inside with the fire-engine and fastened them by ropes, so the sledges were of no avail. Lee then ordered forward reserves, with a heavy ladder for a battering ram, with which a portion of the door was dashed in and admission gained. Up to that time Brown's fire had been harmless, but at the threshold one marine was mortally wounded. The others quickly ended the contest, bayoneting the insurrectionists that resisted, Lieutenant Green cutting down Brown with his sword. The whole affair was over in a few minutes, and the captured citizens and slaves were released. A party of marines under Stuart was then sent to the Kennedy farm, which captured pikes (said to have been over 1,000), blankets, tools, tents, and other necessities for a campaign, which Brown had there stored. A party of Maryland troops secured from the schoolhouse, where Brown had deposited them, boxes of carbines and revolvers, and the horses and wagon of Colonel Washington, which Brown had sent there to bring his military supplies to Harper's Ferry.

Colonel Lee in his official report to Col. S. Cooper, adjutant-general of the United States army, dated October 19th, stated, from information in papers taken from the insurgents and from their statements: "It appears that the party consisted of 19 men—14 white and 5 black. They were headed by John Brown, of some notoriety in Kansas, who in June last located himself in Maryland, at the Kennedy farm, where he has been engaged in preparing to capture the United States works at Harper's Ferry. He avows that his object was the liberation of the slaves of Virginia and of the whole South, and

acknowledges that he has been disappointed in his expectations of aid from the black as well as the white population, both in the Southern and Northern States. The blacks whom he forced from their homes in this neighborhood, as far as I could learn, gave him no voluntary assistance. The servants . . . retained at the armory, took no part in the conflict . . . and returned to their homes as soon as released. The result proves the plan was the attempt of a fanatic or madman, which could only end in failure; and its temporary success was owing to the panic and confusion he succeeded in creating by magnifying his numbers."

Lee, by order of Secretary of War John B. Floyd, turned over to the United States marshal and to the sheriff of Jefferson county, Va., Brown and two white men and two negroes. Ten of the white men and two of the negroes associated with Brown were killed during the combat with them; one white man, Cook, escaped, but was subsequently captured and executed; and one negro was unaccounted for. The insurgents killed three white men, Mr. F. Beckham, the mayor of Harper's Ferry, Mr. G. W. Turner, one of the first citizens of Jefferson county, and Private Quinn of the marine corps, and a negro railroad porter; they wounded eight white citizens and one of the marine corps. After this affair was over, great alarm was caused by a report, about sundown of the 18th, from Pleasant valley in Maryland, that a body of men had descended from the mountains, and was massacring the residents of that valley. Colonel Lee, though incredulous, promptly headed a body of marines and hastened to the locality named, only to find the alarm false.

In concluding his report, Colonel Lee expressed his thanks to Lieutenants Stuart and Green and Major Russell "for the aid they afforded me, and my entire commendation of the conduct of the detachment of marines, who were at all times ready and prompt in the execution of any duty. The promptness with which the volunteer troops repaired to the scene of disturbance, and the alacrity they displayed to suppress the gross outrage against law and order, I know will elicit your hearty approbation." He enclosed to Cooper a printed copy of the provisional constitution and ordinances for the people of the United States, of which there was found a large number prepared for issue by the insurgents.



During the afternoon of October 18th, Gov. Henry A. Wise arrived at Harper's Ferry and took precautions for the protection of Virginia and the execution of her laws, Brown, having been turned over to the civil authorities of Jefferson county, was brought to trial at Charlestown on the following Thursday, October 20th, because on that day began the regular fall session of the circuit court. A grand jury indicted him upon the charges of treason and murder. His prosecution was conducted before an impartial judge and jury by Hon. Andrew Hunter; he was defended by able counsel from Virginia and other States, including Hon. D. W. Voorhees, of Indiana, and was condemned and convicted. His trial lasted nearly a month, and, as Brown himself admitted, was fair and impartial. He was condemned to be executed on the 2d of December. His counsel asked the Virginia court of appeals for a stay of execution, on pleas presented, but this was refused.

After the condemnation of Brown and his associates, fearing from published threats that an attempt might be made by Northern sympathizers to rescue them, Governor Wise ordered Virginia troops to Charlestown to guard the prisoners until after their execution. Toward the last of November about 1,000 were there assembled, among them the cadets of the Virginia military institute, under command of Col. F. H. Smith, the superintendent. Maj. T. J. Jackson, the famous "Stonewall" Jackson of the war, was present in command of the cadet battery. He witnessed the execution of Brown about midday, December 2, 1859. In a letter to his wife he wrote of Brown, "he behaved with unflinching firmness," and of the execution: "My command was in front of the cadets, all facing south. One howitzer I assigned to Mr. Truehart, on the left of the cadets, and with the other I remained on the right. Other troops occupied different positions around the scaffold, and altogether it was an imposing but very solemn scene. I was much impressed with the thought that before me stood a man, in the full vigor of health, who must in a few moments enter eternity. I sent up the petition that he might be saved. Awful was the thought that he might in a few minutes receive the sentence, 'Depart, ye wicked, into everlasting fire!' I hope that he was prepared to die, but I am doubtful."

On the day of Brown's execution, bells were tolled and minute guns fired in many places in the North, and church services and public meetings were held for the purpose of glorifying his deeds and sanctifying the cause he represented, recognizing in him a martyr to the teachings of the abolitionists. Eventually his name became the slogan under which, as a battle hymn, the Northern troops invaded and overran the South.

In reference to Brown's invasion of Virginia, Hon. A. H. Stephens, in his history of the United States, says: "This act greatly inflamed the Southern mind, especially as it was lauded by the official authorities of those Northern States which had refused to comply with their obligations under the Constitution in the matter of the rendition of fugitive slaves."

It is interesting to note the men who appeared upon the scenes of these opening hostilities between the North and the South, and who subsequently became famous or celebrated characters in the great drama of the civil war. Among those who became Confederate generals were: S. Cooper, R. E. Lee, J. E. B. Stuart, John B. Floyd and Henry A. Wise; and among colonels, C. J. Faulkner and A. R. Boteler. In the committee of the United States Senate, appointed by resolution of December 14, 1859, to inquire into the facts attending this invasion, were Hons. Jefferson Davis and J. M. Mason, and this committee had before it as witnesses, Hons. W. H. Seward, J. R. Giddings, Henry Wilson and Andrew Hunter. John A. Andrews, of Massachusetts, secured funds to pay Brown's counsel.

### CHAPTER III.

FROM JOHN BROWN'S EXECUTION TO THE FEDERAL  
INVASION—THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT LIN-  
COLN—MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION—  
GOVERNOR LETCHER'S REPLY TO THE CALL FOR  
TROOPS—SEIZURE OF HARPER'S FERRY—UNION  
WITH THE CONFEDERATE STATES.

THE United States Congress met on December 5, 1859, three days after the execution of John Brown. The most intense excitement prevailed throughout the Union, inflamed by Brown's execution and the events that preceded it. The House of Representatives did not succeed in electing a speaker until February 1, 1860, having spent two months in wrangling over the questions of slavery, State rights and secession. A Republican, Pennington of New Jersey, was elected speaker.

On December 1st, the general assembly of Virginia met in regular session, and at the suggestion of Governor Wise proceeded to reorganize the militia of the State, to provide for volunteer military companies, the collection of munitions of war, and in general for putting the State in a condition of defense. The people, although almost unanimously in favor of the Union, seconded the action of the legislature by encouraging home manufactures of every kind and advocating non-intercourse with the North because of its attitude on the vital questions of the day. On the 16th of December, others of Brown's conspirators were hanged at Charlestown, which was still guarded by a number of volunteer military companies assembled by Governor Wise. This again attracted attention to Virginia, and added to the political excitement which had been somewhat quieted after the execution of Brown.

On January 1, 1860, John Letcher, who had been elected, as a decidedly Union man, on May 26, 1859, was inaugurated governor of Virginia. He sent a strong message to the general assembly, recommending the adoption of resolutions for calling a convention of the States of the

Union to consider the condition of the country and provide some remedy for the existing state of political affairs, since, in his opinion, there must be a speedy settlement of the slavery controversy if the Union was to be preserved, to which end everything should be done "consistent with honor, patriotism and duty." At the same time he urged the promotion of the efficiency of the military organizations of the State, the enlargement of the Virginia military institute, and the purchase of munitions of war. The general assembly invited Col. R. E. Lee, of the United States army, who was at Arlington on furlough, to come to Richmond and give advice concerning the organizing of the Virginia militia.

By official reports submitted to this general assembly, it appears that in 1859 the real estate in the commonwealth was valued at \$374,989,889; the slaves at \$313,148,275; and all the property of the people, including the preceding, at \$1,143,676,088, which, if equally divided among the whites of the State, would give to each \$1,051. The debt of Virginia, incurred for public improvements, in most of which the State owned a three-fifths interest, was \$29,106,559.

The beginning of 1860, the year for the election of a President and Vice-President of the United States to succeed Buchanan and Breckinridge, found the House of Representatives still unorganized, after a month of effort, and Congress and the general assembly of Virginia, as well as the legislatures of the other States that were in session, engaged in the excited discussion of the questions of slavery, State rights and secession, to the exclusion of nearly all other topics. Upon these issues the people divided and subdivided, until four parties, instead of the usual two, prepared to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President. The Democratic party in Virginia met in convention at Richmond, February 16th, and after a discordant session appointed delegates, with a diversity of opinions upon the vital questions of the day, to a national convention. The Constitutional Union party in Virginia, the one embracing most of the Whigs and all those opposed to disunion and secession, met in Richmond, February 28th, and elected delegates to a national convention.

The Democratic party met in national convention, at Charleston, S. C., April 23d, and, after many ballots and

much rancorous debate, instead of nominating candidates, split into two wings, one of which met in Baltimore, on the 23d of June, nominated Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, for Vice-President, and declared in favor of leaving the question of slavery in the Territories to the voters of each Territory, or to the supreme court. The Southern wing of the Democratic party met June 28th, nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for Vice-President, and declared that neither Congress nor a Territorial legislature had the right to prohibit slavery in a Territory, and that it was the duty of the Federal government to protect slavery in the Territories when necessary. The convention of the Constitutional Union party met in Baltimore, May 9th, and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President, announcing for its broad platform, "the Union, the Constitution and the enforcement of the laws." The Republican party held its convention in Chicago, May 18th, and nominated Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois (a son of Kentucky and a grandson of Virginia), for President, and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and declared itself in favor of the prohibition of slavery in the Territories by congressional action.

The candidates nominated and the platform of each party defined, a fierce political contest was waged throughout the extent of the Union, during the months of July, August, September and October. The election was held on November 6th, with these results: Lincoln and Hamlin received 180 electoral votes, from eighteen States all lying north of Mason and Dixon's line; Breckinridge and Lane received 72 votes, all from Southern States, including Delaware and Maryland; Bell and Everett received the votes, 39 in number, of Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee; while Douglas and Johnson received 12 votes, those of the single State of Missouri. Lincoln was declared elected, as he had a majority of the votes in the electoral college, but only 1,857,610 votes of the people, against 2,804,560 which were divided among the three other candidates.

This election of sectional candidates by purely sectional votes produced the most intense excitement throughout the Southern States and among all the people without

respect to their previous party associations. A number of these States promptly called conventions to take action as to their future policy. Congress met on December 3, 1860, and heard a message from President Buchanan, in which he argued against the right of secession but expressed doubt as to the right of Congress to coerce the States to obedience to its mandates by military force. On the 6th the House of Representatives appointed a select committee of thirty-three, to take measures for the perpetuity of the Union; on the 10th, Howell Cobb, of Georgia, resigned as secretary of the treasury; on the 12th, Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, of Virginia, commanding the army of the United States, arrived in Washington, by order of the President, to advise in reference to military affairs; on the 14th, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, resigned as secretary of state; on the 20th, South Carolina adopted an ordinance of secession; on the 25th, Maj. Robert Anderson transferred the Federal garrison from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor; on the 27th, South Carolina occupied Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie, captured the United States revenue cutter William Aiken, and her three commissioners arrived in Washington to treat, as representatives of an independent State, with the Federal executive. On the 29th, John B. Floyd, of Virginia, resigned as secretary of war, because President Buchanan would not order Major Anderson to return to Fort Moultrie. On the 30th, South Carolina took possession of the United States arsenal at Charleston. This rapid succession of disintegrating events marked the close of 1860. Between the 2d and 7th of January, 1861, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Florida took possession of a number of United States forts and arsenals within their borders, although none of these except South Carolina had as yet seceded. On the 8th, Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, secretary of the interior, resigned from Buchanan's cabinet. Mississippi adopted an ordinance of secession on the 9th, Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, Georgia on the 19th and Louisiana on the 26th, followed by Texas, February 1st. On the 9th of February, the Star of the West, bringing relief to Fort Sumter, was fired on and driven back from Charleston. The States which seceded quickly seized other United States forts and property, and the United States sent reinforcements to forts within these States

still in its possession, the surrender of which had been demanded by authorities of the States in which they were situated.

In the midst of this stirring and rapid sequence of events, Gov. John Letcher, by proclamation, convened the general assembly of Virginia in extra session, on the 7th of January, 1861, to consider the critical political condition of the country. On the 14th that body ordered an election, on the following 4th of February, of delegates to a convention of the State, the people at the same time to vote on the question as to whether any ordinance changing the relations of Virginia to the other States of the Union should be submitted to a popular vote for approval or rejection. On the 19th the general assembly invited the other States of the Union to meet it in a peace conference, at Washington, that should endeavor to heal the dissensions then prevailing, and appointed ex-President John Tyler, Hons. William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrough, George W. Summers, and James A. Seddon, some of its most distinguished citizens, as delegates to that conference. It also appointed ex-President Tyler a commissioner to the President of the United States, and Judge John Robertson a commissioner to the States that had seceded, to request each of these to abstain from acts likely to bring on a collision of arms pending Virginia's efforts to secure peace. On February 4th this peace conference met in Washington, D. C., with representatives present from thirteen of the free States and seven of the border slave States. On the same day the Southern slave States, with the exception of the seven border States that had not seceded, met in convention at Montgomery Ala. Subsequently, during the conference at Washington, delegates appeared from other States until twenty-one were represented. That conference submitted a plan of reconciliation to Congress which was rejected, and soon thereafter Congress adjourned.

On February 13th the delegates that had been elected to the Virginia convention met at Richmond. On March 4th Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States. On the 6th the Virginia commissioners to the peace convention at Washington submitted a report, through Governor Letcher, to the Virginia convention, setting forth the unsatisfactory results of the conference. On the 8th of April the Virginia

convention, still anxiously seeking to secure peace, selected three of its most distinguished members, Alexander H. H. Stuart, William Ballard Preston and George W. Randolph, to visit Washington and confer with President Lincoln in reference to the course he intended to pursue in dealing with the Confederate States. This delegation met Mr. Lincoln on the 12th, and on the next day, by appointment, had a conference with him, during which he read and handed them a paper setting forth his views and declaring his intention to coerce the seceding States into obedience to Federal authority. That same day Fort Sumter surrendered to the Confederate States.

On the 15th of April, President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 militia, apportioned among the States, to serve for three months, to suppress combinations against the laws of the United States in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. He also summoned the Congress to meet on the 4th of July, 1861. That there might be no misunderstanding of the object of his call for troops, Lincoln stated in his proclamation: "I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places and property which have been seized from the Union." In pursuance of Lincoln's call, the following letter was sent to Governor Letcher:

War Department, Washington, April 15, 1861.

To His Excellency the Governor of Virginia:

Sir: Under the act of Congress for calling forth "militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, repel invasions, etc.," approved February 28, 1795, I have the honor to request your Excellency to cause to be immediately detached from the militia of your State the quota designated in the table below, to serve as infantry or riflemen for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged.

Your Excellency will please communicate to me the time, at or about, which your quota will be expected at its rendezvous, as it will be met as soon as practicable by an officer to muster it into the service and pay of the United States.

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

The quota of Virginia called for in the table attached to this letter was three regiments, embracing 2,340 men, to rendezvous at Staunton, Wheeling and Gordonsville. To this communication Governor Letcher made prompt reply, as follows:



Executive Department, Richmond, Va., April 15, 1861.

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:

Sir: I received your telegram of the 15th, the genuineness of which I doubted. Since that time I have received your communication, mailed the same day, in which I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of Virginia "the quota designated in a table," which you append, "to serve as infantry or riflemen for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged."

In reply to this communication, I have only to say that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795—will not be complied with.

You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the administration has exhibited toward the South.

Respectfully, JOHN LETCHER.

Lincoln's call for troops to invade and coerce the newborn Confederacy, and Letcher's reply to that call, wrought an immediate change in the current of public opinion in Virginia, from the mountains to the sea. At the election of delegates to the State convention, held on the 4th of February, the best and ablest men of the commonwealth had been chosen, largely without regard to party affiliation, but because they were for the maintenance of the Union. The citizens of the State further safeguarded their views upon this subject by deciding, by a large majority, at the time of that election, that any action of the convention looking to a change of the relations of the States to the Union must be submitted to a popular vote for approval or rejection.

Up to this time the convention had been mainly engaged in efforts to conciliate the discordant sections, urging the general government, which was now entirely Northern in character, to abstain from hostile action toward the seceded States, and at the same time endeavoring to restrain the latter, in the hope that time and reflection would lead to a reconsideration of their, in its opinion, hasty and premature action. The Confederacy had sent its ablest men to urge Virginia to join it, satisfied that unless she did so the effort to organize a new and independent nation would be a failure. To these eminent men the convention had given a respectful hearing, but had declined the proffered alliance, satisfied that if she joined the Southern Confederacy, almost her entire territory would become the scene of a fierce and long-continued

civil war, the brunt and burden of which would fall upon her more heavily than upon any other State. But as the views of the people were changed by Lincoln's call, so were those of a majority of the members of the convention. As soon as the President's call for troops was known, the convention met, with closed doors, and within two days thereafter, on Wednesday, April 17, 1861, adopted an ordinance of secession, in these words:

An ordinance to repeal the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America by the State of Virginia, and to resume all the rights and powers granted under said Constitution:

The people of Virginia, in their ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America, adopted by them in convention on the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand, seven hundred and eighty-eight, having declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whenever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression, and the Federal government having perverted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the South or slaveholding States,

Now, therefore, we, the people of Virginia, do declare and ordain, That the ordinance adopted by the people of this State in convention, on the twenty-fifth of June, in the year of our Lord, one thousand, seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and all acts of the general assembly of this State ratifying or adopting amendments to said Constitution are hereby repealed and abrogated; that the union between the State of Virginia and the other States under the Constitution aforesaid is hereby dissolved, and that the State of Virginia is in the full possession and exercise of all the rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent State.

And they do further declare, That said Constitution of the United States of America is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this State.

This ordinance shall take effect and be an act of this day when ratified by a majority of the votes of the people of this State, cast at a poll to be taken thereon, on the fourth Thursday in May next, in pursuance of a schedule hereafter to be enacted.

Done in convention in the city of Richmond, on the seventeenth day of April, in the year of our Lord, one thousand, eight hundred and sixty-one, and in the eighty-fifth year of the commonwealth of Virginia.

This ordinance was adopted by a vote of 81 for and 51 against. Subsequently, after the will of the people was made known by a vote taken on May 23d, which by an overwhelming majority ratified the act of the convention, others signed the ordinance, until the signatures of 146 members of the convention were attached to it, leaving but few, mainly from Trans-Appalachian Virginia, who refused to sign.

Gen. J. E. Johnston, in the opening of his Narrative, says:

The composition of the convention assembled in Richmond in the spring of 1861, to consider the question of secession, proved that the people of Virginia did not regard Mr. Lincoln's election as a sufficient cause for that measure, for at least two-thirds of its members were elected as "Union men." And they and their constituents continued to be so, until the determination to "coerce" the seceded States was proclaimed by the President of the United States, and Virginia required to furnish her quota of the troops to be organized for that purpose. War being then inevitable, and the convention compelled to decide whether the State should aid in the subjugation of the other Southern States, or join them in the defense of the principles which they had professed since 1789—belong to the invading party, or to that standing on the defensive—it chose the latter, and passed its ordinance of secession. The people confirmed that choice by an overwhelming vote.

The action of the Virginia convention was kept secret for nearly two days in order to give time to take possession of the United States armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and volunteer companies were secretly hurried from the valley for this purpose. These troops reached Halltown, about five miles from Harper's Ferry, late in the afternoon of the 18th of April. Learning of their advance, the small Federal garrison there, at 10 p. m., fired the armory, and crossing into Maryland retreated all night toward the United States barracks at Carlisle. The Virginia troops occupied the town shortly after its evacuation, and proceeded to extinguish the fires. On the nomination of the governor, Gen. William B. Taliaferro was, on the 18th, assigned to the command of Virginia troops ordered to assemble at Norfolk for the purpose of capturing the Gosport navy yard. The same day, at the instance of General Scott, President Lincoln offered to Col. R. E. Lee the command of the United States army intended for the invasion of Virginia. On the 20th Colonel Lee resigned his commission in the United States army, and on the 22d he was elected by the Virginia convention, major-general to command the forces of the State, for which provision had been made to mobilize for its defense. General Lee accepted this appointment, and on the 23d was assigned to the command of the military and naval forces.

On April 20th a Federal expedition from Fort Monroe attempted to destroy the dry dock at the Gosport navy yard, near Norfolk, but only with partial success, as the Virginia troops arrived and took possession.

The same day Governor Letcher made public the following call for volunteers:

Executive Department, Richmond, April 20, 1861.

In obedience to a resolution of the convention, the injunction of secrecy having been removed, the following section of an ordinance passed by the convention is published for the information of the public:

"Be it ordained, That the governor of this commonwealth be and is hereby authorized and required to call into the service of the State as many volunteers as may be necessary to repel invasion and protect the citizens of the State in the present emergency, which volunteers we will receive in companies and organize into regiments, brigades and divisions, according to the force required; the governor shall appoint and commission the general, field and staff officers of said volunteers, and proceed to have them organized and instructed. And that he shall immediately invite all efficient and worthy Virginians and residents of Virginia in the army and navy of the United States to retire therefrom, and to enter the service of Virginia, assigning to them such rank as will not reverse the relative rank held by them in the United States service, and will at least be equivalent thereto."

By order of the Governor.

GEORGE W. MUNFORD, Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Immediately after the passage of the ordinance of secession, most of the members of the convention and of the general assembly of Virginia from the Trans-Alleghany section left Richmond, and they presently called a meeting of the citizens of that region who were opposed to secession to assemble at Clarksburg. That meeting issued a call to the Trans-Alleghany counties to send delegates to a convention to meet at Wheeling on the 13th of May, which convened with so-called representatives from 26 of the 140 counties of Virginia, and issued a call for an election, on June 4th, of delegates to a convention "of the State of Virginia," to meet in Wheeling on June 11th. It also advised its supporters to vote at the coming May election against the ordinance of secession, and at the same time to elect members to the United States Congress from the three Trans-Alleghany districts of Virginia.

On April 21st the governor of Virginia, in pursuance of his call of the 20th, issued the following proclamation:

By virtue of authority vested in the executive by the convention, I, John Letcher, governor of the commonwealth of Virginia, do hereby order that each volunteer company, equipped and armed, whether infantry, artillery or riflemen, in the counties lying west of the city of Richmond, between Richmond and the Blue ridge, and in the valley of Virginia from the county of Rockbridge to the Tennessee line, establish forthwith on the lines of speedy communica-

tion a rendezvous, and hold themselves in readiness for immediate orders; telegraph or send by express to the executive the names of captains, number of men, and description of force. It is further ordered that officers of all grades on the line of the Potomac render obedience to the orders of Gen. Philip St. George Cocke, who has been assigned to the command of that section of the military operations of the State bounded by said river.

Given under my hand as governor, and under the seal of the commonwealth at Richmond, 21st April, 1861, and in the eighty-fifth year of the commonwealth.

By the Governor:

JOHN LETCHER.

GEORGE W. MUNFORD, Secretary of the Commonwealth.

On April 24th the convention appointed commissioners to meet Vice-President A. H. Stephens, the commissioner of the Confederate States, to formulate an agreement for provisional co-operation in the pending conflict between the Confederate States and the United States, and on the 25th it ratified the agreement of these commissioners and conditionally adopted the provisional Constitution of the Confederate States. On the 1st of May the convention adopted an ordinance releasing all officials and citizens of the State from any obligation to support the Constitution of the United States, and absolving them from all obligations arising from oaths to support that Constitution. On the same day Governor Letcher called out the volunteer forces of the State to resist invasion, and on the 3d issued a call for volunteers. On the 4th Col. George A. Porterfield was assigned to the command of the Virginia troops in northwestern Virginia and directed to establish his headquarters at Grafton, where the two branches of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad diverge, the one to Wheeling and the other to Parkersburg. On the 10th Maj.-Gen. R. E. Lee was assigned to the command of all the Confederate forces serving in Virginia.

On the 23d of May the Virginia ordinance of secession was ratified, by a popular vote, by a majority of about 130,000. On the 24th the Federal army at Washington advanced into Virginia and occupied Arlington heights and Alexandria, and on the 26th the Federal forces under General McClellan advanced into northwestern Virginia and occupied Grafton.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE PLAN OF INVASION—NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA— GRAFTON, PHILIPPI AND RICH MOUNTAIN—MAY TO JULY, 1861.

THE concentration of troops in the States adjacent to Virginia, under President Lincoln's call for 75,000 men, indicated very clearly an intention to invade Virginia from several directions: (1) From Washington along the Orange & Alexandria railroad toward the Virginia Central, at Gordonsville, threatening the line of communication between Richmond and the western portion of the State; (2) from Fort Monroe up the peninsula toward Richmond, and to the same objective by the James; (3) by way of the Cumberland valley, from Harrisburg through Chambersburg into the Shenandoah valley and the adjacent Potomac valleys to the west; (4) from Ohio into western Virginia, by the line of the Great Kanawha valley toward Staunton, in the center of the State, and simultaneously from Wheeling and Parkersburg along the Baltimore & Ohio eastward to Grafton, and thence southeastward, also to Staunton. To meet these threatened movements, Gen. R. E. Lee, when Governor Letcher's call for troops was issued, began to organize opposing columns of defense in the vicinity of Norfolk, in front of Alexandria and Washington, at Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah valley, at Grafton on the Baltimore & Ohio, and below Charleston in the Kanawha valley, with intermediate forces in observation between these points, thus establishing a cordon around the great length of the exposed boundaries of the State.

The concentration of Federal troops at points convenient for invasion of western Virginia, all under the command of Maj.-Gen. George B. McClellan, with headquarters at Cincinnati, and the organization of two Union regiments at Wheeling and Parkersburg, led to urgent appeals from the loyal people of Trans-Alleghany, in response to which General Lee sent trusted officers to

call out and organize militia and volunteers. But the reports soon received from Col. George D. Porterfield and Maj. T. M. Boykin from Grafton indicated prevalent apathy and disloyalty, though General Lee continued for some time, apparently, to cling to the belief that no citizen of Virginia would betray her interests. For the small body of men that Porterfield was able to collect at Grafton, Lee ordered 1,000 muskets and rifles to Beverly, and some from Harper's Ferry to Grafton.

Soon after the election upon the ordinance of secession, Porterfield, being advised of a contemplated Federal movement against Grafton, ordered the burning of two important bridges on the branches of the Baltimore & Ohio, northwest and west of Grafton. Considering this an overt act of rebellion, for which he had been waiting, McClellan, on the 26th, ordered Col. B. F. Kelley, of the Wheeling Union regiment, with his so-called First and Second Virginia regiments, which contained but few native Virginians, to move toward Grafton, to be followed by an Ohio regiment, while other regiments were ordered to occupy Parkersburg and thence advance on Grafton.

Porterfield, asking for reinforcements, but receiving none, held his position until May 28th, with about 550 badly-armed and undisciplined cavalry and infantry, and then learning of the near approach of Kelley and the force from Parkersburg, he fell back to Philippi, 15 miles southward. Receiving some slight reinforcements he went in camp, hoping to return to Grafton and expel the enemy.

Kelley reached Grafton on the 30th and was soon followed by General Morris, with an Indiana brigade. The combined force prepared to make a night march, in two columns, against Philippi, and attack at day-break of Monday, June 3d. Each Federal column consisted of about 1,500 men; one, Dumont's, had also two smooth-bore 6-pounders. Porterfield's force was about 600 infantry and 173 cavalry. On the 1st of June, two heroic and loyal Virginia ladies rode on horseback 34 miles, from Fairmont to Philippi, and warned Porterfield of the Federal movement. The night of the 2d was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops discharged picket duty so badly and were drawn in so near to his camp that Dumont's artillery got into position

unobserved, and just after daybreak of the 3d, gave the first notice of the Federal approach by firing on the little camp of Virginia troops. Kelley had expected to surround and capture the whole force, but this premature alarm enabled Porterfield, by the aid of the courageous companies from Pendleton and Highland, and by cool and deliberate management, to get off his men in fairly good order, with only the loss of a few arms and some camp equipage and supplies, having but one of his men and a boy who was visiting his camp, wounded. Kelley himself was seriously wounded, but there were no other casualties. For lack of cavalry the Federals did not pursue Porterfield.

The advantage gained by the Federals was an advance of 20 miles southward, giving better protection to the Baltimore & Ohio, and forcing Porterfield to retreat to Beverly, some 30 miles farther, where the turnpike from Grafton joins the great stage road and highway from Parkersburg to Staunton. The telegrams to the Northern papers claimed that the Virginia force was 2,000 men and lost 15 killed; and on the assumption that there were many wounded and prisoners, the affair was exploited as a very considerable victory, on the strength of which McClellan mounted the first round of his ladder of fame. "The Philippi Races," as this campaign was called, encouraged the Union and depressed the loyal citizens of northwestern Virginia.

Porterfield continued his retreat across Laurel hill through Beverly and on to Huttonsville, with about 1,000 men, including 180 cavalry, all undisciplined. The Federal cavalry advance occupied Beverly. The news of the Philippi disaster reached Staunton June 6th, just as reinforcements with a supply of arms and ammunition, in charge of Lieut.-Col. J. M. Heck, were about to march toward him, and Lee promptly urged the war department to reinforce this expedition with 2,000 additional troops, artillery, etc. Brig.-Gen. Robert S. Garnett, C. S. A., an old army officer, was sent to take command in the northwest, in the hope that he would inaugurate a more agreeable state of things and put down the "revolution" that Porterfield reported.

General Garnett, reaching Huttonsville on the 14th, organized two regiments from the companies collected; one, afterward the Thirty-first Virginia, under command



of Lieut.-Col. William L. Jackson, of Parkersburg, former lieutenant-governor of Virginia, and the other, later the Twenty-fifth Virginia, under Lieut.-Col. J. M. Heck, a prominent lawyer of Morgantown. Leaving three companies at Huttonsville, under Porterfield, to guard his line of communication, Garnett made a forced march, on the night of June 15th, with his two regiments and Rice's New Market battery of four guns, preceded by the Churchville cavalry, to Beverly, whence he detached Heck's regiment, two guns and the cavalry by the Parkersburg turnpike, across Rich mountain, to a position at the western foot of that mountain, 7 miles beyond Beverly. Garnett himself pushed forward with Jackson's regiment, two guns, and a company of cavalry, and took possession of Laurel hill, the northeastern extension of Rich mountain. Garnett made this strategic movement because he had learned that the enemy was advancing from Philippi, presumably to get possession of the same position which he had thus promptly seized.

Garnett's two intrenched camps were really on the same mountain range, cut through by Tygart's valley river, which turns sharply to the northwest some 12 miles below Beverly. As a whole, this range is the most westerly of the Appalachian system. Its occupation enabled him to cover his base of supplies at Beverly and the lines of communication from northwest Virginia to Staunton by way of Huttonsville, from Huttonsville to Lewisburg on the Kanawha line, and between these towns to the Virginia Central railroad at Millboro. He really held the gates to northwestern Virginia.

Reinforced by the First Georgia under Colonel Ramsey, Garnett made Laurel hill more defensible by blocking with fallen trees all the country roads from the northwest; placed Colonel Porterfield in command at Beverly, with two regiments which he was organizing, and sent out escorts to collect grain and cattle from the country in his front, making Beverly a depot of supplies. Realizing that his chief objective was to again secure control of the Baltimore & Ohio through Virginia, he felt that his force was too weak for aggressive movements against the enemy, reported to him as 12,000 men at Clarksburg, Grafton, and Cheat river bridge on the railroad, and he asked General Lee for reinforcements. These so far as available were promptly ordered to him.

General McClellan, meanwhile, had resolved to push his forces to Beverly and cut Garnett's line of communication with Staunton. Reaching the field of operations in person, he had, by July 9th, pushed forward his forces, Gen. W. S. Rosecrans commanding the advance, and concentrated before Rich mountain, where Lieut.-Col. John Pegram, Twentieth Virginia, was now in command, some 5,000 infantry, two batteries and two companies of cavalry, over 6,000 in all. To oppose this force, there were 908 men at Rich mountain and 409 at Beverly, of which 252 were cavalry and 186 artillery. Another force, under General Morris, threatening Garnett at Laurel hill, had fully 3,000 men and a battery, besides cavalry, while Garnett had near 4,000 of all arms. The opposing forces contained about twice as many Federals as Confederates.

On July 1st, Garnett called for additional forces, and Lee informed him, on the 5th, that Col. W. C. Scott, with the Forty-fourth Virginia, had left on the 2d to join him, to be followed promptly by Col. Edward Johnson, with the Twelfth Georgia, and by Col. Stephen Lee, with the Sixth North Carolina.

About 4 a. m. on the 11th, Rosecrans, with his brigade, which numbered 1,842 infantry and 75 cavalry, began a flank movement against Pegram, ordering reveille beaten at the usual hour by those left in camp; first marching southward, up the valley of Roaring creek, thence eastward up a hollow and along a spur of Rich mountain, southward of the ones occupied by the Confederates, to the crest of the mountain, and thence along the crest northeast to gain the gap in the rear of Camp Garnett on the road leading to Beverly. By arrangement, McClellan was to threaten Pegram's front with his other two brigades and his twelve guns when Rosecrans attacked the rear, and thus inclosing the Confederates between two fires, force them to surrender.

Rosecrans found his march a difficult one through the damp and nearly pathless forest, especially as he made every effort to conceal his movement, thinking Pegram would be on the alert because of the alarm in his camp. A heavy rain set in about 6 a. m., and lasted until about 11, with intermissions, during which the Federal column pushed steadily and cautiously forward, and then halted to rest near the top of Rich mountain. The movement

along that crest to the gap was found difficult, and it was 3 p. m. when the Federal advance, covered by deployed skirmishers, was fired upon by a Confederate picket, consisting of the Rockbridge guards of the Twenty-fifth Virginia and the Buckingham institute guards of the Twentieth, which Pegram had sent to the gap very early in the morning, after hearing from Captain Anderson and from a loyal mountaineer concerning the Federal movement to the left. A note of warning from Garnett had given Pegram the idea that his right flank was to be turned and not his left, but the captain in charge of the picket sent to the gap shrewdly concluded that the attack would come from the south, therefore he posted his men some distance in that direction, in the woods, on the top of the mountain, beyond the clearing. As the Federal skirmishers advanced, followed by a line of battle, they soon, by mere force of numbers, drove the picket back and followed it through the forest.

During the morning a cavalry sergeant, following after Rosecrans, missed his way and was captured. Pegram gathered from him some information about the flank movement, which induced him to send Maj. J. A. De Lagnel, of the Confederate States artillery, with a section of artillery, a company of cavalry and two companies of infantry to reinforce the guard at the gap. These took position on the north side of the gap, about 1 p. m., and threw up some rude breastworks of logs just in time to meet this Federal advance, about 3 p. m., as it emerged from the forest into the clearing, and drive it back by a bold artillery and infantry fire; the gun opening upon the enemy with well-directed spherical shot, firing rapidly. A second advance, of three regiments, came on again in about twenty minutes. Moving his gun a little higher up the slope, De Lagnel again opened at short range with spherical shot, and again forced the enemy to a hasty retreat, which was followed by shouts from the Confederates, who confidently believed that they had gained the day. Rosecrans soon reformed his men, lengthening his lines, and renewed the attack, his sharpshooters firing on the artillery horses so that they ran away down the mountain with the drivers and caisson, leaving the gunners only a little ammunition in the limber box. De Lagnel moved his gun near a small log stable, a little farther to the right, but by that time the

enemy's fire became so heavy that it rapidly disabled the artillerists, leaving but few to the gun, when DeLagnel, who had had his horse shot under him, gallantly volunteered in person, and helped to load and fire the gun three or four times, at last with only the help of a boy, all his artillerists having been killed or wounded. Finally, receiving a severe wound and finding his command outflanked on both sides, he ordered his men to retreat into the woods and by an old road, to the northward, which led down the mountain to Beverly, after having sustained a brave fight, from 3 p. m. to 6 p. m., with his staunch 310 men of all arms, against over six times his own number, and suffered a loss of nearly one-third of his courageous men, who had held their position and fought like veterans until ordered to retreat. De Lagnel, the last to leave the field, escaped capture and found refuge in the house of a mountaineer, who, though a Unionist, secretly cared for him, until he was able to find his way toward the Confederate lines only to be captured in their immediate vicinity.

Moved by the noise of furious battle in his rear, Pegram, late in the day, took six companies from the right of the intrenchments at Camp Garnett, and hurried up the mountain to the scene of action, ordering another gun of Anderson's battery to follow. Nearing the gap he found De Lagnel's men in retreat, their gun abandoned, and the Federals in possession. The runaway horses of De Lagnel's caisson rushed down the mountain just in time to meet and overturn the second piece of artillery on its way up. Maj. Nat Tyler, with five companies of the Twentieth Virginia and one of the Twenty-fifth, continued to advance up the road to a good position for an ambuscade on its north side, about halfway between Camp Garnett and the gap, which they took to resist any Federal movement down to the rear of the camp. Pegram joined this force, and led them, as he reports, to a position from which to attack the enemy, when, after a consultation of officers, all agreed that there was nothing left to do but for Tyler to march with his command either to join Garnett at Laurel hill or Scott near Beverly. It was half-past six in the afternoon when this conclusion was reached, and Tyler retreated and Pegram rode back through the forest down the mountain, frequently losing his way, and reached Camp Garnett about midnight.

Colonel Scott, with the Forty-fourth Virginia, reached Beverly on the 10th. On the 11th, under conflicting orders from Garnett and Pegram, he marched and countermarched, finally approaching the Rich mountain gap close enough to hear the victorious cheers of Rosecrans' men, which persuaded him to fall back toward Beverly, with intention to join Garnett. By a misunderstanding, his lieutenant-colonel marched the command toward Huttonsville, and on receiving information that Garnett was about to retreat, Scott continued this movement on the 12th beyond Huttonsville.

While Rosecrans was fighting in the gap, McClellan drew up his remaining force in line of battle, ready to assault as soon as he should hear the musketry of Rosecrans, his engineer meanwhile cutting a road to a knob south of Camp Garnett, from which his artillery could enfilade its intrenchments. McClellan waited all day, but had no word from Rosecrans and heard no firing. The repeated cheers of the Confederates in the works before him led him to believe that the flanking movement had been unsuccessful, so he ordered his men back to camp, with intention to assault at daybreak next morning. Just as his guns were moving into position, early on the morning of the 12th, Rosecrans marched down and occupied Camp Garnett, and sent one of his troopers to notify McClellan. In the camp Rosecrans captured some 69 officers and privates, some wounded and others left on picket.

At about 11 p. m. of the 11th, having heard nothing from Pegram, Heck, at the instance of several of his company officers, called a council of war, which he informed of Pegram's orders to hold his position until he heard from him, which might not be before morning, as he had determined to attack Rosecrans either that night or in the morning, and he considered it his duty to remain and await orders. As these officers were about to return to their posts, expecting a Federal attack very soon, Pegram came in, told them what had happened, that he had decided not to make an attack, and had ordered Tyler to retreat with the men selected for that purpose. He then said that, being exhausted by his efforts during the day and night, and having been injured by being thrown against a tree by the shying of his horse, he would remain in camp and surrender; but he directed

Heck to immediately withdraw the small remaining force from the works and retreat in the direction of Laurel hill. Heck at once asked Engineer Hotchkiss whether he thought he could find his way, at the head of the column, through the pathless forest up and across Rich mountain, in the heavy rain and thick darkness then prevailing. The latter replied that he had reconnoitered the country in that direction, and was confident he could find his way up and across the mountain. Heck then directed him to lead the retreat, accompanied by Major Reger, of the Twenty-fifth, he proposing to follow in the rear. The line of march was promptly taken up at about 1 a. m., with Capt. R. D. Lilley's company from Augusta county in the advance. The pickets were left out to deceive the enemy. The troops first filed to the northward, from the extreme right of the works, through the Laurel swamps near Roaring creek, then across the rocky and heavily-wooded spurs of Rich mountain, then northeastward and eastward toward the crest of the mountain, which was reached about daylight, when the leaders were surprised to find that but 70 or 80 men had followed them. It was subsequently learned that shortly after the retreat began, Pegram changed his mind and sent word along the command to halt until he could reach its front. This word only reached the rear of Lilley's company.

After a conference on the mountaintop, at about sunrise of the 12th, it was decided to go to Beverly. The march was continued down to the old Merritt road, by which the Churchville cavalry and Tyler's men had retreated, and Beverly was reached about 11 a. m. After a rest and collecting supplies of quartermaster and commissary stores from the large quantity there abandoned, the retreat was continued to Huttonsville, gathering up escaped soldiers, most of them armed, all along the way, and reaching that place at about 3 p. m., just as the bridge over Tygart's Valley river, which Scott had fired some hours before, on his retreat, was about consumed.

Scott, impressed with the idea that McClellan was in rapid pursuit and would soon fall on his rear, had continued on across Rich mountain, just before sunset, passing the middle top, which the Federals subsequently fortified and continued to hold, and reaching Greenbrier river at about daylight of the 13th, where he found Governor Letcher, and was met by Col. Edward John-

son, advancing with the Twelfth Georgia from the east.

Hotchkiss and party, learning at Huttonsville that Scott had gone into camp six miles further on, followed after; not finding him there, they went on to the foot of Cheat mountain, which was reached about dark, where they gave up the chase, having already marched 30 miles, since between 1 and 2 a. m., through swamps and forests and across Rich mountain, in drenching rains and mud. They went into camp, putting out pickets from the 75 or more armed men then in the command. Resuming retreat on the 13th, they found the Churchville and Bath cavalry companies and portions of many infantry companies bivouacked on the middle top of Cheat mountain, where they had spent the night. This body of Virginians, who had in various ways escaped capture, although of the rawest kind of soldiery, understood thoroughly the importance of retaining this stronghold against a Federal advance further into the State. The officers present held a conference and delegated Engineer Hotchkiss to go forward to Greenbrier river and urge Governor Letcher to allow them to remain and hold Cheat mountain. To this patriotic request the governor consented, but soon after the envoy left to return to his companions, he was overtaken by orders to abandon the mountain and continue the retreat. Scott's exaggerated idea of McClellan's force and of an energetic pursuit by him, had so impressed Governor Letcher and Colonel Johnson, the latter now in command as the ranking officer present, that a retreat was ordered to the top of Alleghany mountain, where Brig.-Gen. H. R. Jackson, of Georgia, who had been sent to take command, met the army and thence continued the retreat to Monterey, where he established headquarters on the 14th and awaited reinforcements and the return of the remnant of the Laurel hill force from its circuitous retreat through Maryland, and Hardy and Pendleton counties, Va. McClellan, with his advance, reached the Cheat mountain summit at about 3 p. m. of the 14th, nearly two days after Scott had passed that point, and about twenty-four hours after the Confederate cavalry, by orders, had reluctantly left it.

When Pegram reached the head of the column that had waited for him just north of Camp Garnett, soon after

midnight of the 11th, he continued the retreat and reached the summit of Rich mountain soon after sunrise. The officers present, familiar with the country, urged him to push forward to Beverly; but looking over the valley to the eastward and seeing troops marching along the road in that direction, either Tyler's or Hotchkiss' men, he concluded that Rosecrans had already occupied Beverly (although he did not reach that place until eight hours later), so he overruled the others and spent the whole day wandering along the rough spurs of the eastern slope of Rich mountain toward Laurel hill. Late in the afternoon he allowed Heck to reconnoiter to the road between Beverly and Laurel hill, but he learned nothing of the movements of the enemy. Pegram then marched toward the road, but found the way difficult through the swampy grounds bordering Valley river, which his men waded three times. When near the road, as his column was closing up at about dark, his command was fired into. Instead of pushing boldly forward, he recrossed the river and put his men in line of battle, having heard that the enemy, 3,000 strong, were at Leadsville church, not far from where he had reached the road. Later, he fell back to the foot of Rich mountain, where, at a secluded farmhouse, near midnight, he informed his leading officers that he had concluded to surrender, as he believed it impossible to escape the enemy, which he supposed had nearly surrounded him so he could not cross the valley and get through the mountains to Monterey. Most of the officers appeared to tacitly concur in this view; but Lieutenant-Colonel Heck and Capt. J. B. Moorman, of the Pendleton company, opposed it. The latter, having marched his company across Cheat mountain by the Seneca road, in the vicinity of which they then were, after the Philippi affair, was sure he could safely lead the whole command out that way. Heck urged trying this, considering that better than hunting up some one to surrender to, which could be done later should necessity demand it. Pegram, however, took his own course and sent a messenger to Beverly, some 7 miles distant, with a note to McClellan, saying, that in consequence of the retreat of Garnett and the condition of his command, most of whom had been without food for two days, he desired to surrender his men, as prisoners of war, the next morning. Between 7 and 8 a. m. of the 13th, two of



McClellan's staff and some twenty cavalry brought a note to "John Pegram, Esq., styling himself Lieut. -Col. P. A. C. S.," saying he would receive his officers and men as prisoners of war, but could not relieve them from any liabilities incurred by taking up arms against the United States. Pegram accepted the terms offered, but when he formed his companies to march to Beverly, he found that Moorman and his forty brave mountaineers had left during the night, taking the Seneca road, as he had proposed. These in due time reached Monterey, as could all of Pegram's command had he boldly pushed forward as Heck and Moorman urged. Pegram surrendered 22 officers and 259 men of Heck's regiment, and 8 officers and 166 men of his own.

Returning to General Garnett, we find that late in the afternoon of the 11th a messenger informed him that the Federals were in possession of Rich mountain in Pegram's rear, and by that time were probably in Beverly. It is asserted that this messenger also reported the road blockaded between Beverly and Laurel hill by trees felled across it; which was not true. Threatened by Morris' large force in his front, and, as he supposed, by a large one under McClellan advancing to his rear and occupying his line of retreat to Staunton, Garnett evacuated Laurel hill about midnight, and fell back to Leadsville, about halfway to Beverly, where he took a rough country road, leading northeast by way of New Interest and across Cheat river to Red House, in western Maryland, on the Northwestern turnpike leading from Wheeling across the mountains through Hardy county to Winchester. On the 12th, late in the day, he encamped at Kaylor's ford of Shaver's fork of Cheat river, after a march of some 15 miles from Leadsville, his rear extending back some two miles. He resumed his retreat about 8 a. m. of the 13th, with Taliaferro's and Jackson's regiments, Hansbrough's battalion, a section of Shumaker's battery and a squadron of cavalry in the lead, followed by his baggage train, with the First Georgia, the Twenty-third Virginia, Lanier's section of artillery, and Captain Jackson's cavalry in the rear. The continuous rains and the passing of the trains cut up the road and made progress slow. Before he could cross Kaylor's ford the enemy fell on his rear. Garnett then rode back, placed the First Georgia in position, and held the enemy in check

until his train had forded the river. The First Georgia then fell behind the Twenty-third Virginia, which in the meantime had taken an advanced position, and that defended the train until the First Georgia formed again, further on. Thus skirmishing and retiring, the retreat was skillfully conducted, without loss, to Carrick's ford of Cheat river,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles beyond Kaylor's. That ford, wide and deep, was now swollen by recent rains, making the crossing difficult, so that some wagons were stalled and abandoned. This delay enabled the Federals to close up, but Taliaferro's Twenty-seventh Virginia, posted on the high bank on the far side of Cheat river, joined in a lively engagement, known as the battle of Carrick's Ford, in which infantry and artillery engaged from opposite sides of the river, and the Federals were twice driven back, with considerable damage from Lanier's guns. Taliaferro continued to fight until his men had expended nearly all their cartridges and the artillery had been withdrawn, when, believing that the enemy were attempting to turn his flank, he ordered his regiment to retire, which, although it had lost nearly 30 in killed and wounded, it did very reluctantly. He then moved on to the opposite side of the next ford, where he found General Garnett, who directed him to halt his regiment around a nearby protecting turn of the road, and send him some good riflemen, remarking: "This is a good place, behind this driftwood, to post skirmishers." Taliaferro sent him a whole company, from which he selected 10 sharpshooters and ordered the others back to the regiment. While posting his command to meet an expected attack, Taliaferro received orders from Garnett to march rapidly and overtake the main body. A few minutes later he was informed, by the officer in charge of his 10 riflemen, that the brave Garnett had been killed by a Federal sharpshooter, firing across the river, just as he was ordering the skirmishers to retire. One of Lanier's guns was disabled in this engagement and abandoned after being spiked.

Closely followed by the enemy, Taliaferro fell back 4 miles further to Parsons' ford, the last one of Cheat river to be crossed; a half mile beyond this he overtook the main body, halted there by Garnett's order and drawn up to receive the enemy. After waiting for some time, and no enemy appearing, the retreat was resumed,

now under the command of Colonel Ramsey of the First Georgia, up the Horseshoe run road, marching all night and unmolested, reaching the Red House and the North-western turnpike at about daylight of the 14th, and safely passing that danger point of attack from the Federal forces at Cheat river bridge and elsewhere on the Baltimore & Ohio, not far away, which McClellan had ordered, by telegraph, to fall upon Garnett's retreating column.

The retreat from Laurel hill was managed so skillfully by General Garnett that Morris did not know he had left until daylight of the 12th. The pursuit was not continued, except by scouts, beyond Cheat river, where his command closed up about 2 p. m. The Confederate loss was small, but it included the brave and skillful Garnett, who was the first officer of rank to lay down his life for his native State. Ramsey continued his retreat on the 14th, followed at some distance in the rear by numerous Federal troops from along the Baltimore & Ohio, which failed to overtake him; crossed Alleghany mountain through Greenland gap; reached the South Branch valley at Petersburg, where the Federal pursuit ended, and thence turned up that valley and arrived at Monterey, 54 miles distant, several days later, with his command thoroughly disorganized but having suffered little loss.

McClellan telegraphed to Washington his first report of the battle from his camp in front of Rich mountain, on the 12th, and followed it with other announcements, of which Gen. J. D. Cox has written (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*):

It is a curious task to compare the official narrative with the picture of the campaign and its results, which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dispatches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he announced that they had "annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure." The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his success was followed by the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by Providence as the ideal chieftain, who could repair the misfortune and lead our armies to certain victory.

On the 16th, leaving a force at Huttonsville and on Cheat mountain, McClellan returned to Beverly and proceeded to reorganize his army.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE FIRST KANAWHA VALLEY CAMPAIGN—APRIL TO JULY, 1861.

WE now turn to a consideration of the Kanawha valley campaign of the early part of 1861, as that was a portion of Scott's plan of invasion of Virginia that was intrusted to McClellan; deferring until later the consideration of military operations along the Potomac, which, in sequence of time, would at this point demand attention. McClellan's original intention was to begin the invasion of Virginia from Ohio by way of the Kanawha valley along the great stage road to Staunton, having the same objective as Patterson from Pennsylvania up the Shenandoah valley; but events treated of in the preceding chapter diverted him to the lines of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and led to the Rich Mountain campaign and the handing over of operations on the Kanawha line to a subordinate, with whom he was in constant telegraphic communication.

Previous to the building of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, the most important way of travel across Virginia to the west was, as it had been from time immemorial, by the valleys of the James across the Appalachians, and down the Great Kanawha to the Ohio. Vast herds of buffaloes, from the rich open pasture lands of the Great Valley, first engineered and opened trails which the Mound Builders and the Indians followed, and which in turn became the bridle paths for the white men into the great Trans-Appalachian basin of the Ohio. Along these trails took place, for many years, numerous combats between the white man in his westward progress and the Indian who sought to stay that progress, until the decisive battle at Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Big Kanawha in the River Ohio, on October 9, 1774, broke the power of the great Indian confederacy of the northwest, and established the supremacy of the Virginia white man in that direction. The bridle paths were gradually widened into rude wagon ways, along which a steady

stream of emigration poured, especially after the Revolution, robbing Virginia of many of her best citizens, to the enrichment of the great central west. The State and allied companies then began the construction of well-graded turnpikes along these natural highways, until good roads from nearly every county town in the basin of the Big Kanawha led into the James river and Kanawha turnpike, the main stage road from Staunton through Lewisburg, Charleston, and thence to the mouth of the Kanawha, and also to that of the Guyandotte near the Kentucky boundary. From the days of Washington Virginia spent lavishly of her means in the opening of a great waterway, from the head of tide at Richmond, up the James and across to and down the waters of the Kanawha to its head of steamboat navigation; and when the civil war began, the James River & Kanawha canal was in operation for 198 miles, from Richmond to Buchanan, in the heart of the Great Valley. In the same general direction, at an early date, the State co-operated in the construction of a railway, 195 miles of which, from Richmond to Jackson's river, well within the Appalachians, were in operation as the Virginia Central at the beginning of the war, and large numbers of men were then at work constructing the continuation of that line to the Ohio at the mouth of the Guyandotte. That work is now known as the Chesapeake & Ohio railway.

The basin of the Big Kanawha as a whole was one of the most important portions of Virginia, rich in agricultural, forest and mineral wealth, especially coal and salt. The coals which underlie the larger portion of its area were then in demand down the Ohio. In the year of grace 1898, they were one of the most important factors in the magnificent victories won by the sea power of the United States at Manila and Santiago. The loyal Virginians of that region promptly prepared for home defense by the organization of military companies, and demanded arms and aid from the more thickly settled portions of the State, as their territory was peculiarly vulnerable by way of the Ohio and the navigable waters of the Big Sandy, the Guyandotte and the Big Kanawha. These waterways gave easy access for the troops and supplies of the enemy for more than 100 miles toward the interior of the State, and made the problem of its defense one difficult to solve.

On the 29th of April, six days after he took command of the forces of Virginia, General Lee sent Lieut.-Col. John McCausland, a native of the Kanawha valley and a graduate of the Virginia military institute, to muster into the service of the State ten companies of volunteers from the Kanawha region, take command of these, and direct military operations for strictly defensive purposes. On May 3d, Col. C. Q. Tompkins, a West Point graduate and former officer in the United States army, having his home in the Kanawha valley, was appointed colonel of volunteers in the Virginia service and directed to take command of the forces in the Kanawha region and carry out the orders already given to McCausland.

Colonel Tompkins reported from Charleston, May 23d, that he found some 350 men, in five companies, at Buffalo; that within two or three weeks he could probably raise fifteen or sixteen companies, but that the country was destitute of fabric suitable for uniforms.

McCausland, covering the front on the Ohio river, reported Federal troops concentrating at and about Gallopis, Ohio, on the 26th, and Tompkins, hastening to Charleston from his post at Kanawha Falls, sent McCausland as a special messenger to Governor Letcher to inform him of the disaffection of the population of the Kanawha region, of the difficulty of procuring reliable troops, and the imminent danger of invasion. After sending this dispatch on the 28th, Tompkins issued a spirited appeal, calling the "men of Virginia—men of Kanawha, to arms."

On the 23d of April, ex-Gov. Henry A. Wise tendered his services to Virginia. Subsequently he was appointed brigadier-general and given authority to raise a force to be called "Wise's legion." While engaged in organizing this body, he was, on the 6th of June, ordered to take the force he had in hand and proceed, as speedily as possible, to the valley of the Kanawha and rally the people to resist the invading army reported to be already on the march. He was informed that he must rely upon the people for a supply of arms from those in their own hands, and upon their valor and knowledge of the country as a substitute for organization and discipline. Wise's popularity in western Virginia was very great, and it was supposed that his appearance in command on the Kanawha line would stem the tide of opposition to State

authority that was so strongly rising in that region. Before leaving Richmond, Wise was informed that John B. Floyd, recently United States secretary of war, had also been appointed brigadier-general, and specially charged with organizing a large body of troops in the southwestern part of the Great Valley and adjacent regions, the locality of his home where he was extremely popular, and with the protection of the Virginia & Tennessee railroad, the great route of travel to the Confederate capital from all the southwest; and that it would doubtless occur that there would be a junction of his force with that of Wise, in which event Floyd, as the ranking officer by commission, would command their united forces.

Nothing more fully illustrates the poverty of preparation that Virginia had made for a most gigantic warfare than General Floyd's appeal of July 1st, by special messenger, to the governors of South Carolina and Georgia, for the loan of arms, saying that he had three regiments and a fourth rapidly forming, but needed 1,600 guns to arm them, and giving as his excuse for thus applying that neither the Confederate government nor the State of Virginia could furnish arms for his troops, and he was fretting under the delay caused by this want.

On June 23d, Wise, with his legion, reached Gauley bridge, 100 miles beyond the terminus of the Virginia Central railroad, and reported from Charleston, on the 6th of July, that he had 2,705 men in his command, all infantry but 181.

Gen. J. D. Cox began his invasion of the Great Kanawha valley on the 11th of July, in accordance with instructions from McClellan, crossing the Ohio from Gallipolis to Point Pleasant, and moving up the Kanawha. Cox's movements were greatly facilitated by the use of Ohio river steamboats, which, thrown out of trade by the war, were plentiful, and accompanying his columns, made the problem of supplies and transportation for the larger portion of his troops an easy one to solve. In moving up the Kanawha detached columns of troops marched along the roads on each side of the river, while his main body followed in a fleet of steamboats, keeping in rear of his marching columns, but near enough to reinforce either bank in case of attack.

The first day, July 11th, his command made 13

miles, Cox himself directing operations from the top of the pilot house of the leading steamboat, while military bands on board enlivened this novel mode of campaigning. The movement was without opposition until the third day, when, at the mouth of the Pocotalico, some resistance was met from Wise's advance pickets, and Cox learned that the Confederates were in force some 12 miles further on, at Tyler mountain. Cox decided to await at Pocotalico the coming in of his flanking columns.

On the 16th the forward movement of the Second Kentucky (Federal) began at Guyandotte, a few miles beyond which, at Barboursville, a lively skirmish took place with O. J. Wise's advance cavalry pickets, which fell back, pursued by the Federals, to the force encamped near Scary creek, some 24 miles from Charleston, which, on the afternoon of the 17th, met and repulsed this pursuit.

After the engagement at Scary, the Federals crossed the river and encamped on the north side. The next day Wise attacked Cox's advance post with some 800 men of all arms under McCausland, forcing them to retreat to their intrenched camp near the mouth of the Pocotalico.

The retreat of Garnett's forces from Rich mountain and Laurel hill, and the advance of McClellan to Cheat mountain, thus threatening a movement on Staunton, or to the Virginia Central railroad, or to the Kanawha line at Lewisburg, induced the Confederate authorities to promptly reinforce the Northwestern army in McClellan's front, and to concentrate forces on the Kanawha line by withdrawing Wise toward Lewisburg and advancing Floyd from the valley in the southwest to the same line. Col. A. W. McDonald, in command of a large cavalry force at Romney, was ordered to march with his command to Staunton, and unite with the forces there concentrating. Gen. W. W. Loring was assigned to the command of the army of the Northwest.

Acting under discretionary orders, Wise abandoned Charleston July 24th, marching up the Kanawha; left Gauley bridge, which he burned behind him, on the 27th, and after a march of over 100 miles arrived at Lewisburg on the last day of the month, and located his camp at Bunger's mill, 4 miles west of that town.

These brief Northwestern Virginia campaigns, the first of the war and of barely two months' duration, ending



with July, were very far-reaching in their results. McClellan, by the force of numbers many times increased in efficiency by the aid of steam power on navigable rivers and railways, by the use of field telegraphs following his movements, and by superior strategy, made possible by these agencies, compelled the Confederates to retreat from the banks of the Ohio to near the Alleghany range of the Appalachians, and abandon to Federal control—which thenceforward during the war was well nigh continuous—most of Trans-Alleghany Virginia, nearly one-third of the State. These results were not only of present but of great future importance to the Federal government in the conduct of the war. They not only gave it control of the navigable waters of the Ohio along and within the borders of Virginia for transportation purposes, but also gave it access to and control of the important coal mines and salt works on the Big Kanawha, and the newly-discovered petroleum wells in the Little Kanawha basin, to the great advantage of Ohio and other Western States, and enabled it to establish camps of observation, accessible by rail and river, far within the borders of Virginia, from which raiding parties were constantly threatening Virginia's interior lines of communication through the Great Valley and the lead mines, salt works, coal mines, blast furnaces, foundries, and other important industrial establishments in and near that grand source of military supplies, thus requiring the detaching of large numbers of troops to watch these Federal movements, and to guard these important and indispensable sinews of war. They deprived Virginia of a large portion of her annual revenues, of a most important recruiting ground for troops, and enabled the bogus government of Virginia to establish and maintain itself at Wheeling, and under the protection of Federal armies strengthen the disloyal element in that part of the State, and organize numerous regiments of infantry and companies of cavalry and artillery to swell the numbers of the Federal army. McClellan had good reason to exult at his success, no matter if it had been easily won.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE FIRST SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN—APRIL TO JULY, 1861.

**T**HE United States arsenal and armory at Harper's Ferry, at the junction of the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers, was the coveted object that first led to military operations in the Shenandoah valley in 1861. Ex-Governor Wise, early in April, urged the authorities at Richmond, by letter, to press forward on three points, the first, "Harper's Ferry, to cut off the West, to form camp for Baltimore and point of attack on Washington from the west."

In Richmond, on the night of April 16th, when it became evident that the Virginia convention would pass an ordinance of secession, Wise called together at the Exchange hotel a number of officers of the armed and equipped companies of the Virginia militia: Turner and Richard Ashby of Fauquier, O. R. Funsten of Clarke, all captains of cavalry companies; Capt. John D. Imboden, of the Staunton artillery; Capt. John A. Harman of Staunton; Nat Tyler, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, and Capt. Alfred M. Barbour, late civil superintendent of the United States armory at Harper's Ferry. These gentlemen, most of them ardent secessionists, discussed and agreed upon a plan for the capture of Harper's Ferry, to be put in execution on the 17th, as soon as the convention voted to secede, if the concurrence of Governor Letcher and railway transportation could be secured. Col. Edmund Fontaine, president of the Virginia Central railroad, and John S. Barbour, president of the Orange & Alexandria railroad, being called in consultation about midnight, agreed to provide the necessary trains for the movement of troops if requested to do so by Governor Letcher. A committee was then sent to the governor, which roused him from sleep and laid before him the scheme for the capture of the armory and arsenal. He refused to take any official steps until after the passage of the ordinance of secession, but

agreed, contingent upon that event, that he would next day order the movement by telegraph.\* He was then informed what companies would be under arms and ready to move at a moment's notice. This self-constituted committee then wired the captains of the companies along the above-named railways to be ready to move the next day, by orders from the governor, which, it was stated, would be to aid in capturing the Gosport navy yard, as a precaution lest information of the movement should reach Washington. It was well known that the guard at Harper's Ferry was only 45 men and could easily be captured if surprised; but Wise had information from Washington that a Massachusetts regiment, 1,000 strong, had been ordered to Harper's Ferry.

After the close of the conference the Ashbys, Funsten, Harman and Imboden secured ammunition and 100 stand of arms for the Martinsburg light infantry from the Virginia armory at Richmond, and had these moved to the railway station and loaded on a train before sunrise of the 17th.

Imboden, by telegraph, ordered all volunteer companies in the county of Augusta to assemble at Staunton at 4 p. m. of the 17th for marching orders. This produced great excitement, as that was a strong Union county, and the people assembled in Staunton in great numbers. When Imboden reached that place, in the afternoon of the 17th, he found his own company, the Staunton artillery, and Capt. William S. H. Baylor's West Augusta guards, an infantry company, drawn up to receive him. There were also present Maj.-Gen. Kenton Harper, commanding the Fifth division of the Virginia militia, and Brig.-Gen. William H. Harman, commanding the Thirteenth brigade of the Virginia militia, who had a telegram from Letcher ordering them into service and referring them to Imboden for information. He informed them, confidentially, of what had been done. Letcher had wired Harper to take chief command of the movement and Harman to call out the armed companies of his brigade. At 5 p. m. Harper left for Winchester by rapid conveyance, after ordering Harman to take command of the trains and troops that might report

\* "Jackson at Harper's Ferry," by Brig.-Gen. John D. Imboden, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." Century Co., New York, 1887.

en route. Reaching Winchester at noon of the 18th, Harper received orders from Letcher to go on to Harper's Ferry.

The two companies from Staunton left by the Virginia Central railroad about sunset; at Charlottesville they were joined by Capt. W. B. Mallory's Monticello guards and Capt. R. T. W. Duke's Albemarle rifles, and at Culpeper by a rifle company. Manassas Junction was reached at about sunrise of the 18th, when Harman impressed a Manassas Gap railroad train to take the lead toward Strasburg, followed by the other trains that had brought troops to the junction. The Ashbys and Funsten left Richmond on the 16th to collect their cavalry companies, and those of the Black Horse cavalry under Capts. John Scott and R. Welby Carter of Fauquier; these to march across the Blue ridge and rendezvous near Harper's Ferry. Ashby sent men on the night of the 17th to cut the wires between Manassas and Alexandria and keep them cut for several days, to prevent information of this movement reaching Washington. Before 10 a. m. of the 18th, the trains reached Strasburg and the infantry companies took up the line of march for Winchester. Imboden, with great difficulty, secured horses for his battery, and by noon followed on to Winchester, 18 miles, which he reached about dark. The troops were coldly received by the majority of the people of that conservative town, quite unlike their conduct during the following years of heroic endurance.

Harper, reaching Winchester in advance, when the infantry arrived sent them forward by rail to Charlestown, 8 miles from Harper's Ferry, and then ordered back the train for the artillery. About midnight the infantry marched to Halltown, within 4 miles of Harper's Ferry, to which point the artillery was taken by train and the guns run forward by hand to Bolivar heights and put in position to shell the place if necessary. Harper, who thought the Massachusetts regiment had arrived at Harper's Ferry, was making his arrangements to attack the armory and arsenal at daybreak of the 19th, when at about 10 p. m. of the 18th a brilliant light from the direction of the armory convinced him that the Federal troops in charge had fired it and fled. He promptly advanced and took possession, but too late to extinguish the flames, which destroyed nearly 20,000 rifles and pis-

tols, although the workshops, the armory proper and the rifle works up the Shenandoah were saved.

On January 2, 1861, Supt. A. M. Barbour had informed the United States ordnance bureau that he apprehended an assault on the armory, and that he had organized the armorers into volunteer companies for its protection. The next day, Maj. H. J. Hunt, of the Second artillery, was assigned to command at Harper's Ferry and Lieut. R. Jones was ordered to report to him for duty with 60 picked men of the mounted rifles from Carlisle barracks. Hunt was instructed by Adjutant-General Cooper to dispose his force to protect the armory, but to make no display of it that would cause irritation. He arrived and took command on the 5th. On the 2d of April, Lieutenant Jones succeeded Hunt in command. His force on the 18th of April was but 45 men. Just before that date he sent a message to Secretary of War Cameron, asking for a large reinforcement if it was the intention to save the contents of the armory. To this he had no reply and was left to act on his own judgment. On Thursday morning, April 18th, Col. A. M. Barbour, who had resigned the superintendency of the armory a short time before and was now a member of the Virginia convention from Jefferson county, arrived at Harper's Ferry and thoughtlessly stated in public that the convention had passed an ordinance of secession; that the governor had called out the volunteers to repulse any effort to reinforce the command at Harper's Ferry, and that Virginia intended to take possession of the armory and arsenal. This caused much excitement, as the citizens were under the impression that an unlawful seizure of the United States property was to be made, which they determined to oppose. In the meantime, Colonel Allen called out the local regiment, the Second Virginia, to assemble at Charlestown. Apprised of these things, Superintendent Kingsbury (Barbour's successor) and Lieutenant Jones, knowing they could not resist an attack by any considerable force, made arrangements to destroy the property. Dismissing the operatives with the assurance that they should resume work on the 19th, they closed the gates of the armory and posted sentinels; removed the foot bridges across the canal, and placed kegs and sacks of powder in the arsenal buildings, using bedticks for this purpose; scattered powder over the floors of the shops, and

placed barrels of it so as to not only destroy the buildings but any persons who might approach them. They then sent out mounted sentinels for two or three miles on different roads to watch the approach of the Virginia troops. One of these, about 9 p. m., hailed Colonel Allen and his command on the road to Charlestown; when the colonel ordered a charge to capture him, he rode off rapidly and reported to Jones, who at about 10 p. m. fired the buildings and crossed with his command into Maryland and retreated. By great exertions, notwithstanding the danger from explosions, the citizens (who had gathered in large numbers) and soldiers promptly proceeded to put out the fires and prevent them from spreading, thus saving many thousand stand of arms from the arsenal and preventing any damage to the armory, the removal of the machinery from which, to Richmond, was immediately begun.

On the 22d, news reached Harper's Ferry that Virginia had passed the ordinance of secession, relieving the fears of many of the officers and troops that had been assembled there, that they had been acting unlawfully.

Within a week after the capture of Harper's Ferry some 1,300 Virginia troops, the armed and equipped volunteer companies of the militia, were there assembled under the commands of Brigadier-Generals Carson, Meem and Harman, from whose jurisdictions they had been summoned, and all under Major-General Harper, as division commander of the militia. These officers, in the full and brilliant uniforms of their rank, and each with a large staff, made an imposing display as they rode through the camps and around the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The reign of the militia lasted about ten days, during which the only marked event was an ordering of the command under arms, on the night of the 25th, to capture a train of Federal troops reported as coming from the West, but which was found to have on it only General Harney of the United States army, who was taken prisoner. Letcher, on the 20th, had prohibited the Baltimore & Ohio from passing troops across Virginia over that road.

Imboden relates that he improvised caissons for his artillery from horse carts found in the armory; procured harness from Baltimore with his own means, and ordered red flannel shirts and other service clothing for his men

from Richmond to replace the fine dress uniforms with which they came to camp.

On the 27th of April, Maj. Thomas J. Jackson, of the Virginia military institute, was appointed colonel of Virginia volunteers and ordered to Harper's Ferry to take command of the forces there assembled. At the same time an order was issued decapitating every militia officer in the State's volunteer service above the rank of captain, the vacancies thus created to be filled by the governor and his council of three. Colonel Jackson arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 29th of April and took command on the 30th. This order, resolving the Virginia forces into units of organization, created much indignation among the deposed officers, and greatly excited the troops they had commanded. In the midst of this excitement, Imboden ordered the Staunton artillery into line and informed them that they were required to muster into service, either for twelve months or the war, at their option, but urged them to go in for the full period, as it would be much to their credit to do so and set a good example to others. His men shouted unanimously, "For the war!" They were at once mustered in, and their captain had the pleasure of handing to Colonel Jackson the roll of the first company mustered in "for the war," for which the colonel expressed his thanks and asked that the same be conveyed to the men. Jackson then requested Imboden to muster in the two other artillery companies present, which he did and returned the rolls before sunset. This action of the artillerists was followed the next day by the other troops; all were mustered in, and the organization into regiments and battalions began. Soon after this, Letcher appointed Harper colonel of the Fifth Virginia, Harman, lieutenant-colonel, and Baylor, major, and thus was organized one of the finest regiments of the famous Stonewall brigade.

The period of Jackson's command at Harper's Ferry was marked by few notable incidents. The colonel commanding, in the simple uniform of a major on duty at the Virginia military institute, quietly, but firmly and unceasingly, worked to change citizens that had patriotically rushed to arms, most of them young men, many of them mere boys, into disciplined soldiers, nearly all the officers needing this as badly as the privates. His long experience as a trainer and drill-master of the same kind

of material at the military institute fitted him admirably for such work. Jackson regulated the trains on the Baltimore & Ohio, seeing that they were not used to the detriment of Virginia, as Governor Letcher ordered, and when supplies from Baltimore for Virginia were detained by Butler at the Relay house, May 9th, he retaliated by seizing five carloads of beeves and one of horses from the West, intended for Federal use, and appropriated them to the use of his own army; buying from the quartermaster one of the captured horses, to which he took a fancy, that became famous as his favorite war-horse, "Little Sorrel."

As soon as he took command at Harper's Ferry there was an immediate change in the condition of the camp. Orders for instruction in military duties and for regular drills were at once issued, and strict military discipline enforced. He also began the construction of defenses on the surrounding heights, both in Virginia and in Maryland, to put his position in a state of defense against any attack that might be made by the Federal forces that were being pushed forward from Washington up the north bank of the Potomac, down the Cumberland valley from Chambersburg toward Hagerstown, and from the northwest by McClellan along the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. His outposts were extended along the Baltimore & Ohio to Point of Rocks, 12 miles below Harper's Ferry, whence a wagon bridge crossed the Potomac into Virginia and where the railroad from Baltimore reached that river, thus guarding his position against the approach of Federal troops under General Butler from toward Baltimore, and of those under Colonel Stone up the Potomac from Washington. The staff departments of his command were promptly organized, with Maj. John A. Harman, as quartermaster, Maj. Wells J. Hawks, commissary, and Dr. Hunter McGuire, medical director. These gentlemen and Lieutenant Pendleton (afterward lieutenant-colonel), and others appointed later, continued as the efficient heads of departments during his subsequent famous military career.

About this time Lieut.-Col. J. E. B. Stuart reported to Jackson for duty, and the latter ordered the consolidation of all his cavalry companies into a battalion, to be commanded by Stuart, thus relieving Capt. Turner Ashby, the idol of all the troopers, from chief command of the



cavalry. One of the bravest, shrewdest and most daring men ever put on outpost duty, he was lacking in the disciplinary qualities which Stuart, as a trained soldier, had in such an eminent degree. Ashby felt so aggrieved by this action that he determined to resign his captaincy, but was persuaded by Imboden to pay Jackson a visit and discuss the situation, the result of which was that the companies present were divided into two regiments, one under command of Col. Angus W. McDonald, with Ashby as lieutenant-colonel, who soon became its colonel, and the other under Stuart.

When on the 17th of April Virginia passed in convention its ordinance of secession, Brig.-Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was stationed at Washington as quartermaster-general of the United States army. This action of Virginia was not known in Washington until Saturday, the 19th, when he at once wrote his resignation. On Monday morning he offered it to the secretary of war, who accepted it. That done, he left Washington on Tuesday, with his family, for Richmond, but in consequence of railway accidents did not reach there until Thursday the 25th, when Governor Letcher at once gave him the appointment of major-general of Virginia volunteers, and Maj.-Gen. R. E. Lee, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces on the 22d, assigned to him the duty of organizing and instructing the volunteers who were then arriving in Richmond. General Lee had already selected the points to be occupied for the defense of the State and the number of troops to be assigned to each. These points were: Norfolk, in front of Yorktown; the front of Fredericksburg; Manassas Junction, Harper's Ferry and Grafton. Johnston was assisted in the duties assigned him at Richmond by Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, Majors Jackson and Gilham, and Capt. T. L. Preston, who had all recently reported for duty. Johnston was employed in this way some two weeks, when, Virginia having joined the Southern Confederacy, President Davis offered him, by telegraph, a brigadier-generalship in the Confederate army, which he promptly accepted, and on reporting to the war department at Montgomery was assigned by President Davis to the command at Harper's Ferry. He reached that place Friday, May 23d, accompanied by his staff, Col. E. Kirby Smith, assistant adjutant-general

(afterward lieutenant-general); Maj. W. H. C. Whiting, of the engineers (who fell at Fort Fisher a major-general); Maj. A. McLean, quartermaster, and Capt. T. L. Preston, assistant adjutant-general. Within an hour after his arrival, Col. T. J. Jackson called on General Johnston, learned the object of his coming, and saw his orders; but when Johnston, the next morning, sent him orders announcing the change of commanders to be made known to the troops, Jackson courteously replied that he did not "feel at liberty to transfer his command to another without further instructions from Governor Letcher or General Lee;" but offered to furnish Johnston at once every facility for obtaining information relative to the post. Jackson soon learned that the Virginia forces had been turned over to the Confederacy, when he promptly obeyed Johnston's orders.

On assuming command at Harper's Ferry, Johnston had under him the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Twenty-seventh Virginia regiments of infantry; the Second and Eleventh Mississippi; the Fourth Alabama; a Maryland and a Kentucky battalion; four companies of Virginia artillery, of four guns each, but without caissons, horses or harness; and the First regiment of Virginia cavalry, about 250 men, including Capt. Turner Ashby's company, temporarily attached to it by Colonel Jackson; about 5,200 effective men in all. Among the officers present were T. J. Jackson and A. P. Hill, who became lieutenant-generals; Stuart, "matchless as a commander of outposts," as Johnston wrote, and Capt. W. N. Pendleton, who became brigadier-general and Lee's chief of artillery. As Johnston wrote, the troops were undisciplined, of course, also "badly armed and equipped—several regiments being without accouterments; were almost destitute of ammunition, and, like all new troops assembled in large bodies, they were suffering very much from sickness; nearly 40 per cent. of the total being in the hospitals, there or elsewhere, from the effects of measles and mumps."

Johnston had been distinctly informed, in his conversations with Lee and Davis, that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a natural fortress commanding the entrance to the valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and that his command was not of a military district, or of an active army, but of a fortress and its garrison. A

study of the strategic environments at Harper's Ferry, after extended reconnoissance, convinced Johnston that the route of invasion into the valley from Pennsylvania was across the Potomac at Williamsport to Martinsburg, 20 miles west of Harper's Ferry and beyond the control of its garrison; and a careful examination of the position and its immediate surroundings, made on May 25th, with Engineer Whiting, convinced him that the place could not be held, even against equal numbers, by the force then in hand; that it was untenable unless he also had possession of the neighboring heights north of the Potomac and east of the Shenandoah, as artillery on those heights could sweep every part of the position and it could easily be turned by the fords of the rivers.

When Johnston took command at Harper's Ferry, the three Federal armies threatening Virginia, each, directly or indirectly, also menaced his position. He supposed that they would co-operate with Richmond as their objective, and from what he could learn, that Patterson and McClellan would direct their first movements so as to combine at Winchester. He considered it absolutely necessary that the troops in the Shenandoah valley under his command should be always ready, not only to meet the attack of Patterson from the northeast and of McClellan from the northwest, but also to unite quickly with the army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction, whenever threatened by McDowell. For such purposes he regarded his army at Harper's Ferry wrongly placed, since Patterson, coming from Chambersburg and marching through Williamsport and Martinsburg toward Winchester, would pass a day's march to the west of it. The only direct road from Harper's Ferry to Manassas, that down the south bank of the Potomac and across by way of Leesburg, was under the enemy's guns on the north side of the river; and if McClellan should come in by the Northwestern turnpike to Winchester, he would be completely in the rear of Johnston's army. For these reasons it was manifest that Winchester, and not Harper's Ferry, was the point to occupy, and he expressed these views in several letters in May and June to the authorities at Richmond, who in reply dissented from his opinions, and held the maintenance of the existing arrangements necessary for retaining command of the valley and communication with Maryland. Notwith-

standing, Johnston decided that he would hold Harper's Ferry only until his command was needed elsewhere in consequence of movements of the enemy, and continued to urge the change of location of his command. He also conferred with Beauregard (who took command at Manassas Junction, opposing McDowell's advance, a week after Johnston took command at Harper's Ferry), and he, because of their mutual dependence for aid, concurred in Johnston's views.

During this period Stuart and Ashby with their cavalry held Johnston's front along the Potomac from the Point of Rocks entirely across the Shenandoah valley to within the North mountains, as they had done for Jackson. Johnston had cartridge boxes, belts and cartridges manufactured in the neighboring towns and villages, and smuggled in percussion caps, in small quantities, from Baltimore. At Captain Pendleton's suggestion, caissons were constructed by fixing roughly-made ammunition chests on the running gear of farm wagons. Horses and harness were collected for the artillery, and horses and wagons for field transportation, from the surrounding country; and the removal of machinery from the armory to Richmond was continued. The two heavy guns that Jackson had placed in battery west of the village, Johnston mounted on Furnace ridge, the extension of Bolivar heights to the Potomac, to command the approach by railway from the west. During the first week in June the Seventh and Eighth Georgia and the Second Tennessee regiments reached Harper's Ferry.

On June 10th, Col. Lew Wallace, with the Eleventh Indiana, occupied Cumberland, Md., and on the 15th Patterson advanced his troops to Hagerstown from Chambersburg, Pa., where he had been collecting, organizing and instructing them for some days. From the information he could gather, Johnston concluded that Patterson had about 18,000 men, in twenty-four regiments of infantry, and several companies of artillery and cavalry. Johnston had at that time at Harper's Ferry about 7,000 men of all arms. At sunrise, June 13th, Johnston was advised, from Winchester, that 2,000 Federal troops, supposed to be the advance guard of McClellan's army, had marched into Romney, 43 miles west of Winchester by turnpike. As this information came from most reliable sources, Johnston at once sent Col. A. P. Hill, with

his Thirteenth Virginia, regiment, and Col. S. B. Gibbons, with his Tenth Virginia, by special train to Winchester. Colonel Hill, in command, was instructed to also take Colonel Vaughn's Third Tennessee regiment, which had just reached Winchester, as part of his detachment, move toward Romney without delay, and do the best he could to retard the progress of the Federal troops toward the Shenandoah valley.

When Patterson ordered Lew Wallace to occupy Cumberland with the Eleventh Indiana, June 10th, he warned him to be very cautious, but the ambitious colonel, learning that a considerable Confederate force was quartered at Romney, Hampshire county, in the South Branch valley, left Cumberland at 10 p. m. of the 12th, with eight companies of infantry, about 500 in number, and went by rail 21 miles southwest to New Creek (Keyser) station of the Baltimore & Ohio. On the morning of the 13th, about 4 a. m., he started to march across the mountains, by a rough country road, hoping to reach Romney, 23 miles distant, by about 8 a. m. When within a mile and a half of the town, coming from the west from Mechanicsburg, his advance was fired upon by a mounted picket, which fell back and gave the alarm, although the camp had an hour's previous notice of his coming. Pushing forward to the bridge over the South Branch, he saw the little band of Confederates drawn up on the bluff in front of the town, supporting a battery of two guns which commanded the road by which he must approach. Wallace's advance guard crossed the bridge on a run, and came under a warm fire from the windows of a large brick house not far to the right, which continued for several minutes, during which a second company crossed the bridge, and following up a ravine got into a position from which it drove the Confederates from the house and into the mountain back of it. Wallace then pushed a flanking party up a hill to the right, but before these men got within rifle range, the Confederates limbered up their guns and retreated over the bluff. The Federals at once entered, taking possession of empty houses and a lot of negroes, and searching for arms, and after a short stay returned to Cumberland, making a forced march. It was this movement that misled Johnston and induced him to send Hill to Romney.

The advance of Patterson to Hagerstown, within a day's

march of Martinsburg, and the reported Federal advance toward Romney, convinced Johnston that the time had come to abandon Harper's Ferry and put his army in a defensive or active offensive position; so during the 13th and 14th the heavy baggage of the troops (Johnston says nearly every private soldier had a trunk), the property of the quartermaster and commissary departments, and the remaining machinery of the armory were sent by rail to Winchester, and the bridges over the Potomac, from the Point of Rocks to Shepherdstown, were destroyed. The machinery from the armory was sent forward, by wagons, from Winchester to Strasburg, and thence by the Manassas Gap railroad to Richmond.

The Confederates evacuated Harper's Ferry on the morning of the 15th, moved out on the Berryville road and bivouacked three or four miles beyond Charlestown. The next morning, before the resumption of the march, the cavalry outposts reported that the advance of Patterson's army had crossed the Potomac below Williamsport and was marching on Martinsburg. Johnston at once decided to oppose this advance toward Winchester by marching across the country to Bunker Hill, midway on the turnpike between Martinsburg and Winchester, and by thus opposing Patterson prevent his anticipated junction with McClellan. While waiting for a guide, he received a letter from Cooper, dated June 13th, giving him permission to abandon Harper's Ferry and retire toward Winchester, and, if not sustained by the people of the valley so that he could turn on the enemy before reaching Winchester, to continue to retire to the Manassas Gap road; that it was hoped he could make an effective stand, even against superior forces, in some of the mountain passes; but if he was forced so far as to make a junction with Beauregard, he would leave the enemy free to occupy the valley of Virginia and move on the rear of Manassas Junction.

Johnston broke camp at 9 a. m., June 16th, and marching through Smithfield, reached Bunker Hill in the afternoon and bivouacked on Mill creek, the full-flowing branch of the Opequan running through that village from the west, where armies so often encamped during the subsequent years of the war. Next morning the troops were advanced toward Martinsburg, to high ground favorable for battle, to await the approach of the Federal

army. About noon, information came that Patterson had recrossed the Potomac, because, it was supposed, of Johnston's movement, but really because Wallace, at Cumberland, had reported himself hard pressed by Hill's move on Romney, and Patterson ordered five regiments of infantry and cavalry and artillery up the Potomac to his support. Johnston then followed out his original intention and marched toward Winchester, going into camp some 3 miles east of the town, on the Martinsburg road, but replacing his cavalry in observation along the Potomac, under Colonel Stuart, who, as Johnston says, "had already won its full confidence and mine."

Mansfield, in command at Washington, notified Colonel Stone, on the Potomac line, that the Confederates were evacuating Harper's Ferry and advised him to watch the lower Potomac fords, as though he feared Johnston might advance on Washington. On the 16th he informed Stone that the large force reported at Manassas Junction was probably that of Johnston from Harper's Ferry. In view of the demonstrations in front of Washington, Scott, on the 18th, thought of having Patterson march from Hagerstown to Frederick and join Stone in a movement down the Potomac, from Leesburg, to meet one by McDowell moving up the river.

After reaching Romney, Col. A. P. Hill, resenting Wallace's raid, sent Col. J. C. Vaughn with two companies of his Tennesseans and two of the Thirteenth Virginia to New Creek depot by the same back road Wallace used, to attack a Federal force there located. Vaughn found the enemy well posted on the north bank of the Potomac near the railroad bridge, but with no pickets out. After reconnoitering he gave orders, at 5 a. m. of the 19th, to charge the position. The order was gallantly and enthusiastically executed, but as soon as his men came in sight of the enemy, the latter broke and fled in all directions, firing a few random shots and wounding one of Vaughn's men. They did not fire their two pieces of artillery, which were captured loaded but spiked. These and the enemy's colors were brought away, and the railroad bridge over New creek was burned. Vaughn made a march of 36 miles between 8 p. m. of the 18th and noon of the 19th, when he returned to his camp. Hill commended the handsome manner in which his orders had been executed, and Johnston called

attention to "the difference it exhibited between the spirit of our troops and that of those of the United States."

Assured that no considerable body of Federal troops was approaching from the west, Hill's detachment was called back to Winchester. Some rough gunstocks having been left at Harper's Ferry, Lieut.-Col. G. H. Stuart was sent, with his Maryland battalion, to bring these away, which he did, leaving nothing there worth removing. Jackson's brigade was left near Martinsburg, in supporting distance of the cavalry along the Potomac.

While Johnston was tarrying at Winchester, President Davis wrote him that, while governed by circumstances, he must bear in mind that the general purpose of his command was to resist invasion and repel the invaders whenever it could be done; that reinforcements had been steadily sent forward to Manassas Junction, and that others would be sent to that place and to him as the current of events might determine on which line to advance; that a large supply of ammunition had been sent him on the 19th, and more would be sent the next day; that the movements of the enemy indicated the importance attached to the valley of Virginia, and to the power he would acquire if he could advance as far as Staunton, cut off communication with the West and South, and operate on the flank and rear of Beauregard's army, at the same time provisioning his own army from the valley of the Shenandoah, and by so doing dispensing with a long line of transportation from Pennsylvania; therefore, everything should be destroyed that would facilitate such a movement through the valley.

In the meantime, the army of the Shenandoah was strengthened by the arrival of more regular army officers and of regiments from different States, and Johnston, early in July, proceeded to organize four brigades of infantry: The First, a Virginia brigade, under Col. T. J. Jackson, composed of the Second, Fourth, Fifth and Twenty-seventh Virginia regiments and Pendleton's Rockbridge artillery; the Second, under Col. F. S. Bartow, composed of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Georgia regiments, Duncan's and Pope's Kentucky battalions, and Alburtis' Virginia battery; the Third, under Brig.-Gen. B. E. Bee, composed of the Fourth Alabama, Second and Eleventh Mississippi, First Tennessee, and Imbo-



den's Virginia battery; the Fourth, under Col. Arnold Elzey, composed of the First Maryland battalion, Third Tennessee, Tenth and Thirteenth Virginia, and Grove's battery, leaving the First Virginia cavalry and the Thirty-third Virginia infantry unbrigaded. These commands numbered, on June 30, 1861, 10,654 present for duty, of which 10,010 were infantry, 334 cavalry and 278 artillery.

Learning that Patterson was again preparing to cross the Potomac, Jackson was sent with his brigade to the vicinity of Martinsburg to support the cavalry, and at the same time protect and aid an agent of the government who was sent to select and remove locomotives from the Baltimore & Ohio railroad shops at Martinsburg, hauling them with horses along the turnpike through Winchester to the Manassas Gap railroad at Strasburg. Jackson was also instructed to destroy all Baltimore & Ohio rolling stock that could not be brought away. On June 22d, President Davis wrote General Johnston that if the enemy had withdrawn from his front to make an attack east of the Blue ridge, they would probably attempt to advance from Leesburg to seize the Manassas Gap railroad and turn Beauregard's left, and if he had timely information of this, he might make a flank attack through the passes of the Blue ridge, and in conjunction with Beauregard achieve a glorious and beneficial victory.

During this waiting time some 2,500 of the militia of Frederick, Shenandoah and adjacent counties, were assembled at Winchester, under Brigadier-Generals Carson and Meem. To encourage these and add to their efficiency, Major Whiting, of the engineers, was directed to throw up some light defensive works, on the most commanding positions northeast of the town, and have some heavy guns, found in Winchester, mounted there.

Maj.-Gen. Robert Patterson, with the Federal army which he had concentrated, left Hagerstown June 30th, with the intention of invading Virginia in two columns, one crossing the Potomac at Dam No. 4, and the other at Williamsport, to converge at Hainesville, near which, at Camp Stephens, was encamped Jackson's brigade. Finding the fording difficult at Dam No. 4, his whole force crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, July 2d, and advanced on the main road toward Martinsburg, detaching Negley's brigade, a mile beyond the ford, to march by

way of Hedgesville and guard the right, coming into the main road again at Hainesville. About 5 miles from the ford, Patterson's skirmishers became engaged with the Confederates, posted in a clump of trees, and soon with the main force in front, sheltered by fences, woods and houses.

From Darkesville, July 3d, Jackson made report concerning this battle, his first engagement with the enemy. At about 7:30 a. m. of the 2d, Colonel Stuart informed him that the Federal troops had advanced to within  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Camp Stephens, and he promptly sent forward Colonel Harper's Fifth Virginia regiment and Captain Pendleton's Rockbridge battery, and gave orders for moving baggage to the rear and advancing his other regiments; that reaching the vicinity of Falling Waters he found the Federals in position, as indicated by Stuart, when he directed Harper to deploy two companies, under Major Baylor, to the right of the road; that the enemy soon advanced, deployed and opened fire, when Harper's skirmishers drove them back on their reserve; that from a house and barn, of which he had taken possession, an apparently deadly fire was poured on the advancing foe until his position was about being turned, when he ordered Harper to gradually fall back; that the enemy opened with artillery, to which Captain Pendleton replied, with one of his guns, from a good position in the rear with a solid shot which entirely cleared the road of the enemy crowding it in front. Satisfied that the enemy were in force, Jackson, as Johnston had ordered, then fell back, checking the enemy as they advanced through the fields and woods, in line as skirmishers and endeavoring to outflank him, by deploying his men and by an occasional shot from Pendleton's gun. Allen's and Preston's regiments had also been advanced to support Harper if necessary, and once Allen took position for that purpose, but was not brought into action, as Jackson had already accomplished the object of his movement.

Before Jackson's arrival on the field, Stuart, leaving Captain White with his company to watch on the main road and fall back before the enemy, had moved forward, by a road farther to the west, to turn Patterson's right flank, and, if possible, capture his advance. Informed of Stuart's intention, but fearing that he might be cut off, Jackson had informed him by messenger, that he would make a stand about a mile and a half in front of Martinsburg and wait

for him; but Stuart joined him soon after he had posted Harper's regiment and a single gun, at Falling Waters. Leaving Stuart in front of Martinsburg, Jackson fell back to Big Spring,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles the other side, where he encamped for the night, and the next day retired to Darkesville. Patterson entered Martinsburg at noon of July 3d.

Stuart reported to Jackson the capture of a whole company of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, with the exception of the captain, after killing three; that one of the enemy was killed by Captain Carter's negro servant and one of Captain Patrick's company; that the captured 49 of the enemy were from the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, the First Wisconsin and the Second United States cavalry. Jackson highly commended Stuart and his command, and wrote of the former, "He has exhibited those qualities which are calculated to make him eminent in his arm of the service." Jackson concluded his report with the reasons which induced him to advance on the enemy. They were: "A desire to capture him if his strength was only a few hundred; if he should appear in force, to hold him in check until his baggage wagons could be loaded and moved in column to the rear."

Jackson's brigade, on the 30th of June, had 128 officers and 2,043 men of the infantry, and 4 officers and 81 men of the artillery, present for duty. Stuart's cavalry had 21 officers and 313 men. At that time, Patterson had present for duty in his command, the department of Pennsylvania, 14,344, of which 395 were cavalry, 258 artillery and 13,691 infantry. This force was composed entirely of three months' men, under Lincoln's call for 75,000, with the exception of the Fourth Connecticut infantry, four companies of United States cavalry, and three of United States artillery.

In his account of "the affair at Falling Waters," as he calls it, Johnston wrote, after describing Jackson's operations, that hearing of this attack, at sunset of the 2d, he ordered the rest of his army forward, from the front of Winchester, and met Jackson's brigade, retiring, at Darkesville, about daybreak of the 3d; that he there bivouacked his whole army, in order of battle, expecting the Federals to advance and attack, and waited four days, in this expectation, supposing that Patterson had invaded Virginia for that purpose; but, as Patterson did not come

on, and being unwilling to attack superior numbers in a town so defensible as Martinsburg, with its numerous stone and brick buildings, he ordered his troops back to Winchester, much to their disappointment, as they were all eager to fight. Johnston's effective force at that time was not quite 9,000 men of all arms.

In a letter to General Cooper, from Darkesville, July 4, 1861, transmitting the reports of Colonel Jackson and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, General Johnston wrote: "Each of these two officers has, since the commencement of hostilities, been exercising the command corresponding to the next grade above the commission he holds, and proved himself fully competent to such command. I therefore respectfully recommend that Colonel Jackson be promoted without delay to the grade of brigadier-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart to that of colonel."

Capt. W. N. Pendleton wrote, concerning the affair at Falling Waters, that the enemy praised the Confederate artillery firing. Pendleton says his orders for aiming the gun were: "Steady, now; aim at the horses' knees," which he considered the first important lesson for making efficient artillerymen.

Stuart's exploit at Falling Waters, which introduced this young Scotch-Irish Virginia cavalryman as a wily strategist and bold fighter, furnishes a good opportunity for telling how he got into the Virginia army and more about this exploit, as told by his biographer, Maj. H. B. McClellan.

In March, 1861, Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart obtained a two months' leave of absence from his regiment, the First United States cavalry, then at Fort Lyon, Kan., a portion of which he spent with his family in St. Louis. After three weeks of anxious waiting on Virginia's action, he returned to Fort Riley, where he learned that Virginia had adopted an ordinance of secession. As his leave had not yet expired, he promptly removed his family to St. Louis, and himself took steamboat for Memphis, forwarding from Cairo, to the United States war department, his resignation as an officer in the United States army, at about the same time that he received notice that he had been promoted to a captaincy in his regiment. He reached Wytheville, Va., the nearest railway station to his old home in Patrick county, on the 7th of May, the very day his resignation was accepted by the United

States war department. Informed of this, he went at once to Richmond, and offered his sword in defense of Virginia, his native State, and on the 10th was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of infantry, in the Virginia army, and ordered to report to Col. T. J. Jackson at Harper's Ferry. On reporting for duty he was assigned to the command of the cavalry, some 350 men, then in the Shenandoah valley. With this small force, with the skill, energy and activity that had already won him reputation, he held, and efficiently watched, a front of nearly 100 miles along the Potomac, from east of the Blue ridge entirely across the Shenandoah valley and nearly to the Alleghany range, and duly reported every forward movement of the enemy. His early discovery of Patterson's move across the Potomac, at Williamsport, the 1st of July, enabled Johnston to send Jackson's brigade to the assistance of the cavalry north of Martinsburg, and to participate in the creditable affair at Falling Waters. There he displayed the prompt courage for which he afterward became famous, and converted threatened disaster into victory, when, riding alone in advance of his men, and emerging suddenly from a thick piece of woods, he found himself confronting a body of Federal infantry only separated from him by a fence. Quickly comprehending the possibilities of the emergency, he unhesitatingly rode forward and ordered some of the Federal soldiers, who probably mistook him for one of their own officers, as he was still dressed in his United States uniform, to throw down the fence. This order was promptly obeyed. He then ordered the whole party to lay down their arms and surrender, on the peril of their lives. Bewildered by this audacity and boldness, they obeyed, when Stuart, filing them off through the gap in the fence, soon had them surrounded by his troopers, his prize proving to be 49 men, nearly an entire company of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers, from the right of Patterson's line of battle.

On the 10th of July, President Davis wrote to Johnston that he was trying, by every means at his command, to reinforce him; that he expected to send off Colonel Forney's regiment the next morning, and others as fast as railway transportation could be secured. On the 13th he gave notice that another regiment, fully equipped, was sent him that day; that he could get 20,000 men

from Mississippi, if they could be armed, and that he had numerous tenders of troops from Georgia, but he had to answer all that he had no arms to spare them.

The lower valley of the Shenandoah (the northeastern part of Virginia's unfailing storehouse for supplying Confederate armies) furnished Johnston an abundant supply of provisions and forage, which the people, staunchly loyal, were willing to sell to his quartermasters and commissaries on credit, so he had no need for subsistence supplies from Richmond, except rations of coffee and sugar. He wrote that under the management of Maj. G. W. T. Kearsley, his chief commissary, the valley could have abundantly supplied an army four times as large as his. The great difficulty was to procure ammunition, as but little had been imported and the partially organized Confederate ordnance department had neither time nor means to prepare the half that was needed. The small supply brought from Harper's Ferry was increased by some from Richmond and by sending officers elsewhere to collect caps as well as cartridges.

On the 15th of July, Stuart reported that Patterson's army had advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, where it remained the next day; but on the 17th it moved from that village and the Winchester road, by its left, to Smithfield, a few miles on the turnpike road to Charlestown. This suggested to Johnston that the Federal commander designed to continue his movement on through Berryville, to place his army between the Confederates at Winchester and those at Manassas Junction, to hold Johnston in the valley while McDowell was assailing Beauregard; or, perhaps, to attack Winchester from the south and turn its slight intrenchments.

After the Confederate army retired from Darkesville toward Winchester, the Thirty-third Virginia, under Col. A. C. Cummings, was added to Jackson's brigade; the Sixth North Carolina to Bee's; the Eleventh Georgia to Bartow's, the Ninth Georgia having joined that brigade soon after the troops left Winchester; and a fifth brigade was formed, for Brig.-Gen. E. Kirby Smith, of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Alabama and the Nineteenth Mississippi regiments, and Stanard's Virginia battery. At that time the effective strength of the regiments in the army of the Shenandoah did not much exceed 500 men each, so many were sick with

measles, mumps, and other diseases to which unseasoned troops are subject.

About 1 a. m., July 18th, Johnston received a telegram from Adjutant-General Cooper informing him that Beauregard was attacked, and that to strike the enemy a decisive blow a junction of all their effective forces was needed; and directing him, if it was practicable to make the movement, to send his sick and baggage across to Culpeper Court House, but, in all arrangements, to exercise his own discretion. A half hour later, a telegram from Beauregard informed Johnston of his urgent need for the aid he had promised him in the emergency now arrived. Confident that the troops under his command could render no service in the valley so important to the Confederacy as preventing a Federal victory at Manassas Junction, Johnston unhesitatingly decided to hasten to that point with his whole army, the only question being whether to first attempt to defeat Patterson, or, by a secret movement, elude him. The latter course he considered the quickest and safest, if it could be accomplished. He relied on Stuart to furnish him the means of judging whether this could be done, while his troops were preparing to march. The Federal cavalry, chiefly regulars, had the advantage in arms and discipline, but kept close to the infantry; Stuart, on the contrary, held his men far in advance of the Confederate infantry camps and kept his pickets and scouts near the enemy, and by so doing could quickly learn of their movements, at the same time concealing his own. His report to Johnston showed that at 9 o'clock of the 18th, Patterson had not advanced from Smithfield, a point so far from Johnston's road to Manassas that Patterson could neither prevent nor delay his march. Stuart's information proved the expediency of moving as soon as possible.

Johnston had, at that time, at Winchester, some 1,700 sick men. If he waited to remove these to Culpeper Court House, it would cause a delay of days when hours were of importance. Therefore he provided for these in Winchester, leaving for their defense the militia brigades of Carson and Meem, which were quite strong enough to defend the place and the district. Moreover, there was no doubt but that Patterson would follow, with his main body, the movement to Manassas, as soon as he discovered it; but to delay that discovery, Stuart was instructed

to establish as complete a cordon as his regiment could make, and as near as practicable to the Federal army, to prevent information reaching it from the direction of Winchester or Berryville; to maintain his close picketing until the night of the 18th, and then follow the army through Ashby's gap. Stuart screened this movement of Johnston's whole army from the valley so effectually that Patterson did not know that it had been made until the 21st, when the army of the Shenandoah was bravely participating in the battle of Bull Run.

Johnston's troops left their camp at Winchester about noon, June 18th, Jackson's brigade leading the march. When the rear of the command was a mile or two beyond Winchester, all the different regiments were at the same time informed of the object of the movement and the necessity for a forced march, and exhorted to strive to reach the field of contention in time to take part in the great battle that had already begun. Johnston, accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldiers, was greatly discouraged by the slow rate of marching of the volunteers and the frequent delays, and nearly despaired of reaching Beauregard in time to aid him in battle. This induced him to dispatch Major Whiting, of the engineers, to Piedmont station of the Manassas Gap railroad, the nearest one on his line of march through Ashby's gap, to ascertain whether railway trains could be procured for transporting his troops to their destination quicker than they could reach it by marching, and if these trains could be secured, to make the necessary transportation arrangements. Whiting, in returning, met Johnston at Paris, a hamlet near the top of the Blue ridge, with a favorable report. The head of Jackson's brigade reached Paris, 17 miles from Winchester, about two hours after dark. The four other brigades halted for the night on the Shenandoah, 4 miles back from Paris and 13 from Winchester. The next day, Friday, July 19th, Johnston's infantry were all across the Blue ridge, as were also his artillery and cavalry, under Colonels Pendleton and Stuart, and all on their way eager to reach the field of conflict.

After the affair at Falling Waters, Patterson, as we have seen, did not enter Martinsburg until the 3d; and though he informed Scott that day that he was in "hot pursuit" of the enemy, he remained there until the 15th,



giving as excuse that he had not transportation enough to supply his army for more than three days at a time, and as he could get nothing from the country he had invaded, while the enemy could, he was compelled to send back to Hagerstown for all his subsistence. He was also under the impression that Johnston's army had been increased to 13,000 men. On the 4th, he wired that as soon as he could get a supply of provisions he intended to advance on Winchester, "to drive the enemy from that place, if any remained," and then move toward Charlestown, to which point he believed Stone was advancing from toward Washington, by way of Harper's Ferry; and then, if it was not too hazardous, he would continue to Leesburg, but unless he was reinforced with long term men, he would have to abandon the country, as the time of most of his army was about to expire, on the 15th of July.

Scott, who had on the 1st informed Patterson that he hoped to move a column of 35,000 men the next week, aggressively, toward Manassas Junction, promised reinforcements and said that Stone was in supporting distance, with all his force, opposite Harper's Ferry. He suggested that after defeating the enemy, Patterson could continue the pursuit, if not too hazardous, and advance toward Alexandria by way of Leesburg, but must move with great caution through the dangerous defiles. Patterson replied that large reinforcements had come from Manassas to Johnston, who probably then had "26,000 men and 24 field guns, some of them rifled and of large caliber."

Patterson must have been greatly confused by Scott's unintelligible orders, directing movements to Alexandria by way of Strasburg, etc., but, stimulated by the arrival of reinforcements and the prospect of more, he issued orders on the 8th for a movement the next day, in two parallel columns, toward Winchester; but instead of marching he called a council of war, participated in by the heads of his staff departments and his brigade commanders, in which there was a general concurrence of expressed opinions, that it would be a very dangerous business to move toward Winchester, each having a professional reason for his conclusions; the quartermaster and the commissary saying they could get neither sufficient transportation nor supplies for such an extended move-

ment; the engineers considering the line of the movement a false one, and the position then held a dangerous one, as Johnston could easily flank it, and all agreed that they ought to go at once to Shepherdstown, Charlestown, or Harper's Ferry. Stone suggested that from the latter place they could best threaten Johnston.

Later, the same day, Scott added to Patterson's distractions by telling him that they had information, doubtless reliable, that the Confederates intended to draw him far back from the Potomac, where Johnston could defeat him, when the latter would join Wise, and moving upon McClellan, in the northwest, conquer him; and then their joint forces would march back and join Beauregard in an assault upon Washington. Concerning this marvelous scheme, Patterson replied, on the 12th, that it confirmed his impression as to the insecurity of his position, and he asked permission to transfer his depot to Harper's Ferry and his forces to the Charlestown line, as defeat in the Shenandoah valley would be ruin everywhere. Scott at once gave his consent, suggesting that later he could march to Alexandria, by way of Hillsboro and Leesburg, but that he must not recross the Potomac.

The news of McClellan's success at Rich mountain, on the 12th, elated Patterson, but he maintained that his column was the keystone of the combined movements, and it must be preserved in order to secure the fruits of that and other victories; that it would not do to hazard that result by a defeat, and he would act cautiously while preparing to strike. Scott promptly replied that if he was not strong enough to defeat Johnston the coming week, he must make demonstrations to detain him in the valley.

After having tarried twelve days at Martinsburg, in his "hot pursuit" of Johnston, Patterson, on the 15th, advanced 12 miles to Bunker Hill, only opposed by Stuart's cavalry (he said some 600), which fell back, skirmishing with his advance and barricading the road behind them, which Patterson interpreted as "showing that the enemy had no confidence even in their large force." The day after he reached Bunker Hill, Patterson, realizing that his ninety days' race with time was about up, and that the prospect of having Johnston's army as a prize had vanished, informed Scott that the term of service of most of his command had about expired, and he felt confident that

many of these would lay down their arms the very day their term of enlistment ended; therefore, he could not think of advancing toward Winchester until these men were replaced with three years' men. On July 17th he began his retrograde movement (the newspapers called it an advance) by leaving the Winchester road, crossing the Opequan, and posting his army along the road from Smithfield to Charlestown. Scott telegraphed him that he had learned, through the Philadelphia papers, of his "advance," and added: "Do not let the enemy amuse you and delay you with a small force in front while he reinforces the junction with his main body." Next day Scott repeated his injunction:

I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, his superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories. The time of the volunteers counts from day of muster into the service of the United States. You must not retreat across the Potomac. If necessary, when abandoned by the short term volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for reinforcements.

Three times on that same 18th of July, while Johnston's army was rapidly marching from the valley toward Manassas, Patterson telegraphed Scott, insisting that the enemy had not stolen a march on him; that he had held Johnston in Winchester and accomplished more than Scott had asked or could well have expected in the face of an enemy of superior numbers. The determination of his three months' men to go home still troubled him, and on the 19th, he said that only three regiments had consented to stay for ten days, and repeated that from his last information, Johnston was still at Winchester and being daily reinforced. That day, July 19th, Patterson was honorably discharged from the service of the United States, to take effect on the 27th, and Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks was directed to assume command of the army under Patterson, and of the department of the Shenandoah.

From Harper's Ferry, on the 21st, Patterson reported that Winchester was abandoned the day before by all armed parties; that Johnston had left to operate on McDowell's right, and that he could not follow because he had but few active troops, all the others being barefooted and ordered home when their term of service should expire.

Patterson, on the 23d, was sending his train across the river at Harper's Ferry, intending to go to Washington with all his available force unless ordered to the contrary; but Scott advised him that this force was not wanted at Washington, but "it is expected you will hold Harper's Ferry unless threatened by a force well ascertained to be competent to expel you." Patterson replied that he considered the occupation of Harper's Ferry, with his small force, as hazardous, and that not less than 20,000 men were needed to hold it against a formidable enemy.

The Shenandoah valley campaign of 1861—three months long, to a day—though marked by no brilliant achievements, was full of substantial advantage to the Confederacy. (1) The capture of the arsenal and armories at Harper's Ferry gave it a large number of arms, when most needed, and the machinery for their continuous manufacture, worth millions of dollars. (2) The few days of militia rule and service showed that not much dependence could be placed in that State organization. (3) Jackson's twenty-five days of command at Harper's Ferry organized into regiments and brought under control and military discipline a large number of volunteers, and enabled him to become so familiar with that post and its surroundings that he knew just how to capture it when ordered so to do in the fall of 1862. (4) Johnston's defiant holding of Harper's Ferry, until the 15th of June, kept Scott in a constant state of alarm for the safety of Washington, held a large number of troops in observation in Maryland, and deprived the Federal capital of the use of its best line of communication with the West. (5) Johnston's prompt and bold action in sending Hill to Romney, the quick move of the latter on New creek, and Johnston's evacuation of Harper's Ferry, June 15th, without waiting for orders, and at once placing his army across Patterson's line of advance, not only inspired courage in his men and confidence in their leader, but disconcerted Patterson and made him withdraw his invasion. (6) The conduct of Stuart and Jackson at Falling Waters gave satisfying promise of heroic leadership and made men eager to follow them into mortal combat; and Johnston's all night march and four days' offer of battle, which orders from Richmond alone prevented his forcing, assured the army of the Shenandoah that it had an everyway competent commander. (7) The

taking of a mount of observation at Winchester, the quick response to Beauregard's call, the telling his men of the object of his movement, and the complete concealment of that from Patterson, crowned the confidence of his soldiery in their bold commander, and made them ready to follow wherever he might lead. (8) Above all, it was a training school, under the ablest of tacticians and strategists, which almost made veterans out of raw troops and fitted them for the good fight they so soon joined in, on Bull run.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE BULL RUN, OR MANASSAS, CAMPAIGN—JANUARY TO JULY, 1861.

**O**F the four columns of Federal invasion in 1861, by which Scott and Lincoln expected to overrun and subjugate Virginia in ninety days, the third, that from Washington toward Richmond, was the most important, as it had for its object, not only a direct movement upon the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy, but also the protection of the Federal capital; furthermore, it was under the special supervision of the general-in-chief of the United States army, Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott. The important result of the operations of that line of invasion was the famous Bull Run, or Manassas, campaign of 1861. The events leading up to this require at least a brief notice.

President Buchanan, alarmed by the action of the Southern States and by the excitement throughout the Union that followed the election of Lincoln, called Scott, from the headquarters of the army in New York, to Washington, and on the last day of 1860 conferred with him in reference to the protection of that city and of the coming inauguration of Lincoln, both of which, he was led to believe, were threatened with violence. As the result of this, Col. Charles P. Stone was appointed inspector-general for the special purpose of reorganizing and arming the volunteer militia companies of the District of Columbia, in such a way as to secure their loyalty to the Union, in the belief that these would furnish all the military protection Washington then needed. This work was thoroughly done, and these citizen soldiery served as guards in the city and at the inauguration of President Lincoln, on the 4th of March, 1861; and sixteen companies of them, organized into battalions, were mustered into the service of the United States, about the 12th of April, when Fort Sumter was fired on, and became the nucleus for the great volunteer army that later assem-

bled at Washington in response to Lincoln's call of April 15th.

The first State troops to reach Washington after Lincoln's call was the Sixth Massachusetts, which was attacked in passing through the streets of Baltimore, on the 19th of April, by unorganized citizens, but reached Washington late that day and was encamped in the capitol. After the passage of these troops, the railways from Baltimore north to Harrisburg and east to Philadelphia were broken in consequence of the destruction of bridges by Southern sympathizers, and were not again opened for travel until the 7th of May; but in the meantime, troops in large numbers were brought to Washington from the North and the West by steamers from Perryville, on the Susquehanna, on the road to Philadelphia, down the bay to Annapolis, and thence by rail across to Washington, and also around the coast to Chesapeake bay, and up that and the Potomac, so that quite an army was gathered in that city when Col. J. K. Mansfield took command of it on the 27th of April. Steps were taken to guard the bridges from Virginia and all other approaches, Lincoln on the same day calling for twenty-five regiments of regulars in addition to the 75,000 three-months' men previously called.

On the 25th of April, the Confederates planted batteries on Arlington heights, and placed guards in Alexandria and along the Potomac above and below Washington. On the 28th, Federal troops guarded the northern, and Confederate troops the southern, end of the long bridge; but on the 30th, General Lee ordered the withdrawal of all troops between the long bridge and Alexandria, to avoid provoking a collision for which he was unprepared. On the 5th of May, the Confederate forces in Alexandria, some 500 in number, including 70 cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. A. S. Taylor, alarmed by a rumored attack, evacuated Alexandria, without orders, and fell back to Springfield. General Cocke, in command along the Potomac, from his headquarters at Culpeper promptly ordered them back. On the 9th two Virginia regiments of infantry were ordered to Cocke, and on that day he located his headquarters at Manassas Junction and began the gathering of troops at that point, establishing connections with Col. Daniel Ruggles, in command at Fredericksburg with his advance at Aquia creek on the Potomac,

and strengthening Leesburg, under command of Colonel Hunton, with several regiments of infantry and companies of cavalry and artillery, to protect that place, the line of the railway to Alexandria, and watch the fords of the Potomac. On the 12th, Federal gunboats in the Potomac were brought up in front of Alexandria. On the 21st of May, Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham was put in command of the Alexandria line, and established his headquarters at Manassas Junction. Troops from all portions of the South were ordered forward to that place, which, it was rumored, was threatened with early attack.

On May 24th, the day after the citizens of Virginia approved her ordinance of secession, about a dozen regiments of Federal infantry, with cavalry and artillery, at 2 a. m. crossed the Potomac by the aqueduct and the long bridge, and by steamer at Alexandria, and took possession of Arlington heights, Alexandria and the intermediate front of the Potomac, driving out the Confederates, some 500 men, from Alexandria, at half-past four, and capturing Ball's company of cavalry. The Confederates fell back to Manassas and the Federals at once began fortifying their front, after advancing their pickets several miles on the roads leading into Virginia. The supposition of Colonel Terrett, who evacuated Alexandria, was that the Federals proposed to advance toward Leesburg. The next day Bonham reported to Lee that he then had at Manassas Junction but 500 infantry, four pieces of artillery and one troop of cavalry.

Before the opening of the Manassas campaign there were a number of minor affairs, of which a condensed account may be here given:

On May 21st, and again on June 1st, two armed steamers attacked the Confederate battery established at Aquia creek on the Potomac, but without doing much damage. Colonel Ruggles promptly moved 700 men across from Fredericksburg, with some 6-pounder rifle guns, and engaged the gunboats successfully. He then established Bate's Tennessee regiment in a camp at Brooke Station, and returned the rest of his forces to Fredericksburg.

On June 1st, Lieutenant Tompkins, with 75 men of the Second United States cavalry, sent on a scout, drove in the pickets and charged through Lieut.-Col. R. S. Ewell's camp, at Fairfax, between three and four in the morning. A lively skirmish ensued, forcing the Federals to pass around the village in retreat, after some loss. Colonel Ewell was wounded, and Captain Marr, of the Warrenton rifles, was killed, while bravely rallying their men. This attack was made without orders, and McDowell says it frustrated, for the time, a



more important movement, which Ewell learned was to have been an attack on Manassas.

On June 10th, Col. Charles P. Stone began, with the District of Columbia volunteers, what is known as "the Rockville expedition," having for its object the holding of the line of the Potomac from Washington up toward Harper's Ferry, guarding the fords and ferries of that river from Virginia, and any movement on Washington from that direction. This resulted in skirmishes near Seneca mills on the 14th, at Conrad's Ferry on the 17th, at Edward's Ferry on the 18th, at Harper's Ferry July 4th, and at Great Falls July 7th. Colonel Stone was reinforced from time to time with other volunteer troops from Washington. His headquarters were opposite Harper's Ferry July 6th, when he marched, with most of his command, to Williamsport, Md., and thence to Martinsburg, to reinforce Patterson. The Confederate force opposing him was mainly that under Col. Eppa Hunton, in observation at Leesburg.

On June 16th, Col. Maxcy Gregg, with the First South Carolina infantry, about 575 strong, several companies of cavalry and two guns of Kemper's battery, marched from his camp near Fairfax on a reconnoissance to Dranesville, where he learned that several hundred of the enemy had that day come up the Leesburg turnpike to near Hunter's mill. On the morning of the 17th, Gregg rode with a troop of horse to the Potomac, opposite Seneca creek, and reconnoitered. Returning, he marched by Hunter's mill to Vienna, on the Alexandria & Leesburg railroad. About 6 p. m., as he was moving off, the whistle of an approaching train was heard in the direction of Alexandria. He at once marched back, planted his two guns on a hill commanding a curve in the railroad, and placed his infantry and cavalry in support. As the train came round the curve, Kemper opened on it a rapid fire from his guns, which badly damaged the train and caused the Federals, the First Ohio, under Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck, to escape from it and rapidly retreat. Owing to the lateness of the hour Gregg, could not pursue, but he destroyed one passenger and five platform cars, captured some arms, and killed and wounded several of the enemy, without loss and with credit to his management.

On June 25th a small party of the enemy landed at Mathias Point, under cover of guns from a steamer, and burned the house of Dr. Howe; the object being to discover whether a battery was being located there. On the 27th another descent was made by a force landed from boats. Maj. R. M. Mayo's command of one cavalry and three infantry companies met and drove this body. Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes, in command, reported that he then had fifteen companies of volunteers at Mathias Point, and had ordered a section of Walker's battery to the same place.

On July 14th, Colonel Davies, with the Fifteenth New York, made a reconnoissance from Alexandria 7 miles out on the Fairfax road, 10 miles on the Richmond, or Telegraph road, and to Mt. Vernon. Only a small picket was met on the Richmond road. Some of Davies' command visited the house of Col. John A. Washington, near Mt. Vernon, and brought away plantation supplies, taking Colonel Washington's teams and negroes to haul them to camp. Davies sent back the teams and supplies, but kept the negroes to do team duty in his brigade. Col. D. S. Miles, his division commander, instructed Davies to respect private property, and send back the negroes.

On June 2d, Brig.-Gen. G. T. Beauregard took command of the Confederate troops on the "Alexandria line." His main line of defense was behind Bull run, and his headquarters at Manassas Junction, 26 miles from Alexandria and the Potomac river. This army then held the line of the Potomac from the Blue ridge down to the vicinity of Washington, thence around the already partially fortified Virginia front of that city to the Potomac, and then south along that river to Chesapeake bay.

The only advantages of the line of Bull run to the Confederates were strategic. It was, by public roads, about 20 miles from the Potomac, a distance over which the movements of the Federal army could be easily watched; and it covered the junction of the Orange & Alexandria railroad—which had connection at Gordonsville, by the Virginia Central, with Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, and with Staunton, a great depot of supplies and the most important town in the Shenandoah valley—with the Manassas Gap railroad, which led from Manassas Junction to Strasburg in the lower valley of the Shenandoah, giving quick connection with the army there operating under Gen. J. E. Johnston.

Excellent highways from Alexandria and Washington, and from other important points to the northwest and southwest, converged at Centreville, about 3 miles east of Bull run, offering great advantages for the concentration of the Federal army in the immediate front of this line; while roads diverging from the same village to the northwest, west and southwest, made it an easy matter to maneuver troops for offensive operations upon the flanks of a defensive army holding the line of Bull run. There were also excellent positions on the northeastern side of that stream for holding the defensive army in check in front of its center while flanking movements to either hand were in process of execution.

The Federal army of invasion consisted of five divisions: The First, under Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler, was composed of four brigades of infantry and four batteries of regular United States artillery; the Second, under Col. D. M. Hunter, of two brigades of infantry, a battalion of United States cavalry, a battery of regular United States artillery, and two volunteer batteries; the Third, under Col. S. P. Heintzelman, of three brigades of infan-

try and two batteries of regular United States artillery. These three divisions and their cavalry and batteries participated in the battle. The Fourth division, under Brig.-Gen. T. Runyon, and the Fifth, under Col. D. S. Miles, each composed of two brigades of infantry, two batteries of regular United States artillery, and one volunteer battery, were held in reserve, in front of and at Centreville, and in its rear, and did not participate in the battle, except that the Fifth had some skirmishing while covering the retreat of the Federal army. The Fifth division guarded the roads leading to the Potomac and did not get nearer to Centreville than about Fairfax, 7 miles eastward. The official returns for July 17th show that McDowell had 34,127 men present for duty. His adjutant-general claims that the rank and file of his army that participated in the battle of Bull Run numbered 18,572, with 24 pieces of artillery. This does not include the two divisions in reserve, which had over 11,000 men and 25 pieces of artillery.\*

The Confederate forces at Bull Run were embraced in the army of the Potomac, which, under Brig.-Gen. G. T. Beauregard, had been holding Manassas and the line of the Potomac east of the Blue ridge, and the army of the Shenandoah, under Gen. J. E. Johnston, which reinforced the former, from the Shenandoah valley, during the engagement. The army of the Potomac, before the battle, consisted of the First brigade, one North Carolina and four South Carolina regiments, under Brig.-Gen. M. L. Bonham; Second brigade, two Alabama and one Louisiana regiments, under Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell; Third brigade, two Mississippi and one South Carolina regiments, under Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones; Fourth brigade, one North Carolina and three Virginia regiments, under Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet; Fifth brigade, one Louisiana battalion and five Virginia regiments, under Col. P. St. George Cocke; Sixth brigade, two Virginia, one Mississippi and one South Carolina regiment, under Col. J. A. Early; and not brigaded, two Louisiana and one South Carolina infantry regiment, two cavalry regiments and one artillery battalion, and five artillery batteries.

\* Beauregard states, in a paper published since the war, that the combined Confederate army at Manassas mustered 29,188 men, rank and file, and 55 guns; that of these, 21,923 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery, and 29 guns, belonged to his army of the Potomac.



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10 Col. James  
11 Mr. Wilkins  
12 Bowser reported a horse killed  
13 Garrison's grave

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- A. Bzyl. Va. Viola*  
17-18 Feb.

- A. Boyd, Via Veldt*

- Regt. Va. Vols.  
25 - 1st P.S.  
13 - 2d

- Rayt. Va. Vol.  
24 - 1st Reg.  
25 - 2d  
44 - 3d

- 13 Regt. Va. Vols.  
15-1st Div.

- 437-22  
229-34  
Royt. Va. Viola  
18-100. Png.

- Regt. Va. Vols.  
23-1st Regt.  
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- 33 - 1st Pos.  
33 - 2d  
41 - Tiger's alarm.

- 4-14 Feb  
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- 51-1st Flr.  
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- Regt. Va. Vols.  
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- 2d Rept. S.C. Vol. 100

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| 12                   | 1 <sup>st</sup> Pub |
| 14                   | 2 <sup>d</sup>      |

- 44-3d  
45-Companion  
Salem

- $\frac{60}{30} = \frac{1^{\text{st}} \text{ Ave.}}{2^{\text{nd}} \text{ Ave.}}$
- Early's Brigade*  
 $\frac{30}{30} = \frac{1^{\text{st}} \text{ Ave.}}{2^{\text{nd}} \text{ Ave.}}$

- 60 Capt. Kilpatrick  
42 " Anderson

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- 10

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
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The army of the Shenandoah, when it joined Beauregard, was composed of the First brigade, four Virginia infantry regiments and Pendleton's Virginia battery, under Col. T. J. Jackson; Second brigade, three Georgia regiments, two Kentucky battalions and Alburtis' Virginia battery; Third brigade, one Alabama, two Mississippi and one Tennessee regiment, and Imboden's Virginia battery, under Brig.-Gen. B. E. Bee; Fourth brigade, one Tennessee and two Virginia regiments, a Maryland infantry battalion, and Grove's Virginia battery, under Col. A. Elzey; and one Virginia regiment of infantry and one of cavalry, not brigaded. The army of the Potomac, it was estimated, had 9,713 men of all arms engaged; the army of the Shenandoah had a total of 8,340 of all arms for duty. The combined army was estimated to contain some 30,000 men of all arms; but only about 18,000 of these were actually engaged in the battle.

When Beauregard took command at Manassas, Johnston's "army of the Shenandoah," in the lower Shenandoah valley, was, in a sense, Beauregard's left, although not under his command, as Johnston ranked him. On the right, at Aquia creek, on the Potomac, holding the terminus of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac railroad, was a Confederate force of some 2,500 men, under Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes. Beauregard had a small advanced outpost, under Colonel Hunton, at Leesburg, watching the fords of the upper Potomac east of the Blue ridge; another at Fairfax, in direct observation of the Federal army at Washington, with detachments on the line of the railway toward Alexandria, and to the south of that road, guarding the approaches to his right from Alexandria. The principal advantage of his chosen line of defense was that it was an interior one.

From information that he deemed authentic, Beauregard concluded that he was confronted by an army of 50,000 men, fully equipped and ready for offensive operations, under the direction, as general-in-chief, of Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, then considered the most able, as he was the most distinguished military officer on the American continent, and under the immediate command of Brig.-Gen. Irvin McDowell, one of the most esteemed of the active officers of the Federal army. To oppose these

he could muster barely 18,000 men and 29 guns. In view of this supposed disparity of opposing force, Beauregard urged President Davis to concentrate the armies of Johnston and Holmes with his at Manassas, that he might be ready to fall upon McDowell's flanks, rear, and line of communication, whenever he should advance, cut off his retreat upon Washington, and force him to surrender; and, by so doing, compel Patterson to retreat from the lower Shenandoah valley, and thus insure the capture of Washington. These suggestions were not favorably received at Richmond, and it was intimated to Beauregard that he should retire behind the Rappahannock when an offensive movement of the Federal army began.

Left to his own discretion, Beauregard informed himself fully concerning his position and the approaches to it, destroyed the railroad bridge across Bull run in front of Manassas Junction, and awaited results. A faithful spy, sent to Washington, having reliable information July 15th that the Federal army would march the next day, rode rapidly around the left flank of that army and put this important information in the hands of Beauregard before 9 p. m. of the same day, thus giving him notice of the ordered movement of the Federal army nearly half a day before it began. He at once ordered his outposts back to assigned positions; that from Leesburg, by way of Aldie, by forced marches (28 miles in a day and a half) to Manassas. President Davis was informed of the situation and the suggestion made that the army of the Shenandoah and Holmes' brigade at Aquia creek should be ordered to reinforce Manassas. Davis promptly ordered Holmes to report to Beauregard, and gave Johnston discretion to move his command for the same purpose. The latter, in anticipation of such a call for aid, unhesitatingly consented to this arrangement, and Beauregard, on request, hastened trains up the Manassas Gap railroad to meet the army of the Shenandoah on the way to Manassas Junction and expedite its arrival. At the same time he suggested to Johnston that he concentrate his army at the Aldie gap of the Bull Run mountains, where the turnpikes from the valley through Snicker's gap and Ashby's gap of the Blue ridge unite, and then march southeastward by roads leading to McDowell's line of advance, and fall upon the right and rear of the Federal

army while he pressed him offensively in front. This proposition of a divided instead of a combined co-operation did not meet the approval of Johnston.

The Federal army, in light marching order, began its march toward Manassas in the afternoon of Tuesday, July 16th, and its advance, in well-disposed parallel columns, but little opposed, encamped that night in front of Fairfax. Advancing again on the 17th, the cavalry moving along the right of the Federal army had a skirmish with the Confederate cavalry at Vienna, on the Alexandria & Loudoun railroad, and the column on the Centreville road with the Confederate pickets in front of Fairfax as they retired, leaving the way open for the Federals to reach the vicinity of Centreville and the front of Bull run late in the evening of that day, after having covered 20 miles from the Potomac in two days.

By morning of Thursday, July 18th, McDowell's army was massed around Centreville, with the exception of a division which had been left at Fairfax Court House to guard the right of the advance and watch the roads leading to the northwest. The Confederate line south of Bull run, at Mitchell's ford, on the direct road from Centreville to Manassas Junction, was but 3 miles from Centreville. On this road the Federal forces advanced on the morning of the 18th, the leading division, under Tyler, making infantry demonstrations before Mitchell's ford and Blackburn's ford (about a mile further east), opening with artillery from the fine positions on the north side of Bull run in front of each of these fords. Beauregard had placed Longstreet's brigade, with Early's in reserve, to cover these two fords. These repulsed the Federal attacks and efforts to force a passage, and the enemy's infantry retired about 1 p. m., but an artillery duel continued the contest.

Federal authorities deny that an attempt was made to force a passage of Bull run on the 18th, and that this engagement, which has been called the "battle of Bull Run" (that of the 21st being known as the "battle of Manassas"), was only a demonstration to engage the attention of the Confederates while McDowell reconnoitered to decide upon his plan of attack. Beauregard claims that his success in this first encounter was of especial advantage to his army of raw troops; that it made McDowell cautious and hesitating in forming his

plans for a general engagement, and that it gave him time, then his greatest need, for the concentration of the three Confederate armies for the final struggle.

While providing for and awaiting the general attack, Beauregard was, on the 19th, urged by Adjutant-General Cooper to withdraw his call upon Johnston for assistance if the enemy in front of him had abandoned an immediate attack. As this was not an order, Beauregard paid no attention to it, and continued his efforts to secure the early arrival of Johnston's forces, intending, with their help, to take the offensive. McDowell spent the 19th and 20th reconnoitering the Confederate front and waiting for rations. During these two days, 8,340 of Johnston's men with twenty guns, and 1,265 of Holmes', with six guns, arrived upon Beauregard's left and right; the larger number of them in the afternoon of the 20th. Most of these were ordered to the Confederate left-center and left, at the instance of General Johnston, as Beauregard had placed the most of his own army on his right-center and right, expecting, from McDowell's demonstrations of the 18th, that his main effort would be to turn the Confederate right by marching southward to Union Mills.

From Centreville, in the rear of which McDowell had established his headquarters, and around which he had massed his troops, seven public roads diverge to the principal points of the compass, and from each of these, at no great distance from that village, other roads diverge to intermediate points, until not less than a dozen roads lead from that village, crossing Bull run at nearly as many fords, making it an extremely difficult matter to watch the movements of an army there concentrated and having for its objective the southwestern side of Bull run. A circle with a radius of 3 miles from Centreville will pass through or near ten of these fords, from McLean's on the southeast to Poplar on the northwest. Bull run, in this interval of 6 miles of arc, nearly follows the three-mile circle drawn around Centreville. A circle with 7 miles of radius, drawn around the same center, crosses Bull run to the south of Centreville, near Union Mills and the bridge of the Orange & Alexandria railroad; about  $9\frac{1}{2}$  miles away to the northwest it crosses the Sudley ford of Bull run; and from that ford, back toward the beginning, in a distance of 3 miles, it passes directly through the field of the 21st.

With this many-roaded problem of offense and defense before him, and his notions of McDowell's designs, Beauregard disposed his forces along Bull run for over a dozen miles in the following order, from right to left, so as to cover all the fords by which he thought McDowell might seek a crossing: At the Union Mills ford, on his extreme right, beyond the railway bridge, he placed Ewell's brigade, supported by that of Holmes, which had arrived from Aquia creek; at McLean's ford, about two miles farther up the stream, D. R. Jones' brigade, supported by Early's; at Blackburn's ford, one mile farther up, Longstreet's brigade; at Mitchell's ford, about a mile farther up stream, Bonham's brigade, which also covered another ford about three-quarters of a mile still farther up and near the mouth of Cub run. Cocke's brigade held the line from Bonham's left, covering Island, Ball's and Lewis' fords, for two miles up the stream to the mouth of Young's branch, three-fourths of a mile below the stone bridge, while Evans' half brigade, under Cocke's command, extended the Confederate line up to and covering the stone bridge, the Warrenton turnpike from Centreville, and a farm ford a quarter of a mile above that bridge. The brigades of the army of the Shenandoah that had already arrived were placed in reserve; those of Bee and Bartow between McLean's and Blackburn's fords, in the rear of Early's and Longstreet's brigades, and Jackson's to the left, between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords, covering the rear of parts of Longstreet's and Bonham's brigades.

During the night of Saturday, July 20th, the Federal army was thus disposed: Tyler's division was advanced along the Warrenton road and massed about a mile west of Centreville, near Rocky run, and Richardson's brigade of this division was advanced about a mile and a half to the southwest of Centreville, on the road to Blackburn's ford. The remainder of the Federal army, except the reserve divisions left near Centreville and Fairfax, was encamped a short distance to the east of Centreville. After having spent two days reconnoitering along Bull run, McDowell decided to make demonstrations in the Confederate front, on the Warrenton road and on the road to Blackburn's ford, with Tyler's division, while with Hunter's and Heintzelman's he would, by a wide detour of 7 miles or more to the westward and northward,

cross Bull run at Sudley ford, turn the Confederate left, and get in its rear between Bull run and the Manassas Gap railroad, hoping by so doing to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard. This plan of engagement adopted, McDowell intended to begin his movement during the night of the 20th, but his division commanders persuaded him to put it off until the morning of the 21st. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades of Tyler's division, with Carlisle's battery of six brass guns and a 30-pounder Parrott gun, marched at 2:30 a. m. of the 21st from near Centreville, along the Warrenton road to near the stone bridge over Bull run, where Schenck deployed his brigade on the left of the road and Sherman's on the right, with artillery in the Warrenton road and in that leading to Blackburn's ford, and opened at 6:30 a. m. on the Confederate left with all his guns, but brought no reply, as the Confederate guns were of too short range. This disconcerted McDowell, leading him to fear an attack from Blackburn's ford, and caused him to hold back one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve to Schenck. Later, as Schenck's skirmish line advanced, it was met on the eastern side of Bull run by that of the Confederates. About 7 Beauregard ordered Jackson's brigade, the nearest reserve force, to move with Imboden's Staunton artillery and Walton's battery to the left to support Coker as well as Bonham; the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the former, were also sent to support the left against the threatened attack by Schenck.

In the meantime, the main Federal column continued its flanking movement by Sudley ford, but losing time in wading across as the men halted to drink. Seeing clouds of dust rising in the direction of Manassas Junction, indicating the coming of a large force that might head off his movement, McDowell ordered the heads of regiments to break from the columns and march forward, separately, as rapidly as possible; directed Heintzelman's reserve brigade to cross the fields on the left to a nearer ford below Sudley, and sent word to Tyler to hurry up the advance. The brigades of Burnside and Porter, with Griffin's battery, had already passed through the Sudley wood, which Jackson made famous the next year, and were deploying, facing southward, on the sloping open of cultivated ground beyond; and immediately behind these were marching the brigades of Franklin and Wilcox,

accompanied by the batteries of Ricketts and Arnold. The brigades of Howard and Keyes were still detained in the vicinity of the Warrenton turnpike, where the road that the flanking columns had followed diverged to the northward. The distance to Sudley had proved greater than McDowell expected and the troops had been delayed.

Learning from his scouts that the enemy was concentrating along the Warrenton turnpike, Beauregard concluded that an attempt would be made to turn his left flank at the stone bridge; therefore, at half past four, not long after sunrise, he ordered his brigade commanders to hold themselves in readiness to move at short notice, suggesting to each that the Federal attack might be on his left. A little later he was advised of the advance of the Federals toward the stone bridge, and, by half past five, that they were deploying in front of Evans, who covered that bridge. Concluding that the opportunity had arrived for an offensive flank movement on the Federal left and rear, Beauregard sent orders to the brigades on his center and right to cross the fords and advance rapidly on Centreville, with vigorous attacks, while he held, with Evans and Cocke and their supports, the attack on the stone bridge to the last extremity. This wheeling movement of his right to the Federal left and rear, by his front line, was to be followed up by the reserves, which, without orders, were to move to the sound of the heaviest firing. Ewell was to begin this flanking movement from the Union Mills ford, on the extreme right, to be followed by the brigades to the left, successively, at the various fords, as before enumerated. Great care had been taken to instruct the subordinate commanders in reference to this movement, as they were all unaccustomed to command in battle maneuvers; they were also ordered to establish close communication with each other before making the attack.

At half past eight, Generals Johnston and Beauregard took position on a high hill in the rear of the center, opposite Mitchell's ford, to await the opening of the Confederate attack on the right, by which Beauregard confidently expected to win a decisive victory by midday, and cut off the retreat of the Federal army to Washington. At about the same hour, Evans, from near the stone bridge, discovered a lengthening line of dust advancing from the north toward the Warrenton turnpike, and, observing



that the attack on his front was not pressed with vigor, became satisfied that it was a mere feint, and that a column of the enemy was moving, masked by the Sudley woods, to fall on his left flank. He promptly informed General Cocke, his immediate commander, of the enemy's movement, and took the responsibility of making dispositions to meet it. Leaving four companies under cover at the stone bridge, which had been previously destroyed, he led six companies of the Fourth South Carolina riflemen and Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers, with two 6-pounder howitzers, across the valley of Young's branch to the high ground called Matthews' hill (on the divide between that branch and one parallel to it on the north, facing the Henry hill), about three-fourths of a mile north of the Warrenton road, and placed his men so as to meet the Federal advance by the Sudley road, on which he rested his left, planting one gun on his right and the other on his left. His front was covered by a small piece of woods extending along the Sudley road. Here he awaited the approach of the Federal column, which, led by Burnside's brigade, deployed in his front a little before 10 o'clock. Wheat at once engaged the Federal skirmishers, and when the second Rhode Island regiment and its six guns appeared, Evans met them with his South Carolinians and two howitzers, at short range, and drove them back. Burnside's entire brigade, supported by eight guns, was now sent forward in a second charge. These were met and driven back into the strip of woods from which they had advanced, and from which they continued to fire, until, reinforced by eight companies of United States regular infantry and six pieces of artillery, supported by other regiments of Porter's brigade, they advanced to a third attack, which Evans held in combat for about an hour. Major Wheat was severely wounded in the first attack, and, having to leave the field, his battalion became somewhat disorganized. During the third attack, which Evans was sustaining with great firmness, he called upon General Bee, who was in reserve with his own and Bartow's command near the stone bridge, for help. Bee, informed of the Federal movement, had already moved to the left following the sound of conflict, and taken position on the Henry hill, or plateau, to the south of the Warrenton turnpike. This hill commanded the stone bridge and the Sudley road

where that crossed the turnpike, by its elevation of about 100 feet above the level of Bull run. Bee was holding this admirable position with his two brigades on opposite sides of Imboden's battery (which he had borrowed from Jackson's brigade), in full view of Evans' contention on the opposite side of Young's branch valley, and was opening with his artillery upon the Federal batteries opposed to Evans, when he received the latter's request for aid, which he answered by advising Evans to withdraw to his position on the Henry hill. Still full of fight, Evans was unwilling to retreat, and renewed his appeal for reinforcements. As it was plain to be seen that the visibly swelling numbers of McDowell's advance were giving them great advantages over Evans in the combat, Bee yielded to his appeal and led his two brigades across the valley under fire of the enemy's well served artillery, and threw them into the contention, one regiment in the woods held by Evans, two along a fence extending to the right, and two, under Bartow, extending the right still further, but at right angles along the edge of a wood, not more than 100 yards from the Federal left, where the combat, at short range, quickly became sharp and deadly. The superior numbers of the Federal infantry failed to make any headway against this stubborn vanguard, although the powerful batteries of Griffin were playing on Bee's whole line, until two strong brigades from Heintzelman's division, arriving on the field, extended the line of fire on the Federal right, and a six-gun battery of rifled 10-pounders took part from a strong position behind the Sudley road. While contending with these odds, the brigades of Sherman and Keyes, of Tyler's division, under orders from McDowell to force the stone bridge, crossed at a ford above that bridge and moved into position on the Federal left, so lengthening that as to overlap Bee and force him to retire, which he began to do, steadily, covered by the fire of Imboden's guns and of Hampton's legion from the Henry plateau and his own retiring howitzers; but the Federal fire that followed was so fierce and heavy that the Confederates were soon thrown into confusion and the greater part of them retreated, discomfited, across Young's branch, and sought safety around the sheltering spur to the right of the stone bridge.

While this brave battle of Evans and Bee was going on,

Johnston and Beauregard were anxiously awaiting on Lookout hill the development of the flank movement ordered against the Federal left and rear. Surprised that Ewell did not begin this, they learned from D. R. Jones, at the nearby McLean's ford, that he had long been ready and waiting for Ewell to join his right in the forward movement, as he had sent him, between seven and eight in the morning, a copy of the order from headquarters directing Ewell to at once begin that movement; but so far he had heard nothing from him. Beauregard at once, by a staff officer, repeated his order to Ewell, directing him to promptly advance; but soon hearing from him that he, too, had been waiting, having received no orders, and the firing on the left indicating a serious attack by the enemy in that direction, the generals decided to abandon the intended offensive movement and hurry all their available forces to the left, where it was now apparent the main battle was to be fought. Ewell, Jones and Longstreet were left in their assigned positions on the right and along the center, to hold the Federals in their front and make demonstrations toward Centreville. The brigades of Holmes and Early and two regiments of Bonham's brigade, with six guns, were ordered to move rapidly to the left to reinforce the battle of Evans and Bee on the Warrenton road. These orders given, the two generals rode rapidly to the field of conflict, arriving on the Henry hill, which overlooked that field, just as the discomfited men of Bee and Evans, overpowered by numbers, were seeking refuge from the hot and heavy Federal fire in the shallow ravines that ascended from Young's branch, from near the turnpike, to the right and rear of the line that Jackson had formed with his brigade on the Henry hill; Hampton's legion, by steady combat, having covered the rear of the retreat.

The field officers of the more than 2,000 routed men of the commands of Evans and Bee, among whom Federal shot and shell from the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were raining, were making desperate efforts to rally their men and reorganize them, but to no purpose, although Johnston and Beauregard both joined in the effort. Strong masses of Federal infantry were rapidly advancing, and disaster seemed imminent, when the heroic Bee, exhausted in his fruitless effort to rally his men, rode

up to Jackson, who was steadily holding his brigade in a full fronting position, notwithstanding the approaching attack of the enemy, the artillery fire that was thinning his ranks, and the nearby confusion, and cried out in a tone of despair: "General, they are beating us back!" The reply came, prompt and curt, but calm, "Then we will give them the bayonet." The blazing and defiant look of Jackson, his bold and prompt determination, and the steady line of brave men that supported him, gave new life to Bee. Galloping back to the disorganized masses of his command, he shouted, waving his hand to the left: "Look! There is Jackson, standing like a stone wall. Rally behind the Virginians! Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Follow me!" Obedient to this clarion call to duty and the example of soldierly bearing to which their attention had been called, a number of Bee's men rallied and followed him in a charge to the left against the advancing enemy, in which this heroic leader fell dead. From that time forward, through all the ages of history, Jackson became, and will continue to be, "Stonewall" Jackson, and his brigade the "Stonewall brigade."

At this crisis of the battle on the Confederate side, Beauregard ordered the regimental standards to be advanced some 40 yards to the front of the still disordered masses of the commands of Evans and Bee. This was promptly done by the field officers, thus gaining the attention of the men and inducing them to obey orders and rally on their colors. Johnston and Beauregard in person, at about this time, advanced to the front with the colors of the Fourth Alabama, when, as General Beauregard relates, "the line that had fought all the morning and had fled, routed and disheartened, now advanced again into position as steadily as veterans."

Order was but partially restored on the Henry hill, when, flushed with their partial victory and eagerly striving for a complete one, the Federals, in battle array, came sweeping down the slope on which Evans had so long detained them, crossed Young's branch and the Warrenton turnpike, and began climbing the northern slope of the Henry hill, detained for awhile by Hampton's legion, which he had promptly thrown forward to cover the retreat of Bee and Evans.

Seeing the superior numbers of the enemy advancing

to another conflict, Beauregard persuaded Johnston, who yielded with great reluctance, to ride back about a mile to "Portici," the Lewis house, on the line of communication with the right, and hasten forward, as they came up, the reinforcements that had been ordered to the battle, while he looked after the immediate combat, which was provided for by placing Smith's Forty-ninth Virginia, ordered up from Cocke's brigade on Bull run, on Jackson's left, and the Seventh Georgia still farther to the left. Hampton's legion of South Carolinians and Hunton's Eighth Virginia, which had also been called up from Cocke, were placed in the rear of Jackson's right to oppose any attack from the direction of the stone bridge. These 6,500 men and 13 field guns in place, he awaited the attack of four Federal brigades, a battalion of cavalry, and the fine batteries of Griffin and Ricketts of the regular army, some 11,000 soldiers in rank and file, that in splendid martial order were now nearing the front of his position on the Henry plateau. The north-western crest of this they soon reached, in well formed line of battle, captured the Robinson house on the Confederate right and the Henry house on its left-center, quickly placed the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts in position near the Henry house, and poured a galling fire of infantry and artillery on the Confederate line, to the fury of which three other Federal batteries contributed from the hills beyond the turnpike. The somewhat sunken Sudley road, along which the Federals had been advancing, furnished a covered way up the Henry hill which their infantry took advantage of in supporting their batteries near the Henry house. The lines of battle were now not far apart on the undulating Henry plateau, and the Confederate batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Walton, Pendleton and Alburtis had their innings at short range, cutting fearful gaps in the oncoming lines, which were still more severely punished by the steady fire of the musketry of Jackson's men and of those on his right and left; especially was this the case on Beauregard's left, which he had strengthened with two companies of the Second Mississippi. Two companies of Stuart's cavalry, coming from the left, just then charged through the Federal ranks to the Sudley road, and added to the havoc wrought by the infantry and artillery.

McDowell, watching from the Sudley ridge slope the

wavering battle, followed up his attack by continuing to extend his right with fresh bodies of infantry and artillery as they came forward from the rear, and by so doing threatening to turn Beauregard's left. Some of the Federal guns were pressed so boldly to the front that men from the Thirty-third Virginia sprang forward and captured them, but they were soon retaken. To meet this threatened blow on his left, Beauregard took the offensive and ordered a counterstroke from his right to clean off the Henry plateau in his front. The commands of Bee, Bartow, Evans and Hampton, the men who had so bravely and stubbornly held back McDowell's advance in the early morning, now responded with spirit and speed, striking the Federal left; Jackson, with strong and steady blows, pierced its center, while Smith's Virginians and Gartrell's Georgians charged on its right. This bold movement, sweeping over both infantry and artillery, entirely cleared the plateau of Federal troops and captured the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin. The success of this brilliant counterstroke cheered the Confederates and braced them for another struggle.

Looking from his commanding position to the northward, Beauregard saw the still constant and steady coming on of Federal reinforcements. Without delay he reorganized his line of battle, under heavy fire from the artillery on the hills north of the turnpike, and prepared for the third attack, which McDowell was then organizing with Howard's brigade, which had just arrived on the field of battle. The attack soon came; the fresh Federal troops swept down the slope from the north, crossed the valley of Young's branch, and pressed up the northward slope of the Henry hill, taking advantage of ravines, clumps of trees, and the sunken Sudley road, and reaching the crest, by the force of numbers bravely led, pressed the Confederates back across the plateau, regained their lost position and recaptured their lost guns. The conflict now became a death struggle for the final possession of the Henry hill and for the closing victory to which that was the key. The advantage of numbers enabled McDowell to still further extend his right through the woods west of the Sudley road, again threaten to turn Beauregard's left, and force him to throw that back as a protection against such a movement; this also enabled McDowell to extend his left

toward Bull run, and threaten to turn Beauregard's right from the direction of the stone bridge.

It was now between two and three of the afternoon of a scorchingly hot midsummer day, and many of Beauregard's men, who had been almost constantly fighting since the early morning, were nearly exhausted; but having faith in the unflinching endurance of his men, whose mettle he had so thoroughly tested during the preceding hours of the day, he not only determined to hold on and await reinforcements, which he knew Johnston was sending, for the final struggle, but to again take the offensive and drive the enemy from the plateau, advancing his whole line as before and adding to it the reserves on the right, which he would lead in person. Of this Beauregard wrote: "The movement was made with such keeping and dash that the whole plateau was swept clear of the enemy, who were driven down the slope and across the turnpike on our right and the valley of Young's branch on our left, leaving in our final possession the Robinson and the Henry houses, with most of Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries, the men of which were mostly shot down where they bravely stood by their guns."

The Sixth North Carolina, which, by railway, had just reached Manassas Junction from toward Richmond, now came to the field in time to join with the left of Beauregard's charge; the Eighteenth Virginia, under Colonel Withers, which had been ordered up from Cocke's brigade on the banks of Bull run, also arrived, opportunely, on the right, and joined in the charge with Hampton's legion, capturing several guns, which some of the officers of these commands turned upon the retreating foe, and so helped to finish the hot work of driving McDowell's men for the second and last time from the Henry plateau.

This successful Confederate charge, across the fields and through the patches of forest of the Henry hill, did not reach McDowell's right, which extended through the woods to the west of the Sudley road and to some distance beyond Beauregard's left. The Second and Eighth South Carolina, moving from the Confederate right on Bull run, had been turned by Johnston to the Confederate left of the engagement. These reached the field in time to meet McDowell's movement from the right.

Preston's Twenty-eighth Virginia and Kemper's Virginia battery also appeared in time to join the South Carolinians in holding, with hot contention, Howard's brigade, Sykes' battalion of regulars, and the accompanying artillery and cavalry of McDowell's right, but were not strong enough to drive them back. The hour of three in the afternoon had now come, and it was time to strike a last telling blow to decide the fortunes of the day. Providentially for the Confederates, E. Kirby Smith's brigade of 1,700 fresh and rested soldiers, the last of the available reinforcements from the army of the Shenandoah, had reached Manassas Junction, by rail, at midday. They were 6 miles in the rear of the battle, but officers of the general staff were at hand to guide and hurry them to the critical point of the pending contention, the Confederate left of the field. Just as that brigade entered the wood to the left of the Sudley road, a Federal bullet seriously wounded General Smith, and the command devolved upon Col. Arnold Elzey, a most efficient successor, who, guided by Captain Harris of the engineers, marched his brigade to Beauregard's extreme left and then, moving forward, met the Federal advance just coming into the open fields of the Chinn farm, and, aided by Beckham's Virginia battery, poured upon it a destructive fire which held it in check in the forest on the northward slopes toward the turnpike. Just then McDowell made another strenuous effort to turn the Confederate right by sending Keyes' brigade across the turnpike near the stone bridge, and thence southward, under cover of the spurs from the Henry plateau, to a favorable point for attack. Latham's Virginia battery, in position to guard that flank, met this advance with a galling fire, aided by Alburtis' Virginia battery, which Jackson had hastened to his left and supported by broken fragments of troops collected by staff officers. These repulsed this movement, and showed McDowell that it was useless to attempt to turn that flank of Beauregard's army.

Still unwilling to yield the field, McDowell formed from fresh men that came up a new line of battle, formidable in numbers and in length, and crescent in outline, across the Sudley road, on the heights to the north of the turnpike, and throwing forward a strong line of skirmishers, proposed for a third time to assault the Henry plateau; but his intention was quickly thwarted



by the fierce combat that Elzey was now pressing on his right, the force of which was intensified by the arrival of Early's grand Virginia brigade from McLean's ford, which, by direction of Johnston, swept around the rear of the woods through which Elzey had passed, and bravely bore down upon the flank of the already wavering Federal right and started that wing in full retreat. Learning of the success on his left which the forest concealed from his center and right, Beauregard ordered his staff and escort to raise a loud cheer, and sent orders all along the line for a common charge on McDowell's left, in which his eager men, now confident of victory, joined with wild yells and drove the already yielding Federal lines from the field of contention, causing them to break, for shelter and safety, for the rear in the Sudley ridge forest, for Bull run, and in all directions, to get beyond reach of the Confederate fire. Sykes' regulars and Sherman's brigade stood firm and withdrew in good order, protecting the rear of the routed soldiers and enabling many of them to escape by way of the fords near the stone bridge, but most of them sought refuge by way of Sudley ford and by the other routes on which they had advanced in the morning.

Having ordered all the troops on the field to pursue the retreating enemy, Beauregard rode to the Lewis house, turned over the immediate command of the field to Johnston, who had generously left it in his hands up to that time, and, mounting a fresh horse (the fourth on that day, one of them killed under him), rode to press the pursuit now being made by the infantry and cavalry, some of the latter having been sent by Johnston across the Lewis ford to intercept the Federal retreat on the turnpike. Before he had ridden far, a courier from Johnston's chief of staff at Manassas Junction reached him with a report that a large Federal force had broken through the right of the Bull run line and was moving on the depot of supplies at the Junction. Beauregard at once returned, and, after consultation with Johnston, it was decided that he should take the brigades of Ewell and Holmes, which were marching, from the extreme right, to the battlefield, but had not reached it, and fall on this threatened counterstroke of the enemy while other troops were called from the pursuit and sent to his assistance.

To gain time, Beauregard gathered all the cavalry at hand, and, mounting behind each an infantryman, started to head off the reported Federal movement. Nearing McLean's ford, by which the Federal attack must have come, he found the report a false alarm caused by the withdrawal of Jones to the south side of Bull run, whose men, in consequence of the color of their uniforms, had been mistaken for the enemy. It was now nearly dark and, in Beauregard's opinion, too late to resume the interrupted pursuit of the retreating army; so turning toward his headquarters and meeting the troops that had been recalled to his assistance, he ordered them to bivouac for the night where they were.

After caring for the wants of his men, Beauregard rode to his headquarters near Manassas Junction, where, at about 10 p. m., he found President Davis and General Johnston. The former had arrived from Richmond late in the afternoon and at once galloped to the battlefield with Colonel Jordan, Beauregard's chief of staff, and reached it in time to witness the last of the Federals retreating across Bull run. The next morning, at his breakfast table, President Davis handed Beauregard his commission, as full general in the army of the Confederate States, dated July 21, 1861, in recognition of his services in the magnificent victory which had been won under his immediate direction.

The Federal army lost in this battle 2,896 men, of which 460 were killed, 1,124 wounded and 1,312 captured or missing. The Confederate loss was 1,982 men, of which 387 were killed, 1,582 wounded and 13 captured or missing. The Confederates captured 26 pieces of artillery, 34 caissons and sets of harness, 10 battery wagons and forges, 24 artillery horses, several thousand stand of small-arms, and numbers of wagons and ambulances, as well as large quantities of army supplies of all kinds. In this Young's Branch or Henry Hill battle were engaged the First, Second and Third Federal divisions, with 18,000 men and 30 guns; and 18,000 men and 21 guns of Johnston's and Beauregard's Confederate divisions, the former furnishing 8,700 combatants and the latter 9,300. Jackson's brigade lost 488 of its 3,000, nearly one-third of the total Confederate loss, and more than that of any other Confederate brigade; and yet it was in good condition for service immediately after the battle.

The returns of the killed, wounded and missing of the entire Confederate army within the field of action at the battle of Bull Run, show that the most of the fighting was done by the army of the Shenandoah (Gen. J. E. Johnston's), as indicated in the following comparative table of losses: Army of the Shenandoah, 282 killed, 1,063 wounded and 1 missing; total loss, 1,346. Army of the Potomac, 105 killed, 519 wounded and 12 missing; total loss, 636.

The losses in the army of the Shenandoah by brigades were: In Jackson's brigade, 119 killed and 442 wounded; in Bartow's, 60 killed (among them Bartow himself) and 293 wounded; in Bee's, 95 killed (including General Bee), 309 wounded and 1 missing; in Smith's, 8 killed, 19 wounded (including General Smith). No separate returns are given of the losses in the batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Pendleton and Alburtis, of the army of the Shenandoah, all of which took a conspicuous part in this battle.

The losses in the army of the Potomac (Gen. G. T. Beauregard's) by brigades were: In Bonham's brigade, 10 killed and 66 wounded; in Ewell's, no losses; in Jones', 13 killed and 62 wounded; in Longstreet's, 23 killed and 12 wounded; in Cocke's, 23 killed, 79 wounded and 2 missing; in Early's, 12 killed and 67 wounded; in N. G. Evans', 20 killed, 118 wounded and 8 missing; in Holmes', no losses; in the Eighth Louisiana, Col. H. B. Kelly, 19 killed, 100 wounded and 2 missing; in the Hampton legion, 19 killed, 100 wounded and 2 missing; in the cavalry, consisting of the Thirtieth Virginia, Harrison's battalion and ten independent companies, 5 killed and 8 wounded; and in the artillery, consisting of the Washington artillery (Louisiana), the Alexandria (Virginia) battery, Latham's (Virginia) battery, Loudoun (Virginia) artillery, and Shields' (Virginia) battery, 2 killed and 8 wounded.

These figures show that the fighting by Beauregard's men was principally done by Bonham's, D. R. Jones', Cocke's, Early's, Evans' and Kelly's commands. Considering only numbers engaged in each Confederate command, the best fighting, judging by losses, was done by Kelly's Eighth Louisiana and the half brigade of Evans, in which were the First Louisiana battalion, Maj. R. C. Wheat; the Fourth South Carolina, Col. J. B. E.

Sloan; Capt. W. R. Terry's cavalry, and Capt. Geo. S. Davidson's section of Latham's Virginia battery.

In the Federal army, the losses were well distributed through the three divisions that did the fighting, under Brigadier-General Tyler, Colonel Hunter and Colonel Heintzelman. Measured by the gauge of losses, the main fighting was done, in Tyler's division, by the brigades under Col. E. D. Keyes, Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck and Col. W. T. Sherman; in Hunter's division, by the brigades under Col. Andrew Porter and Col. A. E. Burnside; and in Heintzelman's division, by the brigades under Col. W. B. Franklin, Col. O. B. Willcox and Col. O. O. Howard; the greatest losses were in the brigades of Sherman, Porter and Willcox.

Longstreet states that after McDowell's forces were in full retreat from the Bull Run battlefield, orders came to the Confederate brigades at the lower fords, directing them to cross and strike the retreating enemy on the line of the Washington turnpike; that under these orders, Bonham's brigade advanced, with instructions to strike the enemy at the crossing of Cub run, about midway between stone bridge and Centreville; while Longstreet's brigade crossed at Blackburn's ford, with instructions to strike the enemy at Centreville. Obstructions in the road to Cub run diverted Bonham toward Centreville; so both these brigades sought the same objective and came under Bonham as the ranking officer. Their line of march led through the Federal camps which had been abandoned in retreat. In passing through these camps, says Longstreet:

We found their pots and kettles over the fire, with food cooking; quarters of beef hanging on the trees, and wagons by the roadside loaded, some with bread and general provisions, others with ammunition. When within artillery range of the retreating column passing through Centreville, the infantry was deployed on the sides of the road, under cover of the forests, so as to give room for the batteries ordered into action in the open, Bonham's brigade on the left, Longstreet's on the right. As the guns were about to open, there came a message that the enemy, instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack the Confederate right. With this report came orders, or report of orders, for the brigades to return to their positions behind the run. I denounced the report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and ordered the batteries to open fire.

At that moment one of Johnston's aides peremptorily ordered that the batteries should not open, and when

asked whether General Johnston had sent such an order, replied that he gave it on his own responsibility. Longstreet claimed an equal right of responsibility, and was in the act of renewing the order to fire, when Bonham rode up and asked that the batteries should not open. As he was in command, that settled the question; and, as night was then at hand, the golden opportunity for completing the victory by following up the rout of the Federal army was lost. Longstreet continues:

Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to their positions behind the run. General Bonham marched his brigade back, but, thinking that there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position until the order was renewed, about 10 o'clock p. m. . . . My brigade crossed and recrossed the run six times during the day and night.

It was afterward learned that some one, seeing Jones' brigade recrossing the run from an advance under earlier orders, mistook it for Federal troops crossing at McLean's ford, as previously stated, and rushed and reported to headquarters a Federal advance, and staff officers took the responsibility of revoking the orders of the commanding generals for the pursuit of the enemy.

There has been not only well-nigh endless discussion, but crimination and recrimination, as well as excuses, regarding the responsibility for not following up the retreating Federal army after it had been so discomfited in the battle of the 21st. It appears to rest mainly upon General Johnston and President Davis, their excuses being the exhausted condition of the Confederate army, the lack of transportation, and the want of provisions. Longstreet, in his *Memoirs*, says:

The supplies of subsistence, ammunition and forage, passed as we marched through the enemy's camps toward Centreville, seemed ample to carry the Confederate army on to Washington. Had the fight been continued to that point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched in terrible effectiveness against the demoralized Federals. Gaining confidence and vigor in their march, they could well have reached the capital with the ranks of McDowell's men. The brigade (Longstreet's) at Blackburn's ford, five regiments, those at McLean's and Mitchell's fords, all quite fresh, could have been reinforced by all the cavalry and most of the artillery, comparatively fresh, and later by the brigades of Holmes, Ewell and Early. This favorable aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through the assumed authority of staff officers, who, upon false reports, gave countermand to the orders of their chiefs.

The medical director of Jackson's brigade, Dr. Hunter McGuire, says in a recent memorial:

While dressing his (Jackson's) wounded hand at the First Manassas, at the field hospital of the brigade near the Lewis house (Portici), I saw President Davis ride up from Manassas. He had been told by stragglers that our army had been defeated. He stopped his horse in the middle of the little stream, stood up in his stirrups, the palest, sternest face I ever saw, and cried to the great crowd of soldiers, "I am President Davis; follow me back to the field." General Jackson did not hear distinctly. I told him who it was and what he said. He stood up, took off his cap and cried, "We have whipped them—they ran like sheep. Give me 10,000 men and I will take Washington city to-morrow."

Maj.-Gen. James B. Fry, who at Bull Run was captain and adjutant-general on McDowell's staff, in an article in the *Century Magazine*,\* describing this battle and what followed, says:

About half past three Beauregard extended his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened and disconnected line, and the Federals left the field about half past four. Until then they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no fresh forces on the field to support or encourage them, and the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no use to do anything more, and they might as well start home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations with some exceptions being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off. There was no special excitement except that arising from the frantic efforts of the officers to stop men who paid little or no attention to anything that was said. On the high grounds by the Matthews house, about where Evans had taken position in the morning to check Burnside, McDowell and his staff, aided by other officers, made a desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses and form them into line . . . but all efforts failed. Stragglers moved past guns in spite of all that could be done; . . . the men trooped back in great disorder across Bull run. There were some hours of daylight for the Confederates to gather the fruits of victory, but a few rounds of shell and canister checked all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion called for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the staunch regulars of the rear guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary meaning of the word until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, congressmen, and carriages were fired upon, on the road east of Bull run. Then the panic began, and the bridge over Cub run being rendered impassable for vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it, utter confusion set in; pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages and ammunition wagons which could not be put across the run were abandoned and blocked the way, and stragglers broke and threw aside their muskets and cut horses from their harness and rode off upon them. In leaving the field the men took the same routes in a general way by which they had reached it. Hence when the men of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Centreville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they walked back to the Potomac, an additional distance of 20 miles; so that these undisciplined and unseasoned men within thirty-six hours walked fully 45 miles, besides

\* See "Battles and Leaders," Century Co., New York.

fighting from about 10 a. m. until 4 p. m. on a hot, dusty day in July. McDowell, in person, reached Centreville before sunset, and found there Miles' division, with Richardson's brigade and three regiments of Runyon's division, and Hunt's, Tidball's, Ayres' and Greene's batteries and one or two fragments of batteries, making about 20 guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack of food and the mass of the army was completely demoralized. Beauregard had about an equal force which had not been in the fight, consisting of Ewell's, Jones' and Longstreet's brigades and some troops of other brigades. McDowell consulted the division and brigade commanders who were at hand upon the question of making a stand or retreating. The verdict was in favor of the latter, but a decision of officers one way or the other was of no moment; the men had already decided for themselves, and were streaming away to the rear in spite of all that could be done. They had no interest or treasure in Centreville, and their hearts were not there. Their tents, provisions, baggage and letters from home were upon the banks of the Potomac, and no power could have stopped them short of the camps they had left less than a week before. As before stated, most of them were sovereigns in uniform, not soldiers. McDowell accepted the situation, detailed Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the retreat, and the army, a disorganized mass, with some creditable exceptions, drifted as the men pleased away from the scene of action. There was no pursuit, and the march from Centreville was as barren of opportunities for the rear guard as the withdrawal from the field of battle had been. [Fry might have added that several regiments of three months' men, whose time had expired, refused to stay longer.]

From Centreville, at 5:45 p. m. of the 21st, while the sun was yet an hour and a half high, McDowell telegraphed to Scott:

We passed Bull run. Engaged the enemy, who, it seems, had just been reinforced by General Johnston. We drove them for several hours, and finally routed them. They rallied and repulsed us, but only to give us again the victory, which seemed complete. But our men, exhausted with fatigue and thirst and confused by firing into each other, were attacked by the enemy's reserves, and driven from the position we had gained, overlooking Manassas. After this the men could not be rallied, but slowly left the field. In the meantime the enemy outflanked Richardson at Blackburn's ford, and we have now to hold Centreville till our men can get behind it. Miles' division is holding the town.

Later, from Fairfax Court House, he telegraphed:

The men having thrown away their haversacks in the battle and left them behind, they are without food; have eaten nothing since breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It was the opinion of all of the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac. We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Court House. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined last night, and they march on us to-night.

Early the next morning, from Fairfax Court House, he again wired:

Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. They could not be prepared for action by to-morrow morning even were they willing. I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and to-morrow morning, as the enemy's force is very large and they are elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear guard. I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as much regularity as possible.

Of McDowell himself, Fry, his adjutant-general, wrote: "When the unfortunate commander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a soaking rain, after thirty-two hours in the saddle, his disastrous campaign of six days was closed. The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three months' men went home, and the three months' chapter of the war ended—with the South triumphant and confident, the North disappointed but determined."

Blenker remained in position at Centreville, as rear guard, until about midnight, when he was ordered to fall back on Washington. He reported that the retreat of "great numbers of flying soldiers continued until 9 o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, but few in collected bodies." He mentioned that he was several times attacked by squadrons of Confederate cavalry, before he left Centreville.

Walt Whitman, a noted Northern writer, says:\*

The defeated troops commenced pouring into Washington, over the long bridge, at daylight on Monday, 22d—a day drizzling all through with rain. The Saturday and Sunday of the battle (the 20th and 21st) had been parched and hot to an extreme. . . . But the hour, the day, the night passed; and whatever returns, an hour, a day, a night like that can never again return. The President, recovering himself, begins that very night—sternly, rapidly sets about the task of reorganizing his forces, and placing himself in position for future and surer work. . . . He endured that hour, that day, bitterer than gall—indeed a crucifixion day—but it did not conquer him—he unflinchingly stemmed it and resolved to lift himself and the Union out of it.

Colonel Henderson, of the British Staff college, in his life of Stonewall Jackson, says:

Before twenty-four hours had passed reinforcements had increased the strength of Johnston's army to 40,000. Want of organization

\* In his volume, "Specimen Days and Collect."



had doubtless prevented McDowell from winning a victory on the 19th or 20th, but pursuit is a far less difficult business than attack. There was nothing to interfere with a forward movement. There were supplies along the railway, and if the mechanism for their distribution and the means for their carriage were wanting, the counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertile. Herds of bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the barns of the farmers were loaded with grain. It was not a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the North no leisure to develop her immense resources. For three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. But his superiors gave no sign, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of reaping the fruits of the victory.

When McClellan, summoned in hot haste from north-western Virginia to avert further disaster, reached Washington, on the 26th of July, he rode around the city inspecting the existing conditions. Of these he wrote:

I found no preparations whatever for defense, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military positions. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels and bar-rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments without leave—a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from Bull Run terminating in New York, or even New Hampshire and Maine. There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city. A determined attack would doubtless have carried Arlington heights and placed the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.

That same day, Secretary of War Stanton wrote:

The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday (July 22d and 23d) it might have been taken without resistance. The rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the whole army were complete.

Of the attitude of the Southern people after this great victory, which might have been decisive, Colonel Henderson says:

When the news of Bull Run reached Richmond, and through the crowds that thronged the streets passed the tidings of the victory, there was neither wild excitement nor uproarious joy. No bonfires lit the darkness of the night; no cannon thundered out salutes; the steeples were silent till the morrow, and then were heard only the solemn tones that called the people to prayer. It was resolved, on the day following the battle, by the Confederate Congress: "That we recognize the hand of the Most High God, the King of kings and

Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance."

Johnston wrote as follows of the Confederate army after Bull Run:

The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers, and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat.

On the 25th of July, Johnston and Beauregard united in a congratulatory proclamation to the "Soldiers of the Confederate States," of which the beginning and conclusion are quoted:

One week ago a countless host of men, organized into an army, with all the appointments which modern and practical skill could devise, invaded the soil of Virginia. Their people sounded their approach with triumphant displays of anticipated victory. Their generals came in almost royal state; their great ministers, senators, and women came to witness the immolation of our army and the subjugation of our people, and to celebrate the result with wild revelry. It is with the profoundest emotions of gratitude to an overruling God, whose hand is manifest in protecting our homes and our liberties, that we, your generals commanding, are enabled, in the name of our whole country, to thank you for that patriotic courage, that heroic gallantry, that devoted daring, exhibited by you in the actions of the 18th and 21st, by which the hosts of the enemy were scattered and a signal and glorious victory obtained. . . . Comrades, our brothers who have fallen have earned undying renown upon earth, and their blood, shed in our holy cause, is a precious and acceptable sacrifice to the Father of Truth and of Right. Their graves are beside the tomb of Washington; their spirits have joined with his in eternal communion. . . . We drop one tear on their laurels and move forward to avenge them. Soldiers, we congratulate you on a glorious, triumphant and complete victory, and we thank you for doing your whole duty in the service of your country.

In this first great battle in Virginia many officers served, on both sides, who afterward became distinguished, or famous. On the Confederate side were Johnston, Beauregard, "Stonewall" Jackson, Stuart, Fitz Lee, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Whiting, D. R. Jones, Sam Jones, Holmes, Evans, Elzey,

Radford and Jordan—all graduates of West Point. Among those holding inferior positions, but subsequently distinguished, were Munford, Kirkland, Kershaw, Rodes, Featherston, Skinner, Garland, Corse, Cocke, Hunton, Withers, William Smith, Hays, Barksdale, Kemper, Wheat, Terry, Hampton, Shields, Imboden, Allen, Preston, Echols, Cumming, Steuart, A. P. Hill, Pendleton, and others.

Stuart, on the 21st, followed the retreating Federals 12 miles beyond Manassas, when his command was so depleted by sending back detachments with prisoners, that he gave up the pursuit and returned to encamp near Sudley church. He advanced to Fairfax Court House on the morning of the 23d, and a little later established his pickets along the Potomac, and in front of Washington, in sight of the dome of the capitol. The infantry of the army was moved to new camps beyond Bull run, with advanced detachments in support of the cavalry. McClellan took command at Washington on the 27th, and at once proceeded to make that city an intrenched camp, to which large numbers of troops were hurried from all the Union States.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### OPERATIONS ABOUT NORFOLK AND YORKTOWN— BATTLE OF BIG BETHEL—BURNING OF HAMPTON.

**S**COTT'S fourth line of invasion had for its objective the capture of Richmond by way of "the peninsula" from Fort Monroe, using the navy on the James and York rivers to guard the flanks of the movement. Before this could be successfully made it was necessary to secure Norfolk and the Gosport navy yard and their defenses, which guarded the entrance to the waterway of the James, and Yorktown and Gloucester point, which guarded that to the York.

The general-in-chief was a soldier, who, naturally, placed the most reliance upon the army to carry out his plans. Therefore he attached the greatest importance to the direct movement on Richmond from Washington, by way of Manassas, and gathered his largest army for that purpose. Yet, one well informed as to the defensive conditions of Virginia, and especially of Richmond, at the beginning of the war, can but wonder that the most important movement was not made by way of the peninsula by the army, aided by the navy on the York and the James, since at that time there had been no preparations worth mentioning to prevent such a movement or the capture of Virginia's capital. This can only be accounted for by the demoralized condition in which the war and the navy departments of the United States were left by the resignation, as soon as Virginia passed an ordinance of secession, of such a large proportion of the best officers of these two arms of the service, natives of Virginia and other Southern States.

As before stated, when it had been decided that the Virginia convention would provide for secession, the first two objects to demand the attention of the executive were the capture of the armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the arsenal and navy yard at Gosport in the vicinity of Norfolk. On the night of April 16th, some men in Norfolk, without authority, seized light boats and

other small craft and sank them in the channel to prevent the escape of ships from the navy yard. There were at the navy yard at that time 4 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 2 sloops of war, 1 brig and the steam frigate Merrimac, and some 780 marines and other armed men.

On the 18th of April, Governor Letcher called out the militia of Norfolk and vicinity, and dispatched Maj.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro to take command of the same and endeavor, by a rapid movement, to secure the navy yard. After having done this he asked Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, to immediately send 2,000 troops to Norfolk to aid the Virginia militia. Pickens at first declined, as "it might appear intrusive," and besides, "we stand at present on the defensive." He said he would ask President Davis for advice. The latter wired Letcher for information as to his object in asking for troops. He replied that it was to secure the Gosport navy yard, where the Merrimac, the Cumberland, the Pennsylvania, and perhaps other vessels were at that time; that the channel was partially obstructed and it would require 5,000 men to take the place. On the 19th the Confederate secretary of war informed Governor Brown, of Georgia, that 2,000 troops had been ordered from South Carolina to Norfolk, to report to General Taliaferro, and asked that several companies be sent from Georgia to the same place, to go at once, or they would be too late. Davis replied to Letcher, on the 19th, that he had ordered sent him two regiments from South Carolina and some companies from Georgia; also that the resolution of the Virginia convention for an alliance had been received and accepted. On the 19th, Letcher telegraphed Taliaferro: "As we need powder, keep an eye to securing that article." On the 20th the governor of Georgia reported that he had four companies ready to start for Virginia. The Seaboard railroad furnished facilities for sending these South Carolina and Georgia troops directly to Norfolk.

Scott, on the 19th of April, ordered Capt. H. G. Wright, of the engineers, to proceed to the Gosport navy yard to aid the commodore there in command, in designing and executing a plan of defense; instructing him to call at Fort Monroe and consult Colonel Dimick regarding the sending of a regiment of infantry to assist in the defense of the navy yard, but to "bear in mind that, although the navy yard and its contents are of very

great importance, Fort Monroe is still more so to the Union." Captain Wright at once proceeded on the steamer Pawnee to Fort Monroe. One of the two regiments which had arrived at Fort Monroe that morning, about 370 strong, under Colonel Wardrop, was marched on board the Pawnee, which arrived at Norfolk on the night of the 20th.

When Captain Wright reached the navy yard he found that all the ships there, except the Cumberland, had been scuttled on the 19th by Commodore McCauley, the commandant of the navy yard, and were fast sinking; but finding McCauley disposed to defend the yard, the troops were landed and dispositions taken for its defense, when Commodore Paulding, who had come on the Pawnee from Washington, decided to finish the destruction of the scuttled ships, and, after destroying the navy yard, to withdraw with the frigate Cumberland in tow of the Pawnee and a steam tug lying at the yard. To Captain Wright and Commodore Rodgers was assigned the duty of blowing up the dry dock, a massive structure of granite masonry, which they prepared to do by placing a mine in a gallery along one of its side walls, in which they used 2,000 pounds of powder, brought from one of the ships, connected by a train of powder and slow matches with the outside. This done, all the men were sent to the ship, except one to watch for the commodore's signal for lighting the matches to fire the mine and the buildings, which was done by Captains Wright and Rodgers. The lighted fires burned so rapidly that those officers had great difficulty in escaping from the yard, and were unable to reach the Pawnee, which had already moved away, as the Virginia troops just then advanced rapidly from the Portsmouth side and opened fire on the yard, the steamer, and the boat in which Wright and Rodgers tried to escape. They then rowed to the Norfolk side and delivered themselves to the commanding general of the Virginia forces, at about 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, April 21st. Their attempt to blow up the dock was not successful, and to burn the arsenal but partially so.

On the 22d, Vice-President Stephens telegraphed President Davis, from Richmond:

Gosport navy yard burned and evacuated by the enemy; 2,500 guns, artillery and ordnance saved, and 3,000 barrels of powder;

also large supply of caps, and shells loaded, with the Bormann fuse attached. Yard not so much injured as supposed. Merrimac, Germantown and Dolphin sunk; Cumberland escaped.

On Sunday, April 21st, Richmond was thrown into great consternation by a dispatch stating that the steamer Pawnee was coming up James river to destroy the powder taken from the magazine at old Fort Norfolk and the cannon foundry above Richmond. Alarms were sounded, citizens rushed to arms, and troops and a battery were at once sent down the James to Chaffin's bluff, where the river is quite narrow, and hasty preparations made for the defense of the city. The Pawnee, after returning from the attempted destruction of the navy yard, was reported as making a reconnoissance up the James, which caused this alarm, revealing to the authorities the utterly defenseless condition of Richmond, and inducing them to take steps for its defense. The advisory council met after the excitement had subsided, and directed Governor Letcher to instruct the governor of South Carolina to change the destination of his troops to Richmond, "where an effort would be made to concentrate as large a force as possible to make that city the base of operations for defending the interests of the Southern States."

Maj.-Gen. Walter Gwynn, who had been assigned to command of the Virginia forces at Norfolk, reported on the 23d that the Baltic had arrived off Old Point with troops from Boston and then proceeded to Washington; that the Cumberland, the only war vessel in Hampton Roads, was lying off Old Point. That day the advisory council asked the governor to direct General Gwynn to send a flag to Fort Monroe and ascertain whether it was true that army officers, citizens of Virginia, were kept in irons at that fort, or otherwise restrained against their will. The governor was also directed to have vessels that had been seized and detained in the waters of Virginia inspected, valued and detained for the defense of the State. Ex-Governor Wise, from near Norfolk, about that time urged the Richmond authorities to place heavy guns at Hampton to prevent the forces at Fort Monroe from taking the points of vantage and shutting up Virginia bays and rivers, concluding: "We are quiet here now, but fortifying, and daily along Lynnhaven seeing the steamers take reinforcements up the bay and the Potomac

to Washington. This can be done all the time until we surround Fort Monroe and make the roads too hot to hold the blockading fleets."

On the 25th, the governor asked the advisory council the very important question as to how steam vessels, entering the navy yard at Portsmouth or other ports, on State service, could be supplied with coal, when in want, that being then the case with one such vessel at Portsmouth. Fortunately for Virginia, she had, in the vicinity of Richmond, the fine Chesterfield coalfield, which supplied during the war an abundance of coal for steam and manufacturing purposes.

On the 24th of April, the steam tug *Young America* went out from the harbor of Norfolk and was proceeding to take charge of the schooner *George M. Smith*, off Fortress Monroe, loaded with contraband of war, when it was seized by the United States frigate *Cumberland*, and there resulted quite a correspondence between General Gwynn and Flag-Officer Pendergrast, of the United States navy, in reference to that and other captures of vessels in Hampton Roads, the one claiming the right to make such seizures and the other denying it.

Learning that the Virginia midshipmen from the naval school at Annapolis had resigned and tendered their services to the State, Capt. R. L. Page, of the Virginia navy, at this time advised the establishment of a temporary schoolship for their use at Norfolk, for drill, etc., until their services were wanted for special duties, a suggestion that received the approval of the advisory council.

A strict blockade had been established by the Federal authorities, cutting off all communication even with other Virginia ports; Federal vessels were constantly making soundings from Cape Henry lighthouse to the barricades in the channel of Elizabeth river, and it was the opinion of Com. French Forrest, May 1st, that the United States intended to make a descent on Gosport navy yard to correct their recent error of destruction and evacuation. He suggested that a competent military force be stationed to resist such efforts, saying that he could muster only 73 men under arms in the yard, and scarcely 40 appeared from the town, and only two of those properly armed.

On the 30th of April, G. J. Pendergrast, command-



ing the Federal squadron, gave formal notice of an efficient blockade of the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. Col. S. Bassett French, aide to Governor Letcher, from Norfolk, May 2d, notified General Lee of this blockade, and that the troops from Suffolk, some 300, had been brought to Norfolk, leaving the Nansemond river approaches undefended. He thought 10,000 men absolutely necessary for the defense of the public property in and about Norfolk.

The Bay line was permitted, on the 4th, to resume trips for mails and passengers. A British ship from Liverpool, with salt for Richmond, was boarded at Old Point, but sailed on and delivered its cargo. It was reported, on the 6th of May, that Federal vessels chased and fired on steamers to within 12 miles of Gloucester point.

Lewis E. Harvie, president of the Richmond & Danville railroad, patriotically offered, without charge, to furnish transportation from his railroad to remove the ordnance from the navy yard at Norfolk to the interior. The council advised the acceptance of this offer, and that orders be immediately given to remove all ordnance from the navy yard, not necessary for its defense and that of Norfolk and Portsmouth, to safe points in the interior. Early in May, Gen. R. E. Lee was assigned to the command of volunteer troops ordered to the battery on Jamestown island.

Gov. I. G. Harris, of Tennessee, asked the governor of Virginia for artillery for the defense of the Mississippi and the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and the council advised Governor Letcher to fill this requisition with fifty 32-pounders, a supply of balls, and two sample gun carriages. The governor was also directed to purchase the steamer Northampton, for the service of the State.

D. G. Duncan, the special agent of the Confederate government, from Richmond, reported to Secretary of War L. P. Walker, that intelligent and distinguished men in Richmond "believe Virginia on the very brink of being carried back, and say no man but President Davis can save her. . . . There is disappointment that he does not assume entire direction of affairs here. . . . General Lee has ordered Louisiana troops to Harper's Ferry. . . . The South Carolina troops refuse to move unless under orders from Montgomery. Military control

is essential to the interests of the Confederate States. I doubt if there are 5,000 Virginians armed and equipped." That same 7th of May the council advised Governor Letcher to issue an order to Major-General Lee to assume command of all forces from other States that had or might hereafter report to him, or tender their services to Virginia, until orders are received from the President of the Confederate States in reference to the same.

It was reported in Richmond, on the 9th, that thirty vessels were detained at Old Point by Commander Pendergrast; one of them a Richmond ship, from South America, with 3,000 bags of coffee, the last of the fine fleet owned at Richmond, that by direct trade with Brazil made that city one of the leading coffee markets of the country, a loss she has never recovered.

On the 10th, Capt. H. Coalter Cabell reported his arrival at Gloucester point, by way of West Point, and the placing of his Virginia battery in position, and that he would soon have that place perfectly safe from attack. He suggested similar works on the Rappahannock, the Potomac and the northern side of James river, adding: "These positions secured and defended by heavy guns, Virginia is safe from invasion by sea."

From Richmond, on the 11th, Rev. Dr. W. N. Pendleton, of Lexington, Va. (afterward captain of the Rockbridge artillery, and later colonel and brigadier-general of artillery), wrote to President Davis: "As you value our great cause, hasten on to Richmond. Lincoln and Scott are, if I mistake not, covering by other demonstrations the great movement upon Richmond. Suppose they should send suddenly up the York river, as they can, an army of 30,000 or more; there are no means at hand to repel them, and if their policy shown in Maryland gets footing here, it will be a severe, if not a fatal blow. Hasten, I pray you, to avert it. The very fact of your presence will almost answer. Hasten, then. I entreat you, don't lose a day." Pendleton was a classmate of Davis at West Point, and an intimate friend.

Maj. Benjamin S. Ewell, in command of the Virginia militia at Williamsburg, wrote on the 11th to Adjutant-General Garnett that a better disposition to volunteer in the service of the State had been evinced by the citizens of James City, York and Warwick, and he hoped to be able to report within a week five or six companies mustered in

and doing camp duty; that in Elizabeth City county, volunteers and militia numbered about 600 men, so that about 1,200 could be raised on the peninsula. He asked for arms and a battery of field pieces for these men, and for cadets to drill them. In a private letter of the same date, Major Ewell informed General Lee that there was disaffection in the Poquosin island section of York county, from which there had been no volunteers, and it might be well to give him authority to call out the militia of the Sixty-eighth regiment from that section if found necessary.

Col. Charles K. Mallory, of the One Hundred and Fifteenth regiment, Virginia militia, from Hampton, on the 13th informed Governor Letcher that two companies from Fort Monroe had taken possession of Mill creek bridge and of the property adjoining, giving as a reason for so doing that they wanted possession of a well of water on that side of the creek. He thought their object was to hold the north bank of Mill creek, and perhaps erect works there. Considering that movement an invasion of Virginia, he had ordered out the volunteer companies of Elizabeth City county. General Lee went to Norfolk on the 16th to look into the condition of military affairs at that point, returning to Richmond on the 19th.

On the 18th, the United States steamer Monticello fired on the unfinished Virginia battery at Sewell's point, but did no damage. There were no guns there at that time, but three were immediately sent forward from Norfolk and got in position by 5 p. m. of the 19th. During the 19th the Monticello lay opposite Sewell's point, apparently not suspecting the placing there of three 32-pounders in battery. When the Monticello opened again at 5:30 p. m., the battery at once replied with such effect as to drive her off, and while many shot and shell fell in and around the battery no material loss was suffered. Capt. P. H. Colquitt, of the Columbus (Ga.) Light Guards, was in command at Sewell's point, with three companies from Norfolk. In the absence of a Confederate flag that of the State of Georgia was hoisted over the battery. He reported that the troops acted with great bravery and he had to restrain them in their enthusiasm. On the night of the 19th additional guns and ammunition were sent to Sewell's point. On the 21st the Monticello steamed up and fired twice at the Sewell's point battery, but when answered drew off.

Brig.-Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, of the Massachusetts militia, was assigned, on the 22d of May, to the command of the "department of Virginia," with headquarters at Old Point Comfort, and nine additional infantry regiments were sent to that place. On the 23d, between 4 and 5 p. m., a Federal regiment made a demonstration against Hampton, greatly alarming the citizens of that place. Maj. J. B. Cary, of the Virginia artillery, in command at Hampton, had made arrangements for the destruction of the bridges leading from Fort Monroe, but the enemy were in sight before the fires could be well started. He then sent Lieutenant Cutshaw to demand of the Federal colonel his object in approaching Hampton with so large a body of men. He replied that he had simply come, under the order of General Butler, to reconnoiter; he then gave assurance that he would make no attack upon personal property, unless molested, when both sides joined in extinguishing the fires at the bridges. This amicable understanding reached, the Federal troops marched into the town, remained for awhile and then returned. Major Cary reported to Colonel Ewell at Williamsburg, that this demonstration indicated the propriety of removing his camp farther from Hampton, where the people had responded indifferently to his call for aid in erecting intrenchments. As the site selected for his camp was probably visible from the ramparts of Fort Monroe, he thought the erection of the first tent there would be the signal for another demonstration.

On the 21st of May, Col. John B. Magruder, of the provisional army of Virginia, a Virginian officer of the old Federal army, later a major-general of the Confederate States army, was assigned to the command of the "department of the Peninsula," including the York and the James rivers, and he began organizing forces for defense. Maj. H. B. Tomlin, commanding at West Point, reported that he had placed guards near the York river railroad bridge over the Pamunkey.

A letter of General Lee to ex-Governor Wise, of May 24th, describes the situation at that date:

Since my arrival in Richmond I have used every exertion to organize troops and prepare resistance against immediate invasion, which has appeared imminent, and as almost everything had to be created, except the guns found at the Gosport navy yard, the preparations have absorbed all the means I can command. We are still engaged

in making gun carriages for the river defenses and field service, preparing ammunition for all arms, constructing machines for the manufacture of caps, etc., ammunition wagons, etc., which must be continued. It seems to me, therefore, impossible at this time to prepare a marine battery, such as you describe, which would be effective in carrying out your design, as desirable as it would be. All the force and means at Norfolk are now employed in preparing defenses against a water and land approach. Could proper redoubts be erected at Willoughby's and Sewell's points, capable of standing a siege, and with an armament to command the adjacent waters, they would be of great advantage. Ineffectual batteries would provoke useless conflict and expose to the risk of capture the heavy guns therein placed. This has, in a measure, been recently exemplified. . . . Gen. B. Huger, formerly of the United States army, an officer of great merit, has been assigned to the command at Norfolk, and I hope will be able to secure it against successful invasion.

On May 25th, Governor Ellis notified President Davis that 37,000 stand of arms in the Fayetteville arsenal were at his disposal; that troops were constantly coming in, and he asked what he should do with a regiment that was ready for service, concluding: "The people are a unit, waiting for an advance on Washington."

Brig.-Gen. Benjamin Huger reported, from Norfolk, on the 26th, that with time and means he hoped to soon get the defenses of Norfolk in order; that Williams' North Carolina regiment had arrived from Richmond, and the Federals were landing troops at Newport News.

Major-General Butler moved a body of troops, by transports, from Fort Monroe to Newport News, about 7 a. m., May 27th, and began intrenching a camp, of which he reported, "when completed, it will be able to hold itself against any force that may be brought against it, and afford even a better depot from which to advance than Fortress Monroe." His next movement would be to take the battery at Big Point, exactly opposite Newport News, and commanding Nansemond river, and once in command of that battery, he could advance along the Nansemond and take Suffolk, and there either hold or destroy the railroads between Richmond and Norfolk and between Norfolk and the South; then, with a perfect blockade of Elizabeth river, "Norfolk will be so perfectly hemmed in that starvation will cause the surrender, without risking an attack on the strongly fortified intrenchments around Norfolk, with great loss and perhaps defeat."

In a letter of May 27th, Butler informed Scott that the people of Virginia were using negroes in the batteries

and preparing to send the negro women and children South; that squads of negro families were constantly coming into his lines and he was "in doubt what to do with this species of property," but had determined to employ the able-bodied persons on wages and issue food to those unemployed, to be paid for out of these wages, and that \$60,000 worth of such property was then in his hands. He concluded this subject thus:

As a means of offense, therefore, in the enemy's hands these negroes, when able-bodied, are of the last importance. Without them the batteries could not have been erected, at least for many weeks. As a military question, it would seem to be a measure of necessity to deprive their masters of their services. How can this be done? As a political question and a question of humanity, can I receive the services of the father and mother and not take the children? Of the humanitarian aspect I have no doubt. Of the political one I have no right to judge. I therefore submit all this to your better judgment; and as these questions have a political aspect, I have ventured—and I trust I am not wrong—to duplicate the parts of my dispatches relating to this subject and forward them to the secretary of war.

Maj. John B. Hood (subsequently a distinguished Confederate lieutenant-general) was, on the 23d, placed in charge of the cavalry on York river, for the purpose of establishing a camp of instruction and making judicious disposition of the pickets and videttes; the same day Col. D. H. Hill (later a Confederate lieutenant-general) assumed command of the post at Yorktown. On the 28th, two more companies of cavalry were ordered from the camp of instruction at Ashland to Yorktown; Hodges' Virginia regiment was sent to Jamestown island as a protecting force for the batteries, and Jordan's artillery company was ordered to Jamestown island and Hupp's to Craney island. Cabell's battery of light artillery was ordered from Gloucester point to Yorktown, leaving at the former place only 400 infantry under command of Lieut.-Col. P. R. Page.

On the 31st, in a letter to Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, General Lee said he had recommended forwarding troops to Norfolk and the transfer of the North Carolina camp of instruction from Weldon to Suffolk, because of the importance of holding Norfolk, which commands the communication with North Carolina by canal and railroad, and in view of the danger of the occupation of Suffolk by United States forces and thereby closing communication between Richmond and Norfolk.

At 9 a. m. of June 5th, the Federal steamer *Harriet Lane* opened on the Confederate battery established at Big Point, across the James from Newport News, with shot and shell from her 11-inch gun and 32-pounders, from a distance of a mile and a half. The steamer fired thirty-three shot and shell, but did no damage except to crack an 8-inch gun. The battery in return fired twenty-three shot and shell, which caused the steamer to move off, apparently injured after a combat lasting fifteen or twenty minutes. Commander R. B. Pegram, of the Virginia navy, praised the cool and self-possessed conduct of the Portsmouth (Va.) rifles, who had never before been in action, writing of them: "Every man behaved in the most spirited and creditable manner, and were so regardless of danger that I had often to interpose my authority to prevent their exposing themselves unnecessarily to the enemy's fire."

On the 7th of June, Governor Letcher, after an extended correspondence with the President in reference to the standing officers in the Virginia service would have in the Confederate service, issued a proclamation transferring all Virginia troops, ordnance stores, etc., to the government of the Confederate States.

On the 10th the Louisiana Zouaves, under Lieutenant-Colonel Coppens, were ordered from Richmond to Yorktown, as were also Alabama companies from Richmond and Gloucester point, to form a regiment under Col. John A. Winston.

Capt. W. H. Werth, of the Chatham Grays, Virginia cavalry, on the 7th of June made a reconnoissance with 20 picked men of the Old Dominion dragoons, two men from his own company, and accompanied by Captain Phillips, Lieutenant Cary and Lieutenant Harrison, to examine the Federal camp at Newport News. He then rode to within a few hundred yards of the fortifications, when he came unexpectedly on a party engaged in cutting wood, the leader of which he killed, and the Federals scattered, yelling, "Look out for the Virginia horsemen!" Two companies from a Federal regiment, that had apparently come to the rescue, did not fire their muskets, but in a panic all rushed back to camp, yelling, "Virginia horsemen!" even gunners abandoning two guns already unlimbered.

General Butler, having learned that the Virginians had

established an outpost at Little Bethel church, about 8 miles from Newport News and the same distance from Hampton on the road to Yorktown, and that a short distance farther on the road to Yorktown, at Big Bethel church, near the head of the north branch of Back river, there was another outpost, where works of more or less strength were in process of erection, ordered Duryea's Fifth New York regiment ferried over Hampton creek, at 1 o'clock of the morning of June 10th, under orders to march to New Market bridge, and thence by a by-road to the rear of the Confederates between Big and Little Bethel. This regiment was to cut them off and attack Little Bethel, and Colonel Townsend with the Third New York regiment was to march an hour later, with two mounted howitzers, from Hampton, in support of Duryea. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn was ordered from Newport News, with a battalion to make a demonstration upon Little Bethel in front, supported by Colonel Bendix's Seventh New York regiment, with two field pieces. The commands of Townsend and Bendix were to effect a junction at a fork of the road from Hampton to Newport News, about a mile and a half from Little Bethel. The march was timed for the attack to be made at daybreak. After the attack on Little Bethel, Duryea's regiment and another from Newport News were to follow up the fugitives, if they got off, and attack the battery on the road to Big Bethel while covered by the retreating fugitives. The troops all got into position as ordered, but by some blunder, Bendix's regiment, which had halted at the fork of the road, with two pieces of artillery, without notice opened fire, with both artillery and musketry, on Townsend's column marching up in Duryea's rear, when but 100 yards away. Some of Townsend's men returned this fire, but his column retreated to a nearby eminence, and Washburn, hearing this fire and thinking his communication might be cut off, reversed his march back to his reserves, as did also Duryea. Pierce, in command of the expedition, who was with Townsend's regiment, fearing that his movement was discovered and that the enemy was in force on his line of march, sent back for reinforcements, when Butler sent him Allen's First New York regiment.

Pierce, in the meantime, having ascertained the true state of affairs, effected a junction of his regiments and



resumed his movement. Upon reaching the Confederate camp at Little Bethel, he found it vacated, the Federal cavalry having pressed on toward Big Bethel. He then prepared to attempt to carry the works at Big Bethel, commencing an attack about 9:30.

In his report of the 16th, Butler said, "This attack was not intended to enable us to hold Big Bethel as a post, because it was not seriously in our way on any proposed road to Yorktown, and therefore there was never any intention of maintaining it even if captured. The length of the road and the heat of the weather had caused great fatigue, as many of the troops, the previous night having been cool, had marched with their thickest clothing." From subsequent information, he was sure the force which was first at Big Bethel did not exceed a regiment, and if his order of attack had been obeyed, he had no doubt the battery would have been captured; but the officers in immediate command had an exaggerated idea of the numbers of the enemy, and believed there were 4,000 or 5,000 troops at Big Bethel. A return, accompanying his report, shows that one Massachusetts, one Vermont, and five New York infantry regiments, and the Second United States artillery were actually engaged in this contest, and that the losses were 18 killed, 53 wounded, and 5 missing, an aggregate of 76. Among the killed was Maj. Theodore Winthrop, of Butler's staff.

From Bethel church, Col. J. Bankhead Magruder, commanding "Hampton division," reported on the 10th that he was attacked by about 3,500 Federal troops with several pieces of heavy artillery, that morning at 10 o'clock, and at 12:30 had routed them completely, having had 1,200 men engaged of his 1,400. Magruder's force in the battle was: Col. D. H. Hill's First North Carolina and Lieut.-Col. William D. Stuart's Third Virginia infantry regiments, Maj. E. B. Montague's Virginia cavalry battalion, and Maj. George W. Randolph's Richmond (Va.) howitzer battalion. A Louisiana infantry regiment arrived after the battle was over; but returned to Yorktown the same night, marching 28 miles during the day, as it was not thought prudent to leave Yorktown exposed without troops.

Col. D. H. Hill, with that fullness and accuracy of statement which always characterized his reports, furnished the particulars of this Big Bethel engagement. On





the 6th of June he marched from Yorktown, with his own regiment, the First North Carolina, and four pieces of Major Randolph's battery, to Bethel church, on the road to Hampton and 9 miles from that village, which he reached after dark. Early in the morning of the 7th he reconnoitered the ground preparatory to fortifying. The northwest branch of Back river was found in front and encircling the right flank, while on the left was a dense wood about 150 yards behind an old field; a thick wood and a narrow field were in the rear. The defect of the position was a very large field, immediately in front of it, across the river, upon which an enemy could readily be deployed. The nature of the ground determined Colonel Hill to make an enclosed work, nearly in the form of a square, with the road running through it, with a redoubt for a battery, for the protection of the bridge, in which Major Randolph placed his guns so as to sweep all the approaches. On an eminence across the creek, on the right of the road, was placed an outwork, with an emplacement for one of Randolph's guns.

During the day and night of the 7th and all day of the 8th, Hill's men busily plied the few implements which he had at his disposal, constructing defenses. Learning on the afternoon of the 8th that a marauding party of the enemy was within a few miles of him, Lieutenant Roberts with a detachment of his regiment, accompanied by Major Randolph with a howitzer, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, of the First North Carolina, set out and chased the party over New Market bridge. McDowell's company of the First North Carolina, with a Richmond howitzer gun under Lieutenant West, in command of Major Lane, of the First North Carolina, was sent in pursuit of a second band, with a result described by Colonel Hill, with his peculiar dry humor as: "the second race on the same day over the New Market course, in both of which the Yankees reached the goal first."

Colonel Magruder came up in the evening of the 8th and assumed command. On Sunday a fresh supply of tools enabled Hill to put more men at work on the intrenchments, but worship was not omitted, as Hill was a Presbyterian elder, of the "Stonewall" Jackson type, who mingled faith and works. Magruder roused his men at 3 o'clock, on Monday morning, June 10th, for a

general advance upon the enemy, which he had planned, but he had marched only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles when it was learned that the enemy in large force was also advancing and but 100 yards in front; the opposing commanders each having decided to attack the other on that day. The Confederates quickly fell back within their intrenchments and awaited the coming of the invaders. Colonel Stuart, with his 180 Virginians and a howitzer, was stationed in the works on the hill, on the extreme right, beyond the creek. Bridgers' company, of the First North Carolina, was posted in the dense woods on the left of the road, and three companies of Montague's (Virginia) battalion were placed on the right. Stuart's men, by vigorous work, in an hour improved their temporary defenses.

At 9 o'clock the heavy columns of the enemy approached rapidly and in good order, but when Randolph opened on them, their organization was broken up, yet they promptly replied to the artillery, firing briskly but wildly. An attempt was then made to deploy, under cover of some houses and fences on the left of the road, but this movement was quickly driven back by Randolph's artillery and its supports. In the meantime, the enemy, under cover of woods, moved a strong column to their right to an old ford three-quarters of a mile below the bridge, where Hill had placed a picket of 40 men. To that threatened point Magruder promptly sent Werth's company and a howitzer under Sergeant Crane, which drove back this attack with a single shot. At about the same time some 1,500 Federals attempted, by a movement to their left under cover of woods and fences, to outflank Stuart and get in rear of his small command posted on the right across the creek. This was detected, and Stuart was directed to withdraw across the swamp. At that critical moment Hill recalled Captain Bridgers from the swamp and ordered him to reoccupy the nearest advanced work; Captain Ross was also ordered to the support of Colonel Stuart. These North Carolina companies crossed the bridge under a heavy fire in a most gallant manner. In the meantime Stuart withdrew, and Ross was detained near Randolph's main battery at the church, but Bridgers crossed over, drove the New York Zouaves out of the advanced howitzer redoubt and reoccupied it. This daring movement turned the combat in favor of the Confederates. Magruder followed it up by

ordering Stuart back to Bridgers' support. He promptly crossed the creek in the face of a largely superior foe and resumed his former position in the intrenchments. A fresh howitzer was also taken across and placed in the battery; thus the conditions of the contention on the Confederate side were made as secure as they were at the beginning of the fight, without the loss of a single man.

The attack on the Confederate right foiled, Captain Winthrop, of Butler's staff, led a strong column to a final demonstration on the Confederate left, crossing the creek and appearing in front of the left angle of the works. The Federals in this advance had a white band around their caps, and kept crying out, "Don't fire," practicing this ruse to enable the whole column to get over the creek and form in good order. They then began to cheer lustily, thinking the Confederate work was open at the gorge and they could get in by a sudden rush, but two companies of the First North Carolina quickly undeceived them by a deliberate and well-directed fire, in which they were assisted later by three other companies of the same regiment sent to their support. These joined in the combat with great ardor. Of this Colonel Hill wrote: "Captain Winthrop, while most gallantly urging on his men, was shot through the heart, when all rushed back with the utmost precipitation. . . . The fight at the angle lasted for twenty minutes. It completely discouraged the enemy and he made no further effort at assault. The house in front, which had served as a hiding place for the enemy, was now fired by a shell from a howitzer, and the outhouse and palings were soon in a blaze. As all shelter was now taken from him, the enemy called in his troops and started back for Hampton." As soon as the road was clear, Captain Douthat pursued the enemy with about 100 dragoons, chasing them for the third time over the New Market bridge, which they tore up behind them and so broke the pursuit.

Of the Richmond howitzers, Colonel Hill wrote: "I cannot close this too elaborate report without speaking in the highest terms of admiration of the howitzer battery and its most accomplished commander, Major Randolph. He has no superior as an artillerist in any country, and his men displayed the utmost skill and coolness." Of his own regiment, the First North Carolina, he said:

"Their patience under trial, perseverance under toil, and courage under fire have seldom been surpassed by veteran troops." After stating that they had done a large portion of the work on the intrenchments at Yorktown as well as on those at Bethel, he said: "After the battle they shook hands affectionately with the spades, calling them 'clever fellows and good friends.' The men are influenced by high moral and religious sentiments, and their conduct has furnished another example of the great truth that he who fears God will ever do his duty to his country."

Hill estimated that the enemy had five and a half regiments, or about 5,000 men, in the action, while the Confederates never had more than 300 of their 1,400 engaged at one time; and that the Confederate loss was 11 wounded, 1 mortally. Stuart reported: "Both officers and men under my command behaved with the greatest coolness throughout the whole engagement, and none were injured." Major Randolph wrote of his battalion: "I can say nothing more of the conduct of its officers and men than to express the high gratification afforded me by their courage, coolness and precision." Capt. W. H. Werth stated that when ordered to the left, to meet the Federal movement about a mile below the bridge, he led his command across an open field under a shower of shell and canister, and when he saw the Fifth New York moving down the opposite bank of the stream to cross the ford and turn his left, he "at once took double-quick and made the distance of over a mile in about nine minutes, beating the Zouaves and getting in position at the ford in time to cause them to halt."

In his report General Magruder lauded the conduct of his men, adding: "Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the heroic soldier whom we lost. He was one of four who volunteered to set fire to a house in our front, which was thought to afford protection to our enemy, and advancing alone between the two fires, he fell midway, pierced in the forehead by a musket ball. Henry L. Wyatt is the name of this brave soldier and devoted patriot. He was a member of the brave and gallant First North Carolina regiment." It is generally admitted that young Wyatt was the first Confederate soldier killed in action in Virginia during the civil war. "The firing of the howitzer batteries," Magruder said, "was as per-

fect as the bearing of the men, which was entirely what it ought to have been." Magruder left his cavalry at Big Bethel, but marched the remainder of his forces back to Yorktown. His cavalry pursuit of the Federals continued for 5 miles, to New Market bridge across the southwest branch of Back river, which the flying enemy had destroyed. He wrote in concluding his report: "Our means of transportation were exceedingly limited, but the wounded enemy were carried with our own wounded to farmhouses in our rear, where the good people, who have lost almost everything by this war, and who could see the smoking ruins of their neighbors' houses, destroyed by the enemy both in his advance and retreat, received them most kindly and bound up their wounds."

On the 13th, General Lee acknowledged the receipt of Colonel Magruder's account of the action at Big Bethel, and added: "I take pleasure in expressing my gratification at the gallant conduct of the troops under your command, and my approbation of the dispositions made by you, resulting, as they did, in the rout of the enemy."

General Lee, in correspondence with Colonel Magruder at this time, urged the rapid construction of batteries for water and land defense, hoped that the defenses at Sewell's point and Craney island, which were in weak condition, had been completed and provided with sufficient garrisons; and among other things, said the troops he was collecting at Suffolk should hold command of and prevent the destruction of the railroads.

Hon. R. M. T. Hunter wrote from Lloyd's, June 10th, to President Davis regarding the rumor that the real attack upon Richmond would be made from the Rappahannock, which he thought practicable. He gave a detailed description of the routes that would probably be taken by an invading army having Hanover Junction for its strategic objective, and suggested the proper locations for defenses against such a movement, not forgetting, good, loyal, Tidewater Virginian that he was, that some of these defenses would protect some oyster-beds.

On the 14th General Lee called the attention of Governor Letcher to the slow progress being made, for the want of laborers, in constructing the defensive works about Richmond, suggesting "that all available persons in and about Richmond be organized for the defense of the city; that they provide themselves with such arms as each



can procure, and that arrangements be made for the fabrication of suitable ammunition. These are intended as precautionary measures, which can better be made now than upon the eve of an emergency, should it arise."

On the 15th of June, Colonel Magruder, by authority from the governor, called into active service the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and Fifteenth regiments of Virginia militia, to rendezvous at Yorktown on the 24th, fully organized. The commandant of the Norfolk navy yard was ordered on the 18th to furnish eight 32-pounders, carriages for ten 42-pounders, and four large launches and cutters, as early as possible, for the defenses of York river. On the 19th the steamer Northampton was transferred to the war department for an army transport on James river.

On the 20th Colonel Magruder issued a general order assigning troops to various posts in his department. Colonel Ewell was assigned to the duty of erecting fortifications in the vicinity of Williamsburg, in conjunction with Capt. A. L. Rives, of the engineers; Col. D. H. Hill, with his First North Carolina regiment, was assigned to the command of the post at Yorktown, with directions to submit further plans for its defense; Col. T. P. August, with his Fifteenth Virginia regiment, was assigned to Williamsburg, to prosecute the defensive works at Grove landing, Spratley's farm, King's mill and Tutter's Neck, under the supervision of Colonel Ewell and Captain Rives; Col. Charles A. Crump, with his Twenty-sixth Virginia regiment, was assigned to Gloucester point, and Col. J. G. Hodges, with the Fourteenth Virginia regiment, to Jamestown island.

Left in temporary command at Yorktown, Col. D. H. Hill wrote, June 15th, to General Lee:

The enemy is burning for revenge for his total rout at Bethel church. There can be no doubt that he will attempt to take this point, either by a night surprise or by a regular siege. We are totally unprepared for either alternative. The development of our lines is so great that they cannot be manned with less than 6,000 troops. Now we have no siege guns at all, and our forces are divided between Bethel church, Grove landing and Williamsburg. We are therefore liable to be beaten in detail with our present weak force, and the York line may be lost at any moment. At this time there are scarce 3,000 men in Yorktown and our lines cannot possibly be defended with fewer than 6,000. Permit me, then, to urge that more troops may be sent here, and that some dozen siege guns be mounted in our batteries.

To this Lee replied that if that place should be besieged, measures would be taken for its relief; that no siege guns were then available for it, and that reinforcements would be sent as rapidly as the arrival of available troops would permit.

Gen. R. E. Lee, commanding, furnished, June 15th, to Governor Letcher, a statement of the military and naval preparations Virginia had made for her defense, from the date of her separation from the United States government to the date of the transfer of the military operations of the State to the Confederate government. (1) Arrangements were made for the establishment of batteries to prevent the ascent of her tidal rivers by hostile vessels, and as soon as sites for these batteries were selected, their construction was begun and their armament and defense committed to the Virginia navy. (2) Preparations were also begun for receiving into the service of the State volunteer companies, and for organizing, arming and equipping these; establishing a rendezvous, appointing mustering officers and providing for their subsistence and shelter. The first estimate of the number of troops of all arms required, based upon the points to be defended, was for 51,000 men. This estimated quota from each portion of the State was furnished except from the western section. (3) Arrangements were made for calling out volunteers from the western section, at the same time and in the same manner as from the east, but up to the date of his writing, this had been but feebly responded to.

Complete returns had not yet been received from the troops in the field, but, from the best information within his reach, General Lee believed the number of Virginia troops in the service was about 35,000, probably more, as the report of her ordnance officer showed that he had issued 2,054 rifles and carbines and 41,604 muskets, besides pistols and sabers for the cavalry. In addition to these, 13,000 arms had been issued from the Lexington arsenal, making a total of 56,658. From Lexington 7,000 arms had been issued to troops from other States, and also several thousand from the arsenal at Richmond. About 5,000 men of the Virginia companies were armed and equipped when received into the State's service, so that the number of Virginia troops in the field was about 40,000. Virginia's adjutant-general, W. H. Richardson,

reported, April 17th, that Virginia had in her service, at that date, of armed volunteers, 3,350 cavalry, 780 artillery, 5,700 light infantry, and 2,130 riflemen; a total of 12,050. General Lee added:

When it is remembered that this body of men were called from a state of profound peace to one of unexpected war, you will have reason to commend the alacrity with which they left their homes and families and prepared themselves for the defense of the State. The assembling of men, however, was not the most difficult operation. Provision for their instruction, subsistence, equipment, clothing, shelter and transportation in the field required more time and labor. Ammunition of every kind had to be manufactured. The carriages of the guns for river, land and field service had to be made, with the necessary implements, caissons, battery wagons, etc. One hundred and fifteen guns for field service have thus been provided, from which twenty light batteries, of four guns each, have been furnished, with the requisite horses, harness, etc.

The defenses for Virginia rivers were provided for as follows: On the James, two batteries and two steamers, mounting 40 guns, ranging from 32-pounders to 8 and 9-inch columbiads; with arrangements made for mounting 60 guns in the defenses around Richmond, and for a naval battery of 6 and 12-pound howitzers. On the York, three batteries had been constructed, mounting 30 guns. On the Potomac, sites for batteries had been selected and arrangements made for their construction, but as the command of that river was in possession of the United States, a larger force was required for their security than could be devoted to that purpose; therefore, only a battery at Aquia creek, with 12 guns, had been completed. On the Rappahannock, a four-gun battery of 32-pounders and 8-inch columbiads had been erected. On the Elizabeth, to guard the approaches to Norfolk and the navy yard, six batteries, mounting eighty-five 32-pounders and 8 and 9-inch columbiads, had been erected. On the Nansemond, to prevent access to the railroad from Norfolk, three batteries, mounting 19 guns, had been constructed. In addition to the batteries described, other works had been constructed for their land defense, exceeding, in many instances, the works on the batteries themselves, such as an extensive line of field works for the security of Norfolk on the sides toward the bay, and redoubts for the same purpose at Jamestown island, Gloucester point, Yorktown, and across the neck of land below Williamsburg.

In the conduct of naval affairs by Virginia, the sunken

frigate *United States* had been raised at the navy yard and prepared for a schoolship and for harbor defense, with a deck battery of nineteen 32-pounders and 9-inch columbiads; the frigate *Merrimac* (the famous ram *Virginia* of 1862) had been raised and was in the dry dock, and arrangements had been made for raising the *German-town* and the *Plymouth*.

Magruder reported on the 16th, from Yorktown, that he had 5,550 effective men; that he should have 4,500 more to make his line secure, and 15 heavy guns. General Huger reported, from Norfolk, on the 17th, that the Federals were placing artillery on the Ripraps, and on Saturday afternoon the command at Sewell's point was surprised by having eight or ten shells from that artillery exploded in and around their battery.

On the 18th, General Lee, as Magruder had requested, directed Lieut. R. R. Carter, commanding the steam tender *Teazer*, to co-operate with the batteries on Jamestown island in the defense of James river. He informed Colonel Magruder that requisition had been made for eight 32-pounders and four 42-pounder carronades for the defense of the land approaches to Yorktown, and for four boats, for service in York river, capable of transporting 400 or 500 men each; and that Captain Whittle was authorized to send to Yorktown the guns intended for Gloucester point, if not immediately wanted at that place. To Hon. W. C. Parks, of the Virginia convention, he wrote that the supply of arms for Virginia volunteers was so limited that he had suggested to the governor a method of procuring some old flint-lock muskets, which, if successful, he hoped would furnish the means of giving arms to the men in Grayson county and others that were much in want.

Colonel Magruder reported on the 18th, from Bethel church, that he then occupied that post with the Second Louisiana, to which he had attached the York and Warwick companies, two batteries of artillery and some cavalry, and had placed a Georgia regiment in support; and next day he wrote, that threatened by an advance of the enemy, via Warwick Court House, he had evacuated Bethel and marched for Yorktown. He learned, afterward, that the enemy had only come out to procure horses and mules and had then returned; and he found his men much fatigued and dispirited by this constant

marching and countermarching, made necessary by the weakness of his force, but still "that must be done and the enemy kept in his trenches and fortifications."

On June 24th, a war steamer came opposite the house of J. W. Gresham, on the Rappahannock river, below Urbana, and sent men ashore to purchase supplies. On being refused, and seeing a small company of Lancaster troops approaching, the enemy fled precipitately to their boats, fired on as they shoved off. The ship then opened and fired fifty-three shot and shell at Mr. Gresham's house, one of the balls striking the bed in which Mrs. Gresham was lying ill, and a shell exploding in an outhouse to which she was removed.

General Butler about this time reported that Colonel Allen, with a small detachment of his men, had, without orders, burned a wheatfield of some twenty-five acres, belonging to a widow, which he had safeguarded, his only excuse being that they were getting the wheat. "For this wanton destruction and waste he had the privates punished and the colonel arrested and held for trial, as such destruction and waste of the property of our enemies even, will disgrace us."

On June 27th, Col. Lafayette McLaws (later major-general) was ordered to take command of all the troops in the vicinity of Williamsburg; Colonel Ewell was ordered to report to him; Capt. A. L. Rives was also assigned to duty with Colonel McLaws, and Colonel August's station was changed to King's mill or Grove landing.

About midnight of July 4th, Lieut.-Col. Charles D. Dreux, of the First Louisiana battalion, led a detachment of 150 infantry, 1 howitzer and about 15 or 20 cavalry, in an advance in the direction of Newport News and took post, in ambush, near Curtis' farm. The videttes soon announced the approach of about 100 Federal cavalry. Notwithstanding the orders that had been given to the men not to fire until ordered, some shots were exchanged between the videttes and some of the men concealed on the left, and the enemy, and Colonel Dreux was mortally wounded. Capt. S. W. Fisk, of the Louisiana battalion, succeeding to the command, ordered his men to wheel into line; but in the meantime the enemy had disappeared, the horses, taking fright, had run off down the road with the gun, and the opportunity for

a surprise having passed, and there being a large force of the enemy near, the scouting party returned to camp. Colonel Magruder reported that he had himself gone, the morning before, with a larger force to the York road, as the enemy had crossed Hampton creek, leaving Dreux in command, who organized this expedition after he left. He ascertained that the enemy's force which fled was about 400, and that a war steamer came up after the skirmish and threw shells into the woods where it took place. The gallant colonel died from his wounds the next morning.

On the 11th, Thomas H. Wynne, chairman of the city committee on defenses, informed the secretary of war that the city council of Richmond was willing to bear a fair proportion of the expenses of erecting defenses around the city, but as that was an important point to the Confederate government, it should take charge of this work, as it had done elsewhere.

Brigadier-General Huger, from Norfolk, July 12th, submitted a list of the Virginia volunteer companies under his command, as organized into regiments and battalions, calling attention to the fact that all the infantry regiments had their complement of companies, except the Forty-first, which would soon be filled up by companies ready to be mustered in. These regiments were: The Third, Roger A. Pryor, colonel, F. H. Archer, lieutenant-colonel, and Joseph Mayo, major; the Sixth, William Mahone, colonel, Thomas J. Corprew, lieutenant-colonel, and W. P. Lundy, major; the Ninth, F. H. Smith, colonel, J. T. L. Preston, lieutenant-colonel, and Stapleton Crutchfield, major (the superintendent and two professors of the Virginia military institute); the Twelfth, D. A. Weisiger, colonel, F. L. Taylor, lieutenant-colonel, and Edgar L. Brockett, major; the Twenty-sixth, R. E. Colston, colonel, H. T. Parish, lieutenant-colonel, and John C. Page, major; the Forty-first, John R. Chambliss, Jr., colonel, George Blow, Jr., lieutenant-colonel, and Fred W. Smith, major. The Forty-first had but seven companies. There was a cavalry regiment of eight companies, without field officers, and a battalion of field artillery of five companies, without field officers. Of the officers named, Mahone afterward became major-general, and Pryor, Weisiger, Colston and Chambliss, brigadier-generals.

Col. Robert Johnston, commanding the cavalry at Cockletown, reported that a volunteer scout of four had returned to camp that morning, bringing in Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Shurtleff of the United States naval brigade. This scout met a party of six, near New Market bridge, killed Major Rawlings, wounded the two officers brought in, and put the rest to flight. Soon afterward Colonel Johnston reported that he would occupy Bethel, endeavor to secure the negroes from the lower part of the peninsula, and then occupy Harrod's and Young's mills, whence he could best operate with safety against marauding parties.

July 24th, on account of the panic following the battle of Bull Run, Butler was required to send a force of about 4,000 men to Washington. He wrote to Scott: "This reduction of my forces here leaves it impossible to take up or hold any advanced position. Newport News, where I have an intrenched camp, and a very important point in my judgment, would be in great danger of attack from Yorktown and Warwick, where the Confederates are now concentrating troops across the James river from Smithfield to Warwick."

As soon as Colonel Magruder learned the result of the battle of Manassas, he ordered Colonel Johnston to proceed, with about 2,000 men, to reconnoiter in the immediate vicinity of Hampton and Newport News. As soon as Johnston appeared before Hampton, a large balloon was sent up, from which his force was observed, and a hasty evacuation took place. Magruder ordered a junction of troops from Williamsburg and Yorktown—about 4,000, including 400 cavalry and two batteries of the howitzers—in Warwick county, where he established a depot of supplies at the courthouse, and then marched to Bethel church. On August 6th he disposed his force between the Federals at and around Fort Monroe and those in garrison at Newport News.

On the morning of the 7th, Magruder displayed his force within a mile and a half of Newport News, with the hope of drawing out the enemy. Disappointed in this, he moved his left flank to within a mile of Hampton, where a copy of the New York Tribune, containing a recent report from Butler to the secretary of war, was placed in his hands, in which the former announced his intentions with respect to Hampton, about one-third of

which had been burned by the Federals when they evacuated it in consequence of the withdrawal of 4,000 of their best troops to Washington. Butler, in that report, in substance stated:

That he intended to fortify Hampton and make it so strong as to be easily defended by a small number of troops; that he did not know what to do with the many negroes in his possession unless he possessed Hampton; that they were still coming in rapidly; that as their masters had deserted their homes and slaves, he should consider the latter free, and would colonize them at Hampton, the home of most of their owners, where the women could support themselves by attending to the clothes of the soldiers, and the men by working on the fortifications of the town.

Magruder reported, that having known for some time that Hampton was the harbor of runaway slaves and traitors, and that being under the guns of Fort Monroe it could not be held, even if taken, he was under the impression that it should have been destroyed before; and when he found, from Butler's report, its importance to the enemy, and that the town would lend great strength to the fortifications directly around it, he determined to burn it; that the gentlemen of Hampton, many of whom were in his command, seemed to concur with him in the propriety of this course. He further hoped that the sight of a conflagration would draw away the troops from Newport News at night. Having reached this conclusion, Magruder made disposition of his troops, selecting four Virginia cavalry companies to burn the town, three of them made up of persons from that portion of the country, and many of them from Hampton. To support this party, the Fourteenth Virginia was posted near Hampton to guard against an attack from any unexpected quarter; New Market, between Hampton and Newport News, was taken possession of, and a force disposed so as to meet any troops coming from Newport News to the relief of Hampton. He then described the skirmish at the Hampton bridge, which induced the enemy to retreat, at the end of half an hour, with some loss, and with only one of his men wounded. "Notice was then given to the few remaining inhabitants of the place, and those who were aged or infirm were kindly cared for and taken to their friends, who occupied detached houses. The town was then fired in many places and burned to the ground." About daybreak of



the 8th the troops that had fired the town returned to Bethel for rest, not having been molested by the enemy.

General Butler, in his report of this affair, said that just before noon the Confederates attacked his guard at the bridge and attempted to burn it, but were driven back, when they proceeded to fire Hampton, in a great number of places, and by 12 o'clock it was in flames and was soon entirely destroyed. He wrote:

They gave but fifteen minutes' time for the inhabitants to remove from their houses, and I have to-day brought over the old and infirm, who by that wanton act of destruction are now left houseless and homeless. The enemy took away with them most of the able-bodied white men. A more wanton and unnecessary act than the burning, as it seems to me, could not have been committed. There was not the slightest attempt to make any resistance on our part for the possession of the town, which we had before evacuated. There was no attempt to interfere with them there, as we only repelled an attempt to burn the bridge. It would have been easy to dislodge them from the town by a few shells from the fortress, but I did not choose to allow an opportunity to fasten upon the Federal troops any portion of this heathenish outrage.

Magruder reported that there was sickness among the troops on the peninsula, nearly all of a typhoid character, and many deaths were occurring. The Fifth North Carolina, over 1,000 strong, had then less than 400 for duty. "In addition to the measles, ague and fever, bilious and typhoid fever, symptoms of scurvy are apparent throughout the command; typhoid has been so prevalent and fatal at Jamestown island as to make the withdrawal of the men from that post necessary." He added, that he had called out a large force of negroes to complete the fortifications, and he requested that funds be sent for the payment of these laborers, without delay, as many of them were free negroes. He did not wish the sanitary condition of his men to be made known, for obvious reasons, and said:

Those men who can take the field are in fine spirits, and so keen for an encounter with the enemy that I believe Newport News could be carried, though it is excessively strong, and garrisoned by troops and supported by a naval force more than equal to my own in numbers. I do not think it can be done, however, without a loss of one-half of our men in killed and wounded. It could not be held by us for any length of time if it were taken, as the troops from Fort Monroe in much larger force could place themselves in our rear, and the position itself could be shelled by the enemy's ships both in front and on the left flank. Its temporary position, therefore, would not compensate for the loss necessary in taking it.

On the 17th of August, Maj.-Gen. John E. Wool superseded Butler in department command, and Butler was put in command of the volunteer forces in the department exclusive of those at Fort Monroe, practically his own brigade.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE TYGART'S VALLEY AND CHEAT MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGN—BATTLE OF GREENBRIER RIVER, OR CAMP BARTOW—BATTLE OF ALLEGHANY MOUNTAIN.

**T**HE unsatisfactory condition of military operations on the line from Staunton to Parkersburg, as well as on that from Staunton to the Kanawha, during the month of July, was the cause of great anxiety both to the Virginia government and to that of the Confederacy. Reinforcements were hurried forward on both lines, especially to northwestern Virginia on the Staunton and Parkersburg line, where the larger Federal force had been concentrated. After the death of Gen. R. S. Garnett and the retreat of his forces, the command of the army of the Northwest was, on the 14th of July, assumed by Brig.-Gen. H. R. Jackson, of Georgia, who established his headquarters at Monterey, 47 miles west of Staunton, and pushed his advance across Alleghany mountain to the Greenbrier river. Another column having been ordered to the Huntersville and Huttonsville road, mainly the brigade of Brig.-Gen. W. W. Loring, that officer was, as the ranking one, assigned on the 20th of July to the command of the army of the Northwest, which included the forces on both the Monterey and the Huntersville lines which had a common objective in the Federal force on Cheat mountain and near Huttonsville. General Loring reached Monterey on the 22d day of July and assumed command.

When Loring reached Monterey he found the army of the Northwest thus distributed: Col. Edward Johnson, with the Twelfth Georgia and Anderson's Virginia Lee battery, were on Alleghany mountain, with pickets at Greenbrier river; Col. Albert Rust's Third Arkansas and Col. John B. Baldwin's Fifty-second Virginia were in supporting distance between Alleghany mountain and Monterey; Col. S. V. Fulkerson's Thirty-seventh Virginia, Col. William B. Taliaferro's Twenty-third Virginia, and Col. W. C. Scott's Forty-fourth Virginia were

at Monterey, as also were Shumaker's Virginia battery and Maj. George Jackson's Fourteenth Virginia cavalry. Col. J. N. Ramsey's First Georgia and the remnant of the Twenty-fifth Virginia, under Maj. A. G. Reger, were placed at McDowell for reorganization; Col. Charles C. Lee's Thirty-seventh North Carolina and Col. William Gilham's Thirty-first Virginia, with some 2,000 men, were on the road between Huntersville and Valley mountain, with their advance at the latter place, holding the road into the head of Tygart's valley. After consultation with Gen. H. R. Jackson, it was decided that other troops which had been ordered to the Monterey line should be sent to Millboro, on the Virginia Central railroad, and thence by way of the Warm Springs to the Huntersville line.

After spending a few days at Monterey inspecting the troops and gathering information, General Loring, on the 1st of August, rode to the front, accompanied by his staff, Col. Carter Stevenson, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. A. L. Long, chief of artillery; Capt. James L. Corley, chief quartermaster; Capt. R. G. Cole, chief commissary; Lieut. H. M. Matthews, aide-de-camp, and Col. W. M. Starke, volunteer aide-de-camp. Most of these officers subsequently became distinguished; Colonel Stevenson as major-general in command of Hood's corps; Major Long as chief of artillery and brigadier-general in the Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia; Captains Corley and Cole as the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary on the staff of General Lee, and Lieutenant Matthews as governor of West Virginia. Most of these had been officers in the United States army.

After crossing Alleghany mountain, General Loring reconnoitered the enemy's position on Cheat mountain and concluded that a direct attack on that, by way of the Parkersburg road, was impracticable. He then decided to take immediate command of the force which had been ordered to rendezvous at Huntersville, and attempt to turn Cheat mountain by way of the Valley mountain pass, which Colonels Gilham and Lee had been ordered to occupy. He directed Gen. H. R. Jackson to advance his whole force of some 6,000 men to the Greenbrier river, and hold himself in readiness to co-operate when the advance should be made from Huntersville toward Beverly. General Loring then rode down the valley of the

Greenbrier to Huntersville, where he established his headquarters, about the last of July, and began to make arrangements for the proposed forward movements on the Federal forces at Huttonsville and on Cheat mountain.

Loring found at Huttonsville Col. George Maney's First Tennessee, Col. Robert Hatton's Seventh Tennessee, Col. John H. Savage's Sixteenth Tennessee, Col. John A. Campbell's Forty-eighth Virginia, Maj. John D. Munford's First Virginia battalion of regulars, Maj. W. H. F. Lee's squadron of Virginia cavalry, and Marye's and Stanley's Virginia batteries of artillery. Colonels Gilham and Lee were at Valley mountain, 28 miles west of Huntersville, with their two regiments, and Col. J. S. Burks' Forty-second Virginia and a Georgia regiment were en route from Millboro to Huntersville. The effective force on the Huntersville line was about 8,500 men, most excellent material for an efficient army, as they were all well armed and well equipped by the respective States that had sent them to the field. Most of them were skilled in the use of arms, as they had received military instruction in the volunteer companies which had been organized into regiments of State troops. Many of their officers were trained men, and all were in fine spirits and eager to be led against the enemy. It was obvious to all who were informed in reference to the position of the enemy, the intervening country, and the season of the year, that the success of the proposed movement depended altogether upon its speedy execution. General Loring had a trained staff, most of them old army officers, competent to expedite military operations. The point of vantage in the advance was already occupied by Colonel Gilham, and yet, to the surprise of every one, Loring lingered at Huntersville, giving his attention to establishing there a depot of supplies and to organizing a supply train, ignoring the facts that it was only two days' march to the enemy's position near Huttonsville; that beef cattle were abundant along the line of advance, and that so soon as Huttonsville should be reached, the road over Cheat mountain would be opened, if that position were captured, and supplies could be sent from Staunton over the Parkersburg turnpike.

The unsatisfactory results of military operations in northwestern Virginia and the constant appeals from the leading men of that region to be rid of Federal domina-

tion, induced Gen. R. E. Lee, the Confederate general-in-chief, to take the field in person and give general oversight to military affairs on the Kanawha and Beverly lines, by each of which Federal armies were overrunning a large and important portion of Virginia and persistently pressing toward Staunton and the center of the State. He first gave attention to the Beverly line. Reaching Staunton the last of July, accompanied by his aides, Col. John Augustine Washington and Capt. Walter H. Taylor, he promptly rode forward, 47 miles, to Monterey, where he spent a day conferring with Gen. H. R. Jackson and inspecting the troops there encamped, and then rode on to Huntersville, which he reached the 1st of August. At that point he remained for several days, conferring with General Loring, and, in his polite, suggestive way, urging him to advance on the enemy by way of Valley mountain. Not succeeding in this, or in gaining the information he desired in reference to the enemy in Tygart's valley, he again rode forward, 28 miles, to Valley mountain, at the head of Tygart's valley, which had been occupied by Colonel Gilham's command for over a week, and there established his headquarters on the 8th of August. Maj. W. H. F. Lee accompanied him with his battalion of cavalry, which was at once put on outpost duty. Without delay, General Lee hastened to inform himself, by personal reconnoissances and through scouts, concerning the condition of affairs in the Federal army in his front and the topographic conditions of the immediate field of action; at the same time taking general oversight of operations on the Kanawha line by constant correspondence with Generals Wise and Floyd, who were there in command.

General Loring joined General Lee at Valley mountain about the 12th of August, and as he was in immediate command of the troops on the Monterey line and on the Huntersville line, which formed his division, he also proceeded to inform himself concerning the field of operations, and addressed himself to the task of preparing to dislodge Reynolds, the capable Federal commander, from his strongholds at Elkwater and on Cheat mountain, by bringing his men to the front and gathering supplies for an advance. His hesitating disposition led to delays, for one purpose and another, but he was completely baffled by the prevailing conditions of the weather. The Cheat

mountain region, the dome of the watersheds of north-western Virginia, covered by a vast and dense forest of large evergreen trees, reaches an altitude of nearly 5,000 feet, so that, naturally, it is at all times a damp and chilly region having a large rainfall. During this particular season the precipitation was very much larger than usual. During most of the months of July and August there was a steady downpour of rain, with intervals of heavy mists. In consequence of these climatic conditions, the whole country became saturated with moisture, and even the graded mountain roads, cut up by the constant passing of heavy army trains, were converted into streams of axle-deep mud, making them practically impassable for vehicles of any kind. The many unbridged streams, swollen by these steady rains, added to the difficulties of transportation. This continuous damp and chilly weather caused a great amount of sickness of every kind among the thousands of unseasoned troops here congregated, until nearly half the army was laid up, in poorly provided hospitals, and the mortality from sickness became very large. Nearly every house in all this sparsely settled country was converted into a hospital, and hospital tents, filled with sick men, were pitched all along the roads to the rear of the armies. Supply trains could not reach the camps, and so for weeks the army was on short and poor rations, and the men, many of them from cities and towns, and most of them unused to exposure and accustomed to all the comforts of good homes, were here forced to pass through an ordeal more trying than that of constant fighting; but they bore all this with uncomplaining courage, wondering why they were not led to action when they could see, from their camps, those of the enemy but a day's march away. On the 1st of September the weather conditions changed, and the dry and hot weather of the early autumn succeeded, with storms at intervals, but the roads became drier so the army could be concentrated and supplies for a few days ahead be gathered at the camps.

The topographical engineer of the army, Capt. Jed Hotchkiss, having completed a detailed map of Tygart's valley, from Valley mountain to Huttonsville, and other arrangements perfected, Loring at last yielded to Lee's urgency for an advance, and on the 8th of September issued confidential orders for a simultaneous movement

by the Huntersville line on the enemy's camp at Elkwater, some 16 miles in front of Valley mountain, and by the Monterey line on that on Cheat mountain, some 12 miles from the Confederate camp on Greenbrier river. The two Federal camps were about 7 miles apart by a bridle path, and 17 miles by the circuitous turnpike roads.

Before divulging his plan of campaign, General Loring (doubtless by the advice of General Lee, who knew the advantages of organization), on the 8th of September issued general orders No. 10, brigading the army of the Northwest as follows: The First brigade, under Brig.-Gen. H. R. Jackson, to consist of the Twelfth Georgia, Third Arkansas, Thirty-first and Fifty-second Virginia, the Ninth Virginia battalion, the Danville, Va., artillery, and Jackson, Va., cavalry; the Second brigade, under Brig.-Gen. S. R. Anderson, to consist of the First, Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee, Hampden artillery and Alexander's cavalry; the Third brigade, under Brig.-Gen. D. S. Donelson, to consist of the Eighth and Sixteenth Tennessee, the First and Fourteenth Georgia, and the Greenbrier, Va., cavalry; the Fourth brigade, under Col. William Gilham, to consist of the Twenty-first Virginia, Sixth North Carolina, First battalion of Confederate States provisional army, and the Troup artillery; the Fifth brigade, under Col. William B. Taliaferro, to consist of the Twenty-third, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-seventh and Forty-fourth Virginia, and Rice's and the Lee Virginia batteries; the Sixth brigade, under Col. J. S. Burks, to consist of the Forty-second and Forty-eighth Virginia and Lee's Virginia cavalry. A section of the Hampden artillery was assigned to the Third brigade, and one from the Troup artillery to the Sixth brigade, for field service. Of these six brigades, the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth formed the Huntersville division, under the immediate command of General Loring; while the First and Fifth formed the Monterey division, under the immediate command of Gen. H. R. Jackson, the command of his own brigade devolving on Col. Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas.

The Federal force in front of Loring at this time was the "First brigade of the army of Occupation of West Virginia," commanded by Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, with headquarters at Elkwater. The official



returns for October, 1861, give this brigade, present for duty, 377 officers, 10,421 men, and 26 pieces of artillery, stationed at Beverly, Elkwater and Cheat mountain. There are no official returns of the Confederate strength. Long, who was in a position to know, in his *Memoirs of R. E. Lee*, states that Loring's force was 6,000 and Jackson's 5,000; and that Reynolds had 2,000 in front of Jackson and 5,000 in front of Loring. So the opposing armies were about equal in strength, were both led by old army officers, and composed of the choice men of each nation. The Federals had the great advantage of fighting from behind well-located and properly-constructed fortifications, and were in comfortable camps.

On the 8th of September, General Lee communicated, confidentially, his plan of campaign for the capture of the Federal positions in his front, to begin the night of September 11th and be carried into effect by assault on the Cheat mountain fortress and attack on Elkwater camp on the morning of the 12th. General Reynolds' headquarters and most of his force were at Elkwater, 2,200 feet above tide, 11 miles due north from Loring's headquarters and the camp of the larger part of his force, at Valley mountain. It was 8 miles due east from the Elkwater camp to that on Cheat mountain, and about the same distance by a very direct bridle path, for most of the way; but it was 17 miles between the two by turnpike roads to the rear by way of Huttonsville. From Loring's camp at Valley mountain, 3,500 feet above the sea level, it was 15 miles northeast, in a direct line across numerous ridges of the densely forested Cheat mountain chain, to Jackson's camp on the Greenbrier, 3,000 feet above tide, on the Monterey line. By the nearest wagon road between the two wings of the Confederate army it was nearly 30 miles, by the rear, toward Huntersville; and by the shortest line of communication, by bridle paths, it was fully 20 miles between the two camps. A single road, the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, led from Jackson's camp some 14 miles westward to the Federal camp on Cheat mountain. Two good roads led from the front of Loring's camp to the Federal intrenched camp at Elkwater. One of these, the turnpike to Huttonsville, followed the Tygart valley river; the other, after crossing a divide to the westward, led down the Elkwater branch of Valley river to the Federal camp at its

mouth. By connected farm roads and bridle paths, there was a continuous route for infantry along or near a bench of fertile limestone land that shouldered out from the western side of the western Cheat mountain, by which, unobserved, the turnpike road from Monterey to Huttonsville could be reached on the top of that mountain, and communication cut between the two wings of the Federal army, some 3 miles west of the Cheat mountain fortress. These several ways of approach regulated the Confederate plan for a simultaneous attack.

Lee's first objective was the capture of the Federal garrison on the middle Cheat mountain, some 4,000 feet above the sea level. To effect this, Jackson was ordered to march an assaulting column of at least 2,000 men under Col. Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas (who had asked to lead it, after an examination of the position), on the night of the 11th, along the turnpike to the first top of Cheat or Back Alleghany mountain, and then, at Slaven's cabin, turn to the left, by paths and through the forest and across the Main or Shaver fork of Cheat river, so as to turn the right of the Federal position and attack it, if possible, by surprise, and carry it by assault at dawn of the 12th. Jackson in person, with the remainder of his command, except a guard left at his camp, was to follow Rust, during the night of the 11th, and after the latter had left the turnpike to continue along that to the front of the Federal position, and be ready to make a demonstration or join in the attack when Rust should make his assault on the morning of the 12th. If the assault should be successful, Jackson was to leave a force to hold the captured redoubt, and, with the remainder of his army, press on to join in the attack on the left rear of the Elkwater position. The men were all to be provided with strips of white cotton cloth, to be fastened on the arm as badges, so they could recognize and not fire on each other when the attacking columns converged in co-operation.

The co-operating force under Loring was also to move on the 11th. General Anderson, with his brigade in light marching order, was to march along the byways and bridle paths on the western slope of Cheat mountain, carefully concealing his movements, during that day and the following night, so as to get possession of the turnpike, on the western top of Cheat mountain, at about

daylight of the 12th, cut the telegraph wire connecting the Federal camps, break the line of communication, and so dispose of his men as to keep back reinforcements from the Elkwater camp; guard against attack from the fort, and aid in the assault of Rust's column, if necessary, on the Cheat mountain stronghold. He was especially charged to so regulate and conceal his movements as not to interfere with the surprise of the enemy by Colonel Rust, with whose left he would seek connection. His route, 20 or more miles in length, was a difficult one, but he was well guided by Dr. Butcher, a loyal practicing physician, who knew that region well. His home was at Huttonsville, and he had retired with the Confederate forces after the battle of Rich Mountain.

General Donelson, with his brigade, was to advance by byways along the eastern side of Tygart's valley and the foot of Cheat mountain, seizing the paths and roads leading to the turnpike from that direction, and driving back any endeavor of the enemy to retard the advance of the center along the turnpike. Such of the artillery as could not be used on the flanks was to follow the turnpike, supported by Munford's battalion and followed by part of Gilham's brigade. The brigade of Colonel Burks was to march across to the Elkwater road and follow that, as the left wing of the advance, guarding that flank, having Lee's cavalry on its flank and rear and ready to make an attack on the enemy's outposts if opportunity should offer. The supply trains were to follow along the main road. On the 9th General Jackson issued orders from Greenbrier river that the brigades of Rust and Fulkerson should draw four days' rations of salt meat and hard bread; similar orders were issued by Loring.

After the plan of campaign had been adopted and the date for its inception been fixed, General Lee from "Headquarters of the Forces," Valley mountain, W. Va., September 9, 1861, issued the following stirring special order:

The forward movement announced to the army of the Northwest in special orders, No. 28, from its headquarters, of this date, gives the general commanding the opportunity of exhorting the troops to keep steadily in view the great principles for which they contend, and to manifest to the world their determination to maintain them. The eyes of the country are upon you. The safety of your homes and the lives of all you hold dear depend upon your courage and exertions. Let each man resolve to be victorious, and that the right of self-government, liberty and peace shall in him find a defender. The progress of this army must be forward.

On the 9th, General Lee wrote confidentially to Gen. John B. Floyd, commanding the army of the Kanawha:

Great efforts have been made to place this column in marching condition. Although the roads are continuous tracks of mud, in which the wagons plunge to their axles, I hope the forces can be united, with a few days' supply of provisions, so as to move forward on Thursday, the 12th instant. I therefore advise you of the probability that on your part you may be prepared to take advantage of it, and if circumstances render it advisable, to act on your side.

On the 8th, Reynolds sent a strong detachment to reconnoiter Loring's front and learn what was going on in his camp. In the early morning of the 9th these encountered Loring's pickets, 4 miles in his front at Marshall's store, in a lively skirmish, in which several were killed on both sides. The Federals then retired to Conrad's store, where a large advance guard was established.

On the morning of the 11th, Lee's forward movement began by the successive marching of Loring's four columns, as provided in the plan of attack. The central column, that moving down by the Huttonsville turnpike, which Lee and Loring accompanied, routed the Federal outpost at Conrad's store, some 8 miles in front. The Federal pickets fell back toward Elkwater, contending all the way with Loring's advance.

Jackson's men marched that night, and all the preliminary movements of the campaign were promptly and admirably executed, notwithstanding the rough topography and other difficulties of the various lines of march and the cold and heavy rain that began during the night, which not only increased the darkness, in the remarkably dense forest through which Rust had to make his way, but swelled the cold waters of the many tributaries of Cheat river, and that river itself, which his column had to cross and even to march in. Each of the co-operating commands was at its appointed place before the dawn of September 12th, and the enemy had not discovered their movements. Generals Lee and Loring, with the brigades of Gilham and Burks and the artillery and cavalry, were in the near front and on the right of the Elkwater camp; Donelson had gained its left and left rear, capturing a regiment there on picket guarding that flank and the way to Cheat mountain; Anderson was on the turnpike, on the western top of Cheat, had cut the telegraph, and was in position to block the coming of reinforcements from Elkwater, or an attack from the

Cheat mountain fort; Rust had overcome the almost insurmountable difficulties of his march through the forest, which his men had courageously endured, and had his command in front of the right of the Cheat mountain fortress, on the same ridge, and in the road in its rear, and was ready for the assault; while Jackson was in position near Cheat river, in the immediate front of the frowning redoubts. All were anxiously awaiting the opening of the fire of Rust's assault as the signal for a general attack, but the dawn came and passed, and no sound was heard from Cheat mountain.

Early on the morning of the 12th, Col. Nathan Kimball, of the Fourteenth Indiana, who was in command of the Federals on Cheat mountain, started a supply wagon train toward the Elkwater camp. About three-quarters of a mile from his camp, that train was attacked by the left of Rust's command, which had gained his rear. Informed of this, Kimball at once took two companies to drive away the attacking party, supposing it to be merely a scout. He deployed his men as skirmishers, and they advanced and developed the presence of Rust in force. Kimball claims that his force, by a vigorous fire, drove away the Confederates, who "threw aside guns, clothing and everything that impeded their progress." At the same time Kimball sent forward a strong detail to open the way to his picket on the path leading to Elkwater, which, without his knowing it, had been cut off by Anderson. This detail met Anderson's force, on the western Cheat mountain, nearly 3 miles from the Federal camp and joined in an engagement which, Kimball claims, drove the Confederates back, aided by the picket which had been cut off but now came up and attacked Anderson's rear.

At this juncture Kimball was informed that the Confederates were in his front, to the east of his camp, and had captured a picket of 35 men; and that his two companies that had attacked Rust's left were driving him to the Federal right flank. Kimball then advanced a strong force from his front to move up Cheat river and fall on Rust's right, 2 miles above the bridge, which he says forced Rust to retreat. Kimball claimed that he was attacked by nearly 5,500 men, which he engaged and repulsed with less than 300. His report of the 14th concludes: "I think my men have done wonders, and ask

God to bless them. The woods are literally covered with the baggage, coats and haversacks of the enemy. Though almost naked, my command is ready to move forward." Reynolds, who had been taken by surprise by Lee's advance, says in his official report: "So matters rested at dark on the 12th, with heavy forces in front and in plain sight of both posts, communication cut off, and the supply train for the mountains loaded with provisions that were needed."

Colonel Rust, at 10 p. m. of September 13th, wrote to General Loring from Camp Bartow, to which he had returned, in obedience to undated instructions from Gen. H. R. Jackson, which read:

Dear Colonel: Return into camp with your command. So soon as you arrive, address a letter to General Loring, explaining the failure and the reasons of it. Show this to Captain Neill, quartermaster, and let him at once furnish an express ready to take your letter by the near route. If possible, get the postmaster, Mr. Arbogast, to go, and go rapidly and at once. Say in your letter that I am in possession of the first summit of Cheat mountain, and in hopes of something going on in Tygart's valley, and shall retain command of it until I receive orders from headquarters. It may bring on an engagement, but I am prepared, and shall whip them if they come. P. S.—I cannot write here. Enclose this scrawl in your own letter. You had better return yourself at once to camp, leaving your command to follow. We had several skirmishes yesterday and killed several of the enemy.

It appears, from this letter, that General Jackson wrote it on the morning of the 13th, after hearing from Rust of the failure of his movement; that Rust, on receipt of it, returned to his old camp, followed by his command, which probably reached there some time during the night of the 13th. Rust's letter to Loring reads:

The expedition against Cheat mountain failed. My command consisted of between 1,500 and 1,600 men. Got there at the appointed time, notwithstanding the rain. Seized a number of their pickets and scouts. Learned from them that the enemy was between 4,000 and 5,000 strong, and they reported them to be strongly fortified. Upon a reconnaissance, their representations were fully corroborated—a fort or block-house on the point or elbow of the road, intrenchments on the south, and outside of the intrenchments and all around up to the road heavy and impassable abatis, if enemy were not behind them. Colonel Barton, my lieutenant-colonel and all the field officers declared it would be madness to make an attack. We learned from the prisoners they were aware of your movements, and had been telegraphed for reinforcements, and I heard three pieces of artillery pass down toward your encampment while we were seeking to make an assault upon them.

I took the assistant commissary, and for one regiment I found

upon his person a requisition for 930 rations; also a letter indicating they had very little subsistence. I brought only one prisoner back with me. The cowardice of the guard (not Arkansan) permitted the others to escape. Spies had evidently communicated our movements to the enemy. The fort was completed, as reported by the different prisoners examined separately, and another in process of construction. We got near enough to see the enemy in the trenches beyond the abatis. The most of my command behaved admirably. Some I would prefer to be without upon any expedition.

General Jackson requests me to say that he is in possession of the first summit of Cheat mountain, and hopes you are doing something in Tygart's valley, and will retain command of it until he receives orders from your quarters. My own opinion is, that there is nothing to be gained by occupying that mountain. It will take a heavy force to take the pass, and at a heavy loss. I knew the enemy had four times my force; but for the abatis we would have made the assault. We could not get to them to make it. The general says in his note to me, his occupying Cheat mountain may bring on an engagement, but he is prepared, and will whip them if they come. I see from the postscript that he requests his note to me to be enclosed to you. I can only say that all human power could do toward success in my expedition failed of success. The taking of the picket looked like a providential interposition. I took the first one myself, being at the head of the column when I got to the road.

General Lee held his positions in Tygart's valley on the 12th and 13th and during a portion of the 14th, awaiting information from Rust, which he received through the preceding letter, on the morning of the 14th, after which he issued the following special order:

Camp on Valley River, Va., September 14, 1861.

The forced reconnoissance of the enemy's positions, both at Cheat mountain pass and on Valley river, having been completed, and the character of the natural approaches and the nature of the artificial defenses exposed, the army of the Northwest will resume its former position at such time and in such manner as General Loring shall direct, and continue its preparations for further operations. The commanding general experienced much gratification at the cheerfulness and alacrity displayed by the troops in this arduous operation. The promptitude with which they surmounted every difficulty, driving in and capturing the enemy's pickets on the fronts examined and exhibiting that readiness for attack, gives assurance of victory when a fit opportunity offers.

R. E. LEE, General Commanding.

Gen. A. L. Long, in his *Memoirs*, referring to Colonel Rust's attack of September 12th, writes:

It was anxiously expected from early dawn throughout the day. On every side was continuously heard, "What has become of Rust?" "Why don't he attack?" "Rust must have lost his way!" The Tennesseans under Anderson became so impatient that they requested to be led to the attack without waiting for Rust. But Anderson thought that he must be governed by the letter of his instruc-

tions, and declined granting the request of his men. . . . Anderson and Donelson, finding that their situation was becoming critical, being liable to discovery and being between two superior forces, rejoined Loring on the 13th.

Colonel Rust's letter to General Loring plainly shows (notwithstanding the fact that he had himself, after an examination of the Federal position on Cheat mountain, advised General Lee to make the attack, as planned, and had requested, as a personal favor, that he might lead it with his own regiment and such other troops as might be assigned to him) that his courage failed him when he came in sight of the fortifications on Cheat mountain, and that he, unwisely, "took counsel of his fears" by giving heed to the exaggerated statements of the Federal prisoners, and did not even make an effort to attack, or an attempt to carry the position by assault. He makes no mention of having gained the road in the rear of the Federal position, or of having had an engagement there, as Colonel Kimball reports, which first revealed his presence. The meager Federal reports clearly indicate that his movement had not been discovered; that his presence was a complete surprise, and that if he had made a bold assault at the appointed time, he would, undoubtedly, have captured the Federal stronghold, and that the combined attack that would then have been made on the Elkwater camp would have completely routed the rest of the Federal army and given to General Lee's able plan of campaign a great victory—one that would have yielded most important results in northwestern Virginia, changed the condition of State affairs in that direction, and had a most important bearing upon subsequent military operations. The very men then led by Rust, later on assaulted and captured far more formidable works.

After issuing his special order of September 14th, General Lee returned to Valley mountain, and the two wings of the army of the Northwest returned to their previous encampments. Although deeply mortified at the failure of his campaign, General Lee did not complain of those who were the cause of it; then, as afterward, when campaigns upon a grander scale were partial failures, he either said nothing, or assumed that he himself was responsible for results.

From Valley mountain, on the 17th of September, he wrote to Governor Letcher:



I was very sanguine of taking the enemy's works on last Thursday morning. I had considered the subject well. With great effort the troops intended for the surprise had reached their destination, having traversed 20 miles of steep, rugged mountain paths, and the last day through a terrible storm, which lasted all night and in which they had to stand drenched to the skin in the cold rain. Still, their spirits were good. When the morning broke, I could see the enemy's tents on Valley river at the point on the Huttonsville road just below me. It was a tempting sight. We waited for the attack on Cheat mountain, which was to be the signal, till 10 a. m.; the men (Federals) were cleaning their unserviceable arms. But the signal did not come. All chance for surprise was gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed the preceding day by the storm. They had nothing to eat that morning, could not hold out another day, and were obliged to be withdrawn. The party sent to Cheat mountain to take that in the rear had also to be withdrawn. The attack to come off from the east side failed from the difficulties of the way; the opportunity was lost and our plan discovered. It is a grievous disappointment to me, I assure you. But for the rain-storm I have no doubt but that it would have succeeded. This, Governor, is for your own eye. Please do not speak of it; we must try again.

Our greatest loss is the death of my dear friend, Colonel Washington. He and my son were reconnoitering the front of the enemy. They came unawares upon a concealed party, who fired upon them within 20 yards, and the colonel fell pierced by three balls. My son's horse received three shots, but he escaped on the colonel's horse. His zeal for the cause to which he had devoted himself carried him, I fear, too far.

We took some 70 prisoners and killed some 25 or 30 of the enemy. Our loss was small besides what I have mentioned. Our present difficulty is the roads. It has been raining in these mountains about six weeks. It is impossible to get along. It is that which has paralyzed all our efforts.

This "forced reconnoissance" made known to General Lee that only Reynolds' brigade was in Loring's front, and that Rosecrans had stolen away with the larger part of his command. When he returned to Valley mountain, on the 15th of September, he had report from Floyd of the engagement at Carnifax Ferry, on the 10th, and learned what had become of Rosecrans. Apprehensive that the bickerings of Floyd and Wise on the Kanawha line would lead to further disasters, now that Rosecrans had added his force to that of Cox, Lee left Valley mountain, about the 19th, and hastened to that line by way of Marlinton and Lewisburg.

On the 14th, Loring made demonstrations on Reynolds at Elkwater, then, late in the day, retired to Conrad's at Valley Head, where he halted during the 15th, hoping that the enemy would follow and attack him. As he did

not come, Loring marched late that night toward his old camp at Valley mountain, which he reached early in the morning of the 16th. Jackson remained in front of the Cheat mountain redoubt on the 14th and 15th, threatening to attack, especially on the 15th, when he made a demonstration on the Federal left; after which, at night, he returned to his Greenbrier river camp.

Shortly after General Lee left Valley mountain he sent back orders to Loring to send reinforcements to Floyd. Loring was very ill, and the doctor would not allow him to be disturbed. A council of brigade and regimental commanders was called, that decided that the army should march at once for the relief of Floyd, leaving Gilham's brigade to cover the movement and take care of the 1,500 sick that were then in and near the camp. The march began promptly, and Gilham addressed himself to the hard task of removing the sick, the stores and his brigade equipage to Huntersville over nearly impassable roads. The division quartermaster failed to furnish sufficient transportation before the Federals appeared, the last of September, in full force, in his front and drove in his pickets. He made dispositions to repel an attack during a torrent-like downpour of rain. Early the next morning Gilham retired from Valley mountain toward Huntersville, taking his remaining sick and such stores as he had transportation for and destroying the remainder. The Federals did not follow.

After the withdrawal of the larger part of the army of the Northwest to the Kanawha line, the opposing forces on the Staunton-Beverly line remained quiet, mainly because of the condition of the almost impassable roads and of the constant rains; the Federal forces in their Cheat mountain and Elkwater fortifications, and at Huttonsville and Beverly on their line of communication toward Grafton; and the Monterey division of the Confederate forces at Camp Bartow, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, in the valley of the Greenbrier, 12 miles east from the Federal fortress on Cheat mountain, and on the Huntersville and Beverly line at Valley mountain, with detachments on the road to its base of supplies at Millboro depot.

The portion of the army of the Northwest left on the line leading to Beverly was in command of Brig.-Gen. Henry R. Jackson, with headquarters at Camp Bartow.

The force at that camp consisted of the Third Arkansas, the First and Twelfth Georgia, the Twenty-third, Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Virginia regiments, the Twenty-fifth and Ninth Virginia battalions, the Virginia batteries of Shumaker and Anderson, and Sterrett's Churchville, Va., cavalry; while in its rear, near the summit of Alleghany mountain, guarding its flank and line of communication to Staunton, was the Fifty-second Virginia, under Col. John B. Baldwin. The morning report of October 2d showed that this command had about 1,800 men for duty. The left of General Jackson's command, on the Huntersville and Beverly line, was composed of the Twenty-first Virginia, under Col. William Gilham, located at Valley mountain and guarding that approach to Huntersville, with the Thirty-seventh Virginia, under Col. S. V. Fulkerson, in his rear guarding the line of communication to Millboro depot and Jackson's left flank.

At midnight of October 2d, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Reynolds, with 5,000 Federal troops of all arms, marched from his Cheat mountain fortress along the Staunton and Parkersburn turnpike to make, as the Federal commander reports, "an armed reconnoissance of the enemy's position on Greenbrier river 12 miles in advance." His force was composed of nine regiments of Ohio and Indiana infantry, two and a half batteries of artillery, and three companies of cavalry, all with four days' cooked rations in their haversacks. The numbers of the attacking column and the provision of rations indicate, very clearly, that the object in view was more than a mere reconnoissance. The leader was doubtless fully informed as to the numbers and disposition of the opposing Confederate forces, and knew that a large portion of the army of the Northwest had been withdrawn to the Kanawha line. It was, evidently, his intention to attempt to drive the Confederates from Camp Bartow and pursue them toward Staunton, and thus secure for himself an advanced position for better winter quarters, either on Alleghany mountain or farther to the east, and get in more direct communication with the Federal force in the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac; or, having driven the Confederates from their partially constructed works and which they were actively engaged in completing, to move down the Greenbrier and fall upon the rear of Fulkerson and Gilham, on the Huntersville line,

and so open that route for an advance from Tygart's valley to threaten the Virginia Central railroad.

About daylight of the 3d, the Federal advance, a whole regiment, drove in the Confederate pickets near the eastern foot of Cheat mountain and followed them across the valley of the Greenbrier to within a mile of Camp Bartow, where it encountered, at about 7 a. m., the grand guard of about 100 men, under Col. Edward Johnson, of the Twelfth Georgia, admirably posted. This small force stubbornly resisted and held the Federals in check for nearly an hour, and did not yield its position until Reynolds deployed a second regiment to move on its right flank and opened six guns on its left; it then withdrew, still skirmishing, in good order, to the main line. This well-managed skirmish, the opening of a brilliant career for its then unknown commander, dampened the ardor of the Federal advance, but encouraged the small Confederate force which had it in full view from the line of its intrenchments on the foot of the western slope of the Alleghany mountain, and aroused their enthusiasm as they repeatedly cheered its successful resistance.

The Confederate intrenchments, which were in process of construction but as yet very incomplete, fronted the south fork of the Greenbrier, on each side of the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike as that descends the western slope of Alleghany mountain to Yeager's, a wayside inn on the bank of the river. The center of this position was held by the brigade of Col. William B. Taliaferro, consisting of his Twenty-third Virginia, Col. William C. Scott's Forty-fourth Virginia, the Twenty-fifth Virginia battalion under Capt. John C. Higginbotham, and Shumaker's battery of four guns, one of these under Rice. At about 8 a. m., Reynolds deployed in front of this center a large body of infantry with two batteries, and opened on Taliaferro with a vigorous and persistent artillery fire. As this produced no effect except to draw a sharp and well-directed reply from Shumaker's guns, Reynolds, at about 9:30, moved a strong column from the woods, in which his main body was concealed, to turn Jackson's left. This column crossed the narrow valley and the shallow South Fork and assaulted the Confederate left, under Colonel Rust, who held it with his Third Arkansas, Col. William L. Jackson's Thirty-first Virginia, the Ninth Virginia battalion under Capt. J. A. Robertson, and

Anderson's two field guns. These met the assault from their intrenchments along the road leading to Green Bank, and drove it back in confusion and with loss. Two Federal guns opened spitefully upon Rust after this, but met with a vigorous response from Anderson.

While keeping up this artillery fire upon the Confederate left and center, Reynolds organized an assault, with the larger portion of his command, upon the Confederate right, which was held by Col. Edward Johnson with his First Georgia, Col. J. N. Ramsey's Twelfth Georgia, and Capt. F. F. Sterrett's Churchville, Va., cavalry. Watching this movement as it defiled along the edge of the woods on the steep hill bordering the west bank of the river, in his front, Jackson directed Johnson to advance the Twelfth Georgia regiment to the immediate bank of the South Fork, to reinforce its line of skirmishers which was engaged in a desultory fire which harassed the Federal column as it advanced; these having the advantage of position opened a galling fire on the enemy. At the same time Shumaker opened two of his guns on the woods, through which the Federal column was advancing, with such effect, as General Jackson reports, "that in a short time the unmistakable evidence of their rout became apparent. Distinctly could their officers be heard, with words of mingled command, remonstrance and entreaty, attempting to rally their battalions into line and to bring them to the charge; but they could not be induced to reform their broken ranks, nor to emerge from the cover of the woods in the direction of our fire. Rapidly and in disorder they returned into the turnpike, and soon thereafter the entire force of the enemy—artillery, infantry and cavalry—retreated in confusion along the road and adjacent fields, leaving behind them, at different points, numbers of their killed, guns, knapsacks, canteens, etc. Among other trophies taken was a stand of United States colors." This engagement lasted from 7 in the morning to 2:30 in the afternoon. The Confederate loss was 6 killed, 33 wounded and 13 missing; an aggregate of 52. The Federal loss was 8 killed and 36 wounded; an aggregate of 43. Colonel Baldwin with the Fifty-second, who had been ordered from the rear, came up with his command just at the close of the engagement.

General Reynolds says in his report: "We disabled

three of the enemy's guns, made a thorough reconnoissance, and, after having fully and successfully accomplished the object of this expedition, retired leisurely and in good order to Cheat mountain, arriving at sundown, having marched 24 miles and been under the enemy's fire four hours. The enemy's force was about 9,000, and we distinctly saw heavy reinforcements of infantry and artillery arrive while we were in front of the works." Reynolds did not disable any of the Confederate guns. A ball stuck in one of them so it could not be rammed down, and that was retired. Captain Shumaker managed his guns with rare skill. They were without the protection of epaulements, so he constantly shifted them whenever the enemy obtained their range and when he could employ them to more advantage in firing on the Federal column, as his guns were all of short range, while most of theirs were of long range.

The secretary of war, under date of October 12th, wrote to General Jackson: "I congratulate both yourself and the officers and men under your command for your brilliant conduct on this occasion and your successful defense of the important position held by you against a force so superior. The President joins me in the expression of the satisfaction we both feel in finding our confidence in you and your command so fully justified."

On the 30th of September the Confederate force under Colonel Gilham evacuated Valley mountain, and on October 2d took position on Elk mountain, where it remained until after the battle of Greenbrier River. After that it fell back to Marlin's bottom (now Marlington), on the Greenbrier, where it threw up fortifications and remained until late in November, when that portion of the army of the Northwest, with the exception of the cavalry left at Huntersville, was withdrawn and sent to Winchester, to Gen. T. J. Jackson, who had, on the 4th of November, assumed command of the Valley district, which embraced Alleghany mountain.

On the 21st of November, Gen. H. R. Jackson evacuated Camp Bartow and retired to the summit of Alleghany mountain, leaving only cavalry at Camp Bartow to scout the enemy's front. On the 22d, from his camp on the mountain, General Jackson ordered Col. Edward Johnson, of the Twelfth Georgia, to take command of the garrison on the summit of the mountain, to consist of the

Twelfth Georgia, the Thirty-first, Fifty-second and Twenty-fifth Virginia regiments and the Ninth Virginia battalion, Flournoy's company of Virginia cavalry, and Anderson's and Miller's Virginia batteries, and at once entering upon the duties of his command, take "the necessary steps to insure the safety and comfort of his troops." The Forty-fourth Virginia and a section of Rice's battery, located on the road to Monterey, were made part of his command. Previous to that time, on the 18th of October, General Jackson had ordered the construction of huts on the top of Alleghany mountain within lines of fortification, laid out under the direction of Lieut.-Col. Seth M. Barton, of the Third Arkansas. These were gladly occupied by Johnson's men, who had been suffering from the inclemency of the season. The same orders directed Col. William B. Taliaferro to take command at Monterey with the First Georgia, the Third Arkansas and the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia, with cavalry to scout down the branches of the Potomac toward Petersburg and Moorefield.

At about the time of the withdrawal of the Confederate troops to Alleghany mountain, General Reynolds resigned the command of the Cheat Mountain district of the Federal army to Brig.-Gen. R. H. Milroy. At about the same time General Kelley was placed in command of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad district, and with a Federal force moved up the South Branch valley and took possession of Romney, thus threatening the line of communication from Alleghany mountain to Staunton, since Monterey, in that valley and on that line, was but 70 miles, by a good road, from Romney. Kelley asked McClellan for 10,000 men, saying that with these he could go up the South Branch valley and, falling on the rebels, "utterly destroyed their whole force at Monterey and Greenbrier." Pierpoint, the bogus governor of Virginia, also urged the same thing, saying that a combined movement by Reynolds and Kelley would "bag all the rebels on Cheat mountain." (He meant Alleghany mountain; being mixed in his geography.)

Ambitious of winning reputation on the line to Staunton on which his predecessor had signally failed at Greenbrier river, Milroy, without waiting for co-operation with Kelley, and doubtless informed, through his numerous traitorous West Virginia spies and deserters from the army of

the Northwest, that the larger portion of the Confederate force which had been on the line of the Greenbrier had been withdrawn toward Staunton, and that there only remained the small brigade of Col. Edward Johnson on the summit of Alleghany mountain, 14 miles east from the Greenbrier river and about the same distance west from Monterey, planned an attack upon Johnson, who was now left in command, Gen. H. R. Jackson having been relieved; and for this purpose collected all the troops in his district, from Belington, Beverly, Hutonsville and Elkwater, and joined them with those at Cheat mountain, making a command of about 5,000 men of all arms. With these he marched from Cheat mountain fortress very early in the morning of December 12th to attack Camp Alleghany.

On that same 12th of December, Colonel Johnson sent out a scouting party of 106 men under Maj. J. D. H. Ross, of the Fifty-second Virginia, with instructions to ambuscade a point on the turnpike beyond Camp Bartow, and, if possible, by a demonstration with a few of his men, draw the Federals into it. His pickets were near Slaven's cabin, near the top of the eastern Cheat mountain, when Milroy's advance appeared. These retired and drew that into the ambuscade, where it received a deadly volley from Ross' command. Milroy at once deployed in force and advanced upon the scouting party, but these, in the meantime, retired, and reaching Camp Alleghany about dark, reported the Federal advance and thus gave Colonel Johnson opportunity to make preparation to meet it.

Colonel Johnson's command of about 1,200 men at Camp Alleghany consisted of his own regiment, the Twelfth Georgia under Lieut.-Col. Z. T. Conner, the Thirty-first Virginia under Maj. F. M. Boykin, Jr., two companies of the Fifty-second Virginia under Maj. J. D. H. Ross, the Ninth Virginia battalion under Lieut.-Col. G. W. Hansbrough, the Twenty-fifth Virginia battalion under Maj. A. J. Reger, and eight 6-pounders of the Lee battery under Capt. P. B. Anderson and the Rockbridge battery under Capt. John Miller. After the close of the engagement the Forty-fourth Virginia arrived, but did not become engaged. The Federal force was made up of the Ninth and Thirteenth Indiana, the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-second Ohio, the Second West Virginia



and a squadron of cavalry, in so far as can be ascertained, as there are no published reports but from one colonel.

About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th the Confederate pickets fired on the Federals coming up the mountain. Aroused by this, Colonel Johnson at once turned out the whole of his command and placed it in position to meet an attack. The Ninth and Twenty-fifth Virginia battalions and the Thirty-first Virginia were ordered to the crest of the mountain on the right, to guard against approach from that quarter. No defenses had been thrown up on that ridge. Some fields, with stumps and felled timber beyond, reached this crest of the mountain. A portion of the enemy, led by a Union man from western Virginia who was familiar with the locality, turned to the left about a mile down the turnpike and reached the field in front of Johnson's right by a trail which led into a road coming into a field near his rear. Hansborough's pickets discovered this approach and reported the enemy coming in strong force. They advanced, some 2,000 men, in line of battle at about 7:15 a. m. and promptly opened a terrific musketry fire, which was bravely responded to by the 300 Confederates on the crest of the ridge. As soon as this firing began, Johnson ordered two companies of the Twelfth Georgia, that had been posted about a quarter of a mile down the turnpike, to move to the support of the right; he also sent three other companies, from the same indomitable regiment, to join in holding this important position against such great odds. The Georgians gallantly moved up and lengthened the line on its left, receiving a hot fire from the enemy from behind the fallen trees and the standing stumps on the opposite side of the field in front. The Federals had, in the meantime, forced back the extreme Confederate right, but when the Georgians came up with a shout, those who had so well held the field rallied and moved upon the enemy at the same time. This brave dash was, for a time, checked by the Federals from the strong positions which they held behind the stumps and the fallen timber, but it was not driven back. It steadily advanced, cheered by its officers, who fought side by side with their men and led them on to the conflict. General Johnson reports: "I never witnessed harder fighting; the enemy, behind trees, with their long range arms, at first had decidedly the advantage, but our men soon came up

to them and drove them from their cover. I cannot speak in terms too exaggerated of the unflinching courage and dashing gallantry of those 500 men who contended, from 7:15 a. m. until 1:45 p. m., against an immensely superior force of the enemy, and finally drove them from their positions and pursued them a mile or more down the mountain." The losses on this wing were severe in killed and wounded, among both officers and men; it could not be otherwise where such brave fighting was done.

The left of General Johnson's position had been intrenched and there were posted Anderson's and Miller's eight guns and the troops that were first turned out in the morning—the Twelfth Georgia, the Fifty-second Virginia, and Dabney's Pittsylvania cavalry, dismounted, with carbines. About a half hour after the attack on Johnson's right, a heavy column of the enemy, led by a traitor well acquainted with the locality, approached this position by a road running along a leading ridge and toward the left of the trenches. The enemy were evidently surprised to find an intrenchment in their front, as they hesitated in approaching. Captain Anderson, as they came in sight, mistook them for Confederate pickets coming in, and rode forward telling his comrades not to fire. The Federals instantly fired a volley in which this brave soldier of three wars and many battles fell mortally wounded. The Confederates quickly responded, and their galling fire soon drove the enemy back into the brush and fallen timber, from which they kept up a constant fire which was returned with spirit, by both infantry and artillery, especially by the latter, which, stung by the death of their loved leader, poured shot and shell among them, making their position untenable and driving them from the combat, in which they were assisted by the force on the right which General Johnson drew to the left after the enemy had been repulsed from that portion of the field. The enemy fled from this combined assault and retreated down the mountain in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded and the debacle of their retreat behind them.

Colonel Johnson concluded his official report of this engagement, dated December 19th, by saying: "Although we have reason to be thankful to God for the victory achieved over our enemies on this occasion, we can but

lament the loss of many valuable lives. Our casualties amounted to 20 killed, 96 wounded and 28 missing. Many of the missing have returned since the day of battle." In a report of December 15th, he wrote: "The enemy were totally routed and acknowledged they had been badly whipped. They were heard to accuse their officers of deceiving them, insisting that our numbers were largely superior to their own. They were much demoralized, and I hope they have received a good lesson."

The Official Records contain no report from General Milroy concerning this engagement, but the official return of Federal casualties gives 20 killed, 107 wounded and 10 missing; total, 137.

Any account of the battle of Alleghany Mountain that fails to make mention of the grandly heroic leadership of Col. Edward Johnson in that memorable engagement, fails to give prominence to the most important factor in the winning of such a decided victory over so large an attacking enemy. The men in Johnson's command were the very pick and flower of Southern soldiery. Those in the Twelfth Georgia were the best that "Empire State" of the South could furnish. The Virginia regiments were made up of the picked men from northwestern Virginia and from the Great Valley. With such men and a brave and dashing commander, success in a contest was almost certain against a large disparity of numbers; but without a leader of such character, even such soldiers would fail to win in almost any field. Colonel Johnson, in the rough dress of a mountaineer, had scouted the whole surrounding country on horseback and on foot. His men were encamped so as to be ready for action, and he was among the first to hear the firing of the pickets on the morning of the 13th, and in the same dress he, in person, promptly ordered the call to arms. When the fight began, armed with a musket, he went from one portion of the field to another, on foot, encouraging and directing his men, and when these were hard pressed, with clubbed musket in his left hand and a long club (a "grub" gathered from a farmyard) in his right, which he brandished over his head, while in thunder tones he encouraged his men to attack, he joined them in rushing upon the foe and driving them, with the bayonet and with severe loss, down the mountain side in full retreat.

His heroic and inspiring presence everywhere increased the valorous ardor of his men. His conduct on that day won for him, for all time, the name of "Alleghany Johnson."

Secretary Benjamin wrote to Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson, on the 23d of December:

The report of the engagement of the 13th inst., in which your gallant command met and repulsed a vastly superior force with a steady valor worthy of the highest admiration, has been communicated by me to the President, and I rejoice to be made the medium of communicating to you and to your officers and men the expression of his thanks and of the great gratification he had experienced at your success. I am happy to add that the President readily and cheerfully assented to my suggestion that you should be promoted to the rank of brigadier-general as a mark of his approval of your conduct, and your nomination will accordingly this day be sent in to the Congress, and take date from the day of the battle.

On the 3d of January, 1862, Secretary Benjamin, in a letter to the President, wrote:

I have the honor to submit herewith for communication to Congress the official reports of the battle of Alleghany Mountain, in which our troops, 1,200 in number, successfully stood the assault of more than fourfold their number, and drove the enemy from the field after a combat as obstinate and as hard fought as any that has occurred during the war. . . . I doubt not that Congress on the reading of this report, will cordially concur with the Executive in the opinion that in this brilliant combat officers and men alike deserve well of their country and merit its thanks.

In consequence of this battle, which revealed the intention of Milroy to gain possession of the pass in the Alleghany mountain and form a junction with Kelley at Moorefield or Romney, if he should succeed in his attempt, General Johnson was ordered to remain at Camp Alleghany while Loring with the rest of his command was sent down the Shenandoah valley to join Stonewall Jackson at Winchester, in an expedition against Romney that would successfully checkmate Milroy's plans and intentions.

## CHAPTER X.

### OPERATIONS ALONG THE POTOMAC — FROM FIRST MANASSAS TO BATTLE OF LEESBURG.

SOON after the retreat of McDowell from Bull run to Washington, Longstreet's brigade, with artillery and Stuart's cavalry, was advanced, first to Centreville, then to Fairfax, and later to Falls Church and Mason's, Munson's and Upton's hills, commanding positions in full view of Washington, but with orders, writes Longstreet, "not to attempt to advance even to Alexandria." The Federal authorities soon threw a cordon of well-located, formidable and well-manned fortifications around the front of Washington and Alexandria, and heavy artillery guarded all approaches to the national capital. The Confederate cavalry was constantly at the front, but the infantry and artillery supports were frequently relieved. A single battery was allowed to Longstreet, and as that had to respond to calls in all directions, General Longstreet writes that he supplied the want of located batteries by collecting "a number of old wagon wheels and mounting on them stove-pipes of different caliber, till we had formidable looking batteries, some large enough of caliber to threaten Alexandria, and even the national capital and the executive mansion."

During this period of three months there was, practically, a suspension of active hostilities between the Confederate army of the Potomac and the Federal army of the Potomac, but the opposing governments were collecting recruits, organizing armies, and making preparations for the renewal of the mighty struggle between the two nations for the mastery within the boundaries of Virginia.

To guard the approaches to Washington from the west, a division of the Federal army was sent, under Banks, to occupy, in Maryland, the line of the Potomac from above that city to opposite Harper's Ferry; while the line of that river from Harper's Ferry westward was guarded by

forces under Kelley. The Confederate outposts, when again advanced, practically held the line of the Potomac, except in the immediate front of Washington and Alexandria. Especially was this the case at Leesburg, the county town of the fertile county of Loudoun, in the vicinity of which were several fords by which the Potomac could be crossed and from which a number of highways led to the front and to the left flank of the Confederate army at Manassas. A Confederate brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. N. G. Evans, who had won such distinction in the battle of Bull Run, was sent to that point, where, under the direction of competent engineers, fortifications were constructed covering the nearby fords of the Potomac and adding to the defensive strength of the position. Banks' Federal division was distributed along the opposite side of the river from near the Point of Rocks, where the Baltimore & Ohio railroad reaches the banks of the Potomac, to the mouth of Seneca creek. The pickets of the two armies were placed on the opposite banks of the Potomac almost to Washington, and thence southward they confronted each other about halfway between Washington and Manassas. This proximity of opposing forces necessarily led to frequent skirmishes and minor engagements, as the commanders of either army sought to gain information in reference to the movements of the other by pushing forward reconnoitering detachments. A mere enumeration of these encounters gives an idea of the activity of the outposts during this period.

On the 29th of July a skirmish took place with Evans' pickets at Edward's Ferry, when a Federal force attempted to cross and ascertain what was going on at Leesburg; on the 5th of August another took place opposite Point of Rocks, some miles from Leesburg, when a Federal force attempted to cross; and again, on the 8th, at Lovettsville, northeast of Leesburg, to which a Federal force had advanced from near Point of Rocks with the same object in view.

On the 17th of August the Federal "department of the Potomac," generally called the "army of the Potomac," was created, to include Washington and vicinity, northeastern Virginia and the Shenandoah valley; and on the 20th General McClellan assumed command of this department with his headquarters at Washington. On the 24th

this department was still further enlarged by taking in the department of Pennsylvania.

Once in full command of the twelve brigades, the five unattached regiments of infantry, and the numerous bodies of cavalry and artillery in his division, on the 5th of August McClellan called upon his outposts for information concerning the Confederate forces in his front. On the 25th of August a scout was sent into Virginia from the Great Falls, some 15 miles above Washington, with which Stuart had combat; on the 27th and 28th skirmishes took place at Bailey's and Ball's cross roads with the scouting parties of that vigilant "eyes-and-ears" of Johnston's command, in the immediate vicinity of Washington; and again on the 31st at Munson's hill, on the Leesburg turnpike, and along the Little river, or Fairfax turnpike, short distances from Alexandria. On the 2d of September a skirmish with Evans' cavalry occurred near Harper's Ferry; on the 4th, Stuart, with five field guns, shelled McCall's brigade at the Great Falls of the Potomac; on the 10th there was skirmishing at Lewinsville, a short distance beyond the northwestern fortifications of Washington. On September 3d General Beauregard, in person, reconnoitered McClellan's front from Munson's and Mason's hills, from which the Federal camps, earthworks and outposts, and the cities of Washington, Georgetown and Alexandria were plainly visible.

On the 11th of September, Brig.-Gen. W. F. Smith, whose brigade was encamped at Chain bridge, just within the District of Columbia, sent Col. I. I. Stevens, with some 2,000 Federal troops of all arms, to make a reconnoissance to Lewinsville, about 4 miles to the northwest, for the purpose of examining that important road center for a permanent Federal outpost, as it was not only held by the Confederates but was uncomfortably near to Washington. That village was reached about 10 a. m.; scouts were sent out on the five roads there converging, and infantry and artillery were properly disposed to guard against an attack while the engineers examined the locality to determine upon the location of works of defense. This done, at about 2 p. m., orders were given to return to camp, and the pickets were called in and the return march begun.

At noon of the same day, Col. J. E. B. Stuart, of the

First Virginia cavalry, who was in command of the Confederate line of picket posts, informed of this movement, started from his camp at Munson's hill, near Falls church, for Lewinsville, which was one of his picket posts, some 6 miles to the northwest, accompanied by Maj. James B. Terrill with 305 of the Thirteenth Virginia infantry, two pieces of Walton's Washington (La.) artillery under Capt. Thomas L. Rosser, and two companies of the First Virginia cavalry under Capt. William Patrick. Nearing Lewinsville and learning that the enemy was in the act of retiring, Stuart promptly made a skillful disposition of his small force in the surrounding woods, and, deploying his infantry as skirmishers, attacked the flank and rear of the retiring Federals, who were taken by surprise and at once beat a hasty retreat. A battery near the village stood firm and opened on the Confederates, but Terrill's riflemen picked off the gunners and that also retired. Rosser's battery secured a good position and raked the flank of the retreating foe. Stuart prudently withheld pursuit and the Federals rallied, for a time, about a mile and a half from Lewinsville, and Griffin's regular battery fired back up the road by which they expected to be pursued, and then retired to the Potomac, having lost 2 killed, 13 wounded and 3 missing. Stuart reported: "Our loss was not a scratch to man or horse," and that, after re-establishing his line of pickets through Lewinsville, he returned to his camp at Munson's hill. The Federal brigadier, informed of the engagement, hastened to it with reinforcements in time to take command of its retreat and claim the expedition a success.

This small affair was, at the time, greatly magnified in importance. General McClellan, in person, met the returning detachment at its camp, and, anxious to score a victory in his new command, sent this dispatch to General Scott: "General Smith made reconnoissance with 2,000 men to Lewinsville; remained several hours, and completed examination of the ground. When work was completed and the command had started back, the enemy opened fire with his shell, killing two and wounding three. We shall have no more Bull run affairs." Three days later, the Seventy-ninth New York regiment, which had borne a prominent part in this affair, was reported by its brigade commander as "in a state of open



mutiny," and its colors were taken from it; but they were returned the next day because of "their conduct in the reconnoissance of the 11th."

To the Confederates this engagement was an important one because such a large force of the enemy had been discomfited by a much smaller one in consequence of the skill and daring of its leader. It gave additional confidence to the Confederate outposts which Stuart's boldness and restless activity had been keeping in sight of the dome of the capitol, and had a dispiriting effect upon those of the Federals. Gen. J. E. Johnston, the next day, issued congratulatory orders, from the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, in which he expressed "great satisfaction in making known the excellent conduct of Col. J. E. B. Stuart, and of the officers and men of his command, in the affair of Lewinsville," . . . in which "they attacked and drove from that position, in confusion, three regiments of infantry, eight pieces of artillery, and a large body of cavalry, inflicting severe loss, but incurring none;" and in a report, from near Fairfax cross-roads, on September 14th, to Adjutant-General Cooper, he wrote: "I am much gratified at having this opportunity of putting before the department of war and the President this new instance of the boldness and skill of Colonel Stuart and the courage and efficiency of our troops." He then called attention to a communication from Generals Longstreet, Beauregard and himself, recommending the "forming a cavalry brigade and putting Colonel Stuart at its head. A new organization of the cavalry arm of our service is greatly needed, and greater strength as well as an effective organization. Our numbers in cavalry are by no means in due proportion to our infantry and artillery, yet without cavalry in proper proportion, victory is comparatively barren of results; defeat is less prejudicial; retreat is usually safe." After proposing other arrangements concerning the First Virginia cavalry, if Stuart were promoted, General Johnston continues:

The regiment so far is exclusively Virginian. By all means keep it so, where it can be done without prejudice in other respects. State pride excites a generous emulation in the army, which is of inappreciable value in its effect on the spirits of the troops. I therefore recommend that Capt. William E. Jones, who now commands the strongest troop in the regiment and one which is not surpassed in discipline and spirit by any in the army, be made colonel. He is

a graduate of West Point, served for several years in the Mounted Rifles, and is skillful, brave and zealous in a very high degree. It is enough to say that he is worthy to succeed J. E. B. Stuart. For the lieutenant-colonelcy I repeat my recommendation of Capt. Fitzhugh Lee. He belongs to a family in which military genius seems to be an heirloom. He is an officer of rare merit, capacity and courage. Both of these officers have the invaluable advantage at this moment of knowledge of the ground which is now the scene of operations.

Stuart soon became brigadier-general of cavalry, later major-general, and then lieutenant-general, and the famous commander of the cavalry corps of the army of Northern Virginia until he fell in action. Fitz Lee soon became colonel, then brigadier-general, and finally the distinguished leader, as major-general, of a cavalry division in the same army, and in 1898 a famous consul-general of the United States and a major-general in its army in the Cuban war. Jones became colonel, later brigadier-general of cavalry, and fell on the battlefield.

General Longstreet, who was in command of the "advanced Confederate forces," reported that he had arranged to move a heavy force during the night to cut off the enemy at Lewinsville, but Stuart did not receive his instructions, and himself "drove the enemy back to his trenches at once." He added:

The affair of yesterday was handsomely conducted and well executed. . . . It is quite evident that the officers and men deserve much credit for their handsome conduct, one and all. It is difficult to say whether the handsome use of his light infantry by Major Terrill or the destructive fire of the Washington artillery by Captain Rosser and Lieutenant Slocumb, is the most brilliant part of the affair. Colonel Stuart has, I think, fairly won his claim to brigadier.

Captain Rosser became the colonel of the Fifth Virginia cavalry, a brigadier in Fitz Lee's division of cavalry of the army of Northern Virginia, and a major-general in command of a cavalry division in the same army; Major Terrill became colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia infantry; Captain Patrick became major of the Seventeenth battalion of Virginia cavalry and fell, in the brave discharge of duty, in the second battle of Manassas.

On the 15th of September a Confederate force of cavalry and artillery scouted the south bank of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry up to the mouth of the Antietam, and had skirmishing at various points during the day with Col. J. W. Geary's Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania

across the river. On the 16th a Federal detachment that crossed the Potomac at Seneca creek was driven back by Stuart's cavalry pickets. On the 24th General Evans sent a detachment to opposite the Point of Rocks, which fired across the Potomac upon Geary's camp and then withdrew; that officer reported, "Our enemy, if not so savage as the Indian, purposes to emulate his vigilance." He also stated that he had taken possession of Heter's and Noland's islands and proposed to occupy all the other islands in front of his lines, "and where Nature has not provided shelter, to make it by art."

On September 24th Col. J. E. B. Stuart received his promotion as brigadier-general of cavalry. His brigade, as nearly as can be ascertained, consisted of the First Virginia cavalry, under Col. W. E. Jones; the Second Virginia cavalry, under Col. R. C. W. Radford; the Fourth Virginia cavalry, under Col. B. H. Robertson; the Sixth Virginia cavalry, under Col. C. W. Field; the First North Carolina cavalry, under Col. R. Ransom, Jr., and the Jeff Davis legion of cavalry, under Maj. W. T. Martin. Of these, Jones and Robertson subsequently became brigadier-generals, and Field, Ransom and Martin, major-generals in the Confederate army.

On September 25th, Gen. W. F. Smith, United States army, marched from his camp, near the Chain bridge, to Lewinsville, with 5,100 infantry, 150 cavalry and 16 pieces of artillery, guarding a train of 90 wagons to procure forage. He not only took the precaution of having advanced guards and flankers, but left detachments of infantry and artillery along every mile of the road as special guards. After loading his wagons and as he was preparing to retire, about 3 p. m., Stuart vexed him with small bodies of cavalry and three pieces of artillery all along the way as he withdrew. On the 28th the same officer started two of his regiments, with two days' cooked rations, toward Munson's hill. They marched at midnight, but when about halfway to their destination, in a thick body of woods, they were fired into from ambush, with considerable loss; in the confusion that followed one portion of the command fired into another. This led to a halt and the forming of a line of battle, which rested on its arms during the night. These two regiments returned to their camp the next day, after a loss of 4 killed and 16 wounded.

On October 3d, 300 infantry, of the Twenty-sixth New York, were ordered to fall upon a body of Confederate cavalry at Pohick church, 12 miles from Alexandria, and capture them. Instead of obeying orders, this force, as soon as it got beyond the Federal pickets, as General Slocum reported, "was converted into a band of marauders, who plundered alike friend and foe." The same day an expedition to Springfield Station drove away the Confederate pickets and brought away 32 carloads of wood and ties. On the 4th Gen. N. G. Evans tried his artillery on the Federal battery on the Maryland shore near Edwards' ferry, to which reply was made. On the 15th a small body of Confederate cavalry attacked and routed the Federal picket near Padgett's tavern, on the Little river turnpike.

On October 16th, Col. Turner Ashby, who held the front of Harper's Ferry, determined to punish the Federal forces that had for several days been making incursions into Virginia, seizing wheat and committing other depredations, their larger force enabling them to push back his smaller one as they advanced. Ashby had in his command some 300 militia, armed with flint-lock muskets, and two companies of cavalry. He asked General Evans to co-operate with him from Leesburg by sending a force to Loudoun heights, which could prevent the sending of Federal reinforcements across the Potomac, and could drive the enemy from the shelter of the houses at Harper's Ferry. Ashby was reinforced, on the 15th, by two more companies of McDonald's Virginia cavalry, Captain Wingfield's, mounted and armed with minie rifles, and Captain Miller's company, about 30 mounted and the rest on foot, armed with flint-lock guns. He also had a rifled 4-pounder, and a badly mounted 24-pounder, which broke down during the engagement and which he had to spike and abandon. His force, on the morning of the 16th, was 300 militia, parts of two regiments commanded by Colonel Albert of Shenandoah and Major Finter of Page; 180 of McDonald's cavalry, Captain Henderson's men, under command of Lieutenant Glynn; Captain Baylor's mounted militia, about 25 men, and Captain Hess', also about 25 men. Captain Avirett had charge of the rifle gun and Captain Comfield of the 24-pounder.

Ashby attacked in three divisions, drove the enemy

from their breastworks on Bolivar heights, without loss to himself, as far as lower Bolivar; there the 24-pounder carriage broke down, much to his detriment. Its detachment was then transferred to the rifle gun, and Captain Avirett was sent to Loudoun heights with a message to Colonel Griffin, who commanded the detachment from General Evans. About this time the enemy rallied in a countercharge, but were repulsed by the militia. At that moment Colonel Ashby ordered a cavalry charge, led by Captain Turner, which was handsomely made, killing five of the enemy.

After holding his position on Bolivar heights for four hours, when the enemy was reinforced by infantry and artillery, which had been left on guard at the ferry, and which Griffin, from the position he had taken, had not been able to keep back, Ashby withdrew to the position, near Halltown, which the Federal pickets had occupied in the morning, and which he called "Camp Evans." That night the Federals recrossed the Potomac and encamped on the first terrace of Maryland heights. Ashby reported his loss as 1 killed and 9 wounded, and that he had captured 10 prisoners, besides a large number of blankets, overcoats and a dozen muskets. In concluding, he reported: "I cannot compliment my officers and men too highly for their gallant bearing during the whole fight, considering the bad arms with which they were supplied and their inexperience."

On the 18th of October, Brig.-Gen. I. B. Richardson, reconnoitered to Pohick church and Accotink village, drove in the Confederate pickets, and on his return advanced his own pickets to Windsor's hill, some 5 miles southeast of Alexandria. On the 20th, Major Whipple made a reconnoissance from Dranesville; near Hunter's mill had a skirmish with Confederate pickets, also one near Thornton Station.

## CHAPTER XI.

### BATTLE OF LEESBURG—OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER POTOMAC AND EAST SHORE—ACTION AT DRANESVILLE.

**A**FTER the first battle of Manassas, Col. Eppa Hunton had been ordered to reoccupy Leesburg with his regiment, the Eighth Virginia; a little later Col. William Barksdale's Thirteenth Mississippi, Col. W. S. Featherston's Seventeenth Mississippi, a battery, and four companies of cavalry under Col. W. H. Jenifer, were sent to the same place, and these were organized into the Seventh brigade of the Confederate army of the Potomac, which, early in August, was put under command of Brig.-Gen. Nathan G. Evans, who had been promoted for his brave conduct July 21st. General Beauregard's object in locating this strong force at Leesburg was to guard his left flank from a Federal attack by way of several good roads that led from the fords of the upper Potomac, near that town, directly to his Bull run encampment; to watch the large Federal force that McClellan had located on the opposite side of the Potomac; to keep up a connection with the Confederate force in the lower Shenandoah valley by a good turnpike that led from Leesburg across the Blue ridge, and to save for his army the abundant supplies of the fertile county of Loudoun.

On the 15th of October General Banks' division of the Federal army was located at Darnestown, Md., about 15 miles due east from Leesburg, with detachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, etc.; while the division of Brig.-Gen. C. P. Stone, composed of six companies of cavalry, three of artillery, and the infantry brigades of Gens. W. A. Gorman and F. W. Lander and Col. E. D. Baker, was located at Poolesville, 8 miles north of east from Leesburg. The object in this disposition of so large a force was, not only to guard the right of the big Federal army that General McClellan was gathering at Washington, but especially to cover the important approaches from the northwest to Baltimore and the Fed-

eral city, particularly those from the lower Shenandoah valley and northeastern Piedmont, Virginia.

On October 19th McCall's Federal division advanced to Dranesville, on the road to Leesburg and about 15 miles from that place, "in order to cover the reconnoissance made in all directions the next day;" and later, Smith's Federal division advanced along a parallel road to the west, acting in concert with General McCall, and pushed forward strong parties in the same direction and for the same purpose. About 7 p.m. of the 19th, Stone's advance opened a heavy cannonade on the Confederate positions at Fort Evans, on the Leesburg pike, and at Edwards' Ferry; and at the same time General Evans heard heavy firing in the direction of Dranesville. At midnight General Evans ordered his whole brigade to the front, along the line of Goose creek, 3 miles southeast of Leesburg, where he had a line of intrenchments, to there await an expected attack from General McCall, the next morning, Sunday, October 20th, as it had been reported that the Federal advance was moving in force from Dranesville toward Leesburg. Evans' scouts captured McCall's courier bearing dispatches to General Meade, directing him to examine the roads leading to Leesburg. The Federal batteries kept up a deliberate fire during the day, but no assault was made.

On the morning of the 20th the Federal signal officer on Sugar Loaf mountain, in Maryland, reported, "The enemy have moved away from Leesburg." This Banks wired to McClellan, whereupon the latter wired to Stone, at Poolesville, that a heavy reconnoissance would be sent out that day, in all directions, from Dranesville, concluding: "You will keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." McClellan desired Stone to make demonstrations from his picket line along the Potomac, but did not intend that he should cross the river, in force, for the purpose of fighting. Late in the day Stone reported that he had made a feint of crossing, and at the same time had started a reconnoissance from Harrison's island toward Leesburg, when the enemy's pickets retired to intrenchments. That "slight demonstration" brought on the battle of Ball's Bluff (or, as it is variously called, Leesburg, Harrison's Island, or Con-

rad's Ferry), on Monday, October 21st. On the morning of the 21st, McCall retired from Evans' front to his camp at Prospect Hill, 4 miles up the river from the Chain bridge.

From his point of observation, at the earthwork called "Fort Evans," to the eastward of Leesburg, overlooking the fords at Conrad's and Edwards' ferries and Ball's bluff, Evans, at 6 a. m. on the 21st, found that the enemy of Stone's division had effected a crossing at Edwards' ferry and at Ball's bluff, 4 miles above. He promptly sent four companies from his Mississippi regiments and two companies of cavalry, under the command of Lieut.-Col. W. H. Jenifer, to the assistance of Captain Duff, to hold the enemy in check until his plan of attack should be developed. Colonel Jenifer immediately engaged the Federal advance and drove it back toward Ball's bluff.

The force that had crossed at Harrison's island, about midnight of the 20th, was part of the command of Colonel Baker, some 300 men under Col. Charles Devens, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts. Its object was to capture a Confederate camp that had been reported to be about a mile from the river. This force advanced to an open field surrounded by woods, where it halted until it could be joined by a company from the Twentieth Massachusetts, which had been left on the bluff, on the Virginia side, to protect the Federal return. Devens, at daybreak, pushed forward with a few men to reconnoiter, and, in person, went to within sight of Leesburg. Thinking he had not been discovered, Devens determined to remain, and sent back to his brigade commander, Colonel Baker, for reinforcements. The latter consulted his division commander, General Stone, and obtained permission to either withdraw Devens or to send over reinforcements to him. He promptly directed Devens to hold his position and said that he would support him, in person, with the rest of his brigade. The boats and flats that had been provided for crossing the Potomac from the Maryland shore to Harrison's island, and from the latter to the Virginia shore, were entirely inadequate, and it was nearly noon before Devens' regiment of 625 men was closed up on the Virginia shore.

Convinced, at about 10 a. m., that the main Federal attack would be at Ball's bluff, 4 miles northeast of Leesburg, Evans ordered Colonel Hunton, with the



Eighth Virginia, to the support of Colonel Jenifer, directing him to form line of battle immediately in the rear of Jenifer's command, and that the combined force should then drive the enemy to the river, while he, General Evans, supported the right of the movement with artillery. This movement was made soon after noon, and the opposing forces at once became hotly engaged, the Confederates advancing on the Federals, who held a strong position in front of the woods. Learning, at about this time, that an opposing force was gathering on his left, and that he would soon be vigorously attacked by a body of infantry that appeared in that direction, and by a body of dismounted cavalry that had deployed in his front, and apprehensive of being flanked, Devens retired his regiment to an open space in the woods, in front of the bluff, and prepared to receive an attack. To ascertain about reinforcements, Devens went back to the bluff at about 2 p. m., where he found Colonel Baker, who directed him to form his regiment on the right of the position that he proposed to occupy, while Baker placed 300 of the Twentieth Massachusetts on the left and advanced in front of these his California regiment, with two guns, supported by two companies of the Fifteenth Massachusetts. At about the same hour General Stone ferried a strong force across the river at Edwards' ferry, to make a demonstration on Evans' right, leaving Colonel Baker in command at Ball's bluff. Stone then telegraphed to McClellan: "There has been sharp firing on the right of our line, and our troops appear to be advancing there under Baker. The left, under Gorman, has advanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, and, if the movement continues successful, will turn the enemy's right."

At about 2:30 p. m., General Evans, having the advantage of a concealed, shorter and inner line, seeing that the enemy was being constantly reinforced, ordered Colonel Burt, with the Eighteenth Mississippi, to attack the Federal left, while Hunton and Jenifer attacked his front, holding the attack at Edwards' ferry in check by batteries from his intrenchments. As Colonel Burt reached his position, the enemy, concealed in a ravine, opened on him a furious fire, which compelled him to divide his regiment and stop the flank movement that had already begun. At about 3 p. m., Featherston, with the Seventeenth Mississippi, was sent at a double-quick to

support Burt's movement. Evans reports: "He arrived in twenty minutes and the action became general along my whole line, and was very hot and brisk for more than two hours, the enemy keeping up a constant fire with his batteries on both sides of the river. At about 6 p. m. I saw that my command had driven the enemy to near the banks of the river. I ordered my entire force to charge and drive him into the river. The charge was immediately made by the whole command, and the forces of the enemy were completely routed, and cried out for quarter along his whole line. In this charge the enemy was driven back at the point of the bayonet, and many were killed and wounded by this formidable weapon. In the precipitate retreat of the enemy on the bluffs of the river, many of his troops rushed into the water and were drowned, while many others, in overloading the boats sunk them and shared the same fate. The rout now, about 7 o'clock, became complete, and the enemy commenced throwing his arms into the river. . . . At 8 p. m. the enemy surrendered his forces at Ball's bluff, and the prisoners were marched to Leesburg."

During this action, Colonel Barksdale, with nine companies of the Thirteenth Mississippi and six pieces of artillery, was held to oppose Stone's movement from Edward's Ferry and also as a reserve. After the engagement, Evans withdrew all his brigade to Leesburg, except Barksdale's regiment, which he left in front of Edwards' ferry.

Each of the combatants had about 1,700 men engaged in this action. The Confederates had no artillery in the fight, while the Federals had three light guns. Shortly after the action became general, Colonel Baker, passing in front of his command, was killed by a sharpshooter, which so demoralized the Federals that the surviving officers conferred and decided to retreat. This was opposed by Col. Milton Cogswell, of the Forty-second New York, who had succeeded Colonel Baker in command. He said a retreat down the bluff and across the river was now impossible, and that they must cut their way through the Confederate right to Edwards' ferry. He promptly gave orders to that effect, and moved to the front, followed by the remnants of his own two companies and a portion of the California regiment, but not by the others. He was quickly driven back and the whole Fed-

eral command was forced to the river bluff in great disorder. Just then two companies of the Forty-second New York landed on the Virginia shore. These Colonel Cogswell ordered up the bluff and deployed as skirmishers to cover the Federal retreat, while he advanced to the left with a small party, and was almost immediately captured. Colonel Devens escaped by swimming the river.

On the morning of the 22d, Colonel Barksdale informed General Evans that the enemy was still in force at Edwards' ferry. He was ordered to carefully reconnoiter the Federal position, learn its strength and make attack. This he did, at about 2 p. m., and drove a superior force, from an intrenched position to the bank of the river, killing and wounding quite a number of men. At about sundown, the Federals, having been reinforced and holding rifle-pits, Barksdale withdrew to Fort Evans, leaving two companies to watch his front. The enemy recrossed the Potomac during the night. Evans reported his loss, in the thirteen hours of fight, on the 21st, as 36 killed, 117 wounded and 2 missing, from a force of 1,709. Among the killed was the brave Colonel Burt. The Federal losses were returned at 49 killed, 158 wounded, 694 missing. General Evans claimed the capture of 710 prisoners, 1,500 stand of arms, 3 cannon and 1 flag.

Evans called on Longstreet for reinforcements when he reported his battle of the 21st, thinking that 20,000 Federals were in his front. Colonel Jenkins, with the Eighteenth South Carolina and cavalry and artillery, was dispatched from Centreville, in the afternoon of the 22d, and marched toward Leesburg, through mud and a driving rain, until midnight, when the infantry went into bivouac; but Capt. C. M. Blackford's cavalry and four guns of the Washington artillery hurried forward all night, and came in sight of Leesburg about daylight of the 23d. That morning, finding his men much exhausted, General Evans ordered three of his regiments to fall back to Carter's mill, a strong position on Goose creek, about 7 miles southwest from Leesburg, and join Jenkins, who had been halted at that place, leaving Barksdale with his regiment, two pieces of artillery and some cavalry, as a rear guard near Leesburg, and Hunton, with his Eighth Virginia and two pieces of artillery, on the south bank of Sycolin creek, 3 miles from Leesburg, and sending his cavalry well to the front toward Alexandria. The weather was stormy and very cold.

The attention of the Federal commander was now turned to operations on the Potomac river, below Washington, as the Confederate batteries, located at Freestone point, Cockpit point, Shipping point at the mouth of the Quantico, and at the mouth of Aquia creek, were a standing menace to the navigation of that river to and from Washington. On October 22d a detachment of the Seventy-second New York was sent to construct intrenchments at Budd's ferry, opposite the Confederate battery at Shipping point, and to report on the Confederate batteries along the Potomac; he also constructed earthworks for batteries opposite Evansport. On the 28th the Confederate battery near Budd's ferry, numbering some 14 guns, opened on a steamer attempting to pass up the river. General Hooker, learning of this, directed his batteries on the Maryland shore to open on the Confederate steamer Page, in case the steamer attempting to go up the Potomac should be disabled, or if an attempt should be made to take it as a prize.

On the 9th of November, Gen. D. E. Sickles, of General Hooker's command, sent an expedition of 400 men down the Potomac to reconnoiter Mathias point, which was held by a small Confederate picket. On the 12th Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, in charge of Fort Lyon, on the Telegraph road, a short distance from Alexandria, sent out two brigades of infantry to Pohick church. On reaching the church, early the next morning, it was ascertained that the Confederates had left the night before.

On the 14th of November, General Dix, commanding the department of Pennsylvania, with headquarters at Baltimore, ordered Gen. H. H. Lockwood, commanding the Federal peninsula brigade, partly composed of Union Marylanders, to proceed on an expedition through Accomac and Northampton counties, in Virginia, for the purpose of "bringing these counties back to their allegiance to the United States, and reuniting them to the Union on the footing of West Virginia." The commander of the expedition was directed to distribute a proclamation by General Dix, which made known the object of the expedition and gave many assurances as to the good results that would follow submission to Federal authority, and to exercise "the utmost vigilance to preserve discipline and prevent any outrage upon persons or property."

In the course of his instructions to Lockwood, Dix proceeded to settle grave questions of state by military instructions. He advised that "The people, if they return to their allegiance to the United States, should make such temporary provision for their own government, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, as they may think best. For the time being, it seems to me that it would be well for them to act with western Virginia, and hold elections by proclamation of the governor."

On November 15th, the day after his expedition started, Dix wrote to President Lincoln, enclosing a copy of his proclamation to the people of Accomac and Northampton, with the hope that what he had done would meet with his approbation; and stated that he had sent 4,500 men on this expedition.

Reaching the borders of Virginia, November 16th, General Lockwood sent a flag of truce to the Confederate troops, some 10 miles below the line, but found no force to treat with, as they had either dispersed or fallen back to Eastville. The bearer of this flag reported, from Temperanceville, "We have thus far had a triumphant welcome and uninterrupted march."

Lockwood reported from Drummondstown, on the 22d, that the larger portion of his command was at that place, but he had sent two regiments, with cavalry and artillery, to Eastville. After describing the points selected for his bases of supplies, he stated that he had found and secured seven new 6-pounder guns, and a number of small-arms of little value. After declaring that the people manifested a readiness to submit to the Federal government, and that they were arranging to hold county meetings for this purpose, he wrote: "The basis of the system in western Virginia will be adopted as a temporary measure. All with whom I have conversed look to an annexation with Maryland as an event much to be desired whenever it can constitutionally be accomplished. This, they think, can be done by regarding themselves, together with western Virginia, as the true State of Virginia, and inducing the State thus constituted and the State of Maryland to pass the necessary laws." He advised that Dix write to the governor of West Virginia, asking him to make proclamation, as soon as the people have

declared their allegiance to the United States, "ordering an election for the civil officers and a representative to the Congress of the United States," and concluded, "I hope that by their joint action this interesting people may be relieved from their present position, and brought into that association with the State of Maryland to which their geographical position naturally points."

On November 16th, Maj. W. T. Martin, of the Second Mississippi cavalry (subsequently major-general), cut off a foraging party of the Thirtieth New York, near Falls Church, and captured 30 prisoners, killing 4 and wounding several. On the 18th Lieut.-Col. Fitzhugh Lee, of the First Virginia cavalry, attacked a Federal picket in the same vicinity, part of the Brooklyn regiment (Fourteenth New York) of hard fighters. Two of Lee's men lost their lives, and 2 of the enemy were killed and 10 captured. On the 26th a squadron of Pennsylvania cavalry, on a reconnoissance to Vienna, was attacked by 120 men of the First North Carolina cavalry, under Col. Robert Ransom, and stampeded. Ransom reported the capture of 26 prisoners, and a considerable number of horses, sabers and carbines. The attention of the government was invited to these successful affairs by General Johnston.

Skirmishes followed, of like character, near Dranesville on the 26th, near Fairfax on the 27th, and at Annandale, December 2d.

Gen. S. G. French, stationed at Evansport, reported on December 15th that his position had been under fire from Federal batteries on the Maryland shore during the past three weeks.

On December 20th Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with a force comprising the Eleventh Virginia, Col. Samuel Garland; Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest; Tenth Alabama, Col. J. H. Forney, and First Kentucky, Col. T. H. Taylor, in all 1,600 infantry; Capt. A. S. Cutts' Georgia artillery (four pieces), Maj. J. B. Gordon's North Carolina cavalry, and Capt. A. L. Pitzer's Virginia cavalry, moved toward Dranesville for the purpose of protecting an expedition of army wagons after hay. At the same time a Federal expedition approached Dranesville, on a similar mission. Upon discovering the presence of the enemy, Stuart sent Pitzer to keep between them and the wagons, and order the latter

back, while the main body was disposed for a vigorous attack upon the Federal rear and left flank. The force Stuart encountered at Dranesville was E. O. C. Ord's Pennsylvania brigade of five regiments (including the "Buck-tails"), two squadrons of cavalry and Easton's battery. Stuart took position, screening his infantry in a wood, and when the enemy came up the action was opened by an artillery combat. Then Stuart ordered forward his right wing, and the Alabama regiment "rushed with a shout in a storm of bullets." Colonel Forney fell wounded, and Lieut.-Col. J. B. Martin was killed. The other regiments also pushed forward, and a stubborn fight resulted. "When the action had lasted about two hours," Stuart reported, "I found that the enemy, being already in force larger than my own, was recovering from his disorder, and receiving heavy reinforcements [Reynolds' and Meade's brigades]." Consequently he withdrew in order. "The enemy was evidently too much crippled to follow in pursuit, and after a short halt at the railroad I proceeded to Fryingpan church, where the wounded were cared for."

Early next morning, with two fresh regiments, Stuart returned to the field, and found that the enemy had evacuated Dranesville and left some of their wounded there. The official returns of casualties were, on the Federal side, 7 killed and 61 wounded; on the Confederate, 43 killed, 143 wounded and 8 missing.

The return of the department of Northern Virginia, Gen. J. E. Johnston commanding, for December, showed for the Potomac district, General Beauregard, aggregate infantry, cavalry and artillery, present and absent, 68,047; aggregate present, 55,165; effective total, 44,563. The forces in the Valley district, General Jackson, were reported at 12,922 present; in the Aquia district, General Holmes, 8,244, raising the aggregate present of Johnston's command to 76,331.

## CHAPTER XII.

### STONEWALL JACKSON'S ROMNEY CAMPAIGN.

ON the 7th of October, 1861, in recognition of his distinguished services at the first battle of Manassas, Stonewall Jackson was commissioned major-general. On November 4th he left Manassas to take command of the Valley district, to which, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, in command of the department of Northern Virginia, had assigned him, and established his headquarters at Winchester. Although forming the left wing of Johnston's army, the main body of which was in the vicinity of Manassas Junction, Jackson's command was, in some respects, an independent one, as he had assigned to him not only the protection of the lower valley of the Shenandoah, but also the extensive Appalachian country to the northwest that drained into the Potomac, and along the northeastern border of which ran the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. It was all a region of parallel mountains and narrow valleys with which he was quite familiar, not only in consequence of his campaigning there in the earlier part of 1861, but from his knowledge of it from his boyhood days. Entering upon his command with but a small body of soldiers, no one would have forecast that he had taken possession of a field which would make both that and himself famous for all time. The enemy, through the exigencies of war, had become possessed of a large part of both the Appalachian and the Trans-Appalachian portions of Virginia, and Jackson had frequently expressed a desire to be placed in position to free that land of his nativity from the Federal invaders. To him, this assignment, even with an inferior force, appeared to open the way for the fulfillment of his cherished hopes.

First the Virginia, and then the Confederate campaigns in the mountain regions of Virginia, during the spring, summer and fall of 1861, had not only been barren of results, but in the main well-nigh disastrous. Garnett had been out-maneuvered and defeated, in the Tygart



valley, in July; Loring, under Lee, had accomplished nothing in the same valley and in that of the Greenbrier in August and September, and the commands of Floyd and Wise along the Kanawha turnpike, even with the assistance of Lee and Loring, had barely sufficed to keep the enemy in check.\*

When Jackson took command in the Valley the advance of General Rosecrans, who commanded the Federal forces in West Virginia, had recaptured Romney, 40 miles west of Winchester, and held it with a force of 5,000 men, thus controlling the important valley of the South branch of the Potomac. Bath, the county seat of Morgan, situated north of Winchester, was also occupied, as was the Maryland side of the Potomac across the entire front of the Shenandoah valley and beyond on either side. The Confederate forces along the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, and the turnpike leading into that from the Warm Springs, had fallen back to the crest of Alleghany mountain, while that on the Kanawha road had retired to Lewisburg, a few miles west of that range. The Baltimore & Ohio railroad was open from the eastward to Harper's Ferry and from the westward to Hancock, for the use of the Federal army, a gap 40 miles long being the only portion broken and controlled by the Confederates, and even this was filled on the Maryland side by the Chesapeake & Ohio canal, furnishing water communication from Cumberland to Georgetown and Washington.

Studying the field intrusted to him and the strategic opportunities presented for driving the enemy from the mountain region to the westward, Jackson asked that his old brigade might be sent him from Manassas, and that all the troops holding the passes of Alleghany mountain to the southwest, some 15,000 or 16,000 in number, be ordered to report to him. The government, not then knowing the man, declined to comply fully with his request, but promptly sent him his old brigade, and one of

\* The first campaign in the Kanawha valley, under General Wise, has been described in this volume. The later operations in that region, in 1861, under the command of General Floyd, and at the last, about Sewell mountain, under Gen. R. E. Lee, are described in the *Military History of West Virginia*, in another volume of this work. To that volume reference is also made for accounts of subsequent military operations within the limits of the State of West Virginia, except such as were part of the campaigns of the army of Northern Virginia.

Loring's brigades reached him from the Staunton and Parkersburg line early in December. Loring did not arrive in person until very nearly the end of the month of December, but Jackson, with characteristic energy, improved the opportunity to drill his command and equip it for service, and to organize certain cavalry companies in his district into a regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Turner Ashby.

Unwilling to be idle and leave his foe to believe that he was not ready for action, Jackson dispatched a small force of infantry and a battery to break Dam No. 5, seven miles above Williamsport, across the Potomac, which supplied a long level of the canal with water, and thus destroy the line of communication between Cumberland and Washington. On the afternoon of December 6th, Jackson's force reached the dam, and while he kept up an active skirmish across the Potomac for two days, an effort was made to break the dam on the night of the 7th, but with little success. Unwilling to be foiled in his undertaking, Jackson again left Winchester on the 16th with a larger force, and on the 17th, having disposed his troops to provide against a flank movement and also to make demonstrations at Dam No. 4, at Williamsport, he sent parties to break Dam No. 5 at its Virginia end. The Federal infantry and artillery kept up a vigorous and annoying fire from the Maryland side on Jackson's working party, so that little was accomplished during the day; but that night Captain Holliday, of the Thirty-third, and Captain Robinson, of the Twenty-seventh, volunteered to go down with their companies and wade in and cut out the cribs that supported the dam. It required heroic endurance to stand waist deep in the water on a cold December night, and under a constant fire of the enemy, but a partial breach was made and the cribs so loosened that a later freshet made a wide gap in the dam and rendered useless for some time a long stretch of the canal. During Jackson's stay to effect the object of this expedition, it became evident from the arrival of Federal regiments to reinforce the command at Williamsport, that it would be hazardous for him to cross the Potomac and attack his opponents, so he withdrew on the 21st and returned to Winchester.

While engaged in the expedition to Dam No. 5, news reached Jackson of the decisive victory Gen. Edward

Johnson had won at his camp on Alleghany mountain on December 13th. Jackson promptly advised that Edward Johnson's force should either reinforce him or advance down the South Branch valley toward Moorefield, so as to co-operate with him in an attack he proposed to make on Romney, where he supposed the force of the enemy was about 10,000, but being constantly reinforced. He wrote to both Gen. J. E. Johnston and Adjutant-General Cooper. He was not listened to, and later in the winter Johnson was forced to fall back to the Shenandoah mountain in consequence of a movement threatening his flank from the direction of Romney.

Loring and the last two of his brigades joined Jackson on Christmas day of 1861. It was agreed that Loring should retain command of his own troops, the three infantry brigades under Col. William B. Taliaferro, Col. William Gilham and Brig.-Gen. S. R. Anderson, and Marye's and Shumaker's batteries, in all nearly 6,000 men, which increased Jackson's entire force, counting 2,000 or 3,000 militia, to about 11,000. Loring was recognized as second in command.

Having secured all the troops that the Confederate authorities would intrust him with, Jackson, feeling that the force in hand was inadequate to the undertaking, but burning with a desire to recover western Virginia, determined to move on the enemy, notwithstanding the lateness of the season and the difficulties that would have to be encountered in a winter campaign in a mountainous region. He desired to first clear out the foe from his own district, which extended well toward the line of the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike to the district which was recently commanded by Loring, and still held by Gen. Edward Johnson, damaging the Baltimore & Ohio railroad along the Potomac as much as possible, and then be guided by circumstances in reference to a campaign farther to the northwest. Preparations were energetically pushed, and by the last day of the year the army was ready to move.

Rosecrans, satisfied that there would be no further westward movement of the Confederates until spring, had determined, under cover of his 5,000 troops at Romney, to collect the whole force of his department, some 22,000 men, along the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, with the hope of securing permission from Gen-

eral McClellan to use these forces in an attack upon the Valley for the purpose of seizing, fortifying and holding Winchester, and thus dominating all of northeastern Virginia, and at the same time threatening Johnston's position at Manassas. These intentions of the enemy were speedily frustrated by Jackson, when, on the 1st of January, 1862, a bright and pleasant day, his army started for Bath, near the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. The army consisted of his own old brigade, commanded by Gen. R. B. Garnett, the three brigades under Loring, a part of the militia, five batteries, and most of Ashby's regiment of cavalry, the whole numbering about 9,000 men. This movement against Bath, if successful, would disperse the enemy at Hancock, destroy communication between General Banks on the east and General Kelley on the west, and by threatening the latter's rear, force him to evacuate Romney or contend with a superior force. Before the first day ended a cold storm set in from the northwest, the beginning of a protracted period of very inclement weather. The second day the storm continued, and the trains were delayed by icy mountain roads, byways having been chosen, instead of following the great turnpike, to conceal the movement. As the trains could not get up, the troops were forced to pass the night of the 2d near Unger's, without rations and many of them without covering. On the morning of the 3d the wagons came up, and after a short delay for cooking and eating, the march was resumed. Later that day snow and sleet set in, adding to the discomfort of the army and making the roads so slippery that the wagons were again unable to keep up. That night was spent in the midst of the storm about four miles southwest of Bath. The advance had dispersed and captured some of a scouting party of the enemy. On the morning of the 4th, Jackson disposed his forces to surround Bath, sending a detachment across the mountain to the left in order to make a flank movement from the west, the main body pushing along the direct road with regiments thrown out on the right and left as flankers. Exhausted by the cold and suffering of the preceding days, and especially by the storm of the night before, the troops moved slowly, greatly hindered by the ice and frozen sleet that covered the ground, so that a large part of the day was consumed before the Confederates, led by Lieut.-

Col. W. S. H. Baylor, of Jackson's staff, dashed into the town. The latter had been held by a part of the Thirty-ninth Illinois regiment, a squadron of cavalry and a section of artillery, reinforced on the morning of the 4th by the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania from Hancock, and at midday by the Thirteenth Indiana. These Federal troops skirmished for some hours with Jackson's advance, then hastily retired, their commander, Colonel Murray of the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, having decided not to await an attack. They retreated precipitately to Hancock, leaving their stores and camp at Bath to be captured.

Finding the enemy gone, Jackson ordered an immediate pursuit, his main body moving toward Hancock and driving the rear of the enemy across the Potomac; Gilham moved toward Sir John's run, but did no damage to the enemy retreating in that direction, as they were able to check his advance with a few men, along the narrow defile of the run, until after dark, when they made good their retreat over the Potomac. Colonel Rust, with the Third Arkansas, the Thirty-seventh Virginia and two guns, was sent to destroy the Baltimore & Ohio railroad bridge over the Big Cacapon. The guard made a stout resistance, but he drove it off on the morning of the 5th and destroyed the bridge, railroad station and telegraph line.

Jackson bivouacked with his main force opposite Hancock on the night of the 4th. The next morning, through Colonel Ashby, he demanded a surrender of the town, threatening if that were not done in two hours, given for the removal of non-combatants, he would open his batteries upon it. General Lander, who had assumed command at Hancock, refused to surrender and prepared to resist until large reinforcements, which had been summoned from both east and west over the National road, could reach him. Jackson put several pieces of artillery in position and kept up a brisk cannonade during the afternoon of the 5th and the forenoon of the 6th, meantime trying to construct a bridge across the Potomac, two miles above Hancock, that he might cross the river and fall on Lander's flank. Finding that it would take several days to construct this bridge, during which time the enemy in front of him would be largely reinforced, and having freed this part of his district from the enemy and destroyed such stores as he could not carry away, Jack-

son left the vicinity of Hancock, on the morning of the 7th, and marched in the direction of Romney, the head of his column reaching Unger's cross roads that evening. The condition of the weather, and especially of the roads on which the sleet and snow, tramped by the marching soldiers, had become frozen and glassy so that it was with great difficulty that the troops could make progress, and almost impossible for the trains and artillery to be moved at all, filled the whole line of march with falling, disabled or killed horses. The cold was intense, and the bivouac the night of January 7, 1862, was one long to be remembered by even Jackson's hardy and much enduring soldiery. The march could not be continued until the horses were rough shod, and Jackson, ever impatient of delay, was forced to remain for some days at Unger's for this purpose.

The day that Jackson retired from Hancock, January 7th, a detachment of the Federal troops at Romney, taking the road to Winchester, fell on a body of some 700 Virginia militia, under Colonel Monroe, with Sheets' company of cavalry, and 30 artillerists with two pieces of artillery, under Lieut. W. E. Cutshaw, in the narrow gorge called Hanging Rock, just across the North river of the Big Cacapon, captured the Confederate pickets about daylight and, having turned Monroes' left, took his command by surprise, and pressing upon them with an overwhelming force scattered them in great confusion, capturing the two guns, part of the baggage and 7 prisoners. The Federal troops burned the mills and private houses at and near Hanging Rock, and then returned to Romney, burning houses and killing cattle on their way, encouraged to this vandalism by those in command. Their track of 15 miles, from Hanging Rock to Romney, was one continued scene of desolation.

On the 13th Jackson resumed his march to Romney. During this delay he had not been altogether idle, for on the 10th he had dispatched, in opposite directions, Brig.-Gen. G. C. Meem, with 545 militia infantry, toward Moorefield, and Brigadier-General Carson, with 200 militia infantry and 25 mounted militia, for Bath, 16 miles away, to confuse the enemy as to his intentions, while Ashby hovered near Romney watching the movements of the Federal forces. Apprehensive of disaster, General Lander, in command of the Federal forces, evacuated Romney on

the 10th and fell back to the Baltimore & Ohio railroad at Patterson's creek, where he concentrated the Federal troops from Hancock and Cumberland with those from Romney and Springfield.

Jackson's advance encamped on the night of the 13th near Slanesville, establishing headquarters at Bloomery gap. The next day, marching through another storm of driving sleet, his advance entered Romney in the evening, capturing some stores and supplies which the Federals had left behind in their precipitate retreat. Having Romney in possession, Jackson prepared for a movement on Cumberland, to destroy the railroad bridges across the Potomac near that town, as well as those across Patterson and New creeks. He selected Garnett's and Taliaferro's brigades for this purpose, in order to destroy the enemy's line of communication preparatory to a further aggressive movement; but a new obstacle, more difficult to overcome than the serious natural ones he had just encountered, now confronted him. While the troops selected for the new expedition did not break out in actual revolt, their murmurings were loud. They made open complaint of the suffering they had endured and concerning the greater ones they imagined in store for them if this campaign were continued in such an inhospitable country and amidst the thawing and freezing of a rigorous, though changeable winter. Especially was this opposition strong in Taliaferro's brigade, which had not been accustomed to Jacksonian discipline under the command of Loring. Not a few of the officers of Jackson's old command sympathized with those who had been selected for the arduous duty Jackson had in view. A rain and thaw set in at about this time, and changed the frozen roads into slush and mire. Jackson reluctantly submitted to the discontent of his troops and the unfavorable conditions, relinquished his aggressive intentions and prepared to defend what he had already won. He had in two weeks and with little loss, though with much suffering, discomfited the enemy opposed to him and disconcerted their offensive plans; practically expelling them from all his district, liberating three fertile counties from their domination, and thereby securing sources of supply for the subsistence of his own army.

Loring's three brigades and thirteen pieces of artillery were quartered at and near Romney; Boggs' brigade of

militia, mainly gathered from that region, was disposed along the South branch to Moorefield, with his pickets joining those of Edward Johnson from Camp Alleghany on the southwest. Three companies of Ashby's cavalry were left with Loring for outpost duty. Carson's brigade of Virginia militia, gathered from the lower valley mainly, was stationed at Bath; and Meem's brigade of Virginia militia, from the counties of Shenandoah and Page, was placed at and beyond Martinsburg; while Ashby, with the larger portion of his cavalry regiment, held the line of the Potomac from near Harper's Ferry westward. Garnett's brigade was ordered to Winchester, to be in position to guard against any movement of the large force under Banks that had been gathered at Frederick City. Jackson established his own headquarters at Winchester on the 24th of January, having provided communication with Loring, at Romney, by a line of telegraph.

With these dispositions of his forces, made so as to be ready for either offensive or defensive purposes, and on good roads by which they could be readily concentrated, General Jackson had a reasonable expectation that he could now rest and recruit his army for the coming spring campaign, which everything indicated would be a very active one. Furloughs were granted freely to men and officers, not only for their own satisfaction, but with the hope that by going to their respective homes they would be the means of bringing new recruits to his army. To his surprise and mortification, these very men, especially the officers, were the means of adding to the discontent already prevailing among Loring's men, and some of them, high in favor with the government at Richmond, were the means of inducing the secretary of war, on the 31st of January, to order Jackson to recall Loring's command, at once, to Winchester, on the pretense that a movement was being made to cut it off, without sending the order through his superior officer, Gen. J. E. Johnston, and without consultation with either of these capable commanders in the field of operations. Jackson promptly obeyed the order; recalled Loring to Winchester, and ordered the militia to fall back in the same direction if the enemy should advance. At the same time he informed Mr. Benjamin, the secretary of war, that he had complied with his order, and asked to be himself ordered to report for duty to the Virginia military insti-



tute, or, if this was not granted, that the President would accept his resignation from the army, writing in this connection, "With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much service in the field." General Johnston detained Jackson's letter to Benjamin, which had been sent through him as his immediate commander, and urged Jackson to reconsider it. Governor Letcher, learning of Jackson's resignation before the receipt of a letter from Jackson telling him what he had done and his reasons for it, immediately called on the secretary of war and insisted that no action should be taken. Yielding to the earnest solicitations of the governor and others whom he esteemed, but without withdrawing from the position he had taken in reference to the interference of the secretary with his command, Jackson consented to the withdrawal of his letter of resignation.

The enemy soon reoccupied the territory Jackson had been ordered to abandon, and he found himself confined to the lower Valley, which he had held previous to the Romney expedition. Loring was ordered to a new command, and the Tennessee, Georgia and Arkansas troops that had been with him were gradually taken away and joined to the other forces constituting Johnston's right wing near Centreville and Manassas, leaving only Virginia troops, those of Garnett's, Burks', and Taliaferro's brigades in the Valley with Jackson. The militia commands, never well organized, were now dwindling away by details and by enlistments in the volunteer regiments.

The Federals reoccupied Romney on the 7th of February, and a little later sent an expedition as far south as Moorefield, bringing off captured cattle. The reconstruction of the railroad was also begun, Carson having fallen back to Bloomery gap, and by the 14th the Baltimore & Ohio railroad was again opened from the west to Hancock, on which day Lander made a bold dash with both infantry and cavalry on the militia stationed at Bloomery, taking them by surprise, and capturing some 75 prisoners, including 17 officers. The militia rallied and checked the Federals until they could get away their train, when they retreated. Ashby drove Lander away from Bloomery gap on the 16th, but the Federals continued to hold the territory they had regained. Warned by these movements, Jackson ceased to give furloughs for

the time, and provided boats at Castleman's ferry on the Shenandoah to make good his communications with Gen. D. H. Hill, who was encamped at Leesburg, east of the Blue ridge.

February, 1862, was a month of Confederate disasters; the capture by the Federals of Fort Henry and Roanoke island, Fort Donelson and Nashville; the evacuation of Lexington, Mo., Bowling Green and Columbus, Ky., followed one after another. In this period of gloom, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated President of the Confederate States.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### REVIEW OF MILITARY CONDITIONS, SPRING OF 1862.

IN the spring of 1862 the Federal and Confederate armies in northeastern Virginia held nearly the same relative positions as in the early autumn of 1861.

The former had, February 7th, again occupied the line of the South branch of the Potomac, which Jackson, by order, had abandoned, and Gen. Edward Johnson, after his victory of December 13, 1861, on Alleghany mountain, had fallen back to Shenandoah mountain; but the Confederate army of Northern Virginia still had its center, in command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, on the field of its victory at Manassas, while its right rested at Fredericksburg, in command of General Holmes, and Jackson held its left in the lower Shenandoah valley. Practically its pickets patrolled the Potomac from Chesapeake bay up to within the mountains. Not satisfied with a condition of military affairs that still held north of the Potomac the great army—on its rolls, March 1, 1862, 222,000 men—that McClellan had, during more than half a year, been collecting and organizing, President Lincoln ordered that an advance of the whole army of the Potomac, except such a force as was necessary to defend Washington, should be made, on or before the 22d of February, to drive back the opposing Confederates and press on to the capture of Richmond.

This movement was actually begun. Banks marched from Frederick City, Md., toward Harper's Ferry, to attack and drive back Jackson. McClellan advanced his great army, from the intrenched camps around Washington, to attack Johnston at Centreville and Manassas, but when, after floundering through the spring mud of midland Virginia, he reached his objective, he found that Johnston, his able and wily opponent, had anticipated his coming, and, abandoning his intrenched camps and advanced positions at Leesburg and elsewhere, along and near the Potomac, had put his forces behind the Rappahannock. Jackson, preferring fighting to retreating,

skirmished with Banks' advance, offering him battle in front of Winchester, but when that was not accepted, reluctantly evacuating that historic town. Sending all his stores up the valley, he fell back to Strasburg, conforming his movements to those of Johnston, but, in the person of Ashby, his famous cavalry leader, constantly punishing every advance of his timid pursuer.

Reaching the conclusion that he had started on the wrong road to Richmond, McClellan, on the 13th of March, called his corps commanders together, at Fairfax Court House, and proposed another plan of advance on Richmond, which they joined in recommending to President Lincoln and which he reluctantly accepted. The commanding general proposed to move a grand and splendidly-appointed army of 120,000 men, by water, from Alexandria down the Potomac and the bay to Fortress Monroe, at the end of the peninsula of Virginia, and from that base of operation and supplies, to march up the peninsula between the James and the York, flanked by a strong naval force on each of these great tidal rivers, by the nearest roads, to Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy as well as of Virginia. The defenses of Washington were to be held by some 18,000 men; some 7,000 were to occupy Manassas, that the railway thence to Strasburg might be reopened, and 35,000 were to help Banks look after Jackson in the Valley. The force that had followed Gen. Ed Johnson as he fell back from Alleghany mountain, and that in the South branch of the Potomac valley were soon to be combined, and thus 16,000 men placed in command of Fremont, in the Mountain department, to menace Jackson's left flank and rear, while the 8,000 under Cox, on the Kanawha line, as well as some Pennsylvania reserves, were ordered to Manassas. A grand total of more than 200,000 troops, of all arms, saying nothing of the large supporting naval force, thus began converging on Richmond from a great bordering sweep that extended northeastward along the mountain ranges that border the valley to the Potomac, then down that great tidal river to Chesapeake bay, Virginia's Mediterranean, and thence to the entrance of the grand harbor of Hampton Roads, the gateway to the mouth of the James, a great circle distance of fully 400 miles.

The shipment of McClellan's army from Washington to his new field of operations, began on the 17th of

March, and on the 21st of that month, Gen. J. B. Magruder, in command of the Confederate front on the peninsula, reported the landing of large bodies of troops at Fortress Monroe, and asked for 30,000 men to meet the threatening invasion.

The sight of the departure of this great army alarmed Lincoln concerning the safety of the capital, and induced him to modify McClellan's plan of campaign by ordering, April 3d, that McDowell's corps should remain in front of Washington. On the 17th of May he was directed to advance to Fredericksburg, but keeping himself in position so he could be readily recalled to Washington, if necessary, to aid in its defense. McClellan objected to this arrangement, but was compelled to submit to it. McDowell appeared in front of the staunch old city on the Rappahannock near the close of May, when the Confederates, under General Holmes, fell back toward Richmond. Lincoln visited McDowell's camp, on the Stafford heights, May 23d, and it was then decided that McDowell should cross the Rappahannock on the 26th and march toward Richmond.

Fortunately for Virginia and the Confederacy, on the very day that McClellan was conferring at Fairfax Court House concerning a change of base and of plan of campaign, Gen. Robert E. Lee took command, under President Davis, of all the forces of the Confederacy, and, with characteristic energy and foresight, at once began preparations to meet the various oncoming Federal armies that were responding to the "on to Richmond" demand of the North.

To meet the several Federal columns converging from the great outer circle, along which they had been gathering during the preceding eight months, the prospect for Lee, although he held the inner circle and the shorter lines of defense, was by no means reassuring, even to such a stout-hearted and self-reliant commander as himself. Huger, on his extreme right, held Norfolk with some 7,000 men, guarded in front by the ram Virginia, already famous for her 8th of March exploits and great naval victory in Hampton Roads; across Hampton Roads, Magruder was holding the peninsula, before Fortress Monroe and Hampton, with 11,000 men; Holmes held the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, with a brigade of 2,000; Johnston held the line of the upper Rappahannock

with about 47,000 men that had fallen back from Manassas; Stonewall Jackson safeguarded the lower Shenandoah valley with some 5,000 in his command; while on the extreme left of the sweep of Lee's line of defense, Edward Johnson held the Fort Johnson pass of the Shenandoah mountain, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, with some 3,500 men, the heroes of the Alleghany mountain battle. Lee's whole muster was only about 75,000 to meet the converging invasion of 200,000 or more fully armed and equipped soldiery.

Aware of the gigantic preparations that had been made for this impending campaign by both the contending nations, for such they undoubtedly were at that time, and of the mighty issues involved, not only all the people of the then United States and those of the then Confederate States, but those of all the living historic nations, paused and anxiously awaited the result of the mighty conflict that in the next half year would rage over nearly one-half of the territory of Virginia and an important portion of Maryland, and give to Fame's keeping and to History's records, names and deeds the world will not soon forget.

To the general observer, the result of this grand game of war was in the hands of McClellan, who, for an insignificant victory in the mountains of western Virginia, over a smaller and badly-generated force, had been, for months, heralded as the "Young Napoleon." He had at his command, counting sea power as well as land power, three times as many men as his antagonist, and behind him, in his nation's reserve, at least five times as many men of military age, saying nothing of the thousands of Europe's "soldiers of fortune" who were, for a consideration, ready to add, indefinitely, to his numbers. His people were the most ingenious, energetic and resourceful of any in the world, and could furnish an almost unlimited quantity of supplies, of every kind, that could be called for by the emergencies of war. His government, centralized by the war spirit and backed up by a great and determined nation, had apparently but to command victory in the impending contest, with the odds so much in its favor, to win it. Unfortunately for its cause, its commanding general, while a grand organizer, an able planner of campaigns, and the idol of the great army that he, mainly, had created, was a timid leader, and in

the hour of conflict "took counsel of his fears"—counselors that never make a successful soldier. These, as the sequence of events revealed, constantly in imagination, doubled the number of his foes and helped the success of their strategic movements. McClellan's plan of campaign was to hold back Lee's widely-scattered forces by the armies of observation that his numbers permitted him to place before Johnson, Jackson, Johnston and Holmes, while he landed his great army for active invasion on the peninsula, and, brushing aside Magruder, and Huger, pushed rapidly forward to capture Richmond before Lee could there concentrate men enough to successfully impede his progress to victory. With the sea power at hand to supply the wants of his army, there were abundant reasons why he should succeed.

Lee, the acknowledged first soldier of the old Federal army, who had been tendered by Lincoln and urged to accept the command of the Union army the very day before he resigned his commission and offered his services to Virginia, his native State and that of his ancestors, had a most serious and difficult problem to solve, when, on the memorable 13th of March, before referred to, he assumed command of the Confederate armies in the field and "sat down to count the cost" of the imminent conflict that, in Virginia, he must at once become the leader of on the Confederate side. He knew then, or soon thereafter, as he always did, the numbers and intentions of his adversary; he also knew, as few men of the South did, or realized, the great disparity of the contending nations in men and in resources. The soldiers at his command were, comparatively, few in numbers; they were also widely scattered; some a hundred miles or more, as the crow flies, to the southeast from his headquarters at Richmond; others 175 miles to the northwest, and others from 75 to 100 miles to the north and northeast, and with but limited means of transportation at his call should he desire to concentrate them. More than this, he knew that in a few days the period of the enlistment of most of these men, which had been but for a year, would expire, and no man could tell what they would do now that the stern experiences of war, in camp and field, had dulled the edge of their patriotic fervor. Even if nearly all re-enlisted, he realized that they were poorly clad, badly equipped, ill fed, and, to all human appearances, even leaving out the

question of numbers, in no condition to meet the splendidly equipped and supplied army they must soon meet and contend with. But there entered into Lee's calculations factors and forces that are mightier than armies and navies and more potent than resources. Fully satisfied of the righteousness of his intentions and of the cause which he had unhesitatingly espoused and was defending; knowing no line of action but that which duty pointed out, and with a sublime faith that never distrusted an overruling Providence, and therefore "never took counsel of its fears," he prayerfully and courageously grappled with the situation and prudently prepared for the impending conflict, satisfied and confident that with the army of Northern Virginia, every man of which not only loved but trusted in him, he would be the winner.

Apprised by McClellan's movements of his intentions, Lee increased and strengthened the defenses of Richmond and guarded the water approach to that threatened city by obstructing the ship channel of the James and planting intrenched batteries on Drewry's bluff; at the same time he recalled all but Ewell's division of Johnston's army from the line of the upper Rappahannock, and with these reinforced Magruder on the peninsula, who had already nearly completed a strong line of defense, from the James to the York, in front of Williamsburg and Yorktown, to bar McClellan's way to Richmond.

Having thus outlined the locations and dispositions of the combatants in the fields of action, the narrative now proceeds to follow the fortunes of the five Federal armies—which the compelling genius of Jackson soon made but two—that at the opening of the Virginia campaign of 1862, near the last of March, were co-operating for the capture of Richmond, and those of the opposing Confederate forces. Stonewall Jackson was first in the field of actual combat, and so his famous Valley campaign is the first chapter of the story.



## CHAPTER XIV.

### STONEWALL JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

**B**EFORE the opening of active military operations in the spring of 1862, Lincoln determined to reopen the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. Jackson held the portion of this road, which he had badly damaged, between Harper's Ferry and Hancock, and he must be forced back from the Potomac before the road could be repaired and reopened. To effect this Banks marched, February 22d, from his winter camp at Frederick, Md., and his advance entered Harper's Ferry the 24th, and laid a bateau bridge across the Potomac on which two brigades crossed on the 26th and occupied the town. McClellan himself reached that place the same day and ordered the establishment there of a depot of army supplies, preparatory to another forward movement, while the railroad was being opened. After going to Charlestown, on the 28th, he instructed Banks to locate Abercrombie's brigade at that place and Hamilton's at Smithfield, a few miles to the westward; Sedgwick, to whose division these belonged, to establish himself at Charlestown. Shields, now in command of Lander's force from the South Branch valley, was ordered to Martinsburg, and Williams from Hancock to Bunker Hill; thus establishing a line entirely across the Valley, in front of the Baltimore & Ohio. These camps were all connected by fine macadam roads. All arrangements were completed by March 6th and the three brigades of Banks were well placed, not only for guarding the Baltimore & Ohio, but also for an advance on Winchester.

On the same day Banks marched from Frederick to attack him, Jackson, in obedience to Johnston's orders, sent the Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee regiments to Manassas and the Third Arkansas to Strasburg, to take the cars for Fredericksburg. He retained for further orders the rest of Loring's men who were not Virginians. Having been thus depleted, Jackson asked Johnston, by letter, February 24th, whether he desired additional

fortifications at Winchester, stating that he was arranging to construct a raft bridge over the Shenandoah so that his troops and those at Leesburg could quickly co-operate. At that very time Johnston was sending his stores and baggage to the rear, and on the 7th of March, Whiting withdrew toward Fredericksburg, from his camp on the lower Occoquan, and D. H. Hill, from his at Leesburg, by way of Warrenton, toward the Rappahannock; and on the 9th, the center, under Johnston himself, abandoned Centreville and Manassas. By March 11th all the Confederate infantry and artillery from the Blue ridge to Fredericksburg, were aligned on the south bank of the Rappahannock.

These movements left Jackson exposed to both front and flank attacks; but Johnston had confidence in his ability to take care of himself, and instructed him "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the valley, but without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent him from making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be compelled to fight." Jackson was ready enough to obey orders as far as keeping the invaders in the valley, and constantly employed, were concerned; but he doubtless fully intended to fight them, notwithstanding these instructions, if opportunity offered for so doing.

By Jackson's field return of February 28th, he had 4,297 infantry, 369 artillery and 601 cavalry; a total of 5,267, officers and men, present for duty. This little army of three brigades (among them the already famous "Stonewall brigade") was made up of ten regiments of Virginia volunteer infantry and a battalion of Virginia Irish regulars; five Virginia artillery companies with 24 guns, and a cavalry regiment composed of Virginia companies and Chew's horse artillery of 3 guns, under the already renowned Ashby. Included among these men were some fragments of militia brigades, mostly on special duty.

By McClellan's field return of March 2d, Banks had present for duty, of all arms, 38,484 men. After the occupation of Winchester, Sedgwick's brigade was sent back to guard the Potomac from the mouth of the Monocacy down to the Great Falls, still leaving Banks full 30,000 men when he followed Jackson, with about one-

sixth as many, as he retired up the Valley, after evacuating Winchester on the 11th of March.

Banks' advance occupied Charlestown, 22 miles from Winchester, February 26th; the advance of his right, marching from Bunker Hill, appeared at Stephenson's, four miles in front of Winchester, March 6th, when Jackson promptly formed line in front of his fortifications and offered battle; but the Federals as promptly fell back. On the 11th Banks cautiously advanced his left to Berryville, 10 miles east of Winchester, by a good stone road. Jackson again drew up his little army, in front of Winchester, covering the three roads by which Banks was advancing his whole army, and all day awaited an attack from the large force that came to within four miles of his position. When this did not come on to combat, he, late in the day, reluctantly followed his trains to the vicinity of Newtown, after having called a council of war (the first and the last he ever called), consisting of General Garnett and his regimental commanders, in Winchester, after dark, to which he proposed that they should make an attack on Banks' advance, at Stephenson's, before daylight the next morning. The council, as yet ignorant of the manner of man that counseled, rejected his proposal. He doubtless would have carried out his plans regardless of this conclusion if he had not then learned that, without orders, his army was already five miles away from Winchester; too far to recall them for a night march and attack. He later followed his army and bivouacked in its rear, with "Little Sorrel," in a fence corner. The next day he marched to Strasburg, 18 miles from Winchester, where he halted until the 15th. Banks occupied Winchester the 12th, but Ashby, with his cavalry, many of them bold riders reared in the lower valley, kept him so occupied in protecting the rear and flanks of his army as well as its front, that he did not follow after Jackson until the 18th, when he started Shields' division in pursuit. This reached Strasburg, the sally-port of the western middle section of the Valley, the next day, when Jackson, leaving the gateway open, with Ashby as its sentinel, again fell back, first to Woodstock, 12 miles, and then to Mt. Jackson, 24 miles from Strasburg.

On the 16th of March, McClellan, convinced that his grand movement on Jackson, by which he had so easily secured control of the lower Valley, would enable him to

hold that lovely country with a small force, ordered Banks to cross the Blue ridge, establish and strongly intrench his command at and near Manassas, and proceed to open the railway from Washington to that point and thence to Strasburg; then intrench a brigade of infantry with two batteries, near Front Royal, where the railway crosses the Shenandoah; intrench another brigade at Strasburg; build and occupy blockhouses at the railway bridges; leave two regiments of cavalry at Winchester, and keep his front covered by constantly employed cavalry well advanced—"the general object being to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington," and, he doubtless mentally added, protect the right of the army moving toward Fredericksburg. Banks hastened to comply with these orders. Shields' division was recalled from Strasburg, and on the 20th, Williams' division took up its line of march for Manassas.

Ashby, who kept up a constant skirmish with the Federal advance between Woodstock and Strasburg, routing its pickets and peering into its camps, reported to Jackson on the evening of March 21st, that the enemy had evacuated Strasburg and he was following them. Jackson, having been instructed by Johnston to hold in the valley the enemy already there, followed after Ashby at dawn of the 22d, Fulkerson's brigade from Woodstock and Garnett's and Burks' from Mt. Jackson, all reaching Strasburg and encamping there that night. Ashby with 200 to 300 cavalry and three cannon, attacked and drove in the Federal pickets, about a mile from Winchester, at 5 p. m. of the 22d. Banks ordered his command under arms and sent a brigade of infantry, two batteries and some artillery to meet this attack. Ashby skirmished for a time and then withdrew, three miles, to Kernstown, for the night, reporting to Jackson that he had learned that all but four regiments of the Federal army had left for the north and that these would follow the next morning. Ashby's information was only partly correct. The last of Williams' division of Banks' command had marched for Manassas the morning of the 22d, but Shields' division, some 7,000 men, had not yet left Winchester.

Shields, whose arm had been broken in the skirmish of the 22d, reported to Banks that he thought the attack was only by a small cavalry force, but during the night, as a precautionary provision, he posted Kimball's brigade

of infantry and a battery across the Valley turnpike, well toward Kernstown, with Sullivan's brigade in supporting distance, and covered all roads leading to Winchester from the north, west and south. Tyler's infantry brigade and Broadhead's cavalry he held in Winchester. On the morning of the 23d, after a careful reconnoissance of the front, it was concluded, as before, that only a small Confederate cavalry force was there, and that Jackson would not venture so far from his support. Thus satisfied, Banks took his departure, under orders, for Washington, leaving his staff to ride toward Manassas in the afternoon.

Jackson knew that a large body of Banks' men had left the Valley and concluded, from Ashby's reports, that but a small force remained at Winchester. This he determined to attack, with the expectation that by so doing he could recall Banks' whole army to the Valley. At daybreak, on Sunday, the 23d of March, he sent four companies of infantry to support Ashby, following these with his whole force. It was 14 miles from his camp at Strasburg to Kernstown, a fair day's march, so his advance did not reach Ashby until about 10 a. m. and his main body until 1 p. m.

Jackson's men were much wearied by the long march of 26 miles, that most of them had made in about a day and a half, over a somewhat muddy stone road, so he gave orders to go into bivouac for the night, intending to attack, with rested troops, the next morning. On a further examination, he found that the position he had taken, about a mile south of Kernstown, could be seen from Pritchard's hill, about a mile north of Kernstown, which was occupied by Federal artillery, and that it would be dangerous to delay his attack, now it was known he was present in force, as the enemy might be reinforced during the night; so he decided to give battle as soon as he could arrange to do so.

Ashby, with his cavalry and Chew's battery, had engaged the enemy's attention from early dawn; when Captain Nadenbousch arrived, at 10 a. m., with his four companies of infantry skirmishers, he again advanced and made a spirited attack. Colonel Kimball, commanding the Federal forces in Shields' enforced absence, met this by more than a regiment of Ohio skirmishers, deployed across the Valley turnpike, flanked by batteries and followed by Sullivan's brigade. These forced Ashby to

retire, a few hundred yards, to Kernstown. When Jackson's main body came up, he was ordered to prepare for the attack in force by threatening the Federal left, resting on the old Front Royal road, and also its right on the Opequon road. To the latter he sent Major Funsten with 140 cavalry, leaving himself but 150.

Jackson mustered, on this Kernstown battlefield, 3,087 infantry, of which 2,742 became engaged; 27 cannon, 18 of which came into action, and 290 cavalry. Shields reported that he had for fighting duty 6,000 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 cannon. Of his thirteen infantry regiments, six were from Ohio, three from Indiana, and one each from Illinois and West Virginia; of his artillery, two companies were from West Virginia, two from Ohio and one from the Fourth regular United States artillery. Of his sixteen companies of cavalry, four were from Michigan, two each from Ohio and Maryland, six from West Virginia, and two appear to have been regulars. McClellan's return for March indicates that Shields had 9,000 men present for duty at this time.

Scanning the topography of the field of battle and the positions his foe had occupied, from a rising ground near Kernstown, Jackson saw that a front attack would be hazardous, since the Federals were protected and concealed by a wood on their left, while their batteries, on commanding hills, guarded their right and swept the roads and open fields in their front. He quickly discovered that the dominating feature of the whole field was a prominent, but rather low ridge, partly wooded and partly cleared, that ran northeast and southwest, nearly parallel to the Valley turnpike and about three miles from it where he had massed his troops, and two miles from it where the Federal line crossed that road. This Sandy ridge, as it was called, was about four miles long; it sank down, its end crossed by a cleared field, into a large open forest at its northeastern end; this forest extended to and concealed the Cedar Creek turnpike, which diverged to the west from the Valley turnpike some three miles beyond Kernstown.

Satisfied that he could easily flank Shields' right and force him in retreat from his position if he could gain the crest of the Sandy ridge and advance to its northeastern end, Jackson at once proceeded to execute his designs. Burke's brigade was left on the turnpike, a mile south of

Kernstown, to support Ashby, guard the train and form a reserve. Fulkerson's brigade, followed by part of Carpenter's battery, was marched northward, as if to attack the enemy's right center, passing bravely through a storm of shot and shell, from Pritchard's hill, to which Carpenter made brief reply in passing. Nearing the Federal batteries, Fulkerson turned northwest and, rapidly moving, soon gained and deployed across Sandy ridge, at right angles to its trend, securing a very strong position, on its crest, for his left, behind a stone fence overlooking and dominating the field that extended down the slope of the northeastern end of the ridge to the forest that reached from the foot of that end to the Cedar Creek turnpike. Garnett's brigade followed, but much farther to the left, and having gained the crest of the ridge, marched along that to Fulkerson's line, where most of it took position on his right, thus extending a strong line of battle across Sandy ridge and into the open field, on its eastern slope, which extended from near the crest and overlooked the Federal position. Jackson quickly saw its advantages and ordered up McLaughlin's and Waters' batteries and Carpenter's other guns, and placed them, nearly at right angles to his infantry line, in front of the wood above this field, supported by some of Fulkerson's men. This disposition of his fighters was admirable. It was a right-angled salient with a protecting wood in the rear at each side. The angle looked into the midst of the Federal position; the batteries protected his right and commanded those of the enemy.

Ashby was ordered to keep up a bold demonstration on the right and Jackson now opened on the left, and soon forced his foe to withdraw from his chosen position. Seeing that his right was in extreme danger, Kimball promptly provided to counteract Jackson's movements. Tyler's brigade, which at about 2 p. m. had reached the junction of the Cedar Creek and Valley turnpikes, and was there waiting in reserve, was ordered to vigorously attack the Confederate left. Jackson was now master of the situation, and unless he could be driven from his position he would, undoubtedly, gain the day.

Tyler, equal to the emergency, marched rapidly along the Cedar Creek road to opposite the northeastern end of Sandy ridge, and there, concealed and protected by the intervening forest, formed his line of battle, parallel to

and longer than Jackson's, and at 3:30 p. m. advanced to the attack, just as Jackson had placed his men in position and was advancing to flank Sullivan's right. Tyler's vigorous onset was unexpected, but Fulkerson, on Jackson's left, behind the stone fence, met it with a withering fire, at short range, and the two attacking regiments were repulsed with severe loss and broke to the rear, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania so demoralized as to be of no further use that day. Tyler, with his other regiments, soon renewed the attack, which Fulkerson again repulsed from his front, but which fiercely continued for two hours in front of Garnett. Shields says of it: "Here the struggle became desperate, and for a short time doubtful."

Observing that the great contention was now on his right, and that there was no fighting force to detain him on the left, Kimball hastened six of his and Sullivan's regiments to Tyler's left, extending his line so that in advancing it would overlap Jackson's right and turn that flank. Jackson made heroic efforts to meet this superior force, inciting his thin line of weary veterans to stubborn resistance, bringing up the Fifth Virginia, which had been held in reserve, ordering up the Forty-second and sending for the Forty-eighth, which had been left to guard his train, that he might throw the last man and the last gun into the final struggle. Tyler did not wait for Jackson to get even these small additions to his force, but with added strength, again led forward his men and by their vigorous charge, the front of which fell on Garnett, caused the Confederate line to waver, and then, by order of its brigadier, to fall back.

Jackson, who was directing the artillery on his right and forcing back the advancing Federals, knew nothing of this order, and was highly indignant, when, just about dark, his army, which he tried in vain to rally, swept by him in retreat. Fulkerson was easily holding his position on the left when Garnett's retreat exposed his right and forced him to retreat, stubbornly fighting the superior numbers now rushing to attack him. The Fifth Virginia was coming to his relief in this emergency when Garnett ordered that also to retreat, but Jackson met and halted it in the edge of a wood in rear of his former position, and ordered the retreating infantry to form behind that. The Forty-second, coming up, was placed



on the right of the Fifth. These regiments and some batteries resisted the enemy's advance, twice repulsing their attacks, and gave the retreating men opportunity to rally and other batteries time to withdraw. By extending their lines the Federals finally forced these regiments from the field.

The mass of the Confederate army retreated along Sandy ridge for some distance, then took a road leading to the Valley turnpike, and then, slowly but sullenly, retired five or six miles to their trains in the vicinity of Newtown, having lost 691 men, of whom 80 were killed, 340 wounded (some 70 of these left on the field) and 260 missing. The Federals held the field of battle, captured two disabled guns and 200 or 300 prisoners. They made no pursuit, and Jackson's rear spent the night where his command had massed in the afternoon. Six days after the battle Shields was uncertain as to his losses, but reported his killed as 103, the wounded as 441, and the missing as 24, a total of 568.

The day after the battle the citizens of Winchester, mainly men past middle age, obtained permission to bury the Confederate dead, and its noble women did all they were allowed to do in caring for the wounded. Jackson firmly believed that his failure was the result of the retreat ordered by General Garnett, and circumstances, months afterward, showed that he continued in that belief. To teach his subordinates a lesson, and to show them and others what he expected should be done under similar circumstances, he placed Garnett under arrest and relieved him from his command. For this he has been censured by writers ignorant of the facts in the case. Those who knew Jackson can testify that in this case, as in others for which he has been blamed, he was not animated by animosity or personal feeling. After the Seven Days' battles, Garnett was released from arrest and subsequently fell at Gettysburg leading a brigade.

On the 24th Jackson retired to the south side of Cedar creek and then fell back to his former camps near Mt. Jackson, holding the line of Stony creek which his engineer, after a careful examination, had recommended as the best one for defense in all that region.

Shields, confident that Jackson would not have brought on such an engagement without expecting reinforcements, hastened, the night after the battle, to bring

together all the troops within his reach; Williams was recalled from his march toward Manassas, with the request that his rear brigade, already 20 miles away, should march all night and rejoin him on the morning of the 24th. He gathered all the men he could find in his rear to join him by forced night marches. Banks was halted, on his way to Washington, at Harper's Ferry. He promptly ordered back all of Williams' division and returned at once to Winchester, retaining Sedgwick at Harper's Ferry. Jackson's prompt action and bold attack had completely changed McClellan's plans, and instead of establishing Banks near Manassas with 20,000 men, he ordered him to remain in the Valley with all these forces and sent him 10,000 more, detached from his own army, to aid in driving back Jackson or to meet another anticipated attack.

McClellan sent his orders to Banks on the 1st day of April, from the steamer on which he was just starting to join his command at Fortress Monroe. Disquieted by what had happened, Lincoln ordered the retention of McDowell's corps in front of Washington until further orders. On the 1st of April, 73,456 men and 109 cannon were held for the defense of that city. Of these, 18,000 were in the forts around Washington, 1,350 along the Potomac above that city, 10,859 at Manassas, 7,780 at Warrenton, and 35,467 (including the 10,000 under Blenker ordered to him) were with Banks in the Shenandoah valley. When Lincoln, on the 3d of April, detained McDowell's corps, it was, as he informed McClellan on the 9th, because he feared that the Confederates might turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. On the 4th, McDowell was put in command of the forces between the Blue ridge and Fredericksburg, including those in the defenses of Washington; his command, thus made independent of McClellan, was called the department of the Rappahannock; Banks was placed in command of the department of the Shenandoah, including that valley and its extension into Maryland, and Fremont was put in command of the Mountain department, embracing the Appalachian region west of the Valley.

Jackson established his headquarters at Woodstock March 24th, at Narrow Passage the 26th, and at Hawnstown on the 29th. Banks made an advance on the

1st of April and forced Ashby's pickets back to Edinburg, on the line of Stony creek, which Jackson had decided to hold. He established his headquarters at Rude's hill, April 2d, and there remained until the 17th, when the Federals again moved forward in force, occupying himself, as well as the cold and raw weather, with snow and rain would permit, in recruiting and drilling his troops, marching them back and forth, almost daily, from their camps to the line of Stony creek, and otherwise keeping them in fighting trim, doing all in his power to get to his command the regiments of Virginia militia that had been ordered to him from the counties of Augusta and Rockingham in the Shenandoah valley. He was greatly aided in reorganizing his army by the anticipated general conscription bill, placing all the able-bodied men of the country, between eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in the military service, which became a law on the 16th of April, as patriotic Virginians preferred to volunteer rather than be conscripted.

When Banks again began his forward movement, on the 17th of April, he captured some of Ashby's outposts, but that fearless trooper turned on him at every favorable opportunity, and forced him to contend for every mile he made up the valley. Jackson retired before the oncoming enemy and reached Harrisonburg, 25 miles beyond Mt. Jackson, during the morning of the 18th. To the east of this town the Massanutton mountains, beginning opposite Strasburg and dividing the middle section of the Shenandoah valley into two parts, drop off abruptly and the valley widens to near 30 miles between the North mountain and the Blue ridge. Sending all his surplus trains and his tents on to Staunton, with orders to burn the Valley Turnpike bridge at Mt. Crawford after these had crossed the North river of the Shenandoah, Jackson, at Harrisonburg, turned abruptly to the left, abandoning the Valley turnpike and taking the one leading from Harrisonburg around the southwestern end of the Massanutton mountains to Conrad's store, and thence across the Blue ridge, by Swift Run gap, to Gordonsville, halting the night of the 18th at Peale's cross roads, six miles from Harrisonburg, and the next day crossing the main Shenandoah to camps on Elk run near the western entrance to Swift Run gap of the Blue ridge; thus placing himself in a thoroughly

secure position, where he could easily hold the road leading to Ewell's division, of Johnston's army, which had fallen back and was holding the line of the Rapidan, taking the precaution of sending to burn the bridges across the South Fork Shenandoah in the eastern, or Page valley, below him.

When Banks learned of Jackson's unexpected movement to the left, he informed his government that he believed Jackson had abandoned the valley. Continuing his tardy pursuit, his cavalry entered Harrisonburg on the 22d of April and part of his infantry on the 26th. Looking out at the broadly widening valley before him, recalling that his base of supplies was nearly 100 miles in his rear by a wagon road, and uncertain as to what had become of his elusive foe, he hesitated what to do and asked for instructions.

Jackson, in his secure position but with his men exposed in open bivouacs to the snow, rain and sleet that made memorable the closing days of April, completed the reorganization of his army, received additions by enlistments and the Tenth Virginia, ordered to him from Ewell's division, increasing his force to near 6,000 men; in the meantime stimulating Ashby to keep Banks busy guarding his encampment and his long line of communication to his rear, which presented so many favorable points of attack to the horsemen of the Valley who knew all its byways as well as its highways and the sally-ports to these from the mountains on either side. He had his engineers, as well as his cavalry, on the outlook for opportunities to attack any exposed positions occupied by Banks. On the 28th, Jackson appealed to Lee, now the acting commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, to let Ewell's command cross the Blue ridge and join him, that thus reinforced he might march out and attack Banks and drive him back down the Valley, suggesting also that some additional men could be spared him from the force covering Fredericksburg. General Lee was favorably impressed with Jackson's suggestion, writing, that "a decisive and successful blow at Banks' column would be fraught with the happiest results, but regretting that the large force of the enemy now threatening Fredericksburg would not admit of the withdrawal of troops from that line, but suggesting that he might combine the forces of Ewell and Edward Johnson with his own, if he thought that by so doing he could hold Banks

in check. Jackson gladly accepted Lee's suggestions, and, at his headquarters at Conrad's store, in the Elk Run valley, worked out his plan of operations.

When Jackson retired from Harrisonburg, on the 19th, to the Blue ridge, and left the road to Staunton, 25 miles by the Valley turnpike, uncovered, Edward Johnson's command, consisting of six regiments of infantry, three batteries and a small force of cavalry, in all about 3,000 fighting men, fell back to West View, 7 miles west of Staunton, to be prepared for any movement Banks might make in that direction; the two brigades of Milroy and Schenck, of Fremont's command, that had been opposing Johnson, following him up and establishing a Federal advance at the eastern foot of the Shenandoah mountain, about 20 miles west of Staunton.

There was no enemy in front of Ewell to prevent his joining Jackson, as McDowell's army, now that all threatened danger of an attack on Washington was apparently removed, had been diverted toward Fredericksburg. It was different with Edward Johnson's force. That could not be removed without endangering Staunton, a base of supplies for Lee's as well as Jackson's army; that town was also on the important line of railway leading to Richmond. This condition of things compelled Jackson to strike his first blow at Fremont's advance under Milroy, and thus release Johnson's command for co-operating with his. Only common country roads led from Jackson's camp, along the western foot of the Blue ridge, to Staunton, and these were rendered almost impassable by the well-nigh continuous wet weather and the freezings and thawings that characterized that season. To solve this difficulty, and at the same time to effectually cover his strategic movement, Jackson, after having had the roads examined and ascertained that he could secure railway transportation, decided to march his own army along the foot of the Blue ridge, some 18 miles, to the vicinity of Port Republic, the way for most of the distance leading through flat woods, and there take the turnpike across the Blue ridge to Meechum's River station of the Virginia Central railroad, whence, by the aid of the railway, he could speedily transfer his command to Staunton and join Johnson, just beyond, in a rapid movement that would

unexpectedly fall upon and demoralize Fremont's advance; arranging that Ewell's division should cross the Blue ridge and occupy the camps at Elk run even before he left their vicinity. To cover the changes decided on and deceive Banks, Jackson, on the 29th of April, sent Ashby, reinforced by infantry and artillery, to make a demonstration in front of Harrisonburg, sending Captain Hotchkiss, of the engineers, to the peak of the Massanutton mountains during the previous night, to observe the effect of the movement, as this outlook commanded a full view of Banks' camp, and regulate the movements of Ashby by signal. His whole army followed after Ashby, thus clearing his camps, which Ewell, crossing the Blue ridge the same day, occupied immediately after. Banks sent his trains to the rear and formed a line of battle on a very advantageous position, but made no attack. His object accomplished, late in the day Jackson countermarched to Conrad's store, but instead of going into his former camps, as his men expected, he turned up the river, just as a driving rain began, and marched several miles in the direction of Port Republic before going into camp. Jackson and his staff rode a dozen miles to "Lewiston," the home of Gen. S. H. Lewis, for the night. Ashby's cavalry covered and concealed the movement by advancing along the roads on the western side of the Shenandoah.

During the whole of May 1st and 2d all of Jackson's command was engaged in an arduous struggle in getting his trains and artillery through the rain, the mud and the quicksands between their camp of the night of the 30th and Port Republic, 12 miles distant. The 3d proved a genuine sunny May day and the troops marched rapidly over the hard, well-graded road across the Blue ridge, and Saturday night found their advance at Meechum's River station of the Virginia Central railroad. The next day, the troops that had reached the railway were conveyed by train to Staunton, while those in the rear marched to the nearer Afton station, to which the cars returned for them. The artillery and army trains took the country road to Staunton, recrossing the Blue ridge at Rockfish gap. The despair of the citizens of Staunton when apprised that Jackson had left the valley was unexpectedly turned into joy, when, just as the church bells were ringing for the Sunday morning serv-

ice, the trains rolled in with the advance of Jackson's army, all of which was there concentrated by the afternoon of the 5th. Taking the next day for rest and to settle with the Lord of the Sabbath for the day that had, of necessity incurred from bad roads, been taken for a march, Jackson was ready to move against the enemy on the morning of the 7th. During the afternoon of the previous day Johnson marched his brigade from his camps at West View, through Buffalo gap and up the eastern slope of Big North mountain, and at dusk rested his advance, in bivouac, in Dry Branch gap or Notch, of that mountain, 15 miles west of Staunton. Milroy's advance was encamped near the eastern foot of Shenandoah mountain, across the Big Calf Pasture valley, in sight of Johnson's pickets. Jackson's engineers had previously conferred with Johnson, after a reconnaissance of the Federal advance, and it had been agreed that Johnson should send a flanking party, by a detour to the left, in advance of his front attack, to fall upon the rear of Milroy's camp.

Learning from his spies that a junction had been made between the forces of Jackson and Johnson, Milroy ordered his detachments to concentrate at McDowell, and calling for reinforcements from Fremont, who was advancing up the South Branch valley, he prepared to make a stand. When Johnson's flanking party reached Milroy's previous camp they found there only a picket, the most of which was captured. Jackson, by rapid riding from Staunton, was early on the ground at Rodgers', at the foot of the Shenandoah mountain, 23 miles from Staunton, and under his personal direction the pursuit was continued across that mountain to Shaw's Fork, the Federal artillery opposing a further advance from the crest of Shaw's ridge. The march was resumed early on the morning of the 8th, Johnson's regiments still in advance. The enemy had retreated during the night, and Jackson met with no opposition in crossing Shaw's ridge, the Cow Pasture valley and the western slope of Bull Pasture mountain, the summit of which was reached early in the forenoon. From a projecting rock on the right of the road Jackson was enabled to see the camp and the position taken by the enemy across the Bull Pasture river, on the terraces and bottoms of that valley in the vicinity of McDowell; while his engineer, who was famil-

iar with the locality, sketched for him the topography and the approaches to the Federal position, which were partly concealed by a forest along the eastern bluffs of the river. Generals Jackson and Johnson then rode up into the fields on the undulating top of the mountain, on the left, and from that locality further reconnoitered the ground Milroy had chosen for defense, observing at the same time arrangements for placing a battery on a cleared spur to the northeast of McDowell. Noticing this group of horsemen with but a line of skirmishers to protect them, Milroy sent a flanking party up the mountain side, through the woods on his right, to try and capture these officers. Johnson reinforced his skirmishers and after a lively engagement the enemy retired. Concluding from this, and the appearance of things in the Federal camp, that no further attack would be made that day, Jackson gave instructions for the posting of Johnson's brigade in rear of the fields on the summit of the mountain south of the turnpike, and ordered the opening of a road by which artillery could be taken to the same position, expecting to attack the enemy the next morning unless they should attack him in his chosen position. At the same time he desired to await the movements of a flanking column which he had sent around to the left into the Bull Pasture valley, to ascend that valley and fall upon Milroy's right while he attacked in front. With these arrangements made and Johnson's brigade in position for attack or defense, and Taliaferro's and Campbell's brigades near at hand, Jackson sent his staff back to headquarters, at Wilson's on the Cow Pasture, intending himself soon to follow for refreshments and rest. In the meantime Schenck's brigade, which had left Franklin at 11 a. m. of the preceding day, had covered 34 miles in twenty-three hours and reached McDowell at 10 a. m. of the 8th, thus adding some 1,300 infantry, a battery of artillery and about 250 cavalry to Milroy's command, now in charge of the former as the senior in rank.

Informed by his scouts and skirmishers that the Confederate force was increasing and that there were indications of the moving of a flanking party, Milroy, with the approval of Schenck, at about half past three in the afternoon of the 8th, formed and moved forward a line of battle, composed of portions of his own and of Schenck's brigade, across the Bull Pasture and up the



slope of Sitlington's hill, as the part of the mountain held by Johnson was called, to seize that hill and drive the Confederates from it. A skirt of woods concealed his initial movement, but as soon as his skirmishers appeared in the bushy field, Jackson, who was still on the lookout, ordered up four regiments of Johnson's brigade which had been halted in concealment along the turnpike. He deployed the Fifty-second Virginia as skirmishers and advanced them to engage the enemy; posting in their rear, in the center of his position on the summit of the hill, the Twelfth Georgia, and on its right the Forty-fourth Virginia. The Fifty-eighth Virginia was marched to the left to support the Fifty-second. The Confederate line then formed an arc of a circle, with its convexity toward the enemy so that its right was nearly perpendicular to its left. As the Federal skirmishers, in line of battle, advancing up the mountain side, came in sight they became engaged with Johnson's skirmishers. Two Federal regiments attacked the Confederate left, advancing boldly and steadily and pushing back the skirmish line until they became engaged with the line of battle in a fierce struggle on the brow of the hill. In the meantime, Milroy had sent two Ohio and a West Virginia regiment to attack and attempt to turn the Confederate right. The two Ohio regiments vigorously attacked Johnson's right, while the West Virginia one pushed up the turnpike to accomplish the purpose for which it was sent. Anticipating such a movement, Jackson had placed the Thirty-first Virginia on the turnpike below the point where the Confederates had climbed to Sitlington's hill. The attack on Johnson's right led Jackson to withdraw the Thirty-first from guarding the turnpike and send that and the Twenty-fifth Virginia to Johnson, who placed them in support of the Forty-fourth on his right, thus extending his line not only across the field on Sitlington's hill, but down the slope of that hill northward toward the turnpike. Jackson then committed the guarding of the turnpike to the Twenty-first Virginia. Milroy next ordered two cannon and a force along the turnpike, but their attack amounted to nothing. The main contention was with Johnson's right by the combined attack of all the Federal forces that had climbed up the mountain side. Again and again were the brave attacks of the Ohio and West Virginia troops

repulsed in their efforts to drive the Confederates from the crest of the hill; the issue being joined at close quarters while the musketry firing was incessant. The Confederates had some little advantage of position, and the uneven ground, such as is characteristic of most limestone regions, gave them some advantage, but, on the other hand, facing to the west as they did, they were clearly outlined against the eastern sky, and so were plain targets for the Federals, who were themselves advancing not only up the slope but in the shadows of the waning day; consequently the Confederates suffered terribly from the long range rifles of the Federals, especially the Twelfth Georgia, which became the special object of attack, but which unflinchingly held its position and drove back its assailants.

The attack all along Johnson's line, even as extended by some of Jackson's men, indicated that the Federal leader was throwing all his force into this engagement. This led Jackson to order Taliaferro's brigade to Johnson's aid; when this reached him, he placed the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments near the center of his line, and advanced them to reinforce the gallant Twelfth Georgia, just in time to promptly meet the movement of the enemy on the Confederate right and drive it back. To still further strengthen his right, Johnson sent portions of the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia regiments to occupy an elevated piece of woods on his right and rear, thus securing a commanding position. Campbell's brigade, which Jackson had hastened toward the field of carnage, came up about this time, and that and the Tenth Virginia, from Taliaferro's rear, were also ordered to support Johnson's right in the woods down the slope of the spur toward the turnpike. These arrangements thwarted all the enemy's movements, and by securing the larger tactical force on the immediate field of action made certain the result of the conflict.

The battle lasted from half past four until half past eight of the afternoon. Every movement of the enemy was promptly met and defeated, and Johnson held firmly to his first position. Jackson had no hesitancy in leaving the immediate field of contention in charge of the hero of Alleghany mountain, but taking no chances, he located himself on the turnpike, where it crosses the top of the mountain, to watch the right, guard the roads

which were concealed from Johnson, and at the same time hurry forward reinforcements, having promptly ordered his whole army forward to meet any emergency. Late in the day General Johnson was wounded in the arm and had to retire from the field, leaving Taliaferro in immediate command. Learning from Johnson, as he was taken, badly wounded, to the rear, the condition of things on the field of battle, he quickly ordered Taliaferro, now left in command, through a staff officer, to hold his position at all hazards, and he would soon be there with the Stonewall brigade to help him, if necessary. But the conflict was then over, and Milroy had become satisfied that he was no match for his antagonist, so in the coming darkness he withdrew to McDowell and Schenck hastened to retreat toward Franklin, where he expected to meet Fremont, with the main body of his command, coming up the South Branch valley.

The Federal artillery placed on the terrace to the south of McDowell was quite active, but uselessly so, prior to the advance of its infantry, because of the elevation of the position held by the Confederates. A single gun on Hull's hill, a spur of the mountain opposite the Federal left, did a little damage but not much. The Confederates that did the fighting were five Virginia regiments and one Georgia of Johnson's brigade, and three Virginia regiments of Taliaferro's brigade, about 4,500 men. They were supported by the three Virginia regiments and the Irish battalion of Campbell's brigade, but which did not become engaged; making the Confederate force on the immediate battlefield about 6,000 men. Of these, 71 were killed and 390 wounded. Milroy's force that took part in the battle was, parts of four Ohio and two West Virginia regiments, and parts of two Ohio batteries, in all about 2,500 men, who, considering the disparity of forces, made a most determined and brave fight. Schenck reported the losses as 28 killed, 225 wounded and 3 missing.

Jackson prepared himself to renew the conflict on the morrow unless the Federals did it, arranging to have his artillery in position on Sitlington's hill by daylight and his whole army closed up and ready for action, issuing strict orders to those in advance to be on the alert to detect any movement of the enemy. Schenck, satisfied that Jackson, from his position, could very soon make

McDowell untenable, evacuated that place early in the night, after lighting his camp-fires and making a show of remaining there, and fell back during the night in the direction of Franklin.

On the morning of the 9th, Jackson sent a laconic dispatch to General Cooper, the adjutant-general of the Confederate States at Richmond, saying, "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday;" then mounting his horse at dawn, he rode in the keen and frosty air to the summit of the mountain, there to learn from officers he had sent in advance to reconnoiter that his enemy had fled. He at once took possession of McDowell and proceeded to close up and ration his men preparatory to a pursuit. Following the road to Monterey for a few miles from McDowell, Schenck turned to the northeast, by the road to Franklin, resting his wearied men for a short time when his rear guard reached the junction of the two roads on the morning of the 9th, but moving on before Jackson could close up on his rear. A retreat is easily managed in a narrow valley and through a wooded country like that which Schenck was traversing, so he was able to make Jackson's pursuit on the 10th a slow one; but the latter managed to press the Federal rear, and on the 11th came very near to it in the vicinity of Franklin, although impeded by the smoke and flames from the forests that hemmed in the road, which his crafty foe had set on fire.

During the march on the 10th, Jackson sent Captain Hotchkiss, of the engineers, to ride rapidly back to the Valley and there take a cavalry company which had been left on guard, and blockade the North river and the Dry river gaps of the Shenandoah mountain, by either of which Fremont might cross from the South Branch valley and join Banks in the Shenandoah valley, at or near Harrisonburg, Jackson's positive orders being that these roads must be blockaded by daylight of the 11th. The execution of this order required a ride of over 60 miles during the afternoon and night of the 10th, but the order was executed, and when Lincoln telegraphed to Fremont to make the move Jackson had said to his engineer he should make (although he did not think he would), the reply was, that the road was blockaded and he could not do it.

Having advanced to within two miles of Franklin and

finding Schenck in a very strong position which could only be reached by a combat at a disadvantage in a gap of the mountain, and ascertaining that Fremont was near at hand with large reinforcements, and being very desirous of getting back to the Valley to look after Banks' army, and that he might also be at hand to respond to a call from General Lee, Jackson, after resting his army, fell back toward the Valley on Monday, May 12th, leaving a company of cavalry to look after Fremont's army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men enveloped in the smoke of the burning forests, which had now become Jackson's ally instead of his foe.

Having used the previous Sunday, or a part of it, in the pursuit of his enemy, Jackson devoted the forenoon of Monday, May 12th, to Sunday observances as well as to rest, and issued the following order to his troops:

Soldiers of the Army of the Valley and Northwest: I congratulate you on your recent victory at McDowell. I request you to unite with me this morning in thanksgiving to Almighty God for thus having crowned our arms with success, and in praying that He will continue to lead you on from victory to victory until our independence shall be established and make us that people whose God is the Lord. The chaplains will hold divine service at 10 a. m. this day in their respective regiments.

Leaving the front of Franklin on the afternoon of May 12th, Jackson's army reached McDowell on the afternoon of the 14th, at about the same time that Fremont arrived in Franklin with reinforcements for Schenck, and where he remained quietly for the next ten days, leaving Jackson free to prosecute his intentions. Continuing his march from McDowell, Jackson encamped on the night of the 15th at Lebanon Springs, in the Big Calf Pasture valley, where the Warm Springs and Harrisonburg turnpike crosses the Parkersburg and Staunton turnpike, giving his troops opportunity to speculate as to his next movement while he rested there on the 16th to observe the day of fasting and prayer which had been proclaimed by the President of the Confederate States.

While on his way back from Franklin, Jackson sent a message to Ewell asking him to meet him for a conference, which took place at Mt. Solon on the evening of the next day, the 17th, on which the army marched with alacrity down the valley, its advance reaching North river, opposite Bridgewater, the troops in high spirits in anticipation of a victorious movement. Sunday, the

18th, was spent resting in camps in one of the most delightful portions of the Shenandoah valley, its charms heightened by the full flush of springtime, and in religious observances; the general himself riding to the camp of the Stonewall brigade, on the south bank of North river, where his adjutant-general, Maj. R. L. Dabney (a revered doctor of the Presbyterian church), preached a soul-stirring sermon.

Nineteen days had now elapsed since Jackson left Ewell in his old camps in the Elk Run valley. Learning that Jackson had been reinforced by Ewell, although probably not informed as to Jackson's movements to attack Fremont's advance, Banks evacuated Harrisonburg on the 1st of May and withdrew to New Market, whence, after detaching Shields' division to march toward Luray, on the way to join McDowell's "on to Richmond," he continued down the valley to Strasburg, which he proceeded to fortify, in compliance with his first orders from McClellan. Shields left New Market May 12th, after the departure of Banks, with orders to march by way of Luray and Front Royal toward Fredericksburg, taking with him about 11,000 men and leaving Banks about 8,000; of this number, the latter placed 1,000 at and near Front Royal, on May 16th, to protect the Manassas Gap railroad, the bridges of that road, and the bridges of the turnpike leading to Winchester, in that vicinity; in this also obeying McClellan's original orders.

With Fremont's large command safely disposed of at Franklin and the large force of Shields removed from the valley, Jackson found himself possessed of a larger tactic force than Banks had in hand, after he had arranged with Ewell, with the consent of General Lee, to join him in a movement on Banks, holding now the portal of the western part of the Shenandoah valley at Strasburg with the aid of defensive works.

On May 17th, the day Jackson's advance reached North river at Bridgewater and was again fairly in the Valley, with Ewell's division only some 20 miles away to the east, as the crow flies, the Federal authorities ordered McDowell to move upon Richmond, as soon as Shields' division should join him, to become the right wing of McClellan's army, now in front and in sight of that city, but always holding himself in position "to cover the cap-

ital of the nation against the sudden dash by any large body of the rebel forces."

On the morning of the 19th, Jackson advanced to the vicinity of Harrisonburg, and on the 20th continued to near New Market, a portion of Ewell's command, which had marched around the southwest end of the Massanutton mountains, joining him on the way while the rest of his division marched down the eastern, or Page valley, to opposite New Market. Ashby, under instructions, demonstrated all along Banks' front, which held the line of Pugh's run with cavalry pickets, below Woodstock, while Jackson proceeded, with urgent expedition to maneuver Banks from his position at Strasburg by capturing his exposed left at Front Royal, and, that turned, reaching his rear somewhere between Strasburg and Winchester. The great Massanutton chain not only screened, but absolutely concealed and protected this movement.

On the 21st, Jackson crossed the Massanuttons by the turnpike leading from New Market to Luray, and being joined on the road by the portion of Ewell's division that had followed down the eastern valley, he, with between 16,000 and 17,000 men and 48 guns, encamped that evening on the South Fork of the Shenandoah. On the 22d, with Ewell in advance, he marched quietly, but rapidly, down the Luray valley and bivouacked his advance within 10 miles of Front Royal.

On Friday morning, May 23d, the cavalry of Ashby and Flournoy, which had preceded the army, crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah at McCoy's ford, and, following along the eastern foot of the Massanuttons by a road between that mountain and the river, soon reached a fork of the road, where it divided into two bodies, one under Flournoy proceeding down between the rivers to capture the bridges at the fork and prevent a retreat of the Federals at Front Royal toward Winchester, while the other under Ashby, moving farther to the left, was to cut the railroad and telegraph at Buckton, between Front Royal and Strasburg, thus breaking communication between those places and preventing the sending of reinforcements to the latter. In order to flank the enemy's position at Front Royal, concerning which he was well informed through Ashby's local scouts, and prevent a retreat eastward across the Blue ridge, Jackson, when

his advance reached Asbury chapel on the river road,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Front Royal, turned the head of his main body eastward, by a by-road up the slope of the Blue ridge, until he reached the turnpike leading from Gooney Manor to Front Royal, which was well up on the side of the mountain and led into the eastern side of the town. That road reached, the head of his column, consisting of the First Maryland Confederate regiment and a Louisiana battalion, supported by Taylor's Louisiana brigade, advanced rapidly into and through the town to the camp of the Federal forces which were mainly Maryland troops with two pieces of artillery, on a hill between Front Royal and the Shenandoah, overlooking the forks of the river and near the railway and turnpike bridges which they were specially guarding. Two companies of cavalry had just arrived from Strasburg in time to resist the Confederate advance. The Federal opposition was spirited, but being attacked in front by the force that first reached them, and then in flank by one that Ewell had turned to the left from his command, and discovering the advance of Flournoy's Confederate cavalry between the rivers that would soon block his way toward Winchester, Colonel Kenly, the Federal commander, abandoned his position before the infantry closed down upon him, and retreated across the two rivers, firing his camp and attempting to fire the bridges. The Confederates pressed him so closely that he did but little damage to the bridge over the South Fork, but did sufficient to that over the North Fork to check the pursuit. Having gained the commanding bluff of Guard hill, beyond the rivers, which the road to Winchester crosses, Kenly attempted to further check the Confederate advance with the artillery that he had brought off, but Flournoy's cavalry soon dashed through the river, after a few shots from a Confederate battery had driven off the Federal artillery, and continued the pursuit. Covering his retreat with two companies of New York cavalry, Kenly hurried toward Winchester. With invincible ardor Flournoy pressed after him with his four companies of cavalry, charged and routed Kenly's cavalry rear guard, and came upon the rear of his infantry, which he found drawn up on either side of the road with his artillery in the road to meet him. Jackson had joined in the pursuit, and,



inspired by his presence and enthusiastic bearing, Flournoy did not hesitate to attack the enemy's artillery and infantry in position, but dashed upon and routed them. They rallied again and made a gallant stand in an orchard in the rear of the position from which they had been driven; but this stand was in vain; they had become thoroughly demoralized and so magnified Flournoy's troopers into an army of horsemen, when they dashed among them with the assurance of victory and scattered them, in wild disorder, but taking most of them prisoners when they threw down their arms and surrendered. Reinforced by the coming of two more of his companies, Flournoy pushed the pursuit to within four miles of Winchester, capturing one gun near the fighting ground and soon after the wagon train and the other gun, abandoned in the road, sending the latter back with two plough horses taken from a farmer's field.

The victory was complete. A large quantity of stores was captured in Front Royal; the Federal camp was taken; the wagon bridges across the two rivers were saved for the passage of the Confederate army and its trains and artillery, and 904 of the enemy made the list of killed, wounded and captured, while the Confederate loss was but 26 killed and wounded. Ashby's movement had been successful, he having reached Buckton before the enemy were aware of the move on Front Royal, and cut the telegraph and railway, capturing the block-house guarding that station, after a spirited resistance, his attacking party being the troopers from that immediate vicinity; his attack turned back a train of cars, which was captured near Front Royal.

Late in the day Jackson established headquarters at Cedarville, some 5 miles from Front Royal on the road to Winchester, near the scene of the last conflict between Flournoy and Kenly, where a country road leaves the Front Royal and Winchester pike and leads to the Valley turnpike at Middletown, some 8 miles in the rear of Banks' position at Strasburg, which he was firmly holding in anticipation of a front attack while Jackson was successfully turning his left, at Front Royal, routing and capturing his men and cutting his communications with Manassas and Washington, concerning which he had no information until after nightfall, attaching but little importance to the message which Kenly sent

him by a courier, informing him that an overwhelming force had descended from the Blue ridge on his position at Front Royal. Jackson and his staff slept near the picket line, on the ground in the front yard of McCoy's house at Cedarville, while his army bivouacked along the road between that place and Front Royal.

By the dawn of Saturday, May 24th, Jackson was on the alert, pushing his cavalry scouts forward toward Winchester and to points along the Valley turnpike between that place and Middletown, dispatching his topographical engineer toward the latter place to find out the movements of the enemy. That officer soon struck the Federal pickets, within less than a mile of where Jackson had bivouacked, and following after these with cavalry, infantry and artillery that he had successively sent for, he reached the vicinity of Middletown early in the day in time to cut Banks' retreating column just as Jackson himself came up with a larger force, which he formed into two bodies, one pushing after Banks' men retreating toward Winchester, and the other following those that fell back toward Strasburg when they found their line of march interrupted at Middletown. This latter body destroyed the bridge as they crossed Cedar creek, thus checking the Confederate pursuit, and then hastened through Strasburg and retreated by the Strasburg and Capon road and by the Winchester and Capon road, through the mountains to Winchester, which they reached during the night. These disposed of, Jackson reunited his men and pressed toward Winchester, having ordered Ewell's division forward along the Front Royal and Winchester road on which he was constantly coming nearer and nearer to Banks' line of retreat, as that road and the Valley turnpike converged toward Winchester. Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart, who had been temporarily placed in command of the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, was sent in advance of Ewell to Newtown, 8 miles from Winchester, to observe the enemy's movements. There he attacked the flank of Banks' retreat and made some captures of prisoners, wagons and ambulances.

Banks, now fully realizing his perilous situation, and alarmed at the rapid and incomprehensible movements of Jackson, and realizing that his only safety was in flight, retreated, pressed in rear and flank, as rapidly as

possible toward Winchester, making vigorous efforts to ward off the Confederate attacks; constantly strengthening his rear guard and right flank for that purpose, ordering back, among others, a New York and a Massachusetts regiment, under the brave Col. George Gordon, an intimate classmate of Jackson at West Point, with two sections of artillery, from Bartonsville to Newtown. Gordon checked the confusion in the rear and boldly drove back the Confederate advance, aided by the considerable cavalry force that General Hatch brought around the Confederate left to his assistance. Apprised of the near presence of Ewell on his right flank and that the Federal infantry cut off at Strasburg had escaped, Gordon fell back from Newtown at dusk, steadily resisting Jackson's pursuit, burning loaded commissary wagons and a pontoon train in and beyond Newtown, and reaching Winchester about midnight, leaving the Second Massachusetts infantry as a rear guard. With this Jackson, with regiment after regiment of the Stonewall brigade, contended during all the night, its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, taking advantage of the darkness and of the stone fences along the turnpike, hotly and courageously disputed every mile of the way with Jackson's advance, led by that indomitable leader in person, who was anxious to occupy the heights overlooking Winchester before dawn of the next day. Ewell, keeping even pace with Jackson's movements, but rather in advance of them, brought his command, on the Front Royal road, to within two or three miles of Winchester, then bivouacked along that road, thus preventing any retreat of Banks to the eastward. Stuart's cavalry moved still farther to the right and occupied the roads leading to Millwood and Berryville from Winchester.


Banks was in a state of uncertainty, until he reached Winchester, as to what had actually happened to him; but soon learning that all of his detachments had been routed and that a large force was pressing after his main column, he became satisfied that Jackson was upon him with overwhelming numbers; and although the day before he had concluded that his safety lay "in a foot race," he decided, on the morning of May 25th, that he would stand an attack "to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision." He had at Winchester about 6,400 men for duty, including infantry,

MAP OF ROUTE  
OF  
THE ARMY OF THE VALLEY  
FROM  
FRANKLIN, PENDLETON CO., VA.,  
May 15<sup>th</sup>, 1862,  
TO THE  
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER,  
May 25<sup>th</sup>, 1862,  
AND THE  
PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY.  
BY  
JED. HOTCHKISS, Act. Top. Eng. V.D.,  
1863.

Scale of Miles.



Route of Army





cavalry and artillery, while Jackson, by his magnificent strategy, was confronting him with a tactic force of near 15,000 of all arms.

Banks selected a fine defensive position in front of Winchester. The gallant Gordon, with his brave New Englanders and western men and one Pennsylvania regiment, was placed by Banks on a low ridge, sloping gently to the south but abruptly to the north, just in front of the town, with its left on the Valley turnpike and its right extending westward along the ascending ridge in front of Winchester, while skirmishers were thrown out in advance and guns were placed on either flank. Hatch's cavalry supported the center. Donnelly's brigade, of Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania troops, was placed on the left of the turnpike and extended around to the eastward of Winchester, covering the Front Royal and Millwood roads, with eight pieces of artillery in a commanding position; the Federal line, forming the arc of a circle, covering Winchester from the west around by the south to the east.

Jackson, personally, had with his Valley men pressed, with all the energy at his command, the pursuit of the Federal army, and just at dawn he discovered the coveted position in front of Winchester occupied by the enemy. He promptly ordered Winder, of the Stonewall brigade, to drive them from this position as speedily as possible, first taking possession of a commanding crest in the enemy's front, from which Gordon promptly moved the Second Massachusetts further to his right to lengthen his line and guard against the threatened flank attack. Jackson massed his abundant artillery and opened fire on the Federal guns in place, extended his left by ordering up Taylor with his Louisianians, who, passing behind Winder, formed on his left, overlapping the Federal right. He sent the Tenth Virginia to extend Taylor's line still further to the left, and the Twenty-third to promptly strengthen his right. This formidable battle array soon moved forward, regardless of the enemy's destructive fire of musketry and artillery, swept them from the crest of the hill down the steep to the northward and across the fields and through the town of Winchester, bearing down all opposition, cheered forward by old men and matrons, maidens and children who crowded the sides of the streets as the Confederate

veterans swept through them in pursuit of the retreating Federals. Jackson, cap in hand, dashed to the front, cheering as wildly as the men that followed him, and when cautioned that he was rushing into the midst of the retreating foe, said to the officer who cautioned him, "Go back, and tell the whole army to press forward to the Potomac," in utter forgetfulness of the fact that that army had been fighting and marching almost without rest for the past thirty hours.

Ewell was not standing idly by while this contest was raging. He had encamped in the immediate presence of the enemy, and when daylight came, on the 25th, he moved forward, and at 5 a. m. his North Carolinians, under Kirkland, boldly dashed on Donnelly's line, stretched across the Front Royal road. These met with a hot reception, for the Federals were posted behind stone fences at right angles to the road, and Kirkland was forced to retire with a large loss in killed and wounded; but in the meantime Col. B. T. Johnson, with the First Maryland, moved forward between the Front Royal road and the Valley turnpike and turned Donnelly's right, while the Twenty-first Georgia turned his left, and by an enfilade fire routed him from behind the stone fences. Donnelly took a new line, nearer the town, but at Trimble's suggestion, Ewell sent the Sixteenth Mississippi and the Fifteenth Alabama, the remainder of Trimble's brigade, still farther to the right, threatening Donnelly's flank and rear just as Jackson's men broke in wild triumph over the Federal center and right. These movements caused the entire Federal line to give way and retreat, as rapidly as possible, toward Martinsburg, between 8 and 9 a. m. Elzey's brigade shared in the attack by obeying Jackson's order and following the Valley turnpike through the town as the enemy gave way on each side. At first the Federals fell back in very good order, but they were thrown into confusion in passing through the town, from which they were unable to rally, especially as Jackson's pursuit with his infantry was quick and vigorous, while his artillery promptly took advantage of favorable positions and shelled the retreating enemy.

Never was there a better opportunity for capturing the remnant of an army and all of its artillery and wagons that had started in retreat, if a well organized and well

led cavalry force were at hand to reap the fruits of victory; but, unfortunately, such was not the condition of Jackson's cavalry at that time. Ashby's poorly disciplined cavalry had been diverted and demoralized by the tempting sutlers' and other stores that had been scattered along the Valley turnpike by Banks' retreating army, many of them being unable to resist the temptation to secure many things that they had long been in need of and which, now to be had for the taking, they hastened to appropriate and conceal, thus greatly depleting his command. Ashby himself, with the few faithful men who had remained with him, had ridden to the enemy's right to prevent their retreat by way of Berryville to Harper's Ferry, hoping to capture a part of Banks' force by so doing. This movement delayed him so that he did not reach the Martinsburg road and join Steuart in the pursuit, some 10 or 12 miles beyond Winchester, after Banks had passed that point. Steuart, with the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, was under the immediate command of Ewell and led the advance of his movement. When he was ordered by Jackson, through one of his aides, to pursue the retreating Federals, he refused to do so until ordered by General Ewell, and so much time was lost and Banks had made considerable distance in his rapid retreat before Steuart took up the pursuit, which accomplished but little except that he captured a large quantity of stores at Martinsburg, 20 miles beyond Winchester, where Banks had halted for an hour or two before he continued his retreat to the Potomac, at Williamsport, which he reached about sundown, after having fought the battle of Winchester and marched 34 miles during daylight of the 25th. The next morning he crossed the Potomac with two-thirds of his previous command in a thoroughly disorganized condition, thankful that he was safe from the blows of his sturdy antagonist.

Jackson's immediate victory was a glorious one, even if he had not accomplished all that his ardent desires and unconquerable energy thought desirable. In two days he had driven his enemy, that in fancied security dreamed he had permanent possession of the lower valley of the Shenandoah, nearly 60 miles from Front Royal and Strasburg to the Potomac, and freed the valley of his presence. He had captured immense military stores of



all kinds; had sent to the rear some 2,300 prisoners, besides leaving enough in hospitals to make a total Federal loss of 3,050; while his own loss was less than 400 in killed, wounded and missing, the killed being but 68. But this is a narrow view of the results accomplished with a force only about one-fourth that of his enemy in the strategic field. The wider and more important result was that affecting the movements of the entire Federal army in and near Virginia. On May 23d, the day Jackson struck Banks' left at Front Royal, President Lincoln visited McDowell at Fredericksburg, and wired McClellan on the 24th that Shields, with his 10,000 men, had joined McDowell, and that on the following Monday, the 26th, the 40,000 men of his command would march from Fredericksburg to reinforce McClellan's right in front of Richmond. Returning to Washington the night of the 23d, he heard of the attack on Front Royal. The next day more alarming intelligence came, and Fremont was ordered, by telegraph, to move from Franklin to Harrisonburg, to intercept Jackson and capture or destroy his forces, and so relieve Banks; McDowell was ordered to lay aside his movement on Richmond and put 20,000 men in motion for the Shenandoah valley, to capture Jackson, either with or without the co-operation of Fremont, informing McClellan of these orders at 4 p. m. of the 24th, adding, "the enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry." On the 25th the alarm at Washington increased as Jackson drove Banks from Winchester, and Lincoln again telegraphed McClellan: "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly." Later, on the same day, he again telegraphed: "Banks ran a race with the rebels, beating them into Winchester yesterday morning. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout."

The news of Banks' defeat caused the Federal government to call upon all the loyal States for all their militia and other troops, to be forwarded immediately to Washington, and an order was issued taking military possession of all the railways in the United States for the transportation of these troops. The alarm

at Washington produced an almost indescribable panic throughout the North, on Sunday the 25th and for several days thereafter. The governor of Massachusetts, at 11 p. m. of the 25th, ordered the whole active militia of that State to report on Boston Common the next day, "to oppose with fierce zeal and courageous patriotism the progress of the foe." The governor of Ohio proclaimed, on the same day, "The seat of our beloved government is threatened with invasion, and I am called upon by the secretary of war for troops to repel and overwhelm the reckless invaders." In consequence of Jackson's movements threatening to pass through the gateway of the Potomac and attack Washington, a half million men, within twenty-four hours after the issue of Lincoln's proclamation, offered themselves for the defense of the Federal capital. McClellan's plans were all disconcerted, and although he protested against the detachment of McDowell to intercept Jackson, claiming that it could lead to no results because of his distance from the field of operations, his protests were of no avail, and McDowell's march toward the Valley began while McClellan stood hesitating on the banks of the Chickahominy, and the plans of the army of the Potomac, in all of its departments, were thoroughly demoralized by the boldness and results of Jackson's grand strategic movements.

Jackson's infantry followed after Banks, on Sunday the 25th, as far as Stephenson's, five miles beyond Winchester, when he handed over the pursuit to the cavalry and ordered his wearied men into camp, taking up his own headquarters in Winchester, whose citizens, mostly women, had first put out the fires which the retreating Federals kindled in the warehouses where their great army stores, including gunpowder and explosive shells, were accumulated, and then cared for the wounded and buried the dead.

A Sabbath having been appropriated in the pursuit of Banks, Jackson ordered the observance of the 26th as a day of rest and devotion, issuing this stirring order:

Within four weeks this army has made long and rapid marches, fought six combats and two battles, signally defeating the enemy in each one, captured several stands of colors and pieces of artillery, with numerous prisoners, and vast medical, ordnance and army stores; and finally driven the boastful foe, which was ravaging our beautiful country, into utter rout.

The general commanding would warmly express to the officers and men of his command his joy in their achievements, and his thanks for their brilliant gallantry in action and their patient obedience under the hardships of forced marches, often more painful to the brave soldier than the dangers of battle. The explanation of the severe exertions to which the commanding general called the army, which were endured by them with such cheerful confidence in him, is now given in the victory of yesterday. He receives this proof of their confidence in the past with pride and gratitude, and only asks a similar confidence in the future.

But his chief duty to-day, and that of the army, is to recognize devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence in the brilliant successes of the last three days (which have given us the results of a great victory without great losses), and to make oblation of our thanks to God for His mercies to us and our country in heartfelt acts of religious worship. For this purpose the troops will remain in camp to-day, suspending as far as possible all military exercises; and the chaplains of regiments will hold divine service in their several charges at 4 o'clock p. m.

It is noteworthy that after this battle of Winchester there was inaugurated a humanitarian movement, in reference to surgeons left in charge of wounded prisoners, that has since become the rule among civilized nations engaged in war. Immediately after Banks was driven out of Winchester, Dr. Hunter McGuire, the medical director of the army of the Valley district, visited the Federal hospital, which had been established in the old Union hotel, where he found among the captured prisoners eight Federal surgeons or assistant surgeons. He reported this fact to General Jackson, and asked his permission to unconditionally release these medical officers upon their parole of honor that they would remain in charge of the Federal sick and wounded in Winchester for fifteen days, after which, by the terms of their paroles, they would be permitted to report to their commanding officers for duty. It was further understood that these surgeons should use every effort to have released, on the same terms, the medical officers of the Confederate States who were then held as prisoners by the Federal government, or who might thereafter be captured.

General Jackson readily assented to Surgeon McGuire's proposition, and directed him to carry out his suggestions. Accompanied by Dr. Daniel B. Conrad, of the Second Virginia regiment, he then went to the Federal hospital and released, on their paroles, the surgeons, assistant surgeons, attendants and nurses, but not the sick and wounded, who were afterward paroled by the regular

officers of the army, not to take up arms again until properly exchanged. General Jackson issued no regular order to perform this duty, but he frequently discussed with Dr. McGuire, subsequently, the policy and humanity of such a measure. This rule established, by this precedent, was kept up by Dr. McGuire during his term of service as medical director with Generals Jackson, Ewell, Early, and Gordon, with whom he successively served as medical director until the close of the war. Near the end of February, 1864, some Confederate scouts captured the medical inspector of Sheridan's army in the Valley. Dr. McGuire promptly released him on his parole, and returned him to his command. About a week after that, Dr. McGuire was captured in the defeat of Early at Waynesboro, when General Sheridan promptly released him on the same terms he had accorded to his medical inspector. In consequence of this action of General Jackson and Dr. McGuire, a number of Confederate surgeons were released and sent back from Northern prisons.

The Confederates had another day of well-earned rest on May 27th, while Jackson was busy providing for the safety of the vast military stores he had captured at Front Royal, Winchester and Martinsburg, and waiting for instructions from Richmond, in response to dispatches he had sent by a trusty aide immediately after the capture of Winchester, as to his future operations. He had now shown the character of his military genius and established his fame as an independent commander. He had relieved Richmond from the danger of an immediate attack by the overwhelming force of the army of the Potomac, and the authorities were only too willing to direct him to press the enemy still hovering in the defense of Harper's Ferry, threaten an invasion of Maryland and an attack upon Washington, and thus still further derange the plans of McClellan by stimulating the fears of the Federal authorities and inducing them to deplete the army of the Potomac for the defense of their capital.

Ashby's tireless and everywhere-watching spies and scouts kept Jackson informed as to the movements of the enemy, and he quickly divined their plans for intercepting his way of retreat up the Valley, should the necessity arise for so doing; but his cardinal rule of action in military, as well as in other matters, was to "take no counsel

of his fears," therefore, early on the morning of the 28th he dispatched Winder with four regiments and two batteries toward Charlestown by the direct road. Nearing Charlestown and learning that the enemy held that place in force, he notified Jackson, who promptly ordered Ewell to move in the same direction. A small Federal force had been holding Harper's Ferry, but when the defeat of Banks became known, troops were hurried by rail to that point from all directions, and by the morning of the 28th, 7,000 men and 18 cannon had been collected there, under the command of General Saxton, who at once occupied the commanding plateau of Bolivar heights, in front of that place, and located a formidable battery on Maryland heights, across the Potomac in its rear, which, from its still more commanding position, dominated nearly all the approaches from the Virginia way to Bolivar heights and Harper's Ferry. Finding that it was only a reconnaissance that had advanced to Charlestown, Winder pressed forward and drove the enemy back to Bolivar heights, where Saxton had drawn up his main body in line of battle. Seeing he could accomplish nothing more, Winder fell back to Charlestown and went into camp, having marched 21 miles and had an engagement with the enemy during the day. There Ewell joined him after dark and Jackson in person, with the main body of his army, during the next day, when he made a demonstration against Bolivar heights and sent a part of his infantry force to Loudoun heights. Saxton, being informed that Jackson was crossing a division over the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, moved a part of his infantry force to Maryland heights to defend his rear, and withdrew his line in front of Harper's Ferry to the crest of the plateau nearest that town, thus not only shortening his line, but securing protection from his own batteries on Maryland heights which could fire over his men at an approaching enemy.

Jackson having accomplished the object of his advance to Harper's Ferry, which was to gain time for the removal of the captured stores from Winchester, was now ready to extricate his army from the seemingly perilous position into which he had brought it, a position which induced the Federal commanders, who were seeking to intercept his line of retreat, to say to their men, to stimulate their marching ability, that they now had Jackson in a bottle, and all they had to do was to be in time

to close it with a stopper, at Strasburg, and so end the war. They had not yet learned that Jackson was not to be caught by any combination of movements they could bring about, for while it was true that he only had about 15,000 men to meet the 60,000 that were concentrating toward his rear, he knew the strategic advantages that the great flank-protecting bulwarks of the mountains placed at his disposal farther up the Valley, and had no doubt of his ability to reach these, avail himself of their impregnable protection of his flanks, and at the same time divide the strategic forces of his enemy and enable him to meet them on his own grounds with superior tactical strength. While demonstrating in front of Harper's Ferry, Jackson was definitely informed on the morning of Friday, May 30th, that Fremont was marching his 15,000 men down the South Branch valley to Moorefield and had there turned toward Strasburg, and that his advance had reached 10 miles east of Moorefield, where he halted the 29th to rest his army, and on the 30th had moved to the western foot of the Shenandoah mountain, to within some 20 miles of Strasburg, and that McDowell's advance was already crossing the Blue ridge and not far from Front Royal. Thus advised of the strategic situation, Jackson, on the morning of the 30th, ordered all his troops back to Winchester except Winder's brigade, the First Maryland, and a body of cavalry which he left to continue threatening Harper's Ferry. After dinner at the home of Major Hawks, his chief commissary in Charlestown, he took the railway train which he had captured at Winchester, and with most of his staff rode back to that town, reaching it late in the afternoon of the 30th, where he received intelligence that McDowell's advance had that morning reached Front Royal and surprised the Twelfth Georgia, which had been left there to guard the captured stores and the bridges across the Shenandoah, and that he was now in force at that town, within 12 miles of Strasburg by the direct road leading past the northern end of the Massanutton mountains. Fremont had reached Wardensville, 20 miles from Strasburg, and had telegraphed Lincoln that he would enter that place by 5 p. m. of Saturday, May 31st. The main body of Jackson's army had marched 25 miles on the 30th and encamped in the vicinity of Winchester, 20 miles from Strasburg; Winder's brigade had spent most of the

day skirmishing with the Federals at Harper's Ferry and collecting his men together, and late in the afternoon had encamped near Halltown, some 43 miles from Strasburg by way of Winchester.

Fully apprised by Ashby of the movements of the enemy and of the points which they had reached in marching from opposite directions toward Strasburg, Jackson prepared with the utmost calmness to meet the threatening emergency. At 10 that night he dispatched Captain Hotchkiss, of his staff, to Harper's Ferry, with orders to bring Winder's force to Strasburg with the utmost dispatch, informing him of the points reached by Fremont and McDowell at that time, and saying that he would remain at Winchester as long as he could. To the question of Captain Hotchkiss as to what he should do if he found Winchester occupied by the enemy before reaching that place, Jackson replied, with a wave of his hand to the westward, "Come 'round through the mountains." Winder was reached at an early hour and hastened to bring in his pickets, some of which were across the Shenandoah on Loudoun heights, and then marched rapidly, passing through Winchester late in the afternoon, to the vicinity of Newtown, within about 10 miles of Strasburg, where he encamped after dark after a march of 28 miles for the main body, and of 35 miles for a portion of the brigade. Early on the morning of the 31st, Jackson put everything in motion from Winchester for Strasburg. The 2,300 Federal prisoners marched first, guarded by the Twenty-first Virginia; then followed, in double column, 7 miles of wagons loaded with captured stores and the ordnance and supplies of the army, the main body of which followed these, and the whole reached and passed through Strasburg late in the afternoon and the army bivouacked just beyond, in line of battle, within the portal of the narrow western valley of the Shenandoah, with its flanks safely guarded by the Massanuttons on the right and the North mountains on the left, and ready to meet either the advance of Fremont from the northeast or that of McDowell from the southeast, or of both combined; well satisfied that in such a strong defensive position he could easily defeat any force they could bring against him.

The next morning, Sunday, June 1st, the heavy rain-

storm that had been prevailing the previous day passed by, and the encouraging and cheerful sun gladdened Jackson's men who were resting at Strasburg, and helped Winder's men in their early march to the same place, which they reached about noon and passed to the rear of their comrades, who in line of battle had been waiting for them. Maj. John Alexander Harman, Jackson's tireless quartermaster, was busy all day pushing the great wagon train to the rear, while those in charge of the Federal prisoners made a full day's march in the same direction. Fremont's advance did not put in an appearance in front of Strasburg until late in the afternoon, Ashby having contested the way in a series of remarkable engagements, in which hundreds contended with thousands, impeding the enemy's progress and keeping them within the mountains until Jackson had safely passed his trains and his collected army to beyond Strasburg.

Once in the valley where he could deploy his forces, Fremont drove in the cavalry, but Jackson supported these with Ewell and other troops, who repulsed the Federal attack and induced Fremont to withdraw to the rear, where he remained idle the rest of the day, fearful of results if he should bring on a general engagement with Jackson while he was not certain of any support from McDowell, whose advance, instead of marching directly to Strasburg as ordered, had by mistake taken the road toward Winchester from Front Royal, and so did not appear upon the scene during the day, except a cavalry brigade under Bayard, which took the direct road to Strasburg, but failed to reach it in time to be of any assistance to Fremont.

It is interesting to pause for a moment and review the movements of the past three days. Friday morning Jackson was 50 miles from Strasburg, in front of Harper's Ferry; Fremont was at Moorefield, 38 miles from Strasburg, with the head of his army 10 miles in advance; the main body of Shields' division of McDowell's army was not more than 20 miles from Strasburg, for his advance had entered Front Royal, but 12 miles away, before midday, while McDowell, in person, was following with two divisions close in his rear; yet, by Sunday night Jackson, encumbered with prisoners and a long train of captured stores, had marched between 50 and 60 miles,



reached Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and passed safely between their converging armies, holding Fremont at bay on the left by an offer of battle, and blinding and bewildering McDowell on the right by the celerity and secrecy of his movements.

Retiring on the afternoon of June 1st from the front of Strasburg, Jackson withdrew to Woodstock, 12 miles, for the night, his cavalry holding the rear four miles from Strasburg, followed by a small party of Federal cavalry, which it repulsed in a slight engagement. Fremont bivouacked on the Capon road, on the line of battle he had chosen, and only entered Strasburg the next morning at about the same time that Bayard's cavalry reached there from Front Royal. Ordering these to take the advance, Fremont followed after Jackson with quite a display of vigor. McDowell held one division of his troops at Front Royal and started another, under Shields, up the valley of the South Fork, to co-operate with Fremont in his pursuit of Jackson. The latter concluding, from what he could learn, that a Federal force was moving up the Luray or South Fork valley, dispatched a small body of cavalry under Captain Boswell, of the engineers, by way of New Market, to burn the three remaining bridges across the South Fork, thus destroying the possibility of a junction between Fremont and Shields either at New Market or near Luray, owing to the swollen condition of the South Fork as well as of the other streams in the valley, in consequence of the heavy and almost continuous rains that characterized that season.

Jackson's strategy had now brought all the Federal forces in the Valley or on either side of it into the lower valley. Banks, with the shattered remnant of his army, was still resting at Williamsport. Saxton, with his 7,000, made a show of following after Winder, but soon returned to his safe quarters at Harper's Ferry. Fremont and McDowell had failed to combine before Strasburg, and now they feared to do so and leave either the eastern or the western valley open, and so each was pursuing his own way up the Valley, Fremont following after Jackson, and Shields following an objective the location of which he did not know, and that Jackson knew he could not reach with his army closed up, through the mud and quicksands of the road leading up the South Fork valley, such as Jackson had encountered on his way to McDowell.

The military problem for Jackson, as it now presented itself, was to get his trains and prisoners safely to Staunton and find an opportunity to defeat his oncoming foes separately, before they could form a junction in the vicinity of Harrisonburg. The grand bulwark of the Massanuttons had divided them, and it was for him now to conquer and dispose of them. Knowing the road difficulties in the way of Shields, Jackson felt secure in falling back leisurely up the great macadam road leading to Staunton. On the 2d he reached Mt. Jackson. Bayard's cavalry force, which had not yet had a taste of Ashby's tactics, pressed with unusual vigor on Jackson's rear guard, which broke and was thrown into some confusion; but Ashby promptly rallied his men behind the bushes and fences, and with the help of an infantry regiment that filed to the roadside, sent the Federals back in confusion. On the 3d, Jackson retired to New Market, Ashby destroying the bridge across the North Fork of the Shenandoah near Mt. Jackson as he fell back, checking Fremont there for a day. From his camp near New Market, Jackson sent Captain Hotchkiss in the night to the peak at the southwestern end of the Massanuttons, accompanied by signal men, to watch the movements of the two Federal armies from that commanding height and report their progress to Jackson as he marched up the valley. Harrisonburg was reached before midday of the 5th, and a cavalry force was promptly sent to destroy the bridge across the South Fork at Conrad's store, by which Shields had hoped to cross and join Fremont near Harrisonburg, thus anticipating the arrival of Federal cavalry which Shields had hastened forward to seize that bridge and which was already near at hand when Jackson's men fired it. There was now but one bridge left across the swollen South Fork, that over its North river fork at Port Republic.

Sending his sick and wounded on to Staunton, Jackson tarried at Harrisonburg with his rear guard till about midday of the 6th, being kept constantly informed by Captain Hotchkiss from the peak signal station. He then left the Valley turnpike and retired toward Port Republic, that he might place himself on the shortest line of communication with General Lee, through Brown's gap, which he had crossed when starting for McDowell a little more than a month before. Upon the approach

of a body of Fremont's cavalry under Sir Percy Wyndham, an English soldier of fortune, Ashby followed the infantry toward Port Republic, halting in a body of woods on a ridge about two miles south from the Valley turnpike. Wyndham moved through Harrisonburg at a rapid trot and followed after Ashby, having in hand about 800 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York and Connecticut cavalry. He advanced some little distance, but seeing no enemy, halted and sent skirmishers ahead. These returned after some time and reported no force of the enemy visible. Impatient and fearing that he had lost an opportunity to capture Ashby, a job he was said to have undertaken, Wyndham again pushed forward contrary to his orders, and soon discovered the Confederate cavalry drawn up across the road, but with its flanks concealed in the woods and in a field of standing grain. Making an impetuous dash on these forces, the Federals were met by volleys in front and on their flanks, and were quickly thrown into confusion and retreat, Sir Percy himself, in a remarkable personal encounter with Captain Conrad of Ashby's staff, and 63 of his men being taken prisoners.

General Ewell, whose command was next to Ashby, coming back at the sound of this engagement, responded to a call for infantry by sending back Johnson's First Maryland and Letcher's Fifty-eighth Virginia, Ashby rightly concluding that the Federal attack would be renewed. This was soon done, and General Bayard, with the Bucktail rifles, the First Pennsylvania cavalry, and Cluseret's brigade of the Sixtieth Ohio and the Eighth West Virginia infantry, was ordered forward, the first to attack the Confederates and the second to hold the farther end of the town and its approaches. The Ohio and West Virginia regiments and the Pennsylvania Bucktails moved forward and attacked the Confederates in a fierce combat, especially with the Fifty-eighth Virginia, which they had approached under cover of a heavy rail fence. Seeing his men waver, Ashby galloped to the front and ordered them to charge. At that moment his horse fell, mortally wounded, and leaping from his saddle he shouted, "Charge, men! For God's sake, Charge!" waving his sword, when a bullet pierced him in the breast and he fell dead. The Virginians heeded the command of their dying general and rushed upon the front of the foe,

while the Marylanders dashed upon their flank. The Federals gave way under this courageous attack and the Confederates gained the fence which they had occupied, and from that poured volleys into the retreating mass until it got beyond musket range. The Federal left had, in the meantime, driven in the Confederate skirmishers, but the defeat of the right forced that to retreat also. The Bucktails left their commander in the hands of the Confederates, and lost 55 out of the 125 that went into action. The Federals retired to Harrisonburg and the Confederate guard followed the army toward Port Republic.

Jackson and his army, as well as the whole South, mourned the loss of the brave, high-minded and noble Ashby, who had just been promoted, at the instance of his commander, brigadier-general, in command of the cavalry of the Valley. Capable and able officers succeeded him, but none was found who could take his place in guarding the outposts or holding back, with a handful of men and a few pieces of artillery, the advance of a whole army of the enemy miles in the rear of the main body of the army of the Valley district. He was the idol of his men and the beloved of every one who had the honor of knowing him intimately. His exploits have been embalmed in song and story, and his memory lives with that of Stonewall Jackson.

Jackson's army enjoyed a well-earned and much-needed rest on the 6th and 7th beside the bright waters and in the green pastures and park-like forests along the road between Cross Keys, where Ewell held the rear, and the north bank of the rivers at Port Republic, where the advance encamped, the surplus trains having crossed the North river and gone into camp just beyond Port Republic between the rivers and on the road to Staunton. A small cavalry force scouted down the river, watching Shields' slow and toilsome progress over the road through which Jackson had so lately floundered for nearly three days. Jackson established his headquarters at Port Republic, on the line of communication with Staunton and with General Lee by way of Mechum River.

Fremont having ascertained that the rear of Jackson's army was in position near Cross Keys, about six miles from Harrisonburg on the road to Port Republic, and having concentrated his army, gave orders to advance on

Sunday morning, June 8th, and attack the Confederates. Ewell had made an excellent disposition of his division on opposite sides of the road, on rising ground behind a creek that ran along his front, and with his flanks extending into forests on either side, placing batteries in the road in his center, which swept the open country between him and the Keezletown road, which ran nearly parallel to his line of battle, and along which Fremont deployed his five brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry and several batteries. Another brigade followed his trains as rear guard. Bayard's cavalry, left as a guard at Harrisonburg, subsequently joined him. His entire force present for duty on the field of battle was about 11,500 men. To resist these, Ewell had Trimble's brigade of North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi regiments; Elzey's, of three Virginia and one Georgia regiment; Steuart's, of one Maryland and three Virginia regiments; Taylor's, of four Louisiana regiments and a Louisiana battalion; besides five companies of artillery; about 5,000 present for duty on the field of action.

Ewell's first position was nearly at right angles to Fremont's; his right rested on the road to Port Republic, about a mile from Cross Keys, thence his line extended nearly parallel to the Port Republic road to within half a mile of Cross Keys, with his left retired. Fremont advanced his left, turning on his right, and brought his whole line into position, parallel to Ewell's, on the hills northeast of Mill creek, protecting his right with batteries and a detached brigade. This movement, which was boldly and skillfully executed, brought his whole line into a dangerous position, which he, apparently, did not comprehend in his ignorance of the topographic conditions of the field, but it gave Ewell an opportunity to detach Trimble's brigade from his right, move it through a forest, and reform it opposite Fremont's left. This disposition made and reinforced with two Virginia regiments of Elzey's brigade, under Col. James A. Walker, on his right, he pressed forward and drove Blenker, of Fremont's left, from his position, and forced him to retreat to the Keezletown road, Walker advancing still further on the right and by his desperate courage adding to the success of Trimble's movement. During this time Fremont advanced Milroy against the Confederate center, and a fierce artillery duel followed, but with no results.

Schenck's brigade, of four Ohio regiments and two batteries, arrived at 1 p. m., when Fremont placed him on his right and advanced him cautiously through the woods to attack the Confederate left. Detecting this movement, Ewell strengthened that part of his line with his reserves, extending it more to the left, and by so doing delayed Schenck's aggressive movement, which Fremont abandoned when his left was driven back by Ewell's flank movement on Blenker. Ewell's skirmishers followed closely the Federal lines as they fell back to their original position, but his inferior force and the approach of night rendered it prudent for him to rest on his arms and make no further aggressive movement, being well assured that Fremont, after the experiences of the day, would make no further advances. Ewell's loss was 287; Fremont's, 664; small losses to either army considering the issues involved, as this battle of Cross Keys, or Union Church as the Federals call it, not only defeated but paralyzed Fremont's army, so that for the time being it ceased to be a very important factor, in so far as Jackson was concerned, in the field of action.

Taking a backward look, the movements of Shields during those of Fremont just described, demand attention. Marching up the Luray valley, when he reached Columbia bridge, 8 miles above Luray, he found that destroyed, so he could not follow the turnpike which there crossed the river, and found himself condemned to follow the muddy common road, which made his progress not only difficult, but extremely slow; but he hastened forward his advanced brigades to harass Jackson's flank, which he expected to reach by the bridge at Conrad's store, which he supposed his cavalry had held, and with orders to go as far as Waynesboro and break the Virginia Central railroad. Carroll's cavalry regiment led the advance. It reached Conrad's store on the 4th, when Shields ordered it to move rapidly forward and capture the bridge at Port Republic; but he could not follow in consequence of the condition of the streams, swollen by heavy rains, which crossed his road at right angles, descending with rapid flow from the Blue ridge and breaking up his command into fragments along the road, his infantry support, on that day, being held back at Naked creek, five miles below Carroll; a fact which Captain Hotchkiss had communicated to General Jackson

from his signal station on the Peak. On Saturday, June 7th, Carroll received fresh orders to press forward to Waynesboro, some 37 miles, by way of Port Republic, doing all the damage he could, in passing, to Jackson's flank and rear. He marched that afternoon with less than 1,000 infantry, a battery of six guns and 150 cavalry, and reached the vicinity of the Lewiston farm, six miles below Port Republic, that night, where his scouts informed him that Jackson's train, lightly guarded, was parked near Port Republic. The same day Shields sent Tyler's brigade from Columbia bridge to aid Carroll; this reached Lewiston at 2 p. m. of the 8th, while the battle of Cross Keys was raging.

On the morning of the 8th, while quiet reigned in Jackson's camps near Port Republic, and just as the general was mounting his horse to ride to Ewell's command, Carroll, who had learned from renegade spies the condition of affairs at Port Republic, and whom he had for guides, dashed forward with his cavalry and two pieces of artillery, drove in the Confederate pickets, and, rapidly crossing South river, took possession of the little village; and a portion of his force, turning to the right, with one gun, seized the south end of the bridge over which the road leading to Cross Keys crosses, and planted there a piece of artillery, while another portion of his force turned to the left to seize the trains parked to the southwest of the town. Providentially, Jackson had time to ride rapidly across the bridge before the street was occupied by the Federal cavalry, but a portion of his staff was captured and affairs were in a critical condition for a short time. Capt. S. J. C. Moore had a few men of his company on picket at the western end of the town. These he promptly rallied behind a fence and poured a checking volley into the Federal cavalry pushing in that direction. Carrington's not fully organized battery was in camp just beyond, near the wagon train; Maj. R. L. Dabney, Jackson's chief of staff, who was remaining at headquarters preparing to conduct religious services in Jackson's camps at a later hour, hastened to this battery, the guns of which were soon brought into position, and joined Captain Moore in a raking fire down the street, which forced the Federals to retreat toward the bridge and to the shelter of the houses in the cross streets. As soon as Jackson got across the bridge and gained the bluff beyond,

he took in the situation of affairs and brought into action the forces which had encamped there ready for such an emergency. Three batteries were quickly brought into position, and fire was opened through the bridge, followed by volleys from the infantry of Taliaferro's brigade, which was promptly available as it was just then drawn up for inspection. The Thirty-seventh Virginia charged through the bridge and captured the gun, and Carroll's force was rapidly driven back across South river, abandoning another gun. His infantry advance, coming up the river road to his support, was soon routed by the concentrated fire of three batteries from the bluff on the north side of the river, and the whole Federal force was quickly obliged to retreat, first toward the Blue ridge along the Brown's gap road to get out of range of Jackson's artillery, and then back toward Lewiston, but still subjected to the fire of the Confederate batteries that followed along the bluff on the opposite side of the river for over two miles, and shelled the retreat until it got out of range. This affair lasted about an hour; Carroll reported his loss as 40 men, two guns and 14 horses. Jackson's cavalry that was picketing the road toward Lewiston, had failed to do its duty and disgracefully fled when Carroll advanced, and so Jackson had no warning of his approach. This affair over, Jackson stationed Taliaferro's brigade in the village, covering the fords of South river, and marched the Stonewall brigade, with artillery, to opposite Lewiston, to watch any further advance of Shields' column, still holding a force in reserve along the Cross Keys road to aid Ewell, if necessary, in his contention with Fremont.

At this time Shields was still at Luray and writing to Fremont, at 9:30 a. m., that he thought that at that hour there would be 12 pieces of artillery opposite Jackson's train at Port Republic, and two brigades of infantry; also that some artillery and cavalry had pushed on to Waynesboro to burn the Virginia Central railroad bridge, and that he himself would follow with two other brigades. He wished to know if Jackson changed direction and hoped Fremont "will thunder down on his rear" if he attempted to force a passage eastward, concluding, "I think Jackson is caught this time."

Carroll remained quietly in the woods on the bluff below Lewiston, to which he had retired on the morning



of the 8th, after his discomfiture at Port Republic, watching the Confederate batteries and their supports on the bluffs across the river threatening destruction to his flank if he should again advance. Tyler's infantry brigade of about 3,000 men, accompanied by 16 guns, after floundering through the mud from Conrad's store, joined Carroll about 2 p. m. Tyler concluded that his force was too small to attack Jackson and create a diversion in Fremont's favor, therefore he remained in bivouac with Carroll the rest of the day.

Convinced that Fremont was either disposed of, or could be kept at bay by a portion of Ewell's command, Jackson provided for falling upon Shields' advance on the morning of the 9th. A foot-bridge, made of the running gear of heavy farm wagons pushed into the river in a continuous line and planked over, was constructed across South river, and at dawn Winder was ordered to cross both rivers and march down the river road to attack Shields, whose advance, under Tyler, had taken position on the bluff of the terrace near Lewiston, overlooking the wide bottom lands between that bluff and the South Fork of the Shenandoah, with his infantry so disposed that he could quickly swing on his left and throw them into line of battle across the meadows and at right angles to the general direction of the river and the road to Port Republic. Ewell was instructed to leave Trimble's brigade and part of Patton's to look after Fremont and to follow Winder at an early hour with the rest of his command. Taliaferro's brigade was left with the batteries on the bluff north of the river, whence he could aid Trimble in holding back Fremont at or near Cross Keys, it being Jackson's intention, if he could quickly dispose of Shields' advance, to turn back with his whole force and again attack Fremont in the afternoon of the 9th, but providing, in case he could not do this, for Trimble to retire across the bridge and burn it, thus leaving Fremont without the means of crossing to aid Shields or to attack Jackson's rear.

By 5 o'clock in the morning of June 9th, Winder was crossing South river and Jackson was moving with him against the Federal troops at Lewiston, without waiting for Taylor, whose brigade was following, but which was delayed in crossing South river by a derangement of the foot-bridge. Tyler had selected a strong position. Upon

his left, on a hearth leveled for burning charcoal, on the slope of the terrace overlooking the stream valley and from the crest of which a dense forest extended eastward, for miles toward the Blue ridge, he placed six guns, with a supporting force above them in the woods looking across a ravine, through which a run made its way from the mountains toward the river. His main body he disposed along a narrow road at right angles to the main road and leading to the river at Lewis' mill, the fences of which were a good defense in his front, which was concealed by an extensive field of standing wheat just ready for the harvest. Tyler's command consisted of two Pennsylvania, four Ohio, one West Virginia and one Indiana regiment, with 16 guns, and a detachment of West Virginia cavalry, in all about 3,000 men.

Nearing the Federal position, Winder deployed with his right in the edge of the woods on the slope of the same terrace occupied by Tyler's left, with the ravine intervening, extending his left toward the river, placing batteries in the road near his right and on swells of the broad bottoms toward his left. The Lewiston farmhouse, with its numerous outbuildings, was between the lines of the combatants near the foot of the wooded terrace. As he advanced, Winder soon found that his lines were commanded and enfiladed by the Federal battery on the coal hearth. He then sent Colonel Allen with two Virginia regiments and two guns into the forest on the terrace, on his right, to attempt to flank the Federal left and capture the battery that was impeding his progress, but he was met and promptly driven back by the superior fire of that battery and by the volleys of the four Federal regiments that were supporting it. To create a diversion, he sent the Fifth Virginia to his left to attack the Federal right, in which it met with some success, but this was promptly checked by Tyler, who reinforced his right with three regiments and drove the Fifth back after a stubborn fight. Finding that his 1,200 men were not equal to the enemy's tactic force, and that he was getting the worst of the battle, Winder called upon Jackson, who was watching the combat just in the rear of its center, for reinforcements. He sent Taylor's Seventh Louisiana, with batteries, to the left, but the Federals were still gaining ground in that direction. Just then the main body of Taylor's brigade, led by Taylor him-

self, approached by the Port Republic road on which Jackson, all alone, was watching the contest and seeing that the field was in danger of going against him. At that moment Captain Hotchkiss joined him. Catching sight of Taylor's advance, Jackson promptly ordered Hotchkiss to lead that command around through the forest, turn the Federal left and capture the battery on the coal hearth. The head of Taylor's column was promptly turned to the right, and, in concealment, marched as rapidly through the woods as the rough character of the ground and the thick growth of young timber would admit. Bearing well to the right, to be sure of completely turning the Federal left, the head of this column had nearly reached Deep Hollow, or Lewis' run, which flowed through the ravine between the contending forces, when an aide from General Winder informed the officer in charge of the movement that unless an immediate attack was made upon the Federal left he would be compelled to give way and abandon the field. After a consultation, it was agreed, in view of the present emergency, that the flank movement should be abandoned and an immediate attack, obliquing to the left, should be made upon the Federal position and battery across the ravine. Taylor quickly formed his brave Louisianians and charged upon the Federal position, from which a portion of the infantry supports had been withdrawn by Tyler to strengthen his right. Taylor's men, though opposed by a most galling fire of musketry and artillery at short range, succeeded in capturing the battery, but Tyler soon recaptured it with men brought from his right, when Taylor again rallied his forces and retook it; and so the contention went on for some time, for the possession of the Federal battery and the point of vantage for victory.

In the meantime, Winder reinforced his left with three regiments that had just come up, and ordered an advance which checked the charge, aided by two regiments under Scott, which Ewell had just sent in on his left, and captured and held the battery just as the Federals were starting in retreat and attempting to carry off the guns, although nearly all their horses had been killed. They succeeded in taking away one gun, but the Confederate attack was successful all along the line, and the Federals were soon in full retreat, followed by Taliaferro's brigade, which had just reached the field, joining with Win-

der in pursuit for over three miles, when Munford took it up with his cavalry, recaptured the piece of artillery that had been taken away, picked up many prisoners and followed the Federal retreat until dark overtook him.

Tyler made a brave and gallant fight, hotly contesting the possession of the field, on which he had so skillfully posted his men and guns, and stubbornly resisting every effort to drive him from it until Jackson's superior tactics made it no longer tenable. His loss was 66 killed, 382 wounded, and 382 missing, a total of 830; or, as stated by another Federal authority, 67 killed, 361 wounded and 574 missing, a total of 1,002, or fully one-third of his command—figures which tell the story of his courageous fight in which brothers and kindred from western Virginia met in opposing regiments on the bloodiest part of this decisive field of carnage.

Late in the forenoon, Fremont advanced against Trimble near Cross Keys, and was driving him slowly back, when Jackson thought it prudent to call him to the Lewiston, or Port Republic, battlefield, when he, with Taliaferro, withdrew as rapidly as possible, and without loss crossed the bridge at Port Republic, which he burned behind him and moved down toward the battlefield. Fremont arrived on the bluffs, overlooking the field of combat across the river, just in time to witness the retreat of Tyler and engage in the safe but shameful business of shelling the ambulances and the relief parties who were engaged on the field in looking after the wounded of both armies. Jackson quickly withdrew his men from the range of Fremont's guns, by byways leading from Lewiston through the woods directly to the mouth of Brown's gap, where he established his headquarters, and within which he gathered all his men in bivouac, but some of them not until midnight. His losses in the Port Republic battle were 816, killed, wounded and missing; 290 of these from Taylor's brigade, 199 from Winder's, 190 from Stuart's, and 128 from Elzey's. During the day all of Jackson's trains were removed to the cove, or amphitheatral basin, within Brown's gap, so that by the morning of the 10th, he was there concentrated and ready to either take the offensive or to retire toward Richmond.

Jackson rested his wearied and well-nigh exhausted men in their camps on the 10th. Tyler met Shields coming to reinforce him, at Conrad's store, and Fremont,

baffled at every turn, fell back to Harrisonburg on the morning of that day and continued his retreat down the valley on the 11th and 12th, followed by Munford's cavalry, which crossed North river and reached Mt. Crawford the night of the 11th, and the next day took possession of Harrisonburg and of the 200 wounded which Fremont had left there. The latter did not halt, owing to "significant demonstrations of the enemy," as he says, until he joined Banks and Sigel (Saxton's command) at Middletown, in the lower valley, to which point they had advanced, respectively, from Williamsport and Harper's Ferry. Shields continued his retreat to Luray, which he reached on the 13th.

On the 12th of June, as soon as he could cross South river by fords made passable by his engineer, Jackson moved his army from Brown's gap into the noble, park-like oak forests between the forks of the Shenandoah, in the vicinity of Weyer's cave and Mt. Meridian, where, for five days of splendid June weather, he rested, recuperated and refitted his army, and where, as he proclaimed in general orders, "for the purpose of rendering thanks to God for having crowned our arms with success and to implore His continual favor," divine service was held in the army on the 14th, during which the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was administered. Jackson issued another inspiring order to his men, June 13th, in these words: "The fortitude of the troops under fatigue and their valor in action have again, under the blessing of Divine Providence, placed it in the power of the commanding general to congratulate them upon the victories of June 8th and 9th. Beset on both flanks by two boastful armies, you have escaped their toils, inflicting, successively, crushing blows upon each of your pursuers. Let a few more such efforts be made, and you may confidently hope that our beautiful valley will be cleaned from the pollution of the invaders' presence. The major-general commanding invites you to observe to-morrow evening, June 14th, from 3 o'clock p. m., as a season of thanksgiving, by a suspension of all military exercises, and by holding divine service in the several regiments."

It is interesting to review this Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862, which closed with the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic. It occupied just three months—from the evacuation of Winchester. March 11th, when

Jackson fell back with about 4,500 badly armed and equipped men, before the advance of Banks with his 30,000, as well equipped and supplied as men could possibly be, to the 11th of June, when Fremont and Shields were in full retreat for the lower valley and Jackson was resting near the triple forks of the Shenandoah, the acknowledged hero of one of the most famous campaigns in history.

Regarding his retreat from Winchester in March as a confession of weakness, the Federal government at once ordered the larger part of Banks' force from the Valley to the support of McClellan's columns advancing on Richmond. Marching rapidly from his apparent hiding in retreat, Jackson fell, on the 23d of March, upon the remaining Federal force in the vicinity of Kernstown with 3,500 wearied men, and, though mistaken as to his enemy's numbers, joined issue with Shields' 7,000, and nearly becoming the victor on the battlefield, he compelled the return to the Valley of all the Federals that had left it, and to that extent weakened the Federal army moving toward Richmond and delayed its operations. Falling back from Kernstown, he drew Banks and his large army, still further reinforced, after him to Harrisonburg, where he disconcerted his pursuer by turning across to the Blue ridge, to a safe position near Swift Run gap, where he reorganized his army; submitted to Lee a plan of campaign for freeing the Valley and the mountains beyond, of three threatening Federal advances; got permission to carry out his designs, if he could do so with the aid of Ewell's division, then across the Blue ridge from his encampment, and with Johnson's brigade, which was holding back Fremont's advance just west of Staunton.

On the last of April, while he was deceiving Banks at Harrisonburg with a demonstration in his front, Ewell crossed to the camps Jackson had evacuated, while he took up his line of march, with his own immediate command, to join Edward Johnson, by a circuitous route, which involved the crossing of the Blue ridge twice, thus deceiving friend and foe alike. Joining Johnson on the 5th of May, he forced back Fremont's advance to McDowell, where he defeated him in battle, on the 8th, and followed after his retreat until it met his main body at Franklin where he left the whole Federal force safely disposed of on the 12th. Marching back to the Valley

and down it to near New Market, taking up Ewell's command in passing, he crossed the Massanutton mountains, marched rapidly down the Page valley, and on the 24th fell on Banks' line of retreat, which his attack on Front Royal, on the 23d, had forced from Strasburg, whither he had retired on learning that Ewell had reinforced Jackson at Conrad's store (Elkton). Defeating Banks in a pitched battle at Winchester on the 25th, capturing many prisoners and great quantities of stores, he drove the remnant of Banks' army across the Potomac at Williamsport, and made a demonstration at Harper's Ferry from the 28th to the 31st, as if he would move on Washington. Thus he threw the Federal government into consternation, causing it to order McDowell, who with 40,000 men had reached Fredericksburg on his way to join McClellan, to turn from his course and march to the Valley to oppose him; to order Fremont to withdraw from his advance toward Staunton, to co-operate with McDowell in blocking Jackson's way out at Strasburg, and to order a formidable force to Harper's Ferry, until more than 60,000 men were on the march to contend with his 16,000. Keeping up his threatening attitude until his converging foes were but a day's march from a junction at Strasburg, he then, having saved his captures and his prisoners, fell rapidly back and safely escaped those gathering to entrap him; divided this great force by calling to his aid the great topographic bulwarks of the Valley, and drew a portion of his foes under Fremont again to Harrisonburg, and to a chosen field of engagement at Cross Keys, where he dealt Fremont a staggering blow which caused him to halt and hesitate, while on the next day, June 9th, he met McDowell's advance coming up the eastern valley, which by his precautions he had kept from joining Fremont, and drove it back in total defeat. These two armies, which he had so successfully outgeneraled, halted not in their retreat until they were again safe in the lower valley.

During these three months Jackson had marched more than 500 miles, fought five pitched battles, and had numerous engagements with the armies of his enemy. On June 11th, General Lee wrote to Jackson from Richmond: "Your recent successes have been the cause of the liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. The admiration excited by your skill and boldness has

been constantly mingled with solicitude for your situation."

The time had now come when it was necessary for General Lee to concentrate all his forces at Richmond to meet the threatened attack of the great army of the Potomac, which was now in position to the north and northeast of Richmond, within sight of the spires of its churches. Jackson's brilliant Valley campaign had delayed McClellan's attack by drawing to the Valley the 40,000 men under McDowell that the Federal commanding general expected to place on his right before proceeding, by one grand movement, as he confidently expected, to seize the Confederate capital. It was important that this force that had been withdrawn should be kept away, and this could best be done by again exciting the fears of the Federal authorities for the safety of Washington. To accomplish this, large reinforcements were hurried, by rail, to the Valley, most of them to Staunton, but Lawton's six Georgia regiments joined Jackson at his encampment near Weyer's cave. Federal prisoners, on their way from the Valley to Richmond, met these reinforcements in passing. These, promptly paroled, carried the news to Washington. The cavalry in Jackson's front, by various devices, spread the intelligence that Jackson, with 50,000 men or more, would soon again march down the Valley to fall on the Federal army there collected. Intelligent escaped "contrabands" reported the arrival of large numbers of troops at Staunton. All these tactics, allowable in time of war, had their effect, not only in persuading Fremont to retreat until he reached Banks at Middletown, but caused the latter to telegraph to the Federal authorities at Washington, on the 12th, "Jackson is heavily reinforced and is advancing," and on the 19th, "No doubt another immediate movement down the Valley is intended, with a force of 30,000 or more." On the 22d he was still on the lookout for Jackson and Ewell, and on the 28th, when Jackson had joined Lee and was actually fighting McClellan before Richmond, Banks still believed "Jackson meditates an attack in the valley." McDowell had been ordered on the 8th of June to collect his forces and resume his march, by way of Fredericksburg, to join McClellan, but the victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic, and the fears of Banks and Fremont as to what Jackson might again do, delayed him in the Valley, and



when he did move, it was toward Manassas, and not Richmond, and Ricketts' division did not leave Front Royal for Manassas until the 17th of June, when Shields followed him into Piedmont Virginia.

The object of his delay in the Valley being accomplished, Jackson left it on the night of the 17th of June, ordering his cavalry to continue its demonstrations down the Valley; and by rail and march, the "ride-and-tie" way, as it was called, he reached the vicinity of Richmond on the 26th day of June, and was in line of battle and ready to fall on McClellan's rear and participate in the bloody engagement of Gaines' Mill on the 27th, and become a potent factor in winning the victory of that great day of the Seven Days of battle around Richmond.

Swinton, the Federal historian of the army of the Potomac, in writing of Jackson's Valley campaign, says:

In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made great captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not its chief result; without gaining a single tactical victory he had yet achieved a great strategic victory, for by skillfully maneuvering 15,000 men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of 60,000. It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved Richmond; for when McClellan, in expectation that McDowell might still be allowed to come and join him, threw forward his right wing under Porter to Hanover Court House on the 26th of May, the echoes of his cannon bore to those in Richmond who knew the situation of the two Union armies, the knell of the capital of the Confederacy.

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN OF 1862 — YORKTOWN, WILLIAMSBURG AND SEVEN PINES.

**T**HE advance of McClellan's army, moved from Washington by transports, reached Fort Monroe the latter part of March, and on the 2d of April, McClellan in person ordered an advance up the Peninsula of 58,000 men and 100 guns. General Magruder, of the Confederate army, with 11,000 men, opposed his progress nearly at its beginning, from Fortress Monroe to between the mouths of the Warwick and Poquosin rivers, where the divide between these opposite flowing estuaries is narrow; then on a line extending from the James to the York, 13 miles in length, behind Warwick river on the southwest and covering Yorktown on the northeast, which had been admirably fortified throughout its length. Gloucester point, opposite Yorktown, was embraced in these defenses, thus guarding the entrance to the York. Marching his army by two nearly parallel roads, McClellan appeared before this line of defense on the 5th of April, and his left at once made a vigorous attack on the right of Magruder's center, which was promptly repulsed. On the 6th and 7th, after a personal reconnoissance, the Federal commander prepared for a regular siege of the Confederate works; distributing his near 100,000 men along their front, with his numerous batteries in favorable positions. Magruder, with his little army of 11,000, bravely maintained his ground for ten days, keeping back his engineering antagonist and vigilantly watching his regular approaches. By maintaining this bold front he gave Johnston time to bring his forces from the Rappahannock and concentrate them on the Peninsula, and thus effectually bar the way of McClellan's host to Richmond.

The famous Confederate ram Virginia still threateningly stood guard at the mouth of the Elizabeth, and held back the Federal naval forces from moving up the James when McClellan began his movement from Fort Monroe;

at the same time the Confederate fortifications at Yorktown and Gloucester point barred the entrance to the York.

On the 16th of April, McClellan again made a vigorous attack near the center of Magruder's line, which he broke, but this was repulsed with severe loss by the Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana troops of Cobb's and Anderson's brigades. A second attempt satisfied McClellan that he could not carry the Confederate line by assault, so he proceeded to besiege it by regular approaches, especially the lines in front of Yorktown. General Johnston took command on the Peninsula the 17th of April, having concentrated there about 50,000 men to oppose McClellan's 100,000 or more with heavy siege trains. Looking over the situation, Johnston thought it advisable to retreat, but the authorities at Richmond directed him to hold his position as long as he could. On the 3d of May, when satisfied that McClellan was about ready to make his grand assault, and recalling what had happened to Cornwallis on the same historic field, Johnston secretly evacuated Yorktown, leaving his heavy guns behind, and fell back to a line in front of Williamsburg, Virginia's ancient capital, which had also been partially fortified, having gained a month of precious time, which had been of great value in making preparations for the defense of Richmond.

McClellan, on the morning of the 4th of May, finding his enemy gone, moved a large force in pursuit by the two roads leading, the one from his right and the other from his left, toward Williamsburg. Two brigades of cavalry and two divisions of infantry with artillery moved on the road leading from Yorktown, and three divisions of infantry by the direct road, up the Peninsula. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with his cavalry, covered Johnston's retreat, aided by the muddy roads, which had been dreadfully cut up by the moving of the Confederate army and its trains. The Confederates reached the Williamsburg earthworks by noon. The evacuation of Yorktown not only opened the York to the Federal navy for co-operating with McClellan, but it also necessitated the evacuation of Norfolk, which Johnston ordered General Huger to make, on the 9th of May.

Knowing the advantages that the opening of the rivers to his naval power had given his foe, and that he could

quickly transport portions of his army to the vicinity of Richmond and to his rear, either by the York or by the James, Johnston continued his retreat, holding back McClellan's pursuit by a cavalry engagement in the afternoon on the Yorktown road, backed up by three brigades of infantry, which forced back the Federal column. Sumner, McClellan's second in command of the Federal army, late in the day attempted to move forward by renewing the combat, but the dense forests, characteristic of that region, and the approach of night prevented his making progress. Magruder's division, followed by that of McLaws, continued the retreat during the night, as Johnston knew he had a race to make with the gunboats and transports that he divined McClellan was already sending up the York to head off his way to Richmond. Longstreet, who was left in command of the rear, placed the brigades of Pryor and R. H. Anderson, with light artillery, in the works in front of Williamsburg, which McLaws had evacuated.

Heavy rain and deep and deepening mud in all the roads characterized the 5th of May. Sumner, who had spent the night in the forest in front of Longstreet's center, in which was a rather formidable earthwork called Fort Magruder, delayed an attack that he might ration his men and reconnoiter on his right; but the impetuous Hooker ordered an attack as soon as he reached the front of the Confederate right, about 8 o'clock in the morning, pushing boldly forward a battery of eleven guns. He twice drove in the Confederate skirmishers by reinforcing his attack. Longstreet, watching the increasing force in his front, reinforced Anderson with the brigades of Wilcox, A. P. Hill and Pickett, and assuming the aggressive, moved against Hooker's flank, which with a stubborn fight was driven back, so that by 11 o'clock he was anxiously calling for help and looking for a diversion in his favor on the Federal right. Sumner ordered Kearny to Hooker's assistance, but he was still miles in the rear, floundering through the rain and mud. Longstreet's attack was successful and resulted in driving away the Federals and the capturing of nine pieces of artillery, but Kearny's arrival on the field with other batteries about 3 p. m., saved Hooker from utter defeat and enabled him to press back the Confederate line which Longstreet had reinforced with two brigades

that he had called back from the retreat. This enabled him to hold his position near Fort Magruder until night-fall, keeping Hooker at bay.

While Hooker was thus engaged, Sumner had been reconnoitering the Confederate left, and between 10 and 11 of the morning he ordered Hancock to make an attack in that direction, thinking he could thus relieve Hooker and flank Longstreet out of his position. Hancock's advance occupied some abandoned Confederate redoubts on the Confederate left about midday, and then awaited the arrival of reinforcements, in the meantime cautiously advancing and occupying the second redoubt, which brought him within range of the Confederate left. At about this time Longstreet, seeing that his trains could not make good their retreat before night, recalled D. H. Hill's division, which was in the rear of Johnston's retreat, and about the middle of the afternoon he put that in position on his left, facing Hancock, except two regiments, with which he reinforced the columns of assault on his right, under Anderson. In front of the cleared space which Hancock occupied was a dense forest, which screened his line from view. His artillery, firing from the redoubt he occupied, was damaging Anderson's left. This and other things induced D. H. Hill to seek and obtain from Longstreet permission to attack Hancock, and attempt to drive him from the field. About 5 o'clock he advanced with his two North Carolina regiments and two Virginia regiments of Early's brigade, himself taking charge of the right and Early of the left. The movement was badly made, the line having been broken into fragments in advancing through the dense forest. Hancock repulsed this bold attack with much slaughter, but did not follow in pursuit, and Hill reformed on Anderson's left. Late in the day McClellan himself came up and ordered reinforcements for Hancock and a renewal of his attack, but it was too late for that to be done. A cold and rainy night followed the stormy day, and both armies were only too willing to cease from strife and find what rest they could in their wet and muddy bivouacs. Longstreet's loss was 1,560 from a probable force of 12,000 engaged, and McClellan's 2,283 from an attacking force of 15,000.

The profitable results of this Williamsburg battle were on Longstreet's side. He had held all his positions for

an entire day, during which the divisions of Magruder and G. W. Smith and all of Johnston's army train had continued, unmolested, the retreat toward Richmond. That was what Johnston contended for, and the battle of Williamsburg enabled him to gain. By his order D. H. Hill and Longstreet abandoned Williamsburg in the early morning of the 6th and encamped at the Burnt Ordinary, 12 miles from Williamsburg, early in the morning of the 7th, and on that day the Confederate army was concentrated in the vicinity of Barhamsville, some 8 miles southwest of the head of the York. The Federal army rested at Williamsburg, satisfied that it was not prudent to follow a foe whose rear guard had handled them so roughly the day before.

As soon as Yorktown was evacuated, McClellan ordered Franklin's division to be promptly moved, by water, to the head of the York and disembarked at Eltham's landing, on the south side of that river, in the immediate vicinity of Johnston's line of retreat, which he hoped to intercept. Franklin arrived by 3 p. m. of the 6th, and before day of the 7th had disembarked his division, which was followed in rapid succession by those of Porter, Sedgwick and Richardson. The accompanying gunboats covered Franklin's landing, and the broad arms of the York protected his flanks. He promptly occupied a belt of forest in his front, not far from the road leading from Barhamsville to New Kent Court House, along which a portion of Johnston's army was retreating. Anticipating what happened, Johnston, on the morning of the 7th, ordered G. W. Smith to protect this road by advancing troops to drive back Franklin's movement. Placing the brigades of Whiting and Hampton in line of battle, Whiting advanced through the forest, drove in Franklin's skirmishers, and followed them through the woods, forcing them back, though reinforced with two regiments, to the edge of the forest nearest the river. S. R. Anderson's Tennessee brigade was added to the attacking column, and by midday Franklin was driven under cover of his gunboats. These and the accompanying transports Whiting attempted to shell from the edge of the bluff in his front, but the range of his guns was not sufficient to do much damage, nor was his artillery any match for the heavy fire of the gunboats; therefore, as he could accomplish nothing more, he withdrew to his

original position near Barhamsville, after a loss of 48 men as against 194 for Franklin.

No further attempt was made to delay Johnston's retreat, which his right continued to the vicinity of the Long bridges of the Chickahominy, and his left to the crossing of that stream by the York River railroad, near Dispatch Station, where he took position, on May 9th, on the north side of the Chickahominy, facing to the northeast, covering all the roads to Richmond by which McClellan could approach, and where he remained undisturbed until the 15th, resting and recruiting his army in a position to be supplied by railway trains and difficult to be turned by water. Longstreet held the right, located near the Long bridges, and Magruder the left, near Dispatch Station.

Huger evacuated Norfolk May 9th, after destroying the navy yard, and fell back toward Petersburg. The now famous ram Virginia was blown up by her gallant crew on the 11th and her men hurried to Drewry's bluff on the James, to take charge of the guns at the fortifications which General Lee, in the meantime, had prudently constructed at that point. The Virginia out of the way, the Federal gunboats ascended the James and attacked Drewry's bluff, eight miles below Richmond, on the 15th. The channel of the James had been filled with sunken ships and other obstructions, and the gunboats met with a most spirited resistance from the guns in the works on the bluff, which repulsed their attack and compelled them to fall back down the river. This naval attack in his rear induced Johnston to retreat across the Chickahominy on the 15th, and place his army in front of the defensive works, three miles to the east of Richmond, which had been thrown up in 1861 for the defense of that city.

On the 8th of May, McClellan ordered Stoneman's cavalry forward from Williamsburg to open the way for the advance of Franklin. On the 10th his army was well concentrated near Barhamsville; thence, feeling his way cautiously, four of his corps reached the vicinity of Cumberland, on the Pamunkey, and New Kent Court House on the 15th. On the 16th his advance took possession of the White House, near which the York River railroad crosses the Pamunkey; thence, advancing along the York River railroad, he reached the north

bank of the Chickahominy at Dispatch Station, unopposed in his progress, on the 19th.

Johnston, ever wary and on the alert, watching the slow but certain advance of his powerful antagonist, prepared to meet his coming assault on Richmond by gathering to that city the troops that had been left at Fredericksburg, Gordonsville and elsewhere. He instructed Jackson to do what he could to retain in the Valley the Federal forces he was already contending with, but to be prepared to come to Richmond with Ewell on short notice. Apprised of the formidable movement of McDowell from Fredericksburg with 40,000 men, he decided to attack McClellan before this large addition could be made to his forces. Johnston's new line of defense extended from Drewry's bluff on the James to opposite Mechanicsville on the Chickahominy, in a nearly north and south direction, but trending to the northwest from where it crossed the York River railroad, thus presenting a convex front from that point to opposite Mechanicsville, a few miles north of Richmond.

McClellan reached the Chickahominy on the 19th, and on the 20th moved two corps, about two-fifths of his army, across that swamp-bordered river at Bottom's bridge, the crossing of the Williamsburg and Richmond turnpike, which he followed to Seven Pines, within 8 miles of Richmond, a point a short distance south from Fair Oaks station of the York River railroad. A general deployment followed, with his left resting on White Oak swamp and his right on the Chickahominy, presenting a convex front to Johnston on the south side of the Chickahominy, and covering all the approaches to McClellan's rear from the west and southwest. This line was at once protected by earth and timber works, abatis and fallen timber. By a skillful movement McClellan, at the same time, extended his right wing along the bluffy north side of the Chickahominy, and on the 24th of May took possession of Mechanicsville, placing there the strong and ably commanded corps of Fitz John Porter, thus covering the great highway leading from Richmond northeastward to the Pamunkey by way of Old Church. On the same day the Confederates had a lively engagement with McClellan's advance at Seven Pines.

Having firmly established himself to the east and northeast of Richmond in a well-selected position for



advancing on that city, McClellan anxiously awaited the arrival of McDowell, that his right might be extended with the 40,000 men that were already on the march from Fredericksburg to Richmond. To open the way for this approach, he ordered Fitz John Porter, on the 26th, to move a strong force northward, along the direct road from Mechanicsville to Hanover Court House, running nearly parallel with the Virginia Central railroad, to destroy that road and also the railroad leading to Fredericksburg, and drive away any Confederate forces in that direction. Porter dispatched three infantry brigades, two cavalry regiments and four batteries on this expedition; at the same time he dispatched Warren, with a strong force of all arms, eastward by the Old Church road, to destroy the bridges across the Pamunkey, and then follow up toward Hanover Court House and support the right of the column sent in that direction.

Branch's Confederate brigade, consisting of one cavalry and six infantry regiments and a battery, had been moved from Gordonsville to Ashland, on the Richmond & Fredericksburg railroad, to protect the two railways leading northward from Richmond. He was encamped between these roads, near Slash church, not far from Peake Station of the Virginia Central railroad. The Federal cavalry, moving by roads more to the eastward, sent its scouts to the vicinity of Hanover Court House on the 26th, thus informing Porter as to the condition of affairs in that vicinity. On the 27th, Branch, ignorant of the movements of Porter, had sent a portion of his force to repair the Virginia Central railroad near Peake. Porter's column, which had left Mechanicsville at 4 in the morning with fourteen regiments of infantry, fell upon Branch's force near Peake and quickly routed it, and when Branch reinforced that with the rest of his command, they also, after a spirited resistance, had to give way before overwhelming numbers, and he fell back to Ashland, after the loss of one gun and some 700 prisoners. His loss in action was 265, and the Federal loss 285, numbers showing that this Hanover Court House engagement, as it is called, but Peake Station or Slash Church as it should be called, was hotly contested by Branch with his comparatively small force. Warren also appeared upon the field near the close of the action with his four

regiments and six guns, and by participating gave the odds very largely to Porter.

On this same 27th of May, Johnston, having information of McDowell's advance from Fredericksburg, determined to strike a blow at McClellan before that large reinforcement should reach him. He at once began the concentration of his army toward his left, with the intention of throwing the larger portion of it upon McClellan's right by a flank movement across the Chickahominy above Mechanicsville. At nightfall of that day his troops were on the march for their assigned positions, but just before dark, Johnston, who had called his division commanders together for final instructions, informed these officers of Jackson's great victory at Winchester, and that McDowell was already marching north and away from Richmond. A discussion followed, in which these various commanders expressed differing and diverging views, the upshot of which was that the movement was abandoned and the troops were ordered back, most of them to their old positions, and no attack was made.

On the 29th and 30th, D. H. Hill made a reconnoissance, in front of his division on the Williamsburg road, along the Federal front. The information thus gained led Johnston to plan, on the evening of the 30th, for another aggressive movement; D. H. Hill's division, on the Williamsburg road, was to advance, supported by Longstreet's. Huger's division, which had just arrived from Norfolk, was to move on Hill's right, extending the line south to the White Oak swamp; G. W. Smith's division, under Whiting, was to move by the New Bridge road and take position on Hill's left. Provision was also made for protecting the left of this movement against attack from the north of the Chickahominy. A deluge of rain fell on the night of the 30th, which swelled the Chickahominy so that it swept away most of the bridges that McClellan was constructing across that stream; that also helped to further convert the already rain-soaked country between the Chickahominy and White Oak swamp, the larger portion of which was covered with flat, tangled forest, into one great swamp. For a direct attack, Johnston's plan was a good one, but it failed in the execution, because his subordinates did not strictly follow his orders in moving to the field of action and each

take the road assigned to him. The result was that they did not arrive simultaneously, and instead of one concerted attack, which would have undoubtedly resulted in a decided victory, on the 1st of June, there was a succession of heroic combats, which were at first successful in the center, carrying even the formidable works which the Federals had constructed at Seven Pines; but, being unsupported by movements on the right and the left, this attack was repulsed by the concentration of a superior force by the enemy, after which followed attacks and repulses on the wings and again in the center. The Federals were driven from the south side of the York River railroad, but they took position along the north side, and the Confederate line was extended in a nearly east and west direction to meet this. They still held their right at Fair Oaks station, extended toward the Chickahominy, and so the 31st ended without decided results, except that the enemy had been driven back from his original position at Seven Pines, and had taken up a new line north of the York River railroad, and the Confederates had taken position in front of this and were again ready for a forward movement. McClellan sent reinforcements from his right to his left. Both armies rested, as best they could, in their water and mud soaked bivouacs that night, Johnston having ordered his men, at 7 p. m., to sleep on their lines and be ready to renew operations in the morning. A half hour later he was hit by a rifle ball, and just after that badly wounded and unhorsed by the fragment of a shell, when, disabled for command, he was carried to the rear, and Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith became for the time the commander in the field.

It took the Confederates some time to sort themselves in the pine forest with its dense underbrush tangled with vines, and to get rationed and arranged for the morning. They built blazing fires from the pine knots scattered all about, to dry their clothing and blankets, but this lighted the enemy in reinforcing their lines north of the railroad. It was nearly midnight when the army was put in order and the killed and wounded were cared for. Longstreet summarizes the forces engaged on the 31st of May, as 18,500 Federals, consisting of Casey's, Couch's and Kearny's divisions under Heintzelman, with Hooker's division at hand but not engaged; and the Confederates

as consisting of D. H. Hill's division and two brigades and two regiments of Longstreet's, a total of 14,600. The Federal losses were 5,031 and the Confederate 4,798; figures showing that this contest was a stubborn one on both sides. Longstreet sums up the day's business thus: "Two lines of intrenchments were attacked and carried; six pieces of artillery and several thousand small-arms were captured and the enemy was forced back, by night, to his third line of intrenchments, a mile and a half from the point of its opening."

The second day of the Fair Oaks battle found Confederate troops under a new commander, by no means in accord with his subordinates. Gen. G. W. Smith wished to leave the left wing in position to meet any movement of Federals from north of the Chickahominy, while Longstreet was to push forward as the left of the main attack and D. H. Hill as the right. Hill soon discovered that the enemy along the railroad had been strongly reinforced and instead of attacking he withdrew his advanced brigades to the position from which he had driven Casey the day before. While thus engaged the Federal troops advanced. To check these, Pickett was ordered to attack, and a severe struggle ensued, which lasted for an hour and a half. The Federal line was again reinforced, and in the subsequent struggle Armistead's brigade, on Pickett's left, gave way and retreated in disorder, leaving Pickett to bear the brunt of the battle, which he did stubbornly and successfully, the Federals in his front not making a countercharge. At the same time Wilcox and Pryor, on Pickett's right, but concealed from him by a wood, were actively engaged with Hooker's troops, which boldly pushed into the woods held by the Confederates, and engaged them in a lively fight just at the time when Hill's order came directing Wilcox to retire to the line in his rear. This he did, but Hooker did not follow him; Pickett, thus left alone, asked for supports. Colston was sent to his left and Mahone to his right, and once more there was an hour of fierce contention without special advantage to either side, when the fighting ceased and Pickett removed his wounded, and at about 1 p. m. retired in good order, unmolested, from the field of carnage. During this haphazard fighting Smith did nothing on the left, fearing to provoke McClellan to move across the Chickahominy in force to the assistance of his three

crops that had been engaged in the pending contest; so the fighting came to an end, the Federals remaining in the lines to which they had been forced back the day before, and the Confederates collecting arms and caring for their wounded.

About two of the afternoon of June 1st, after the strife of the day was over, Gen. R. E. Lee, accompanied by President Davis, rode upon the field and relieved Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith, thus taking command of the army of Northern Virginia, to which the President had assigned him, and which he from that time held for nearly three years, until the surrender of April 9, 1865. Lee at once directed the withdrawal of the Confederate forces, the divisions of Longstreet and Hill to their camps near the city, leaving those of Huger and Smith to hold the advance. This was accomplished during the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d. The Federal forces did not follow them.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES BEFORE RICHMOND.

LEE, in his first general order to the army before Richmond, said: "The presence of the enemy in front of the capital, the great interests involved, and the existence of all that is dear to us, appeal in terms too strong to be unheard, and the general commanding feels assured that every man has resolved to maintain the ancient fame of the army of Northern Virginia and the reputation of its general [Johnston], and to conquer or die in the approaching contest." In a private letter he wrote: "I wish his [Johnston's] mantle had fallen upon an abler man, or that I were able to drive our enemies back to their homes. I have no ambition and no desire but for the attainment of this object." Writing in a humorous vein to a young friend, General Lee described himself, at this supreme moment of taking high command, in these words:

My coat is of gray, of the regulation style and pattern, and my pants are dark blue, as is also prescribed, partly hid by my long boots. I have the same handsome hat which surmounts my gray head, (the latter is not prescribed in the regulations), and shields my ugly face, which is masked by a white beard as stiff and wiry as the teeth of a card. In fact, an uglier person you have never seen, and so unattractive is it to our enemies that they shoot at it whenever it is visible to them.

McClellan was busy during the first half of June in massing four of his corps on the south of the Chickahominy, near the position where Lee found them when he took command; while with the remainder of his army he assiduously fortified his chosen position on the north side of that swampy river, drawing his supplies by the York River railroad from the stores at White House on the Pamunkey. McCall's division, from McDowell's army, reached him on the 13th, but Lincoln held the rest of that corps in front of Washington, still fearing an attack from Jackson. By the 20th, McClellan had 115,000 men present for duty, to which Lee, at

first, could oppose but 57,000, but to these he soon added 15,000 from the Carolinas. On the 8th, while Jackson was ambidextrously engaged with Fremont and Shields, Lee was writing to him: "Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the valley, so as to prevent your leaving it for a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond." Jackson, in reply, asked for reinforcements and the privilege of dealing further blows at his Valley opponents. Lee promptly sent him fourteen veteran regiments, under Lawton and Whiting, sending them off by rail on that day; marching them through Richmond in martial array, with all the pomp and circumstance of war, and taking good care to have McClellan apprised of their destination. The story of Jackson's Valley campaign has already been told, as well as the use he made of these reinforcements, and how he left the Valley on the 17th of June to swell Lee's forces at Richmond, after having amply provided for the quiet and safety of the large Federal army that his strategy had massed in the lower valley.

Undaunted courage, coupled with rare caution, characterized the new Confederate general commanding. Desiring to be fully informed in reference to the rear as well as the front of the great host beleaguering Richmond, Lee took his bold and ever-alert cavalry leader, J. E. B. Stuart, into his councils, and dispatched him on the 12th with 1,200 veteran cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's rear. Starting from Richmond he followed the Brook turnpike northward to Ashland, then turned eastward by way of Hanover Court House, and followed the main road down the south side of the Pamunkey, a few miles in the rear of McClellan's far-stretching army, crossing the York River railroad at Tunstall's, making captures, destroying stores, and breaking the enemy's line of communication as he went; then, turning southward, he crossed the swollen Chickahominy, near Providence forge, and continued to the banks of the James at Charles City, whence he returned by the river road to Richmond, having in forty-eight hours, with the loss of but a single man, the brave Latané, whom he left in the hands of noble Virginia women for burial, ridden entirely around the Federal army and gathered information of incalculable value to Lee in maturing his plans.

Jackson, by marching and using the trains of the Virginia Central railroad, in a "ride-and-tie" way, reached Frederickshall on the 21st, where he rested on Sunday, the 22d. At midnight, after the Sabbath had passed, Jackson mounted his horse, and accompanied by a single courier, rode rapidly toward Richmond for a conference to which Lee had invited him. By impressing a relay of horses, he reached that city after a 50-mile ride, at 1 p. m., and at 3, Monday, 23d, was in conference with the commanding general in reference to an attack on McClellan's right. On that same Monday, Jackson's men moved forward and on the evening of the 25th reached Ashland, suffering greatly from the intense summer heat of the lowlands, the choking dust of the roads, and the scarcity of water.

By June 24th, McClellan had an inkling of the approach of Jackson, and asked Stanton, his secretary of war, what he knew of the whereabouts of this hard-to-be-located man. This information was supplied him on the 25th, locating Jackson anywhere from Gordonsville to Luray, or in the mountains of West Virginia, while Banks and Fremont, in the lower valley, were intently watching for an attack by him from up the valley. On this same 25th, McClellan telegraphed to Washington: "I am inclined to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true."

Lee's plan of attack, which he communicated to his division commanders in a confidential general order, was for Jackson to move on the 25th from Ashland, and encamp his 16,000 men west of the Virginia Central railroad; at 3 a. m. on the 26th to march southeastward by way of Old Polly Hundley's corner and across the Totopotomoy, to Pole Green church, near Hundley's corner, in the rear of McClellan's position and on the Shady Grove road which leads into the road following down the Pamunkey. As Jackson crossed the railway he was to inform Branch, on the Brook turnpike, who was guarding that approach to Richmond with one of A. P. Hill's brigades, who, when thus informed, was to cross the Chickahominy and move down its northern bank toward Mechanicsville. The order next stated: "As soon as the movements of these rear columns (Jackson's and Branch's)



are discovered, Gen. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division (11,000 men), will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville;" Hill's movement to be followed by Longstreet, crossing the Mechanicsville bridge with his 9,000, followed by D. H. Hill with his 10,000, these three to unite in a general movement against McClellan's right flank down the north bank of the Chickahominy. Stuart, with his cavalry, was to lead Jackson's movement and then extend his left, the object of Lee being to cut off any retreat of McClellan toward his base of supplies, by having Stuart and Jackson in his rear and ready to push eastward and intercept a retreat if he should attempt one.

To repeat, Lee's 50,000 men, if marched according to his order, would be thus disposed: A. P. Hill moving on McClellan's right flank at Mechanicsville, supported by Longstreet, with Jackson moving upon the rear of the same flank, supported by D. H. Hill. Jackson's order read: "Bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam creek and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor," after that to "press forward toward the York River railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy." The orders clearly indicate that Jackson, when he was ready for action, was to give the signal for beginning the fight. These were the tactic arrangements on Lee's left. His right wing, south of the Chickahominy, 30,000 strong, held the line of fortifications extending from the front of Mechanicsville to Chaffin's bluff on the north bank of the James, not far below Drewry's bluff on the south side of that river. Holmes with 5,000 held the intrenched bluffs; Magruder and Huger, in the fortifications east of and before Richmond, confronted with their 25,000 men the nearly 80,000 of the four Federal corps south of the Chickahominy and between that and White Oak swamp, with their intrenched advance at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. It took sublime courage and confidence in his men for a commander to make such dispositions, and so divide his forces in the face of such great odds; but Lee had that courage in an eminent degree, and knew that he could trust the veterans of the army of Northern Virginia to resist a defensive attack against more than double their numbers, or to make an equally bold offensive one when he saw fit to command it. He also knew the hesitating

disposition of McClellan, and was doubtless well informed as to his fears in reference to a largely superior attacking force. Magruder and Huger were instructed to impose upon the large Federal cavalry force in their front with constant demonstrations, and if attacked to unflinchingly hold their intrenchments.

The intense heat and the lack of water exhausted Jackson's men and animals, and the reconstruction of bridges and the removal of obstacles from the roads which Fitz John Porter had destroyed and placed during his movement on Hanover Court House, delayed Jackson's march, so that his column did not reach Ashland until the night of the 25th, although his army had made 50 miles from Gordonsville in three days. By 3 a. m. of the 26th his advance, under Whiting, moved from Ashland on the Ash-cake road; by 9 a. m. it was crossing the Virginia Central railroad, near Peake's, and by 10, Branch was informed of Jackson's progress, some six hours later than Lee had expected. Part of this delay was caused by the failure of the commissary department at Richmond to provide rations for Jackson at Ashland, as had been promised him. Jackson, in person, was pushing forward with all possible dispatch and, as White writes in his "Life of Lee," with "vigor unabated and his spirit aglow with the ardor of battle." Keeping to the left and pressing toward Cold Harbor, his right guarded by Stuart's horsemen, at 3 p. m. Hood's Texans in the lead had a hot skirmish at the Totopotomoy. There the Federals destroyed the bridge, which had to be rebuilt before Jackson could cross that stream; so he was unable to reach Hundley's corner, in McClellan's rear, until after dark of the 26th. Obeying orders and bearing to the eastward, he had not passed within sight or sound of the battle that A. P. Hill, contrary to orders, had brought on at Mechanicsville, forcing Lee to follow up without the aid of Jackson and contrary to his plan of attack.

After being notified by Jackson that he had crossed the Virginia Central railroad, Branch moved down the Chickahominy by the road on its northern side, to uncover the Meadow bridges, that A. P. Hill might cross his other brigades and be in position to attack when he heard Jackson's signal guns. Branch met Porter's outposts when crossing the Virginia Central at Atlee's, where he was delayed by a vigorous skirmish. At 3 p. m., A. P. Hill,

although he had no sign from Jackson that he was in position and ready to co-operate in an attack, took upon himself the responsibility of moving on McClellan's right, fearing, as he says in his report, that delay might "hazard the failure of the whole plan." His advance was courageous and impetuous, but exceedingly imprudent. The issue being taken, and the Federals driven from Mechanicsville to their intrenchments across Beaver Dam creek, and the Mechanicsville bridge uncovered, D. H. Hill and Longstreet, of necessity, marched to A. P. Hill's support, and Lee, in person, pressed the attack in front without the help of Jackson in the rear.

Beaver Dam creek, or swamp, as it is called locally, is a short stream running from the north into the Chickahominy; it is crossed by the main road from Mechanicsville down the north side of the Chickahominy, by way of Gaines' mill, to Old Cold Harbor. For about a mile from its mouth up to this road this swamp-bordered stream is well-nigh impassable. Above the road a dam is thrown across it, making an extensive pond above it for the use of Ellison's mill on the north side of the road. This sluggish stream deeply trenches the plateau or high ground north of the Chickahominy. The position was admirably chosen for defense against a movement from the west. The highest engineering skill in the Federal army had crowned the open, high ground with earthworks for numerous batteries, and with intrenchments for troops on the crest and down the slopes looking toward Beaver Dam swamp; while the heavy timber that fringed the stream and covered its high banks was cut down and so disposed as to make an almost impassable abatis in front of the position. The Federal batteries were so placed as to sweep all the approaches to their position, and five brigades of riflemen, of McCall's division, filled the intrenchments and log breastworks provided for the defense.

By 5 in the afternoon of this 26th of June, Branch's skirmishers had driven in those of Porter, and A. P. Hill was ordering the brigades of Archer, Anderson and Field into action along the road leading from Mechanicsville northwestward to Bethesda church, to move upon the rear of McClellan's immediate right, while Pender, supported by Ripley, moved along the river road toward Ellison's mill. The attack was fierce, but the defense was furious, and the Confederates were forced to recoil, shattered by

the infantry and artillery fire that met them from the Federal right. At that very time Jackson was still north of the Totopotomoy, engaged in repairing the bridge which the retiring Federals had destroyed.

On the morning of the 27th, Jackson was advancing Ewell from Hundley's corner, where he had spent the night, eastward along the Shady Grove road, in obedience to Lee's general instructions. McClellan, advised of Jackson's presence on the field of action, and also, doubtless, of his being in force on his rear, fell back from his position on Beaver Dam creek to the central one held by Porter's corps, a short distance down the river road to Cold Harbor, where a second and still stronger position had been selected and strongly fortified. This retrograde movement, which had been brought about by Jackson without the firing of a gun, placed McClellan's troops, on opposite sides of the Chickahominy, in a line extending nearly north and south and facing westward. His right was again behind a swampy stream, running from the north into the Chickahominy, crossed by the road leading from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor, with a pond and Gaines' mill above and beside it. The topographic conditions and the Federal preparations were much the same as those at Ellison's mill.

Jackson, rightly expecting to be supplied with maps of a locality so near to Richmond where the engineers had had ample time to survey and map the country, had sent his own topographical engineer and his assistants back to the Valley to continue the work of preparing an accurate map of that important military field; but no maps were furnished him except some that were imperfect and unreliable, and the guides sent to lead him were not well informed as to the field of action. The same was true in reference to other portions of Lee's command and of General Lee himself; consequently there was a clash in the ordered movements of troops based on unreliable maps, and it was very difficult to secure concert of action where so much of the country was covered with forests and cut up by deeply trenched watercourses.

Lee promptly ordered an attack on the new Federal position. A. P. Hill was sent along the main road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor, by way of Gaines' mill, while Longstreet was moved along a private road between the main road and the Chickahominy, nearly parallel to

those leading to the Gaines house, which was west of the swamp behind Gaines' mill, and the New bridge over the Chickahominy. Jackson's guide conducted Ewell, by a road leading to Walnut Grove church on the main river road, west instead of east of the right flank and rear of McClellan's new position. This brought Ewell face to face with A. P. Hill, instead of some distance to his left, thus paralyzing the movements of each of these division commanders. D. H. Hill, who had been ordered to report to Jackson, pushed forward, from Mechanicsville, on the road leading to Bethesda church and Porter's right rear. By 2 p. m. Jackson had D. H. Hill's division in front of Old Cold Harbor, pressing forward upon Porter's right flank and rear, through fallen timber and tangled brushwood, which the enemy had provided as a defense to the rear of his right flank. This forward movement was opposed by sharpshooters. Lee, at Walnut Grove church, in front of which his line of battle, under A. P. Hill and Longstreet, was advancing toward the enemy's position beyond Powhite swamp, had ordered Jackson to continue his eastward course, strike Porter's rear and threaten his communications with York river, expecting this closing down upon his front, flank and rear would drive him down the Chickahominy.


Having, by strenuous efforts, got his troops in position north of Old Cold Harbor, Jackson ordered forward Bondurant's battery to draw the fire of the Federal guns and thus reveal their position, which was screened by intervening forests. The furious fire that this action drew, furnished Jackson the information he wanted, at about 2:30 p. m., just as Hill was moving his division to assault the Federals at New Cold Harbor, having already driven Porter's skirmishers from Gaines' mill and the immediate line of Powhite swamp. Knowing that Longstreet was on his right, Hill, with his usual impetuous ardor, dashed across Powhite swamp and the obstructions that had been placed behind it, and rushed against the strong batteries and intrenched lines of the Federal center, and in fierce contention strove, for two hours, to carry the strong Federal position. He forced Porter to call for help, and at 3:30 Slocum added his 5,000 men to the defense. Hill had endured this fierce contest without assistance. Of course he could not with his single attacking line, against formidable obstacles, drive from

Scale of Miles

# MAP OF BATTLE-FIELD OF MECHANICSVILLE AND COLD HARBOR, VA.

— Union  
— Confederate

- A. Mechanicville Bridge
- B. J. R. Anderson's Brigade
- C. Road to Meadlow Bridge
- D. Brinck's Brigade from Half Sink
- E. Road on which Ewell came
- F. Charge of 38<sup>th</sup> N. C. June 26<sup>th</sup>
- G. Charge of 1<sup>st</sup> N. C. and 44<sup>th</sup> Ga
- H. Plutheston, Wilcox, Pryor
- I. Field's Brigade
- K. Jackson during battle June 26<sup>th</sup>
- m. Longstreet's route
- n. A. P. Hill's route
- o. Jackson's route
- p. D. H. Hill's route
- Q. D. H. Hill's Division
- R. Ewell and Lawton
- S. A. P. Hill and Jackson
- T. Whitely's charge
- V. Pickett's Brigade
- y. Wilcox's column
- x. Federal guns
- a. Morell's Division
- b. Sykes' Division
- c. M<sup>c</sup> Call's Division
- d. Stocum's Division
- e. Cavalry



From original in the possession of the Southern Historical Society.



their intrenched and barricaded position three lines of infantry, one above the other, on a steep slope, protected by fallen timber, and having the ridge behind them occupied by heavy guns that poured upon him shot and shell over the heads of the Federal infantry. At 4, Lee ordered Longstreet to make a demonstration against Porter's left, toward the Chickahominy, on Turkey hill. The crest of this hill, crowned with numerous Federal batteries, was 60 feet higher than the plateau opposite, on which Longstreet formed his line of battle. Numerous and elaborate defenses protected the slope of Turkey hill at this point, just as above; at the same time, McClellan's heavy siege guns, from his position south of the Chickahominy, had an enfilade fire on Longstreet's right as he advanced. These conditions led Longstreet to concentrate his entire division to strike the blow he had been ordered to give, and it was 7 o'clock before he was ready to move.

In the meantime, Jackson had not been idle. No leader of fighting men better understood the necessity of joining in a fight, when a fight was on, than he did; and when he found himself in front of Old Cold Harbor and heard the sound of firing on his right, he knew that the thing for him to do was to help defeat the enemy and drive him from his position, rather than be a looker-on and continue moving to the eastward, as he might have done under the general instructions of his orders. His divisions stretched across several miles of country, eastward and westward, through forests and across swampy creeks with steep and difficult banks, but he had so arranged them that they could be promptly moved when the emergency came for so doing. His chief of staff, Major Dabney, was quite unwell, having been overcome by the intense heat and the exertions of the past few days in the discharge of his arduous duties. The rest of the staff were scattered, under orders, and Jackson began giving instructions to Major Dabney to ride rapidly to the right and send forward each division, as he reached its commander, instructing each to bear to the left in moving forward, thus bringing his line of battle into successive action in echelon. Just as he was concluding his instructions, another staff officer, whose duty really was not on the field of battle, came up. Jackson at once directed Major Dabney to remain with him, while he sent this officer to



deliver his orders. The major protested, knowing that it was dangerous to intrust such important orders to one not accustomed to such duty, but Jackson, aware of Dabney's exhausted physical condition, persisted. The result was, that this officer instructed the several division commanders, not to move, but to be ready to move, and so an hour or more of precious time was lost, during which Jackson was impatiently waiting to hear the sound of his guns attacking the enemy's flank and rear and bringing relief to Hill. Major Dabney, sent to the rear for another purpose, was also impatiently listening for this attack, and, not hearing it, he, without orders, rode at full speed to the nearest division, and finding what orders had been given it, promptly ordered it into action, and so, in succession, gave the order to each division, when the whole line promptly swept into action; D. H. Hill on the left, followed on the right by Ewell, Jackson's old division, then Whiting. As the sound of the guns of these advances rang out, a wild yell swept through the lines of A. P. Hill and Longstreet, "Jackson's come." Pressing forward, though somewhat in disorder from the character of the country passed over, Jackson's men soon enveloped Porter's right and center, relieved A. P. Hill's exhausted men, and, with fixed bayonets, swept over all obstructions, whether of nature or of man. Lee, intently listening for the sound of battle, hearing Jackson's opening, promptly ordered his whole line to press forward.

Magruder performed his part well in holding the Federal troops south of the Chickahominy, marching and countermarching his infantry in deceptive movements and keeping his artillery in constant action. Porter soon saw that, unaided, he could not long resist the tide of battle that was now rolling full along his front and closing in on his flanks. He called for reinforcements, which McClellan ordered from Franklin and Sumner, across the river. Franklin replied that for him to send was "not prudent," and Sumner, more threatened by the brave Magruder, replied, "hazardous;" but 5,000 men, the brigades of French and Meagher, were sent to Porter's rear, as the day was closing, and reached Turkey hill just in time to receive the routed living remnant of Porter's corps. The forests and the condition of the country occupied by Lee's lines, prevented the use of muchartil-

lery in this battle of Gaines' Mill, but braver, daring and more heroic endeavor was never made by patriotic soldiers than on that day, all along the lines, especially by Hill's North Carolinians and Virginians, Lawton's Georgians, and memorably by Hood's Texans, who stormed the heights of Turkey and McGehee's hills, sweeping across fences and ditches, through fallen timber and abatis, and over intrenchments which blazed with sheeted fire from infantry and artillery, from the entire Federal front, leaving well-nigh half of their comrades dead or wounded on the way, and rolling back, in a sullen tide of defeat, both the regulars and the volunteers of Porter's corps, and becoming masters of the heights they had so bravely stormed. As it ever did, Jackson's "Stonewall brigade" pushed into the thickest of the fight, across the path of Ewell, and bore its full share in winning this glorious victory.

Porter's men were brave fighters and could not well have been asked to do more than they did to hold their position. Especially was this true of the Federal center and left, which held on stubbornly after Jackson had crushed their right. To the disposing of these Jackson then addressed himself, sending Whiting with the 4,000 of Hood and Law, to move with trailed arms, at double-quick, down the slope to the swamp and then rush up the steep ascent to the Federal fortress. Hood's Texans on the right, with Law's Mississippians and Alabamians on the left, swept silently forward, losing a thousand men as they advanced; then, with wild yell, leaped over obstruction after obstruction, cleared the breastworks, and followed in hot pursuit the retreating Federals that fled before their fierce courage and withering fire. All caught the notes of coming victory, and to its wild music rushed forward and helped to make that victory complete.

The reinforcements that McClellan had brought across the Chickahominy were just in time to oppose the onward rush of the Confederates, and to form a line of defense behind which the routed Federals could rally, enabling Porter to form a new line with 35,000 men, just in front of the Chickahominy, on the very verge of Turkey hill. This Porter managed with soldierly skill and obstinately held on until darkness enabled him to cross that stream, destroy the bridges behind him, and join McClellan's main body on the south side of that river. The loss of 7,000

men and 22 guns and the capture of two almost impregnable fortress-like hills, crowned by embattled hosts, attested the daring courage of Lee's men and the vigorous defense of Porter's. Only the closing in of night prevented the capture of the whole Federal force north of the Chickahominy.

Lee had now successfully carried out the first part of his plan, having driven McClellan from his menacing position north of the Chickahominy and become master of his line of communication with his base on the York. He now proposed to follow up his victory and capture the Federal army, but McClellan gave him but a partial opportunity for accomplishing this result. Astute enough to forecast what might happen when Lee, reinforced by Jackson, should fall upon his right, which he had fondly hoped would have been doubled in strength by the arrival of McDowell, he had provided for a change of base by having supplies for his army sent up the James, to Westover, accompanied by a fleet of gunboats to convoy and safeguard them, and at the same time furnish a defense in case his army should have to fall back to that river.

Disheartened by the severe punishment he had received, at the hands of Lee, at Gaines' mill and Cold Harbor, McClellan at midnight of the 27th, after the remnant of Porter's corps was safely across the Chickahominy and had destroyed the bridges behind it, ordered five of his corps to begin the retreat across White Oak swamp to the banks of the James. This was the only way of escape now left him from the toils of Lee. It is true that on the morning of the 28th he had 105,000 men, more than two-thirds of whom had not been engaged the day before, and that between him and Richmond was a force, under Magruder and Huger, only about one-fourth as large as his own, while two-thirds of Lee's army were still north of the unbridged and unfordable Chickahominy and farther from Richmond than his own. Here was an opportunity for a great captain, who "took no counsel of his fears," to capture the Confederate capital by a prompt and vigorous assault, and accomplish the object of his grand campaign. But McClellan was not such a leader and Lee knew it, and had no apprehension that such an attack would be made, although he expected and prepared for a renewal of the combat before McClellan would give

up the formidable position that he still held between the Chickahominy and the White Oak swamp. But McClellan had made up his mind to escape from his sturdy antagonist, and there is no evidence that any of his subordinates opposed this conclusion.

On the morning of the 28th of June, Porter's corps, with a great array of heavy guns, stood on the south side of the Chickahominy, facing Lee and defiantly ready to oppose his advance. Four corps faced Richmond, extending from a fortified work on the Golding farm, on the border of the Chickahominy swamp, southward to the natural defense of the great White Oak swamp, a closed, living gate of well-armed and well-supplied men, in battle array, with well-protected flanks. Thus guarded in flanks and rear, McClellan started his 5,000 wagons and great herd of beef cattle, preceded by Keyes' corps, to open the way along the single road that led southward across the White Oak swamp toward his chosen retreat on the James. The dense forests completely concealed this movement from observation. Before noonday, Keyes had crossed the White Oak bridge and was four miles beyond it, near Charles City cross roads, guarding the approaches from Richmond by the two great highways south of the swamp. All day the impedimenta of the Federal army were forced, with Northern energy, to the rear along the hidden, muddy roads that led through the forest wilderness. This unexpected movement was so well-concealed that it was on for four-and-twenty hours before Lee was informed of it, or could divine McClellan's intentions. The morning after the battle he had hastened Stuart, followed by Ewell, who was farthest on his left, down the Chickahominy river road to Dispatch Station. Stuart spared no time in seizing the railway, damaging its track and attacking the Federal guard, which he scattered from Dispatch Station. They saved him the trouble of destroying the bridge across the Chickahominy as they retreated toward McClellan's army. Stuart hastened after these trains loaded with ammunition and supplies, which plunged into the Chickahominy, while his dashing troopers followed the railway to the White House, with fire and sword, and captured or destroyed the enormous supplies and the scattered encampments which had been gathered along that line of communication to McClellan's base of supplies.

The steadily coming messages from Stuart soon satisfied Lee that McClellan must be seeking another base, but the question as to what one, he could not, as yet, decide. Two ways were open. He could reach the peninsula by the lower fords of the Chickahominy, as Grant did two years later. If he did this, it was necessary for Lee to remain north of the Chickahominy and pursue him toward Williamsburg. McClellan's alternative was to seek the James, which he was already doing, but unknown to Lee. The bold front presented by Porter was a serious obstacle in the way of pursuing McClellan's rear, so Ewell was ordered to hold Bottom's bridge, across the Chickahominy on the Williamsburg road, while Stuart watched the roads farther down leading to the peninsula. It did not take the hot June sun long to dry up the common roads by which McClellan was retreating, and the clouds of dust from these roads, late in the day of the 28th, told the observant Stuart what was going on, and he quickly apprised Lee that McClellan was in full retreat toward the James.

On the morning of the 29th, at the dawn of day, Lee took up the pursuit of his retreating foe. Longstreet and A. P. Hill crossed the Chickahominy at the New bridge, opposite to which they had bivouacked, and marched southward with orders to take the Darbytown road to the Long bridge until they should strike the right flank of McClellan's line of retreat. Magruder preceded these down the Williamsburg road, through the Seven Pines battlefield, and between the Chickahominy and the White Oak swamps. Huger was sent along the Charles City road on the south side of White Oak swamp, while Holmes led his 6,000 down the River road to strike the line of retreat to Malvern hill. Jackson was left to rebuild Grapevine bridge, to which a road led from Old Cold Harbor, with orders to cross and follow McClellan's rear.

Lee did his best to strike McClellan's retreat with some of these marching columns, in the afternoon of Sunday, June 29th. The Federal army was stretched along the road from Savage Station to Malvern hill. Keyes, followed by the remnants of Porter's corps, led the advance and guarded the approaches to the Quaker road, along which the trains were moving to and across Malvern hill. The fragments of McCall's and Slocum's divisions had crossed the White Oak swamp and encamped

near Willis' church, near the knot of cross roads in the vicinity of Glendale. Heintzelman had crossed White Oak swamp and was going into bivouac just south of that, at 10 p. m. At about 4 p. m. Sumner's corps and part of Franklin's were holding the rear against an onslaught by Magruder at Savage Station. At about half past six, Heintzelman was crossing White Oak swamp at Brackett's ford,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles above the swamp bridge, and by 10 p. m. he was bivouacking south of the swamp in front of Charles City cross roads, covering the Charles City road from Richmond. Charles City cross roads, on the watershed between White Oak swamp and Turkey Island creek, was notable for the fact that at or near that point the roads leading north to Bottom's bridge, northeast to the Long bridges, south to Malvern hill, southwest to New Market, and northwest to Richmond, all leading highways as well as numerous farm roads, met in intersection; it was also about halfway between the James and the Chickahominy, and in consequence of the coming together of so many roads, it was the most vulnerable point in McClellan's line of retreat. Knowing this, Lee bent all his energies to there strike a blow on McClellan's right flank.

McClellan also knew, from a personal inspection, the danger that threatened him at that place, and he had provided against it by sending Heintzelman across White Oak swamp at Brackett's ford, a mile and a half above the swamp bridge, so that his line of southward march would place him in position across the New Market and the Charles City, roads leading toward Richmond. To strike this point, Lee, all day, urged forward Huger by the Charles City road, Longstreet and A. P. Hill by the Darbytown road and the Long bridges road, and Holmes by the River road, to either support Hill and Longstreet, or to strike the head of the Federal retreat where the River road and the Quaker road met on Malvern hill. Success for Lee depended entirely upon the vigor and speed of these movements, but Huger was held back by the obstructions the Federals had thrown across the Charles City road, while Longstreet, after making but 12 miles, went into camp near Darbytown, only about six miles from the fatal point at the Charles City cross roads.

The 29th was consumed by Jackson in working hard to bridge the Chickahominy so he could join in the pursuit.

Magruder put but part of his men into the battle at Savage station, and so failed to drive away McClellan's rear guard, that there stubbornly held the road; while Holmes failed to reach and head off McClellan at Malvern hill. So the day passed without decisive results to Lee, and McClellan's retreat was continued with but little molestation.

The morning of June 30th found McClellan's entire army and heavy trains, including his hundred heavy siege guns and numerous batteries of field artillery, safely across the White Oak swamp, and by 10 a. m. Richardson's division, his rear guard on the main road, was destroying the swamp bridge. He now had 60,000 men in a naturally strong position, facing northward and westward, covering the roads leading to and from Charles City cross roads, with his flanks protected by swamps, and with the same sort of well-nigh impenetrable defenses covering nearly his entire front. The approaching roadways were all guarded by artillery, and his men had not been slow to everywhere add fallen timber and abatis to the defenses offered by the creeks and swamps. At the southern end of the swamp bridge was Frayser's farm, clear to the north and with forests to the south. There was placed Franklin with 20,000 men and a park of artillery, facing north and constituting the right wing of McClellan's army, ready to contest the passage of White Oak swamp. To the left, covering the roads from Richmond and the important junction of roads at Charles City cross roads, sweeping in an arc westward and southward, were 40,000 men under Sumner and Heintzelman. The position was, naturally, an exceedingly strong defensive one, and the disposition of the Federal troops could not well have been better made. They were now ready for the opening of the contest which is known in history by the names of White Oak Swamp, Frayser's Farm, Charles City Cross-roads, Glendale or Willis' Church; Glendale being the name of a plantation just south of Charles City cross roads, and Willis' church a point a mile in the same, direction from the same point on the Quaker road.

By 11 o'clock in the morning, the head of Jackson's column appeared at the northern end of the destroyed White Oak swamp bridge. Franklin at once opened on this with his heavy batteries. Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, brought twenty-eight guns

promptly into position and soon drove back Franklin's artillery, when Jackson attempted to force the passage of the swamp; but Franklin successfully resisted this with his more numerous muskets aiding his artillery and with two brigades that were sent to his assistance from Sedgwick's division, giving him 25,000 men to meet Jackson's 21,000. Jackson, seeing that the odds were too great and that he could not get at his enemy at a single point, desisted from making a further attack; but he continued to keep Franklin's position warm with his artillery.

It was 3 o'clock in the afternoon before Huger opened his artillery on Slocum, on the Charles City road, only to find his antagonist thoroughly guarded behind broad belts of fallen trees across swampy ground, so he desisted from attack. Lee, in person, directed Longstreet into battle about 4 p. m., with less than 20,000 men, along the New Market road toward Charles City Court House, or the Glendale farm, against double his numbers holding McClellan's left. Longstreet had charge of the contest. His advance was through fallen timber, tangled underbrush, and hummocky ground on his left, while on his right the head swamp of the western branch of Turkey run was between him and the Federal left. Eager for the fray, Longstreet's men rushed forward, overcame all obstacles, and fell upon McCall's left with such a blow that his men fled, in panic, backward through Hooker's line of battle in their rear. The rush against Kearny's left was not successful, for he not only had Slocum's aid but two brigades from Franklin's left, while Hooker assailed Longstreet's victorious flank. A. P. Hill moved rapidly to Longstreet's assistance, but the Confederates were only able to hold the ground they had won from McCall, having captured that leader and fourteen of his field guns.

While this Frayser's Farm-Glendale battle was raging, Holmes, with his 6,000 men and a six-gun battery on the River road, crossed the western branch of Turkey Island creek and was crossing Malvern ridge toward Turkey Island bridge, when Warren, with 30 guns and 1,500 men, assisted by the gunboats in the James, which had an enfiladed fire on Holmes' line, drove him back. At Holmes' call, Magruder was turned from near Longstreet's battlefield to Malvern hill, to take part in the conflict there pending; but that was over before he arrived.



The Federals had held their line of retreat for another day, though with considerable loss, and when darkness came the corps commanders, without waiting for orders from the commanding general, took up their line of retreat toward the position that McClellan, in person, had selected on the James, passing through the strong force of infantry and the line of powerful artillery that had already been placed across the Malvern ridge to guard the way to the longed-for refuge. McClellan's night dispatch of the 30th, to Secretary of War Stanton, reads: "Another day of desperate fighting. I fear I shall be forced to abandon my material to save my men under cover of the gunboats. You must send us very large reinforcements."

July 1st, the last day of the Seven Days' battles around Richmond, found the Federal army in probably the strongest position it had yet held, on Malvern ridge, a tongue of high land projecting southeastward, almost to the James, between the two principal branches of Turkey Island creek, which meet, near the southwestern end of this ridge, about a mile from the mouth of this creek in the James. This ridge was not only commanding in elevation, but the larger portion of it, where occupied by the Federal army, was cleared and open land, which could be swept by artillery, while its slopes extended to swampy grounds along the bordering creeks.

McClellan placed his main line at right angles to this ridge and to the Quaker road that ran along its crest just south of the junction with the road leading to Charles City cross-roads by Willis' church, along which Jackson would advance, and the one leading to Richmond by way of Darbytown, along which would be the advance of Longstreet and those under him. The flanks of this Federal front extended to the edge of the bluffs above the swampy branches of Turkey run. A cloud of sharpshooters covered the front. Couch's corps was behind these, on the right of the road, with Heintzelman's and Sumner's corps in his rear, but farther extended to the east. Morrell was on the left of the Quaker road, with Sykes in his rear, covering a cross road leading to Holmes' position on the River road. The whole front was faced with protected batteries, while others occupied commanding positions in the rear near his flanks. This made the approach from the Confederate side very difficult, as

these numerous Federal batteries swept the entire front. This part of the Federal line was less than a mile long, and nearly the whole of McClellan's great army was placed within this mile of frontage and a half mile back of it.

Just in the rear of this formidable battle array, the road to Harrison's landing, the point on the James to which McClellan was retreating, diverged to the south-eastward from the Quaker road and from the Malvern ridge. At right angles to his main line and extending southward from his left for nearly a mile to the eastward of the Quaker road, McClellan had covered the bluffs, looking to the westward, with his splendid train of heavy siege guns which he had carefully saved for such an occasion. These swept the whole country in his rear and also the approaches from Richmond by the River road. At the southern end of this projecting ridge and at right angles to its line of heavy batteries, was a still more formidable massing of guns, commanding the River road under the brow of the ridge and leading to the position at Harrison's landing, which he had already covered with formidable earthworks. Warren's division was also placed across this River road at the point of the ridge. But McClellan had another strong arm of defense which was a hitherto unknown element in his fighting. A large number of Federal gunboats had come up James river and were anchored in Turkey Island bend, so that their guns not only enfiladed the whole western front of McClellan's position, but had a range, for their huge shells, to beyond the northern front of his line of battle, and raked the right of the position the oncoming Confederate lines of attack would be compelled to occupy. This co-operation of the sea power of the Federals more than doubled the strength of its local land power, great as that was, and effectually prevented any attack upon the left flank or the rear of the Malvern ridge.

Continuing his pursuit of McClellan on the 1st of July, Lee reached the front of the Federal position about noon-day, and disposed a portion of the forces of Huger and Jackson, which had approached by the converging roads before referred to; the former on the right and the latter on the left. Magruder had been ordered to the same point, by the Quaker road, but it so happened that there were two roads in that region having the same name; he

had taken the wrong one, and finding out his mistake had countermarched, but did not reach the field of battle until late in the day. A. P. Hill and Longstreet were held in reserve, and it was useless for Holmes to attack the intrenched bluff before him bristling with heavy guns and well guarded by numerous nearby gunboats.

There were but few available positions for Lee's artillery, but these Jackson availed himself of; on the left with the batteries of Balthis, Poague and Carpenter, while on the right those of Grimes and Moorman, first put in, were soon driven back and their places taken by Davidson and Pegram. None of these could long withstand the fury of the concentrated fire of the seventy guns that swept the slope in front of the Federal position. Forming his men in the edge of the forest and on the borders of the swamp, Lee ordered his front line, under Huger, Magruder, D. H. Hill and Whiting, to move against the enemy. Armistead's brigade, on the right, was to take the initiative, with a yell and a rush. The assault was not simultaneous. D. H. Hill alone advanced, with his own yell, but Armistead did not. Later, Magruder fiercely contended to reach the Federal left, but Huger failed to support him vigorously, and although he shook Porter's line so that that brave fighter called for reinforcements, Magruder was compelled to retire under the storm of canister and musketry that swept the open slope up which he was leading his brave men. D. H. Hill's assault upon the Federal center was bold and brave, and caused Couch's line to stagger; but Whiting, not hearing Hill's signal, failed to move to his assistance, while the near-at-hand Federal reserves swarmed to the aid of Couch and drove Hill back with great slaughter. Lee hurried forward reinforcements, but to no purpose, for night put an end to the battle before they could join in the issue, leaving him holding only his first position and to mourn the loss of 5,000 killed and wounded of his brave and fearless soldiery. Some of his division commanders had failed to comprehend his orders, and so were late in reaching the field of action; others had failed to advance at the appointed time, and so the attack was irregular, and therefore not forceful. The tangled forests and swamps through which he had to advance, greatly hindered the tactical disposition of his troops, so that he only succeeded in bringing fourteen brigades into

action, and these but by twos or threes at a time, making their repulse certain from the massed Federal infantry and the tiers of batteries in front of them.

Notwithstanding the results of the day's combats and the almost impregnable nature of his position, McClellan was unwilling to try another issue, and as soon as dark fell, he ordered Porter to lead a retreat toward Harrison's landing, on the James, where he had ready for his army an intrenched camp covered by an extended line of gunboats. His thought may be imagined from two lines in his retreat order to Porter: "In case you should find it impossible to move your heavy artillery, you are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages;" and, "Stimulate your men by informing them that reinforcements, etc., have arrived at our new base." The appearance of the road passed over in the retreat, looked, the next morning, like one followed by a routed army. Abandoned wagons were all along the way, and thousands of muskets were scattered along its sides. Hooker, a Federal corps commander, writes: "It was like the retreat of a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody on the road at the same time, and a few shots from the rebels would have stricken the whole command in panic."

On the 2d of July, which turned out to be a very rainy day, Lee ordered Longstreet in pursuit on the direct road to Harrison's landing, but that slow-moving general only made two miles of progress, and went into bivouac when he reached the River road. The army was counter-marched, on the 3d, to Willis' church, to there take the road toward Charles City Court House and leading to the right flank of McClellan's new base and position on the James. But the guides again misled, in that country of tangled roads involved in worse tangled forests and swamps, and his advance, under Longstreet, was again retarded, so that he did not appear in the vicinity of Westover, on the right flank and front of McClellan's fortified camp, until noon of July 4th, to find that the skill of the Federal engineers, and the energy and zeal of its Northern soldiery, had encircled the entire front of the Federal camp with formidable breastworks, well supplied with artillery, the approaches to which were within the range of the gunboats, stationed in the James all along the rear of the Federal camp.

But three short months had passed since the superbly organized and every way equipped army of the Potomac had begun its "on to Richmond," but its every movement had been a failure. Jackson, with a small force in hand, had with strategic power routed or demoralized and then left stranded in the Valley 60,000 of its best men, during a month and a half of this quarter of a year. First Magruder, and then J. E. Johnston, had delayed and badly damaged the march of the main body, under the leadership of McClellan in person, on the Peninsula, keeping him back with fierce blows at Williamsburg, Yorktown and Eltham's landing, and by a bold front at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, held him hesitating in sight of Richmond. Lee, taking immediate command after the wounding of Johnston, had gathered from all directions his scattered forces, hurled them fiercely upon McClellan's lines and intrenchments, and after seven days of fierce contention at Ellison's mill, Gaines' mill, Charles City cross-roads and Malvern hill, had driven him back, followed by dire disaster, and left him stranded on the banks of the James with a loss of 16,000 men. The heroic struggles had cost Lee 20,000 of his brave Confederates, but had relieved his capital.

Calmly reviewing these stirring events, Lee deliberately and honestly wrote: "Under ordinary circumstances, the Federal army should have been destroyed." Seeking reasons why that result had not been accomplished, he found them in the "want of correct and timely information." This, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, but largely chargeable to the lack of trained staff organization, "enabled General McClellan to skillfully conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstructions with which Nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns; but regret that more was not accomplished gives way to gratitude to the Sovereign Ruler of the universe for the results achieved."

Lee recalled these results to his army in a general order of July 7th, in which he said:

The immediate fruits of our success are the relief of Richmond from a state of siege; the rout of the great army that so long menaced its safety; many thousand prisoners, including officers of high rank; the capture or destruction of stores to the value of millions; the acquisition of thousands of arms and forty pieces of artillery. The service rendered to the country in this short but eventful period can scarcely be estimated, and the general commanding cannot ade-

quately express his admiration of the courage, endurance and soldierly conduct of the officers and men engaged. These brilliant results have cost us the loss of many brave men, but while we mourn the loss of our gallant dead, let us not forget that they died nobly in defense of their country's freedom, and have linked their memory with an event that will live forever in the hearts of a grateful people. Soldiers, your country will thank you for the heroic conduct you have displayed, conduct worthy of men engaged in a cause so just and sacred, and deserving a nation's gratitude and praise.

The cheers of the army of Northern Virginia, as the victorious chieftain rode along their columns returning to resting and recruiting camps in the vicinity of Richmond, were their reciprocating general order. In leading them to conquer their foes, he had conquered their lasting admiration and devotion, and henceforward, whether in victory or defeat, their confidence in Lee continued unchanged, as it will continue among their descendants and their people "to the last syllable of recorded time."

## CHAPTER XVII.

### STONEWALL JACKSON'S CEDAR RUN CAMPAIGN.

THE conditions and the scene of conflict in Virginia now changed. McClellan, whining like a well-whipped schoolboy, and in so doing damaging his military reputation, begged for reinforcements and for permission, when reinforced, to make another attempt on Richmond. But the Federal government, alarmed at the result of its gigantic effort to capture Richmond, now feared, and justly, that Lee's victorious army might take up the line of march to menace its own capital; so, instead of reinforcing McClellan and permitting him to try again an "on to Richmond," it ordered him back to the line of the Potomac and to the front of Washington.

When it was learned that the ubiquitous Jackson was really engaged in the contest with McClellan at Richmond, the army that had been waiting for him in the valley, finding none to oppose it, ventured to cross the Blue ridge at Chester gap, and encamp in the lovely coves of Piedmont Virginia, just under and amid the spurs of the grand mountains in the vicinity of Sperryville; where, on the 26th day of June, with the roar of booming cannon, the echoes of which were heard as far away as Gordonsville, was organized from the armies of Fremont, Banks and McDowell, the "army of Virginia," under Maj.-Gen. John Pope. Its three corps, of now well-rested veterans, were prepared for another campaign—to essay another "on to Richmond" from another direction. The 13,000 men under Burnside, in North Carolina, were hastened to the Potomac end of the Richmond, Potomac & Fredericksburg railroad at Aquia creek, to guard the left of the new movement; and preparations were hastened to bring back the great host still on the James with McClellan, and add that to the new army of Virginia.

Excellent highways led from the Rappahannock region, where Pope was encamped, to Gordonsville and Culpeper,

and the march was not a long one to either of these places. A blow at Gordonsville would break Lee's line of railway communication with his best base of supplies in the Great Valley, and it was rightly concluded that if that blow were struck, Lee would meet it with a portion of his army, and thus give McClellan, opportunity to escape.

Full of ambition to accomplish what his predecessors had failed to do, and equally full of himself, and hoping to infuse some of the same spirit into the men whom Jackson had so lately roughly handled and discomfited, Pope joined his army near Sperryville, and on the 14th of July issued a very remarkable address, in which he said, among other things:

I have come to join you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack, not defense. . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find in vogue amongst you, of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us dismiss such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance toward the enemy. Let us study the possible lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear.

After this bombastic fulmination, Pope immediately proceeded to wage unsoldierly war upon the peaceable citizens of the surrounding country, and "disaster" to these citizens followed every movement of his army. Under pain of expulsion from their homes, he ordered that every male citizen of the region dominated by him should take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and thus old men and boys, women and children became the suffering victims of this braggart, who expressed himself so anxious to meet and fight the Confederate soldiers.

McClellan was still lingering on the banks of the James, and Lee was as yet uncertain what his discomfited opponent might be ordered to do; but, watching the whole military chess-board in Virginia, he saw that it would not do to let Pope enter the field of contention without having him met by one competent to manage him, so, on the 13th of July, just as Pope was riding in from Washington to take command of his army of Virginia, Lee ordered Jackson to Gordonsville with Robert-



son's cavalry brigade and the two infantry divisions of Ewell and Winder, only about 12,000 men, but all hardy and well-tested veterans; and on the 27th another 12,000 under A. P. Hill were added to Stonewall's command. Pope's unheard-of orders came to Lee's hands during these preparations. That gentle-mannered man and model soldier characterized such threatenings against "defenseless citizens" as "atrocious," and by direction of his government sent a note to Halleck, the general commanding the Federal forces, protesting that such orders were in violation of the recent cartel entered into for the exchange of prisoners, and characterizing them as beginning "a savage war in which no quarter is to be given." Halleck did not reply to the protest; but it was noticed that Pope, for some reason, changed his behavior.

Lee still had 50,000 men in front of Richmond, watching for any opportunity to strike his enemy that might offer itself. A reconnoissance, on the south side of the James, revealed the fact that Coggin's point, opposite McClellan's camp across the James, and projecting toward its rear, commanded that camp from its bluffs and was within range of field artillery. Taking advantage of this, Lee sent D. H. Hill, secretly, to this point on July 31st, and he, under cover of darkness, startled the Federals in their camp and shipping by pouring into them the fire of forty-three pieces of artillery, doing considerable damage but suffering none, as he retired before an attack could be planned against him. This stung McClellan to seek retaliation, and on August 5th he moved out to Malvern hill, in battle array. Lee promptly advanced to Charles City cross-roads, ordering his left to threaten McClellan's rear, while with the brigades of Cobb and Evans, on the right, he drove the Federals behind the guns on the Malvern ridge and waited for the morning, designing to try again for the capture of that formidable position; but when morning came there was nothing there to meet him, as McClellan's courage failed when he found Lee ready to fight him.

Jackson's advance reached Gordonsville on the 19th of July, and he at once marched his veterans to the charming Piedmont region west of the coast range (the "little mountains of Orange," as Light Horse Harry Lee called them), where they luxuriated amid the open groves and in the grassy fields of that charming region, and recu-

perated from the effects of the miasmatic swamps of the low country in the great wild blackberry patches loaded with ripened fruit. Jackson himself pitched his camp far up on the western slope of the mountain range, whence he overlooked the terrace occupied by Pope, and could study from afar its peculiar topography, at the same time urging to tense activity in the study of the country and in the preparation of campaign maps his topographical engineers, who had again joined him. His cavalry held the line of the Rapidan up to the mouth of the Robertson, and then along that river toward the Blue ridge, communicating with the Confederate cavalry beyond, that still guarded the upper Shenandoah valley. The Federal cavalry picketed to these rivers on their northern sides. Lee had no misgivings about intrusting the care of Pope to Jackson. Writing to him, after sending Hill to his aid, he says: "Relying upon your judgment, courage and discretion, and trusting to the continued blessing of an ever-kind Providence, I hope for victory"—words and sentiments that found a responsive echo in the soul of his twin brother in the art of war.

Watching, through his cavalry, his scouts and his spies, for a coveted opportunity to meet his arrogant adversary, whom he constantly deceived by his own marchings and countermarchings (one of them 10 miles to the rear of Gordonsville to cover the coming of A. P. Hill to his army), Jackson soon found it when Pope moved forward to Culpeper Court House, and sent a portion of his command on the road leading to Orange Court House, but leaving parts of it strung all along the way, back for many miles, to Sperryville, at the foot of the Blue ridge, where a whole division under Sigel still tarried in camp. Pope's strategic force on the 7th of August was 36,500 men; but his tactic force, within easy reach of Jackson, was but a part of this number, and Jackson knew it. This partial force was the 8,000 men under Banks, an old Valley acquaintance of Jackson's army, in an advanced camp across the Rapidan. Ricketts' division, of about 10,000, was nearer to Culpeper Court House, but Sigel was far away at Sperryville.

Late in the day of the 7th of August, Jackson moved his men, by concealed roads, to the vicinity of the Rapidan, where they slept on their arms and were ready to

march in the early morning of the 8th, drive in the Federal cavalry, and occupy a favorable position where the road to Culpeper crosses the low watershed between the Rapidan and Cedar run. The day was intensely hot, the roads dusty, and both animals and men suffered fearfully. A misunderstanding of orders by one of his division commanders, which led to an interference of marching columns, added to the delay caused by the heat and the dust. On the morning of the 9th, Jackson moved forward and drew up his line of battle in the edge of the forest that crowned the Cedar run watershed, at right angles to the road and to the range of low hills known as the Cedar Run or Slaughter's mountain, that, covered with forest, extended parallel to the road and at right angles to his line on his right. A road ran along the top of this broken ridge, which Jackson proceeded to occupy with artillery and a portion of Ewell's division. The basin of Cedar run, crossed by that stream about a mile in his front, lay spread out before him, the larger portion of it divided into the fields of cultivated plantations, but with patches of forest, especially on its western side, along which ran the highway to Culpeper, on the west of which was a low ridge, mostly covered by forest but gashed with fields extending from the road to its crest.

Jackson, by a glance over the field of contest, discovered that he had secured an advantageous position for disposing of his troops for either attack or defense. He turned Ewell's division, which was in advance, to the eastern side of the Culpeper road, and Ewell himself, leading his right, advanced it to Cedar mountain, accompanied by a number of guns, for which he found good positions on the slope and crest of Slaughter's mountain. Early's brigade was formed on the left, followed by Hays' and Trimble's. Winder's division was ordered to support Early, but in echelon, extending his line to the left of the Culpeper road. Several batteries followed, on Early's right, through the open fields, while those of Winder followed the highway. Early's skirmishers soon advanced and drove back the Federal cavalry across Cedar run. Numerous Federal batteries, from the slopes beyond the run, opened on him as he advanced, but these were promptly answered by those on Jackson's left, center and right, and an active artillery duel was kept up for nearly two hours.

At about 10 o'clock, Pope, from Culpeper, six miles in the rear, ordered Banks to the front to make an immediate attack on Jackson. Ricketts' division was held some four miles in front of Culpeper, where the Madison road enters the Orange road, as Pope was in doubt as to whether Jackson was advancing in force over the Orange road; Sigel was ordered forward from Sperryville, 20 miles away at the foot of the Blue ridge, but became no factor in the impending conflict, because, after receiving his orders, he sent back to know which road he should take, although a graded one led directly from his camp to Pope's headquarters at Culpeper, and so arrived too late to join in the combat. It was about noon when Banks' advance reached the vicinity of Cedar run, the line of which was being held by Bayard with his cavalry and artillery. Crawford's brigade was formed on the right of the road, extending up through the woods to near the crest of the low ridge before mentioned. In his front was a wheat field, also extending up the slope of the ridge and prolonged by another field, the two cutting out a narrow parallelogram from the forest. Across this field, in the edge of the forest, with its right resting in a strip of woods south of the road and its left extending a short distance into the edge of the forest to the north of it, Jackson placed Taliaferro's brigade. Banks placed Augur's division, of three brigades, on the left of the road, thus extending his line to the south along the slope toward Cedar creek from the eastward. In Augur's front, next to the Culpeper road, was a large field of standing Indian corn; to the south of that, pasture fields reached to the foot of Slaughter mountain. The topography of the ground occupied by Banks was well suited for defense. That commander, smarting under the criticisms that Jackson's Valley campaign had brought upon him, and having in hand Pope's peremptory order to attack, was in a fighting mood, and doubtless thought that he now had an opportunity for settling with Jackson and regaining his lost reputation.

About 5 p. m. of the long August day, when the sun in that locality does not set before half past seven, and being in battle array, Banks ordered an advance, by one brigade on the north and two on the south of the road, which moved promptly and bravely forward. Gordon's brigade, one of the best in the division, remained in

reserve on the right, while Green's remained guarding the left. It was plain to be seen, from the Federal line, that there was a wide gap in the open field between Early's right and the left of Ewell's other brigades. The Federals attempted to break Jackson's line through this opening; but Early, always quickly comprehending the wants of his position, had already asked for reinforcements to fill this space, and Jackson promptly furnished Thomas' brigade of A. P. Hill's division, and so made his line an unbroken front.

The Federal advance on the north of the road, that of Crawford's brigade, was more successful. Taliaferro's brigade held the road and the strip of woods to the south of it on Early's left, but with several batteries between, and extended a short distance north of the road along the edge of the forest and that of the wheat field. His line was prolonged to the left, in the woods, by Campbell's brigade. It was unfortunate that the brave and prudent Winder was not at this point to look after these brigades of his division. He had been mortally wounded by the fragment of a shell, just as the action commenced some hours before. Crawford, with his own and part of Gordon's brigade on the Federal right, soon emerged from the forest, and in gallant style swept across the wheat field, diagonally turning on his left, and struck first Campbell's brigade and then Taliaferro's, and drove them back in great confusion, thus threatening for the time to effectually turn Jackson's left and gain possession of his rear. The Confederate officers of the two brigades that had been flanked, aided by Jackson in person and all his staff, made heroic efforts to rally their men. Every regimental commander was either killed or wounded, and they met with but small success in their efforts, and the winning tide of Federal soldiery swept eastward across the road and struck Early's left, breaking or driving back the half of his brigade. The Thirteenth Virginia, under Col. James A. Walker, though forced back on Early's left, made a determined resistance, holding on to its organization, and became a check on the Federal attack. Early's right, parts of the Twelfth Georgia and the Fifty-second and Fifty-eighth Virginia (parts of Gen. Edward Johnson's old command on Alleghany mountain and at McDowell), held their ground and beat back the oncoming tide. As soon as this Federal attack

developed, Jackson ordered Winder's brigade, the old Stonewall, through the woods on his left, overlapping the right flank of the Federal movement. The Thirty-third and Twenty-seventh Virginia regiments promptly engaged with the enemy that had scattered Taliaferro's men; the Twenty-seventh had to give way, but at this opportune moment Branch's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, which Jackson had, by orders, been urging forward during the day, came up in gallant style and moved in on the right of the Stonewall brigade, extending its line to the road, and boldly pushing forward struck the flank of the victorious Federal column and hurled it in confusion to the rear. The left of the Stonewall brigade, at the same time, wheeled into action, and Crawford's men, yielding to the force of superior numbers, fled, under a destructive fire, across the wheat field to find refuge in the forest, whence he had advanced, and behind his reserves, which he, too late, had ordered into action. The brave Gordon promptly moved forward to save the day and attempted to check the Confederates; but Jackson, at that time, had extended his left with the brigades of Archer and Pender of Hill's division, and thrown his extreme left forward around the upper end of the wheat field, so that when Gordon advanced he found himself within a blaze of musketry, both in front and flank, and was forced in disorder from the field, after losing fully one-third of his men. A small battalion of Federal cavalry then charged down the Culpeper road to aid in saving a battery, but these were quickly repulsed. Of Jackson's routed men, some rallied on Walker's Thirteenth Virginia and others joined the fresh brigades moving in on the left, and took part in securing the victory.

The brigades of Geary and Prince, which extended Augur's line south of the road, were also swept away by the Confederate counterstroke, Early having joined in the forward movement along with Thomas, and borne an active part in turning the tide of victory. Ewell, on Jackson's right, watched the fierce contention from Slaughter's ridge, impatient to join in the fray; but the Confederate batteries, which, with their usual daring, were being pressed forward, not only to answer those of the enemy but to fire at short range into their lines of battle, so swept the field that he could not enter it without passing through their fire. When the direction of

this fire changed, later in the day, Ewell's two brigades advanced and joined in the thickening combat. His artillery, from a bench in Slaughter's field at the north-eastern end of the mountain ridge, opened with an enfilade on the Federal left and made that portion of its line untenable. Thus vigorously and unflinchingly pressed in front and flanks, by a superior tactic force, resistance, though determined and brave, was no longer possible, and the entire Federal corps retreated in disorder nearly two miles to the rear, to find refuge behind the division of Ricketts, which had been in the meantime thrown forward for this purpose and to check Jackson's pursuit. The latter pressed forward, from his right, Field's fresh brigade of A. P. Hill's division, with Pegram's battery, which opened on the retreating Federals, adding to their confusion; but several batteries, which Ricketts had placed on his left, in commanding positions, soon forced this movement, which was made after nightfall, to retire. Both armies then rested in bivouac on and near the battlefield, exhausted by the intense heat of the mid-summer day and the hard struggles they had undergone.

Jackson's losses in this battle were 1,314; 611 of these were in the brigades of Jones and Taliaferro, upon which Crawford's blow had fallen at the beginning of the battle. Early lost 163, and the brigades of Winder, Branch, Archer and Pender, whose timely arrivals saved the day, lost but 273. The Confederates captured 400 prisoners, a 12-pounder gun and three colors, and gathered from the battlefield 5,300 small-arms, all of which, after deducting about 1,000 left by Jackson's killed, wounded and disorganized men, were lost by Banks' division. The Federal loss was 2,393, of which 1,661 were killed and wounded, and 732 missing. Crawford's brigade lost 867, and Gordon's 466. Generals Augur and Geary were wounded and General Prince captured.

Jackson telegraphed to Lee: "On the evening of the 9th instant God blessed our arms with another victory." Lee promptly responded: "I congratulate you most heartily on the victory which God has granted you over our enemies at Cedar run. The country owes you and your brave officers and soldiers a deep debt of gratitude."

The 10th of August was another scorching summer day. Jackson held his position in the rear of his battlefield with his skirmishers on the other side of Cedar run.

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart put in an appearance during the day, having been sent forward by Lee, with the larger portion of his cavalry, to cover the right of Lee's general movement to the vicinity of Gordonsville. Stuart reconnoitered the Federal left, moving his cavalry along the eastern side of Cedar mountain and advancing his scouts well toward Culpeper. Through these, Jackson learned that Pope already had in hand 22,000 fresh troops, under Sigel and Ricketts, 2,000 cavalry under Bayard, and about 5,000 that remained with Banks; a tactic force of about 30,000 in front of Jackson's 24,000, from which the casualties of the 9th had taken 1,000. When informed of Jackson's advance, on the 8th, Pope ordered King's division of 10,000 men up from Fredericksburg. These joined him on the 11th, so that he then had 40,000 men at command. Reno was following King with 8,000 of Burnside's corps, and he reported to Pope on the 14th.

Through the tireless Stuart, who was as ubiquitous as Jackson himself, he was kept well posted in reference to these movements of the various parts of Pope's army of Virginia. Thus informed, he reluctantly gave up his idea of further attacking Pope, but remained on the battlefield during the 10th and 11th, caring for his wounded, burying his dead, and gathering the spoils of the battlefield. On the 11th he granted Pope a truce, until 2 p. m., for removing his dead, that were not already buried, and then, on request, extended the truce until 5. During the night of the 11th he recrossed the Rapidan, and the next day reoccupied his old camps along "the little mountains of Orange," covering Gordonsville, having stolen a march on Pope, who had arranged to attack him at Cedar run, on the morning of the 12th, with double his numbers. This bold movement of Jackson, although it did not accomplish all he desired and had good reason to expect, in consequence of the condition of the weather and of the failure of his division commanders to promptly and intelligently respond to his orders, was by no means a barren victory. Pope's cavalry had made repeated efforts to reach and break the Virginia Central railroad, and his main body was dangerously near to that important line of communication between Jackson and Lee, and of supply for both armies. The Federal commander was only awaiting the reopening of the railway from Washington to the Rapidan to move forward in



force and fall upon Jackson, and by so doing draw Lee's attention from McClellan that the latter's army might be brought around to Pope's. The battle of Cedar Run taught Pope his first lesson and gave him thenceforward a wholesome fear of his military schoolmaster, which made him desist from further attempts on the railway, and remain idle in his Culpeper camps while McClellan's army was being transported to Washington, thence to reinforce Pope, and while Lee was moving the whole army of Northern Virginia from Richmond to Orange, preparatory to sending Pope's army to meet McClellan's at Washington, and transferring the field of operations to and across the Potomac, while the farmers and planters of Virginia, in Piedmont and in the Valley, garnered the magnificent harvest which a bountiful Providence had vouchsafed to them.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### LEE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST POPE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

**T**HE battle of Cedar Run, as General Lee says in his report, "effectually checked the progress of the enemy for the time;" but the pressure from Washington was so great that Pope had to respond with an advance, which he made, on August 14th, when Reno's arrival increased his force to 50,000. He disposed his army from the crossing of Robertson river by the Orange road, to the crossing of the Rapidan at the historic Raccoon ford, across which Wayne led his Pennsylvania brigade to reinforce Lafayette in 1781. Lee, in expectation of this, had, on the 13th of August, ordered Longstreet, with his division and two brigades under Hood, to move to Gordonsville, and R. H. Anderson to follow him, anticipating by a day McClellan's movement from Harrison's landing toward Fort Monroe. At the same time Stuart was ordered to move the main body of his cavalry toward Orange Court House, covering the right of Longstreet's movement and placing his cavalry upon the right of Lee's army when concentrated in Orange.

Longstreet's troops reached the neighborhood of Gordonsville on the 16th, and the same day Jackson, in advance, moving secretly, put his command behind the outlying Clark's mountain range, east of Orange Court House, covering Raccoon and Somerville fords of the Rapidan.

Lee, in person, followed and joined his army in Orange near the middle of August, and on the 19th gave orders for an advance, having determined to strike Pope and defeat him before the great force under McClellan could join him. Longstreet advised a movement to the left, so that Lee's army, with the Blue ridge behind it, might fall upon Pope's right; but Lee and Jackson thought it better to turn Pope's left and put the army of Northern Virginia between him and Washington, cutting his line

of supplies and retreat. Lee's order of the 19th directed Longstreet to cross the Rapidan at Raccoon ford with the right wing of the army, and move toward Culpeper Court House, while Jackson, with the left wing, was to cross at Somerville ford and move in the same direction, keeping on Longstreet's left. Anderson's division and S. D. Lee's battalion of artillery were to follow Jackson, while Stuart, crossing at Morton's ford, was to reach the Rappahannock, by way of Stevensburg, destroy the railroad bridge, cut Pope's communications, and operate on Longstreet's right. The men were to carry three days' rations in their haversacks, and the movement was to begin at dawn of the 20th. Jackson desired to attack earlier; but Longstreet was not prepared. The concentrated army was ready to move on the 19th, but Fitz Lee's brigade of Stuart's cavalry, the leading one in the march from Richmond, had gone too far to the right, in the direction of Fredericksburg, and was a day late in joining the army, thus causing another delay.

Pope, on the 19th, ordered a cavalry reconnoissance across the Rapidan, which captured one of Stuart's staff with Lee's order of march on his person. This was quickly furnished to Pope, who hastened to evacuate Culpeper and put the Rappahannock between himself and the now famous Confederate general-in-chief; and Lee had the mortification of seeing from the summit of Clark's mountain, the southeastern of "the little mountains of Orange," Pope's army in full retreat, across the plains of Culpeper, on the very day that he would have fallen upon it had his strategic orders been promptly and energetically obeyed by his first lieutenant.

Lee's 50,000 men followed his marching orders at dawn of the 20th; but not against Culpeper Court House, for Pope had evacuated that the day before. Longstreet, preceded by Fitz Lee's cavalry, marched to Kelly's ford of the Rappahannock, while Jackson marched by way of Stevensburg and Brandy station toward Rappahannock bridge, bivouacking for the night near Stevensburg. Stuart, with Robertson's cavalry brigade, had a spirited contest that day with Bayard's cavalry, near Brandy station. Forced from that point, Bayard took position between Brandy and Rappahannock bridge, still guarding the Federal rear, from which Stuart again routed him and drove him across the Rappahannock, under

cover of Pope's batteries on the high northern bank. The Confederates captured 64 prisoners and lost 16, killed and wounded.

The morning of the 21st found Lee's 50,000 veterans on the south bank of the Rappahannock, with Jackson on the left, extending from the railroad bridge to Beverly ford, across which Robertson's Fifth Virginia cavalry had made a dash, scattering the Federal infantry near by, disabling a battery, and spending most of the day on the north side of the river by the aid of Jackson's batteries on the south side. On the approach of a large Federal force, Rosser, by order of Stuart, recrossed. Longstreet extended Lee's line from Rappahannock bridge to Kelly's ford. Pope's 55,000 men held the commanding ground on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and a lively artillery duel was kept up during the day between the confronting armies, but with little or no damage to either.

The undulating Midland plain, on which these contending armies had now met, was far better fighting ground than was the swampy and densely forested Tidewater country, which was so recently the field of contention. The larger portion of this vicinity of the Rappahannock was cleared and had been under cultivation, in large plantations, until the opening of the war. At the same time it was a more difficult region for strategic movements to be covered from observation. It was evident that Pope's concentrated army could not easily be reached by a front attack, while his left was difficult of approach, and receiving the reinforcements steadily coming to him from the direction of Fredericksburg. Lee's military genius, and his conferences with Jackson, convinced him that the proper movement was one that should turn Pope's right and place the Confederates in his rear, cutting him off from the old time highway that led through the Piedmont country, by Warrenton, toward Washington. Moreover, "the strength of the hills" lay in that direction; for within sight, looking to the northward and westward, were the outlying ridges of the coast range, the Rappahannock and Bull Run mountains, behind which concealed movements could be made in the desired direction.

The first step in this strategic movement was to get the mobile left wing of his army, under the energetic

and always-ready Jackson, behind these covering low mountain ranges, the southwestward extensions of the Bull Run mountains, without the knowledge of Pope. To accomplish this, Lee adopted a series of novel advances. While Jackson and Stuart were engaging the attention of Pope along the Rappahannock, north of the railroad, he moved Longstreet from his right, by concealed roads, and placed him in Jackson's rear, leaving the latter free to fall back after dark, giving place to Longstreet, and march to a position farther up the river, but still holding on to Longstreet's left. This first exchange of positions was made during the night of the 21st, or rather the early morning of the 22d, and that day, preceded by cavalry, Jackson reached the neighborhood of Warrenton Springs, where the great highway, from Culpeper Court House toward Washington, crosses the Rappahannock and goes on through Warrenton to Centreville. During that day Longstreet, by a vigorous contention with skirmishers and artillery, engaged Pope's attention in his first position north of the Rappahannock, and caused him to add to his force at Beverly ford, apprehending that Longstreet was about to force a passage there and attack his center. Detachments of Federal cavalry and infantry made dashes on Jackson's line of march from a detached column that Pope was moving up the north bank of the river, to keep pace with whatever movement Lee might be making to his left. Especially was a bold dash made at Freeman's ford, about noon, as Jackson's rear was passing that point. His rear guard, under Trimble, deployed and awaited the Federal attack. Hood, with two of Longstreet's brigades, came up about four in the afternoon, when Trimble, aided by these, vigorously attacked the Federal brigade which had crossed the river, and drove it back with slaughter and in confusion. A third crossing, in pursuit of information, was made at Fant's ford, by cavalry, infantry and artillery, but these soon retired, having learned but little.

When Jackson reached the river, opposite the Warrenton Springs, and found the ford guarded, he at once began moving his troops to the other side, sending over the Thirteenth Georgia and two batteries, while Early crossed, on an old mill dam, about a mile further down the river. It began raining while these troops were crossing, and an afternoon of showers was followed by a

night of heavy downpour and darkness, preventing the crossing of more troops. By morning the river was swollen past fording, and Jackson's advance, under Early, was isolated on the further shore. Pope's main body had continued to hold its position, near the railway, on the 22d, as he was unwilling to remove further from his expected reinforcements from Fredericksburg. Apprehensive of an attack from Longstreet, he did not care to move farther to his right to intercept Jackson's movement, concerning which he as yet had no reliable information. Longstreet still held him at bay.

On this same 22d, Lee initiated one of the boldest of his deceiving strategic movements. During the forenoon he dispatched Stuart, with the main body of his cavalry, by concealed roads behind his army, to Waterloo bridge, four miles above Warrenton Springs, held by Jackson, and where the graded highway from Warrenton to Little Washington crosses the Rappahannock. There Stuart, with 1,500 men and two guns, crossed the river and began a rapid march for Pope's rear, to break the railway leading to Washington and gather information, just as he had recently done in his grand ride around McClellan at Richmond. With a good road to march on, he reached Warrenton unopposed, in the afternoon. After halting there for a short rest, he continued eastward, by Auburn Mills, to Catlett's station, on the Orange & Alexandria railroad, intending to destroy the bridge over Cedar creek near that place. The downpour that had swelled the Rappahannock, caught Stuart on the march, and he reached his objective in the midst of rain and darkness; but an intercepted and captured negro led him to a camp where were the headquarters wagons of General Pope. These Stuart quickly captured with one of the Federal commander's staff and his personal baggage and official papers. His efforts to destroy the wagon trains and the railroad bridge were but partially successful, in consequence of the rain and the darkness. He began his return march before daylight of the 23d, bringing off 300 prisoners, and recrossed the Rappahannock in the evening of the same day, without molestation, after having taught Pope a second lesson on the subject of rear guards, and infused an element of fear into the Federal army as to the safety of its lines of retreat; also bringing off the captured correspondence between Pope and Halleck,


which informed Lee fully concerning the strength and the plans of his antagonist.

In the afternoon of the 23d, before Stuart cut the railway and the telegraph at Catlett's station, Pope had telegraphed to Halleck: "Under present circumstances I shall not attempt to prevent his (Lee's) crossing at Sulphur Springs, but will mass my whole force on his flank in the neighborhood of Fayetteville," a cross-roads hamlet five miles to the southeast of Sulphur Springs, and about the same distance northeast from the right of his position on the Rappahannock. An hour and a half later he telegraphed: "I cannot move against Sulphur Springs just now without exposing my rear to the heavy force in front of me," still looking with alarm across the Rappahannock at Longstreet. Three hours later, after reporting Jackson's crossing, he again telegraphed: "I must . . . either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar run, or cross the Rappahannock with my whole force and assail the enemy's flank and rear. I must do one or the other at daylight; which shall it be?" Halleck approved the suggested bold attack on Lee's rear, and directed the troops approaching from Fredericksburg to march to Stevensburg and Brandy station, on the south side of the river, proposing to unite these with Pope the next day to attack Lee's rear. Gen. George H. Gordon, who has written so well concerning the army of Virginia, in which he served, and who fought so bravely at Winchester and Cedar run, says of Pope: "He awoke on the morning of the 23d with no very clear notions of what he intended to do."

The heavy rain of the night of the 22d interrupted Jackson's movement and compelled Lee to abandon, for the time being, his intended flank movement; Jackson, by the most persistent efforts, repaired the bridge at the springs in order to extricate Early from the perilous position which he was so holdly holding on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and Pope, knowing that river to be impassable, gave up, no doubt gladly, his scheme of crossing to attack Lee's rear, and determined to concentrate against the Confederates on the north side of the river, as he had at first proposed. In the early morning of the 23d he turned Sigel toward Sulphur Springs, by way of Fayetteville, followed by Banks and Reno. McDowell, from his left, was ordered to burn







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the railroad bridge, which up to this time, by the aid of guards and artillery, he had kept intact, and move toward Warrenton. These movements would bring him into line of battle facing any movement of Lee from Sulphur Springs toward Warrenton. Longstreet's batteries gave parting salutes to these backward movements. Reynolds' division of 6,000 men, from Aquia creek, reported during the forenoon of the 23d, and followed after McDowell.

The courage and ready wit of a Confederate soldier are well illustrated by the story that Allan tells in his "Army of Northern Virginia:" "Maj. A. L. Pitzer, of Early's staff, in attempting to find the Thirteenth Georgia regiment, was taken prisoner by a scouting party of the Sixth Federal cavalry. Overmatched in force, the major had recourse to his wits. He persuaded his captors that they were within the Confederate picket lines, and would be fired on whichever way they attempted to escape. He offered to lead them safely in if they would submit to his guidance. The offer was accepted, and the unarmed major led in and delivered the armed squad to General Early.

Early put on a bold front while awaiting the reconstruction of the bridge in his rear, aided by the swollen condition of Great run in his front. He destroyed the bridge over that stream, and held the road against Sigel's advance of 25,000 men, which Pope had ordered to make attack and beat the Confederates on the north side of the river. Sigel conceived the idea that Lee's whole army was in front of him, and therefore only skirmishing and artillery firing took place during the afternoon and until dark, Sigel, in the meantime, going into camp and advising Pope to withdraw his corps to a better position. Robertson, with his cavalry and some guns returning from Stuart's expedition in Pope's rear, joined Early during the day. As soon as the bridge was made passable, at about nightfall, Lawton's brigade was crossed over to Early's support. Ewell himself went over, for a consultation with Early during the night, when it was decided, in view of the large force before him, that it was not expedient to bring on a battle at that place; so orders were given at 3 o'clock next morning for Early to withdraw, which he did soon after daylight, and removed his men to Jackson's rear, where they broke their fast of two nights and the intervening day.

About 10 o'clock on the night of the 23d, Pope himself, accompanied by the corps of McDowell and the division of Reynolds, reached Warrenton. At that time more than 50,000 men of the army of Virginia were concentrated along the turnpike road between Jackson at Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. On the morning of the 24th, Pope girded himself to destroy the army of Lee, which he supposed was still north of the Rappahannock, as Sigel had reported. Buford's cavalry was sent to Waterloo, whence a good country road led to Warrenton, to reconnoiter and to destroy the bridge over the Rappahannock at that point, and get in Lee's supposed rear. Sigel, Banks and Reno were to move toward the same point, from opposite Sulphur Springs, while McDowell was placed along the roads leading to Sulphur Springs and to Waterloo to support the movement. As Sigel approached the river, A. P. Hill, who now, in the succession of exchanging moves, held its Confederate side, opened his batteries and an engagement of artillery was brought on. Sigel continued, cautiously, his march up the river, annoyed by Hill's batteries, and it was well into the afternoon before Buford learned that there were no Confederates on the north side of the Rappahannock. It was nearly 4 p. m. when Pope telegraphed Halleck that "Sigel is pursuing the enemy in the direction of Waterloo bridge. . . . No force of the enemy has as yet been able to cross except that now enclosed by our forces between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo bridge, which will undoubtedly be captured unless they find some means of escaping."

Sigel occupied most of the 24th in his cautious march of six miles from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo, where he arrived late in the afternoon and found the Confederates on the south side of the river, but holding and defending the bridge. The continuing thunder of Lee's guns, from point to point of vantage between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, had thoroughly engaged Sigel's attention during the entire day, as Lee intended they should, to divert attention from the new flank movement which he had already begun. Pope was equally ignorant, for, in the afternoon, after learning that there were no Confederates north of the Rappahannock, he dispatched to Halleck that he would "early to-morrow . . . move back a considerable part of my force to the neighborhood of Rappa-

hannock station," evidently disturbed by the long-staying qualities of Longstreet, which he had now been testing for a number of days, while he himself had been zigzagging around in a vain attempt to find the other portions of Lee's army.

Still desiring to strike a telling blow at Pope before McClellan's main body could reach him, Lee ordered from Richmond the divisions of Walker, McLaws and D. H. Hill, which had been held there for prudential reasons, and sought a conference with Jackson, to which the latter, a little later, called in his chief engineer, Lieut. James Keith Boswell, for information concerning the roads leading behind the Rappahannock mountains to the line of the Manassas Gap railroad and to Pope's rear, with which he was familiar; Lee and Jackson having devised a plan of campaign by which Jackson, free from all encumbrances, should move rapidly to Pope's rear, cut his line of communication at Bristoe, destroy his stores back to Manassas Junction, then fall back to the north of the Warrenton and Washington turnpike, and there await the arrival of Lee with Longstreet, who would remain a day longer on the banks of the Rappahannock for the purpose of detaining and perplexing Pope.

During the night of the 24th, Longstreet's batteries took the place of Jackson opposite Warrenton Springs, as did also his troops, leaving Jackson free to begin his movement on the morning of the 25th, which he did, at an early hour, leaving his baggage train behind and taking with him only ambulances and ordnance wagons. His troops carried in their haversacks scant rations for three days, Jackson confident of being able to abundantly supply them from the enemy's stores. Starting from the vicinity of Jeffersonton, to which he fell back in giving place to Longstreet, Jackson marched for some distance to the northwestward, along the great highway leading to the Valley, by way of Chester gap, and his bronzed veterans were elated with the conviction that they were again bound for the scene of their victories of the preceding spring; but, when a short distance beyond Amissville, their course was turned from the northwest to the northeast, they looked questioningly one to the other, as to whither they were going, led by Lieutenant Boswell and portions of the noted Black

Horse cavalry through their Fauquier home-land. Jackson pressed steadily forward, through the long August day, without halt, until he had covered 25 miles and reached the vicinity of Salem, on the Manassas Gap railroad, just as the sun sank behind the Blue ridge to his left.

At dawn of the 26th, Jackson's men were again puzzled on finding themselves marching to the southeast, following the line of the Manassas Gap railroad, through Thoroughfare gap, to Gainesville, where Stuart joined them with his cavalry and led the way from that hamlet directly to Bristoe Station, on the Orange & Alexandria railroad, which they reached about dark, after a march of 24 miles, without having met opposition on the way. Jackson and his 22,000 enthusiastic men, and Stuart with wide-awake and jolly cavalry, were now in Pope's rear and on his line of communication, which they proceeded to destroy, capturing trains moving toward Washington and breaking up detached Federal encampments along the railway. Not satisfied with this, and desiring to not only reap the spoils stored at Manassas but to guard against movements from Washington, Jackson sent Trimble's brigade of infantry and Stuart with a portion of his cavalry, through the darkness, four miles further to Manassas Junction, which they reached and captured after a brief resistance, about midnight.

On this same 26th of August, Lee and Longstreet, leaving 6,000 men at Waterloo to guard the trains, followed after Jackson and encamped at Orleans. Apprised of these various movements by his scouts and spies, but not comprehending them or their objects or destination, Pope issued orders which scattered, rather than concentrated, his large army. He first ordered a concentration on Warrenton; Porter, with 10,000 men, reached Bealeton, and Heintzelman, with his 10,000 men, reached Warrenton Junction, on their way to obey this order. The corps of Sumner, Franklin and Cox, from McClellan's army, were that day marching toward Pope, under urgent orders, from Alexandria. Late in the night, when the import of Jackson's movement dawned upon him, Pope again changed his orders, directing his troops to march on Gainesville, to intercept what he supposed would be Jackson's line of retreat; and the different portions of his command were headed in that direction, but all hin-

dered by a confusion of orders and a resulting mixing of marching columns.

On the 27th, Lee with Longstreet continued his march through Salem and the Plains station, on the Manassas Gap railroad, but once interrupted, by the attack of a small body of Federal cavalry, which came near capturing General Lee. In the early morning of this same day Jackson marched the divisions of Taliaferro (recently Winder) and of A. P. Hill to Manassas Junction, where, during the day, they rested and reveled in the vast stores of quartermaster and commissary supplies the Federals had gathered at that important junction. Ewell was left behind, at Bristoe, to protect Jackson's rear and oppose any advance from the line of the Rappahannock. There, in the afternoon, he had a vigorous combat with Porter, repulsing him, then withdrew across Broad run, and late in the day followed on to Manassas Junction.

Longstreet was slow in getting under way on the morning of the 28th, and so did not reach Thoroughfare gap, but seven miles from his camp, until 3 in the afternoon, to find that important way, the gate he must pass through to reach Jackson's right at the appointed rendezvous, held by Ricketts and a Federal division. Lee promptly addressed himself to clear the way. Wilcox, with three brigades, was sent three miles to the northward to cross the Bull Run mountains at Hopewell gap and flank the right of Ricketts. Law's brigade was ordered to climb the ends of the mountains cut by Broad run, along which the road and the railway followed, while D. R. Jones was to make a direct attack with his brigade through the pass. Law's toughened veterans soon scaled the mountains, fell upon Ricketts' flanks and forced him to retire just as the day closed, when Longstreet led his command through Thoroughfare gap and encamped east of the Bull Run mountains and eight miles from the battlefield of Groveton heights, where Jackson was hotly engaged with King's division of Pope's army, and anxiously awaiting the coming of Lee and Longstreet.

Satisfied, by the contention of Hooker with Ewell at Bristoe, that Jackson's command was at Manassas Junction, Pope concluded that there was a good opportunity for "bagging the whole crowd;" so he issued orders that, turning from the ways to Gainesville, his columns

should, on the morning of the 28th, march rapidly on Manassas Junction. Jackson spoiled this third plan of concentration for his capture, by not waiting for Pope at Manassas Junction; for on the night of the 27th he set fire to the stores at Manassas that his men had not appropriated and his wagons could not carry away, and hastened to the appointed place for meeting Lee, but by ways that completely baffled his over-confident adversary. Taliaferro's division, with the trains, was sent northward, by the direct road to Sudley church, with orders to occupy the forest covered position behind the unfinished Gainesville & Alexandria railroad, with which Jackson was thoroughly familiar from having encamped in that region after the First Bull Run battle. A. P. Hill was sent northeastward, by the highway across Bull run, to Centreville on the great road leading to Washington, and Ewell was left to follow after him in the same direction.

Porter could not find his way, even with the aid of lighted candles, through the darkness of this night, from Warrenton Junction to Manassas; but Jackson's men, somehow, found the way to their ordered destinations. Hill, on the morning of the 28th, took the big road from Centreville westward, marched across Bull run and took position, on Taliaferro's left, near Sudley church. Ewell, who had encamped the night before on the south side of Bull run, at Blackburn's ford, crossed over, and marching up that stream to the stone bridge, followed after Hill and took position on his right, Taliaferro moving still farther to the right in the direction of Gainesville; so that by the middle of the day Jackson was concentrated in a strong position, the one the Federals had first occupied at the first battle of Bull Run, looking down upon the stream valley of Young's branch along which ran the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, his guns in place and his troops ready for action. That same noonday, Pope, having reached Manassas Junction, was still seeking for Jackson. The movement of Hill and Ewell toward Centreville, the threatening of Washington by Fitz Lee and his horsemen at Fairfax Court House and Burke's station, meant, Pope knew not what, but he proceeded to issue a third order for concentration. Gainesville and Manassas Junction had failed him, and now, thinking he was after a defeated and retreating foe,

he ordered his columns to Centreville. The leading divisions of McDowell's corps had passed through Gainesville, on the way to the junction, early in the day; but King's division did not reach that point until after Pope had ordered a concentration at Centreville, so King, on receiving these orders, decided to take the direct road from Gainesville to Centreville rather than the circuitous one by Manassas Junction, ignorant of the fact that Jackson lay concealed in the forest, flanking the left of this direct road, but a short distance from Gainesville; and so it came to pass that when, late in the afternoon, he was marching along in front of Jackson's concealed army, the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell sprang upon him, and by a short, but fierce and bloody struggle, drove him back, under cover of the night, to Gainesville and to the road to Manassas Junction, on which Ricketts' column, retreating from Lee's bold assault at the Thoroughfare gap, overtook him during the night. On the morning of the 29th these discomfited divisions of King and Ricketts appeared in the vicinity of the junction, and there was now no Federal force to oppose the coming together of the two wings of Lee's army on the famous battlefield of "Groveton Heights," as Jackson named it, that of the first day of the Second Bull Run, or Manassas.

Stuart, from Jackson's right, on the 29th, soon opened communication with Lee and Longstreet, who had but eight miles to march to the field of action and extend his lines southward from Jackson's right and cover the roads leading from Centreville and from Manassas Junction. By 10 a. m. of the morning of the 29th, Lee had stationed himself on a commanding knoll, near the head of Young's branch, on the south side of the turnpike, from which he could see his left, under Jackson, stretching away to the northeast in his strong position on the Sudley ridge, for nearly three miles, those of Longstreet, reaching to the southward, through fields and forests, for nearly the same distance, like two gigantic arms outstretched, with the fingers of Robertson's cavalry on the right and those of Fitz Lee on the left, and ready to close in deadly embrace upon any foe that should venture to come within their far-extending reach.

In the early morning of the 29th, Pope, at Centreville, was issuing orders for a fourth concentration of his



troops, which were now scattered anywhere and everywhere within the 12 miles of broken and much afforested country between his headquarters and Bristoe, still believing that he had but Jackson's command before him only seeking an opportunity to escape, and ignorant of the position of Longstreet. Pope ordered a vigorous attack on Jackson's left by Sigel's corps, supported by Heintzelman, Reno and Reynolds. This attack was bold and vigorous, and from 6:30 to 10:30 there was a fierce contention between A. P. Hill and the Federals; but the latter were repulsed when, just as Lee was leading Longstreet into position, 18,500 men under Heintzelman and Reno were moving in to Sigel's aid. Pope's men, wearied by the constant marchings and countermarchings of previous days, were slow in moving forward; but at noonday, when Pope himself appeared and took post on Buck hill, whence his own lines and those of Jackson were visible, he found his 35,000 men in battle order facing Jackson. These he urged to renew the attack from which Sigel had been repulsed. He also ordered McDowell and Porter to advance their 30,000 men, from Manassas, upon Gainesville; his numerous cavalry hovered about the flanks of the Confederates. Pope did not believe that Lee was yet on the field, so he proposed to hurl his 75,000 against Jackson's 20,000 and win a victory before Longstreet could arrive.

Earnestly watching the battlefield from his well-chosen point of observation, Lee discovered that Longstreet was not far from the left of Pope's line of attack, and as that solid mass of Federal veterans marched with quick and resolute step to assault Jackson, Lee urged Longstreet to join in the issue. After overlooking the field, the latter reported the prospect as "not inviting," and greatly disappointed his commander-in-chief by obstinately persisting in his opposition to make an attack. Just then, Stuart, who was on the right and had been reconnoitering toward Manassas Junction, reported the approach of McDowell and Porter; but these soon turned to the northward and marched, by the Sudley road, to the left of Pope's contention with Jackson. Through all the long day, during ten hours of hotly-contested battle, constantly adding fresh troops and in six vigorous assaults, did Pope force his men against Jackson's position; mainly against A. P. Hill on his left.

The Federal soldiers, well led, with the skill of veterans and the courage of brave men, marched to the very front of Jackson's lines, which, by determined efforts, they several times broke and carried, but were every time driven back, once partly with cobblestones, picked from the fills of the unfinished railway, when the supply of ammunition gave out.

Lee anxiously watched these fierce assaults and desperate repulses, and urged his stubborn lieutenant to join in the combat and relieve the pressure upon his other and indomitable lieutenant, who, with another sort of stubbornness, held to his lines and drove back the successive waves of Federal assaults. At 5 p. m., when less than two hours of the day remained, Pope massed the divisions of Kearney and Stevens for a last assault upon Jackson's left. Gregg had exhausted his ammunition and sent for more, adding that his Carolinians would hold on with the bayonet; but these were forced backward, when the Georgians and the North Carolinians of Branch, dropped in behind them, and all, like Indian fighters, took advantage of every rock and tree as the stubborn Federals forced them back. Jackson promptly moved from his center the Virginians of Field and Early, the Georgians of Lawton, and the Louisianians of Hays, threw these into A. P. Hill's hot contest on his left, and routed and dispersed the brave Federal attack, shattering the brigades of Pope's right.

Again Lee, with all the earnestness of his heroic nature, urged Longstreet to participate and help Jackson in meeting this furious attack. But he persisted in his refusal to move, claiming that it was now too late in the day for so doing. But Lee had one force obedient to his commands, or rather his requests, for thus were the orders of that high-toned gentleman expressed. He had massed Hood's batteries on Longstreet's left, on commanding ground, and as Pope's left, under Reynolds, moved forward to attack, a hot fire from these guns drove him back, and just at set of sun, when Longstreet yielded for what he called a reconnoissance in force, he turned loose Hood's courageous Texans, who fell upon the Federal center and drove King back with heavy loss, capturing three of his battleflags and one of his guns; and so the night closed on this long day of furious and bloody battle, in which the contending armies had

each displayed the undaunted courage of their common, fighting, ancestral stock; but the skill of leadership had again asserted itself against the mere power of numbers, and history, in all its annals, nowhere records braver deeds of heroic and daring defense and persistent courage than were exhibited by Jackson's men through all that long day of steady contention against fearful odds. The invincible Stonewall had unflinchingly held the left, confident that the equally invincible Lee was not only watching the contest, but would, in the crisis of the day, throw his sword into the scale and decide the unequal contest.\*

The battle over, Jackson's men cared for their wounded, gathered their dead for burial, and prepared for another day of conflict, which they well knew was impending; gathered in groups, praying for further aid to the God of Battles, and then, in trusting confidence, slept on their arms awaiting the coming day.

The 30th of August, as the summer neared its end, opened clear and bright, with the two armies ready for the renewal of the mighty conflict. The position of Lee's two wings was unchanged, except that he had massed thirty-six guns, under Col. Stephen D. Lee, on the commanding watershed swell in the center of his lines, where their lines of fire led down the center of the depression followed by Young's branch and threaded by the turnpike leading through the midst of the Federal host to the stone bridge over Bull run. The brigades of Longstreet, from the center southward, were those of Wilcox, Hood, Kemper and D. R. Jones. R. H. Anderson was in reserve, with his 6,000 men, on the turnpike to the rear. Lee then had about 50,000 men at command in his two far-reaching wings, the great jaws of the war monster,

\* "After the arrival of Longstreet the enemy charged his position and began to concentrate opposite Jackson's left. . . . Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position between the lines of Generals Jackson and Longstreet by order of the latter, and engaged the enemy vigorously for several hours. Soon afterward General Stuart reported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Longstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox were sent to reinforce General Jones [Longstreet's right], but no serious attack was made. . . . While the battle was raging on Jackson's left General Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but before the order could be obeyed Hood was himself attacked. . . ." (Report of Gen. R. E. Lee.)

into which the army of Pope was preparing to move, unconscious of the fate that awaited it when these jaws should close and crush it in defeat.

Noticing that the nearby skirmishers of the previous day had disappeared, Pope again rashly concluded that the Confederate army had been defeated, by his assaults of the day before, and was now in full retreat, seeking safety behind the Bull Run mountains; therefore he ordered a prompt pursuit along the Warrenton road to Gainesville, and then toward the Thoroughfare gap. He had brought up Porter's corps, which had been holding the line of Dawkin's branch on the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, and placed it in his center; so it fell to that brave and skillful officer to lead in the supposed pursuit. Recalling Cold Harbor, Porter did not believe, as Pope did, that Lee and Jackson had given up the contest and were retreating, so he formed his men into a triple line of battle, across the turnpike, and placed King's division to support his right and Reynolds' his left; in his rear followed Sigel's corps and half of Reno's. These dispositions were made in the dense forest along the turnpike and to the east of the Sudley road, and thence Porter was ready to advance on Lee's center.

Pope, having had, on the previous day, bitter experience of the sharp temper of Jackson's left, massed the whole of Heintzelman's and the half of each of the corps of McDowell and Reno, ready to throw them against Jackson with the advance of Porter. In the morning, Heintzelman moved against A. P. Hill with Ricketts' division, but soon drew back from the hot reception he met. The skirmishers of Reynolds met the same fate, from S. D. Lee's guns, when they advanced to feel Lee's center. It was three in the afternoon when Pope was good and ready, with his entire army in hand, for his grand assault. The signal was given and Porter's men rushed forward, wheeling on their left, and struck the Stonewall brigade, now in command of Starke, and Lawton's division. The contest was as fierce and earnest as brave men could make it; the lines, for some minutes, were almost within touch, and the dead and dying on both sides strewn the ground. As Porter closed in, across the open field, his left was exposed to S. D. Lee's masked batteries, which now swept through his lines their shot and shell and aided to stagger Porter's attack, while Long-

street opened with three batteries upon his left rear. Thus unexpectedly received, Porter's men fled in routed masses, followed by the men of Jackson's old division, from his right, who leaped across their defenses and chased them in hot pursuit. The fierce attacks of Pope on Jackson's left had, in the meantime, been also repulsed.

Lee now saw that the supreme moment for action had come, and he ordered Longstreet to close in upon the Federal left; but his veteran soldiery, now well trained in the art of war, had at the same moment reached the same conclusion, and without waiting for the word of command, they fairly leaped forward, swinging on their left, and, with Lee leading in person in the midst of them, charged grandly to the front, responding to the movement of all of Jackson's men on the left and hurrying on the rout of the Federal army.\* The Confederate batteries also joined in the rushing charge and were abreast of their infantry comrades all along the lines, where there was opportunity for giving parting shots to the retreating Federals. Stuart, on the right, on the old Alexandria road, heard the well-known shouts of Confederate pursuit, and rushed his brigades and batteries far in advance against the Federal left. Warren's attempt to stem the tide, just east of Groveton, cost him dearly. Schenck, with German tenacity, hung on to the Bald hill, on the Federal left, but the victory-compelling Confederates swarmed upon his flank and forced him from the summit. Hood swept the line of the turnpike to the east of the Stone house. Pope's reserves, on the Henry hill, the old plateau which was the center of the fierce fighting of the year before, resisted the tide of victory, for a time, on his left, until Jackson closed down with his left, upon the retreating Federals, toward the stone bridge, until darkness put an end to his advance, and gave Pope's demoralized brigades an opportunity to follow the crowd of fugitives that, long before the sun went down, crowded over that bridge, seeking safety behind Franklin's corps, then advancing from Alexandria, and the earthworks at Centreville. This day's advance and retreat cost Pope some 20,000 of his brave men, in killed, wounded and

\*"General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal center and left." (Report of Gen. R. E. Lee.)

missing. Since Jackson met him at Cedar run, he had lost 30,000 men, 30 pieces of artillery, and military stores and small-arms worth millions in value and many thousands in number. This great victory of Groveton Heights cost Lee 8,000 men, mostly in Jackson's command, including many of his noblest and bravest officers.\*

A deluge of rain followed the great battle, such as had followed most of those that had preceded it; but through that, and the mud that followed it, Stuart rode in the early morning of Sunday, August 31st, across Bull run to learn what had become of Pope. He found the reinforcements, that had the day before come up from Washington, holding the formidable intrenchments at Centreville bristling with artillery. Informed of this delay in Pope's retreat, Lee ordered Jackson, who was on his left and nearest Centreville, to cross Bull run and march to the Little River turnpike, which enters the Alexandria road near Fairfax Court House, turn Pope's right and cut off his retreat to Washington. The rain and mud made the march a difficult one for Jackson's weary and battle worn surviving veterans; but they, instinctively, divined their important mission and eagerly followed their great leader. When Pope learned of Jackson's new flanking movement, although he had in hand 20,000 fresh troops who had not fired a gun, he hastened in retreat to Fairfax Court House, after placing Reno's corps across the two converging turnpikes covering the approaches to Fairfax Court House from Centreville and Chantilly, with orders to keep back the irrepressible Confederates. Jackson, by continuing his march well into the night, took position across the Little River turnpike, at Ox hill, in front of Chantilly. In the midst of a terrific storm of driving rain, with almost continuous thunder and lightning, on Monday, September 1st, he met and repulsed a Federal advance under Reno, ordering the use of bayonets when informed that the rain-soaked ammunition could not be used. Heintzelman supported

\*The losses of Longstreet's corps, August 23-30, were reported as 663 killed, 4,016 wounded, and 46 missing; total, 4,725. Jackson reported his losses from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, at 805 killed, 3,547 wounded, and 35 missing; total, 4,387. The Federal loss, in the campaign from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, has been stated by Northern authority, approximately, at 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured or missing; total, 14,462.

Reno, but Jackson's well-directed blows forced them both back until darkness ended the contest, when they followed Pope's line of retreat to within the fortifications of the Federal city, where his brief career, of less than two months' duration, as commander of the army of Virginia, came to an inglorious end, and McClellan again took charge to reorganize the army of the Potomac from the broken Federal forces there gathered.

Longstreet followed Jackson to Chantilly, but did not reach there in time to take part in the battle. Lee paused in his onward march, at this noble "Chantilly" mansion of one of his relatives, to give his men much-needed rest and bring forward the supply trains which his rapid marches had left far in the rear. In four short months the army of Northern Virginia had, under his leadership, with its 80,000 men, met and driven Banks, Fremont, McDowell, McClellan and Pope, with their 200,000 veteran troops, from far within the bounds of Virginia, in disastrous retreat, to beyond its borders, with the exception of a small body that still held the line of the Baltimore & Ohio, in the lower Valley, and the remnant that had found refuge within the fortifications of Washington, on the Virginia side of the Potomac.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN AGAINST McCLELLAN.

**R**ESTING at Chantilly, with every reason to be well content with what he had accomplished during the three months that he had personally commanded the army of Northern Virginia, and anxious to keep the Federal invaders from the soil of Virginia, Lee, on the 3d of September, suggested to President Davis that now was "the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate army to enter Maryland;" but he would not conceal the condition of that army after the fierce contests it had just passed through, so he continued:

The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's country. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced; the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss. As long as the army of the enemy is employed on this frontier, I have no fears for the safety of Richmond, yet I earnestly recommend that advantage be taken of this period of comparative safety to place its defenses, both by land and water, in the most perfect condition.

Without waiting to hear from President Davis, after having been joined by the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws, Hampton's cavalry and several batteries, which he had ordered forward from Richmond, Lee issued orders September 2d, for his army to march to the vicinity of Leesburg, but by way of Dranesville, as if threatening Washington, in order to bring his men into the more inviting Piedmont country of the county of Loudoun, abounding in grain and cattle, and to place it where he could easily cross the Potomac, if his Maryland campaign were not forbidden by the Confederate government. In writing to President Davis again, on the 4th, he expressed no fears as to the fighting ability of his army, but was only uneasy about his "supplies of ammunition and subsistence."



Jackson led the advance, Lee still marching left in front, giving the strictest of orders in reference to the marching and resting of his men, that they might be kept closed up, ready for meeting any attack from toward Washington, in passing, and wearied as little as possible by the dusty roads and the intense heat that had followed the preceding storms. He put a major-general, in command of a division, under arrest, while on the march, for failing to halt his command at the minute ordered, to show his officers that his orders must be promptly and thoroughly obeyed.

At Leesburg, the army was stripped of all superfluous transportation, broken down horses, and wagons and batteries not supplied with good horses, were left behind, and everything was put in the best possible condition circumstances would permit, for the campaign, under new conditions of the field of action, that was about to begin.

The glorious autumn days of the Southland had come, when, on the 5th day of September, to the martial strains of "Maryland, My Maryland" from every band in the army, and with his men cheering and shouting with delight, Jackson forded the Potomac at Edwards' ferry, where the river was broad but shallow, near the scene of Evans' victory over the Federals in the previous October, and where Wayne had crossed his Pennsylvania brigade in marching to the field of Yorktown in 1781. By the 7th of the month, Lee had concentrated the most of his army in the vicinity of Frederick City, in a land teeming with abundance. He had issued the most stringent orders, forbidding depredations on private property and requiring his quartermasters to purchase and pay for supplies for his army. On the 8th he issued a stirring proclamation, calling upon the men of Maryland to join the men of his command, gathered within their borders from their sister Southern States; appealing to their manhood to avail themselves of this opportunity to reassert their sovereign rights and join in securing the independence of the South, assuring them that his army had only come to aid them in throwing off a foreign yoke and to enable them "again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen and restore independence and sovereignty to their State." In closing he said:

This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No constraint upon your free will is intended; no intima-

tion will be allowed within the limits of this army at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.

This magnanimous declaration fell upon cold ears, for the Piedmont region, in which Frederick is situated, contained few sympathizers with the Confederate cause. The majority of its people were contented and well-to-do owners of small farms, most of them of German descent, whose affiliations were more with Pennsylvania to the north than with Virginia to the south of them. It would have been quite different had Lee arrived among the men of Midland or Tidewater Maryland; but he had no time to wait on political action, for McClellan had gathered up full 90,000 men, veterans and new recruits, and, without orders from the authorities at Washington, was marching to again attack Lee. This made it important for him to at once turn his attention to military affairs. The alarm that followed the retreat of Pope to Washington had somewhat subsided, but there was no telling what Lee, Jackson and Stuart might attempt to do, and so Banks was held within the fortifications of the Federal city, with 75,000 men, to guard against an emergency. McClellan, resting his right on the Baltimore & Ohio and his left on the Potomac, advanced his lines, slowly and cautiously, toward the banks of the Monocacy, along which he had been informed Lee's army was encamped.

Lee desired to draw McClellan further from his base of supplies than the valley of the Monocacy; preferred to contend with him beyond the Blue ridge (here called the South mountain), in the vicinity of Hagerstown, if he could draw him that far away, where, at the same time, he could threaten an invasion of Pennsylvania, which was one of the cherished designs of Stonewall Jackson. The one obstacle to delay this movement was the Federal garrison, of some 12,000 men, holding Harper's Ferry, with outposts at Martinsburg and other points on the Baltimore & Ohio. Lee had ordered Loring, in the Kanawha valley, to move his force to Winchester, which place he had selected as the rendezvous for his stragglers and men from hospitals, and for a depot of supplies. This made

it necessary for him to first clear out the Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry and establish connection with Winchester before he could engage in a contest with McClellan west of the Blue ridge or make an offensive movement into Pennsylvania. After a conference with Jackson, at Frederick City, he issued a general order on the 9th of September, for the movements of his troops, for the two-fold purpose of capturing the Federal stronghold at Harper's Ferry and for the concentration of his army in the vicinity of Hagerstown.

Jackson was perfectly familiar with the topographical conditions at Harper's Ferry, and knew, from his late experience in threatening but not capturing that place, the strategic and tactic movements that would be necessary to successfully invest and secure possession of it. Therefore, with good reason, Lee had taken Jackson into his councils and provided to put in his hands the execution of the plan of campaign decided on.

Harper's Ferry, located in the fork at the junction of the Shenandoah and the Potomac, just above where the united rivers break through the Blue ridge, cannot be held and defended unless Loudoun heights on the south, across the Shenandoah, the northeastern end of the double Blue ridge, and Maryland heights, across the Potomac, the southwestern end of the Blue ridge in Maryland, are both occupied and defended at the same time; for each of these positions overlooks and thoroughly commands the fronts and flanks of the defenses of Harper's Ferry proper. The Federals had not occupied Loudoun heights, but they had Maryland heights, with formidable batteries placed to command the approaches to Harper's Ferry from Virginia, and with defensive works to protect in the rear from Maryland.

The instructions of Lee's order were, that Jackson should march westward in the early morning of September 10th, along the great National road leading from Frederick across the Blue ridge (South mountain) to Boonsboro, with his fourteen brigades, then take the macadam road leading to Williamsport, on the Potomac, and there, having turned the flank of the Federal outpost at Martinsburg, to cross the Potomac, break the Federal line of communication from the west by the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, then move upon the garrison at Martinsburg, and either capture or drive it in toward

Harper's Ferry, following in pursuit and investing that place with his left resting on the Potomac and his right on the Shenandoah. Walker's division, which had been advanced from Frederick along the line of the Baltimore & Ohio toward Harper's Ferry, was to cross the Potomac at Cheek's ford, and occupy Loudoun heights, connecting with Jackson's right and thus extending the investment from the Shenandoah to the Potomac below Harper's Ferry. Longstreet's command was to follow Jackson across the Blue ridge and halt at Boonsboro, in the Great valley, at the western foot of the mountain. McLaws, with his own and Anderson's division, was to follow Longstreet as far as Middletown, in the Catoctin valley, and there turn to the southwest, by roads leading toward Harper's Ferry, and from the rear secure possession of Maryland heights, resting his left on the Potomac below Harper's Ferry, opposite Walker's right, and his right on the same river above Harper's Ferry, opposite Jackson's left, thus completing the circle of investment. D. H. Hill was to bring up the rear on the National road, preceded by the ordnance and supply trains and reserve artillery, at the same time guarding the rear of both McLaws and Longstreet. Stuart, after furnishing squadrons of cavalry to Jackson, Longstreet and McLaws, was to cover the entire rear of the army with the main body of his cavalry.

The conception of this plan of offensive operations and providing for defensive ones, was every way worthy of the famous commander of the army of Northern Virginia, and he felt confident of success because he had intrusted its execution to able hands. The prompt Jackson, always eager for the fray, and now burning with desire to capture the stronghold that had barred his way to Washington the last of the preceding May, marched at 3 in the morning of the 10th; bivouacked on the line of the Baltimore & Ohio, across the Potomac, at Williamsport, on the evening of the 11th; captured Martinsburg on the morning of the 12th; by noon of the 13th was in front of Harper's Ferry, and on that day completed his portion of its investment. Walker crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, after finding Cheek's ford covered by the enemy's artillery from the high bluffs east of the Monocacy, on the 10th, but did not reach the foot of the Blue ridge until the 13th, or complete his portion of the invest-

ment until Sunday, the 14th, on the morning of which he put five guns in position on Loudoun heights, supported by two regiments of infantry, after placing the larger part of his force so as to command the road from Harper's Ferry down the Virginia side of the Potomac, to prevent a Federal retreat in that direction. McLaws, with ten infantry brigades in his command, crossed the South mountain, by the Brownsville gap, into the Pleasant valley, on the 11th, and by the evening of the 13th, after a spirited contest with the force defending Maryland heights, secured possession of that formidable position and completed the investment of Harper's Ferry. These dispositions not only closed all avenues of escape, but sealed the fate of the beleaguered town whenever Jackson, the commander of the gathered forces, should order his circle of fire to pour down upon it. To further guard his right on the Shenandoah, he had sent a portion of his own immediate command across that river and placed it, with artillery, on a bluff shoulder of Loudoun heights, below the point held by Walker's guns; so that all things were now ready for assaulting and capturing Harper's Ferry on the 14th, except that McLaws was delayed by the necessity for constructing a road by which to bring his artillery from the Pleasant valley to the top of Maryland heights.

It is now important to return to the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill and recount what had happened to General Lee while the investment of Harper's Ferry was being completed. Marching with Longstreet on the 10th, Lee crossed the South mountain to Boonsboro, where, learning that a Federal force was threatening Hagerstown from the direction of Harrisburg, he proceeded to that point, and there placed Longstreet in bivouac on the evening of the 11th, on which day D. H. Hill crossed the South mountain, but still holding its crest with his rear, and encamped at Boonsboro; Stuart still held back McClellan's advance in the Piedmont country, although the latter was pressing him with unusual and unaccountable vigor.

Writing to President Davis, on the 12th, Lee urged the necessity for food and clothing for his army. On the 13th he anxiously awaited news from Walker and McLaws, as they were not yet closed in on Jackson in the investment of Harper's Ferry. To this anxiety was added another when he reflected on the depleted condi-



tion of his army, and as he wrote to the President, he said: "Our ranks are very much diminished—I fear from a third to one-half of the original numbers." Still more disturbing was the news that reached him on the evening of that day. This was of the rapid approach of McClellan in force on the National road toward Hill's position on the South mountain, and toward that of McLaws on the Potomac north of Harper's Ferry and Maryland heights. He knew McClellan's military characteristics, not only from his personal knowledge of him before the existing war, but especially from his doings in leading the great army of the Potomac, in the "on to Richmond" and in the "back to Washington," and therefore could not account for his unusual diligence in pursuing him westward from the Monocacy, to reach which from Washington he had been marching with great caution. McClellan's report, published by the Federal government the following winter, furnished the explanation. On the morning of this same Saturday, the 13th of September, after McClellan had occupied Frederick on the 12th, there was handed him an official copy of Lee's order No. 191, which revealed, in detail, the entire plan of the pending campaign, and showed him, at a glance, how Lee's knights and castles on the military chess-board were disposed, and that a rare opportunity was offered for falling upon his greatly weakened left rear and crushing that before he could gather his scattered forces to his aid, as McClellan had the great advantage of the far shorter line of approach over one of the best roads. More than this; it showed that the dreaded Jackson was too far away to participate in an early combat. Ardent to retrieve his military reputation, and, above all things, anxious to do something that would warrant his unauthorized assumption of command, McClellan at once hastened his main body in pursuit of Lee, and urged Franklin forward with his corps, to harass the rear of McLaws and hold him away from the battle he proposed to make with Lee.

It is now known that two copies of Lee's order were sent to D. H. Hill, who had been made subject to Jackson's command previous to the encampment at Frederick. Jackson, always cautious and himself never giving written orders that would furnish information as to his movements, had, on the receipt of Lee's order, made, with his

own hand, a copy of that and sent it by safe hands to General Hill, supposing he would in no other way receive this order. But it so happened that a copy was also sent to Hill from Lee's headquarters, and this latter, carelessly left on the ground in Hill's camp, was discovered by a Federal soldier, wrapped about some Confederate cigars, and he, recognizing its importance, promptly sent it to McClellan, who at once vigorously set about availing himself of the opportunities that the knowledge contained in that lost order put in his way. It was not the first time that events of great magnitude in the tide of history have been controlled by the demands of that miserable weed.

The close of this eventful Saturday found Lee confronted with serious conditions. D. H. Hill was ordered to retrace his march, recross the South mountain, and hold its eastern slope against the great host that could be seen rapidly approaching from the direction of Frederick. McLaws was urged to finish his work on Maryland heights and move to Boonsboro, by way of Sharpsburg, and Longstreet was ordered to return from Hagerstown, to Hill's aid, on the morning of the 14th.

As Lee rode forward to the South Mountain battlefield on Sunday morning, September 14th, followed by Longstreet's command, he could both see and hear that the mighty conflict for the possession of the passes of that mountain, now looming up before him, had already begun. The roar of cannon and musketry from Hill's 5,000 men rang in his ears, and the smoke of battle showed, by its length along the mountain top, how thin must be Hill's stretched-out line and how large must be the force pressing against it. Hill held the "old road," passing through Fox's gap, against Pleasanton's cavalry and Reno's corps, in one of the most desperate of all recorded contests, until the middle of the afternoon, when Hooker's corps, in furious onset, fell on his left near Turner's gap, where the Boonsboro and Frederick road crosses, and added to the fury of the contention. Lee then sent in 4,000 of Longstreet's men, in eight brigades, to sustain the brave Hill and his unyielding North Carolinians, and so the fight went on, at and between each of the road crossings, until night put an end to the conflict, with the 9,000 Confederates still holding the crest of the mountain against the 28,000 Federals who had been contending for its possession.







At Crampton's gap of the South mountain, six miles to the southward from Turner's gap and Hill's field of action, another battle raged on that same Sunday afternoon. McLaws had left 1,200 men to hold that pass, in guarding his rear, while he occupied Maryland heights. Against these Franklin threw 8,000 from his advance. The resistance lasted until dark, when the Confederates gave way and Franklin took possession of the gap, and thus interposed the head of a strong Federal column between Lee at Boonsboro and McLaws in Pleasant valley and on Maryland heights.

Lee might have said to himself, in the words of Longstreet at Groveton, as he reflected on the positions of his army at the close of the 14th, that the prospect "was not inviting." The two divisions in his immediate presence were not compacted; Longstreet was advising that something else than fighting be done. The other three of his divisions were a dozen miles away, separated from each other by great rivers, and could only reach him by circuitous marches and after the fall of Harper's Ferry, an event which had not yet taken place. His stout heart was doubtless throbbing with intense emotion, which none but a heroic and God-trusting spirit could control, when, at 8 of the evening, nearly two hours after sunset, he wrote to McLaws: "The day has gone against us, and the army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position to-night; . . . your troops you must have in hand to unite with this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg."

The outlook to McLaws was a brighter one. The investment of Harper's Ferry was completed, and neither officer nor soldier doubted but that, with Jackson in command, the early morning of the 15th would find him in possession of that town, of the 11,000 Federals there beleaguered and of the large munitions of war there gathered. So McLaws promptly added to his line in Pleasant valley, to which his men had fallen back from Crampton's gap, and prepared to hold his rear against Franklin's advance until Harper's Ferry was captured and the way opened for him to cross the Potomac on the Federal pontoon, and in that way, through Virginia, reach Lee at Sharpsburg, as he was ordered to do. Lee's vigorous defense of the South mountain passes near Boonsboro had won a day from McClellan and given Jackson time to complete the investment of Harper's Ferry.

During the night of the 14th, Lee withdrew the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill from the vicinity of Boonsboro, and fell back across Antietam river in the direction of Sharpsburg, and formed his line of battle on the commanding ridge between that town and that river. Fitz Lee, with his cavalry, bravely kept back McClellan's advance, and General Lee's change of position was not only skillfully made but without any serious loss. McClellan was again placed at a disadvantage by Lee's prompt and bold strategic movement.

The position occupied by Lee and destined to become famous as the battlefield of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, was such that he could calmly await an attack by many times his own numbers, should McClellan venture to make one. He was ready for the dawn of the 15th, and only awaited the gathering together of his army to try the issue by combat, notwithstanding the disparity of his numbers when compared with those of McClellan. While watching the gathering of the mighty Federal army in the valleys and on the ridges across the Antietam, and defiantly replying to its artillery as that came into position, he received, at midday, a note from Jackson, written during the forenoon, saying: "Through God's blessing Harper's Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered." This stimulating news, which not only meant that Harper's Ferry was captured, but that Stonewall Jackson, without further orders, would soon be with him, with his "foot cavalry," and that McLaws would not be far behind, fired Lee's courage, and he determined that he would not recross the Potomac until after trial of battle with McClellan on the field that he had chosen, and that he could hold until his reinforcements came up.

Fitzhugh Lee so well held back the Federal cavalry advance that it did not reach the front of the Antietam until 2 in the afternoon of the 15th, and it was not until late in the day that the Federal infantry and artillery appeared upon the field of coming combat; so Lee had ample time, with the aid of his capable lieutenants, Longstreet and D. H. Hill, to place the 12,000 men he had in hand, in front of Sharpsburg and extending northward toward Hagerstown, so as to cover the roads by which McClellan must advance; and then, with sublime courage and unflinching trust in Providence, await what the morrow had in store for him and his army. By night-

fall, McClellan had concentrated some 60,000 of his men in front of Lee; and, from the vicinity of Boonsboro, was telegraphing to Washington about his "flying foe," and the "routed rebels" he had driven, in a "perfect panic," from South mountain; while his corps commanders were slowly and cautiously finding their way along the excellent stone roads that converged toward Sharpsburg.

The investment of Harper's Ferry was completed during the night of the 14th, and batteries were in position on Maryland and Loudoun heights, and in front of Bolivar heights, ready to enforce Jackson's demand for a surrender on the morning of the 15th. The assaulting column, under A. P. Hill, that brave and fearless leader, was ready to spring forward at the word of command to join in enforcing, if need be, the demand for a surrender. A few shots convinced the Federal commander that his position was untenable, and after a brief parley he gave up the place with its 11,000 men, their arms and equipments, 73 pieces of artillery, and numerous stores. The Federal cavalry at Harper's Ferry escaped during the night of the 14th, by crossing the pontoon and finding their way along the tow path of the canal, up the river and across to McClellan, meeting and damaging Longstreet's train on the way.

Leaving A. P. Hill in charge of the details of the surrender, and with orders to parole the captured Federals and send them adrift toward Frederick City, to tangle and impede the advance of any of McClellan's forces from that direction, Jackson hastened, without delay, to join Lee, marching his men to the fords of the Potomac near Shepherdstown, and not far from Sharpsburg, before he allowed them to go into bivouac, but leaving many of his best men along the way, overcome by sheer exhaustion. J. G. Walker's 3,200 came across the Shenandoah from Loudoun heights and followed close behind Jackson. Near the dawn of the morning of the 16th, Jackson saluted Lee, in the road opposite where the Federal cemetery now is, in front of Sharpsburg, and reported that his men were just behind, crossing the Potomac, and would soon arrive ready to be placed in position. After congratulating Jackson and Walker upon the success of their operations at Harper's Ferry, Lee expressed his confidence that he could now hold his ground until the

arrival of A. P. Hill, R. H. Anderson and McLaws. Later in the day, in a letter to President Davis, he wrote: "This victory of the indomitable Jackson and his troops gives us renewed occasion for gratitude to Almighty God for His guidance and protection."

The great military engineer who commanded the Confederate forces now gathering at Sharpsburg, had had ample time to examine the position he had chosen and to reach conclusions, from its topographic conditions and those in front of it, as to the direction from which his adversary would probably make his attack; and he was doubtless well satisfied that these conditions would bring the attack upon his left, which, by military rule, would be held by the "indomitable Jackson." He at once gave orders for that victory-compelling leader to move toward Hagerstown and take position guarding the left of his army. With his usual caution, Jackson had brought his troops to the vicinity of Sharpsburg by a concealed way, and he now, in like manner, marched them into position, at and beyond the Dunker church, and gave his men opportunity to rest and prepare for the coming conflict.

McClellan, in person, came to the front on the morning of the 16th, and when the fog lifted from the valley of the Antietam, he carefully examined, from the hill-crowning Try house, the long and bold stretch of commanding ridge which Lee occupied, and hastened to report to Washington that he was confronted not only by a "strong position," but by a "strong force." He spent the day putting his formidable army in position and extending both its flanks beyond those of the opposing one. As Lee had anticipated, late in the afternoon of this day, McClellan sent Hooker's corps, followed by Mansfield's, across the Antietam, by way of the stone bridge at Try's mill, some distance beyond Lee's left, where they went into bivouac. The ever-watchful Stuart quickly informed Lee of this movement, and confirmed his views as to the direction from which he would be attacked.

There were three bridges across the Antietam by which an attack could be made. The one on Lee's right, now known as the "Burnside bridge," was about a mile to the southeast of Sharpsburg. About a mile below that the river was fordable. On the road leading north of east from Sharpsburg to Boonsboro was another bridge, opposite the center of

McClellan's army, and about three miles to the east of north from Sharpsburg was the stone bridge, on the Williamsport road, by which Hooker crossed his two advanced corps.

Lee, before the coming of Jackson, posted his men with Longstreet on the right and D. H. Hill on the left, in order to cover the approaches from the Burnside and the Boonsboro bridges, having excellent positions for his artillery to cover these. Hood's two brigades were transferred to the woods near the Dunker church, to defend the approaches from Hagerstown, while D. H. Hill's five brigades extended Hood's right to the vicinity of the Boonsboro turnpike, and Longstreet's men prolonged the line to the right to the front of the Burnside bridge. On Jackson's arrival his command was posted to extend Hood's line farther to the left, to the vicinity of the old toll-gate, while Stuart occupied the commanding Nicodemus ridge, north of Nicodemus run, from which his artillery swept the roads by which Hooker and Mansfield must advance.

Lee, Longstreet and Jackson were in conference, with a map spread before them, in a house in Sharpsburg, when Stuart reported McClellan's advance, by the Williamsport road, late in the afternoon of the 16th. Jackson was promptly sent to take charge of the left wing and meet the threatened engagement. The turnpike road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown runs nearly north and south, and, for at least a mile, between somewhat parallel and rather bold limestone ridges. At the Dunker church, a little more than a mile north of Sharpsburg, the Smoketown road enters this turnpike at an acute angle. By this latter road the Federal army advanced, having turned to the left, soon after crossing the Antietam. About half a mile above the junction of these roads there were patches and fringes of rocky woods on each side of the Smoketown road. These are known as the "East woods;" and to the northern edge of these, the Federal skirmishers came late in the evening of the 16th, while the Confederate skirmishers held the southern edges of the same. Quite a body of open oak forest surrounded the Dunker church and extended northward for some little distance along the west side of the Hagerstown turnpike; thence a narrow field extended, for a half mile or more, between that road and the skirt of forest

in the vicinity of the Miller house, making what is known as the "West woods." The triangular space between the converging Hagerstown and Smcketown roads was first occupied by grass fields and then by a 30-acre field of standing corn that for yards reached across from one road to the other, but skirted on the east by the narrow East woods, while farther on, patches of forest bounded the cornfield and extended beyond to the Poffenberger land, thus concealing the commanding position beyond that land taken by the Federal troops.

By 5 o'clock of the afternoon of September 16th, Jackson had faced his men northward, some 700 yards beyond the Dunker church, and across the northern edge of the big cornfield, covering both the Hagerstown and the Smoketown roads. Hood and Law held the right, the latter advanced into the East woods, the two having 1,700 men in line. The "Stonewall" division, under J. R. Jones, with 1,600 men, extended this line across the Hagerstown road and into the northern end of the West woods, toward the commanding ridge occupied by Stuart with his artillery and covering the road leading to a ford of the Potomac on his left. Lawton and Trimble were resting in the woods at the Dunker church.

Just at sunset of this lovely September day, the golden autumn of the famous Appalachian valley, Hooker advanced southward, along the watershed ridge between the Antietam and the Potomac, and pushing forward a battery, opened on Jackson's left. Poague silenced this in about twenty minutes and it retired. About the same time his skirmishers advanced on Law, in the East woods, but were soon driven back to its northern edge. Then the two armies lay on their arms, within speaking distance of each other, through the long autumn night, during which Lawton and Trimble took the place of Hood and Law, whose men had had no cooked rations, except a half ration of beef, for three days, subsisting in the meantime on green corn gathered from the fields.

McClellan proposed to join issue with Lee by striking the latter's left with the 40,000 men in the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner, which were already in position for attack on the morning of September 17th. If these should be successful, he intended that Burnside should cross at the bridge now known by his name, and with his 13,000 men fall on Lee's right, under the com-

mand of Longstreet, and then follow up the delivery of these right-handed and left-handed blows with an attack on the center of Lee's lines, on the Boonsboro road, by the 25,000 veterans under Porter and Franklin, that were massed in his front and ready to attack when ordered. Numerous batteries of artillery lined the bluffs all along the eastern bank of the Antietam, many of them with long range guns that could fire into and even beyond the Confederate lines. McClellan had revealed his plans to Lee by placing his troops in the positions indicated, or very near them, in the afternoon of the 16th.

It may be well to repeat the disposition of Lee's forces to meet these three threatened attacks. Stuart, with his cavalry, held the extreme left, where the great bend of the Potomac to the eastward approaches to within a mile of the Hagerstown turnpike. On Stuart's right was Jackson's command, with its left pivoted amid the giant oaks and the great outcroppings of limestone strata, vertically disposed, where he had placed Early; thence his lines stretched eastwardly, covering the roads converging at the Dunker church. Nearly at right angles to Jackson's line were the troops of D. H. Hill and Longstreet, prolonged to the southward to opposite the Burnside bridge. Toombs' brigade, of 600 Georgians, advanced to the front, held the rocky, wooded bluff that overlooked and commanded the Burnside bridge. On the ridge behind Toombs, at early dawn of the 17th, Lee placed J. G. Walker's 3,200 men, with batteries on his right and on the higher hill in his rear; while still farther to the right, covering a ford below the Burnside bridge, was placed another battery and a portion of cavalry. Lee's entire force, of all arms, at the close of the 16th, was about 25,000 men, with which to oppose McClellan's 87,000. Orders of urgency called McLaws and A. P. Hill to promptly bring forward from Harper's Ferry their 10,000 fighting men.

As early as 3 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, two hours and a half before the rising of the sun, Hooker sent forward his skirmishers in the East woods, and as the sun looked over the lovely Cumberland valley from the crest of the South mountain, he boldly and impetuously urged forward his lines of 12,500 muskets against Jackson's front of but 3,500. Six Confederate batteries, well disposed in front of Jackson's line, wrought havoc



with this advancing host, but its lines closed up and swept forward, their right extending across the Hagerstown turnpike, their thirty guns answering those of the Confederates, from the high Poffenberger ridge, while twenty long range guns roared in enfilade from across the Antietam. Stuart's cannon made reply from the Nicodemus ridge, as did Jackson's from the center and S. D. Lee's twenty-six from the swell in the open fields in front of the Dunker church. Lawton's ever-brave Georgians fiercely contended with and held back Hooker's left, in the East woods and in the 30-acre cornfield, but the advantages of position enabled the Federals to force back Jackson's division into the woods, but still hanging to and pivoting on Early's. There, rallying behind the trees and projecting rocks and facing eastward, it repulsed the attack led by Doubleday. Hays, with his 550 Louisianians, moved to the support of Lawton, in the cornfield, and one of the most stubborn and hotly contested of recorded engagements there took place. The Confederates were forced back, by weight of numbers, but contesting every inch of ground and leaving the big cornfield fairly covered with their dead and wounded and those of the enemy. Hood's courageous Texans, at the moment of peril, rushed forward from the Dunker church, with a wild yell, leaving their breakfast beside their camp-fires, to sustain Lawton and Hays in the unequal contest, while three of D. H. Hill's brigades were hastened by Lee from his center to extend Hood's right and fall upon the flank of Hooker's oncoming left. These well-put, right-handed blows forced Hooker's battle-broken ranks from the field of combat with great slaughter; nearly one-fourth of his men having fallen under the withering fire of the impetuous Confederates. His routed men found refuge behind their guns and Mansfield's corps, which was advancing, in echelon, on his left. Nearly half of Jackson's men had fallen in their line of battle, in the open and across the cornfield, while hundreds of them, stiff in death, still stood in silent skirmish line along the rail fence on the north front of the big cornfield; but the other half of his war-worn but unconquerable veterans closed up and grimly awaited the second Federal attack, which they saw approaching.


Banks' old corps, that Jackson's men had so often met, now under Mansfield, had bivouacked, late in the night of

the 16th, about a mile in Hooker's rear; and now, at about half-past seven of the morning of the 17th, it became the turn of that corps to take up the battle, from which, after a three hours' contest, Hooker had recoiled in complete defeat. Forming his line near where Hooker had first formed his, with his right resting on the Hagerstown road and his left extending eastward through the East woods, Mansfield advanced his two divisions, and the bloody conflict again raged across the cornfield and in the East and West woods; 3,600 Confederates, under Hood, Ripley, Colquitt and Garland, faced the 7,000 fresh Federals that advanced to the fight, aided by a mere handful of 300 of Hooker's corps who had so eagerly begun the battle in the early morning. Mansfield fell, on the north side of the East woods, at the beginning of his advance, and Williams took command. Thinking to avoid again joining issue with Jackson, Williams ordered Greene's division farther to the left, and, under cover of the low swell in front of the Dunker church and his Smoketown road, this division rushed forward, turned the Confederate right, crossed the Hagerstown road, and entered the eastern edge of the West woods; but there its progress was stayed by Jackson's men, in their natural fortress of forest and rocks, and Greene was soon forced to retire and join his retreating comrades that Stuart and Jackson's left, especially Early's unflinching one thousand, had driven from the field. Thus far Jackson, with his 7,600 veterans, had met and repulsed the 19,500 in the corps of Hooker and Mansfield and driven them from the field.

Although Lee was, by a previous accident, disabled in both his hands, and could only ride with his horse led by a courier, he had intently watched, from a rock, south of the Boonsboro road, on the summit of the hill east of Sharpsburg, the fierce contests on his left and at the same time had observed the movements of Burnside on his right. His eighty guns, in well chosen and commanding positions, had promptly responded to the still larger number of McClellan beyond the Antietam; his batteries in front of Sharpsburg commanded the road leading toward Boonsboro and held in check any Federal advance on his center. Seeing that the weight of attack was being concentrated on his left, and knowing that Sumner's veteran corps was following the defeated ones

of Hooker and Mansfield, he determined to meet Sumner's advance with a bold counterstroke. McLaws and Anderson, by a night march from Maryland heights, had joined him in the early morning of the 17th and were resting near Sharpsburg. He proposed to join with these the forces of Walker and lead them to the assistance of Jackson.

At half-past 8 of the morning the advance of Sumner's 18,000 veterans, the third of McClellan's successive assaulting columns entered the East woods, followed by Sedgwick's division. The sight was not a reassuring one as Sumner's men crossed the field of recent carnage strewn with the dead and wounded of Hooker and Mansfield. Greene's Federal division still held on near the eastern edge of the West woods, but did not move against Jackson's naturally fortified line. In a deploy of 6,000 men, in the East woods, Sumner faced the big cornfield, strewn with its fresh-mown harvest of the dead, then, in three lines, moved westward across that field and the Hagerstown turnpike to the front of the long line of the West woods. Stuart's guns raked his advance with an enfilade, while Jackson's, from the commanding ridge behind the West woods, raked it at short range. Sumner's right soon struck the brave three hundred that alone remained of the famous fighting Stonewall brigade; but these courageous Virginians flinched not, and from behind the upstanding ledges of rocks and the great oaks of the northern part of the West woods, they stayed the progress of the Federal advance, helped by the depleted command of the unyielding Early on their left, while Lee and Jackson were moving to set the battle in order to fall on Sumner's left flank. Hood had fought his men to a mere wreck, at the Dunker church, and had sent Col. S. D. Lee to tell the commanding general that unless immediately reinforced the day was lost. He met the great leader, on his led horse, about a half mile from the church. He reassured the chief of artillery, who had excitedly delivered Hood's message, by quietly saying: "Don't be excited about it, Colonel. Go and tell General Hood to hold his ground. Reinforcements are now rapidly approaching and are between Sharpsburg and the ford. Tell him that I am now coming to his support." Just then he turned and saw McLaws' division approaching at a double-quick from Sharpsburg.





Jackson had already driven the most of Greene's command from the wood at the church, by bringing Early around from his left and making an attack from the south on Sumner's exposed left flank. To Grigsby, now commanding the Stonewall division, and to Early, were now joined the 6,500 fresh troops under McLaws, G. T. Anderson and Walker, and a sheeted and unerring fire from these tried veterans, from behind the rocks and oaks of the West woods, poured upon Sumner's front, left and rear. Nearly one-third of his 6,500 steady and brave men fell where they stood. His efforts to face his third line to the front were ineffectual. It moved to his right and rear, instead of to his left, and, carrying with it portions of his first and second lines, sought safety behind the Federal batteries, and soon the whole division melted away before the hot reception of the Confederates. Just then, at a little past 9 o'clock, the nearly 6,000 of French's division of Sumner's corps, moving still further to the Federal left, under shelter of the low ridge above Mumma's house, advanced to assault D. H. Hill, on the left of Lee's center, and a fierce combat took place along "the bloody lane," that turns to the eastward, about halfway between Hagerstown and the Dunker church, and ascends to the summit of the ridge between the Hagerstown road and the Antietam. D. H. Hill had sent three of his brigades against the left flank of Hooker and Mansfield. When he withdrew these, from Sumner's advance, he posted two of them, those of Rodes and Colquitt, in this lane, with G. B. Anderson on the right of Rodes. He had but 1,500 muskets and a park of artillery; but on his left, extending to the West woods, were about the same number from the commands of McLaws and Walker. Hill's left was along the Hagerstown turnpike and his right along "the bloody lane," so the two wings of his command were placed at right angles to each other. Into these open arms of as brave and steady veterans as ever shouldered a musket, advanced the front brigade of French. From Hill's left a terrific fire sent French's men, with heavy loss, to the rear. He then advanced a second line to meet Anderson in the lane, but the musketry from Hill's right soon drove these back, behind the shelter of the hill, where the remaining two-thirds of French's brigade sought safety, having left one-third of their number between the

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arms of Hill's lines. The 6,000 veterans of Richardson's division, of Sumner's corps, now approached Hill's left, along the crest of the ridge above it. At this same hour of 11, Lee, who was eagerly watching his center, hurried R. H. Anderson's 3,500 to Hill's aid. These he hastened to reinforce his right, but at right angles to it and extending from the bloody lane southward toward the Piper house. From his position, across this partly sunken road, Richardson secured an enfilade fire on Hill's men in that road and played havoc with his line. Taking advantage of the confusion he had wrought, Richardson pressed forward, put the Confederates to flight and forced them back to the defensive fences along the Hagerstown road and to the shelter of the numerous buildings of the Piper farm. Hill soon rallied his men, brought up his batteries, and drove Richardson back to the cover of the bloody lane. At this juncture Franklin's corps moved into the position that had first been taken by Hooker and afterward by Mansfield, and sought to try a third issue with Jackson on the left. An artillery battle first took place, then Irwin's brigade rushed in a charge against the West woods, at the Dunker church, but Jackson's volleys promptly sent this attack in confusion to the rear.

Intent upon the battle from his overlooking position in the center, Lee, when he saw the partial success of Richardson's movement against Hill in his left center, promptly ordered Jackson to make counterstroke against the Federal right, in which Walker was to join by charging across from the front of the Dunker church. Jackson was hastening to obey, and Stuart's guns were moved out to see what impression could be made upon the great park of artillery in the Poffenberger field; Stuart intending to lead Jackson's movement with his cavalry by moving up the east bank of the Potomac. It was soon found that the Federal position was too strong to be attacked with any certainty of success; but Lee's left and center, just after the turn of the day, stood defiant in its chosen line of defense and ready to meet any forward movement McClellan might again order; but he was content, from the lessons of the forenoon, to merely hold the positions of his right without further advances.

Through all the long forenoon Toombs, with his 600 men, dominated the Burnside bridge and prevented

Burnside's big army corps from crossing, although he was constantly urged by McClellan so to do and help to carry out his original plan for crushing Lee. With unsurpassed bravery and gallantry, Sturgis advanced upon the bridge, aided by a heavy cannonade from the bluffs above, that, at short range, hurled shot and shell against Toombs' Georgians, who, during four hours of fierce contention, drove back four distinct storming parties and held to their position amid the rocks and trees of the bluff overlooking the bridge. Finding he could not carry this by direct assault, Burnside sent Rodman's division, by a wide detour to his left, to cross a lower ford of the Antietam and fall upon Toombs' flank. This forced the Georgians to retire, and at 1 o'clock Burnside began crossing the bridge, after relieving the brave division that had been exhausted in the attempt to carry it by storm.

It took Burnside an hour to cross and array his men on the ridges above the bridge. This disposition of a fresh corps, for assault upon his right, was in full view of Lee from his rock in front of Sharpsburg. Undisturbed by this, he had directed Jackson to assail the Federal right, knowing, by messages from A. P. Hill, that his command was just about crossing the Potomac, coming from Harper's Ferry, and would soon become an important factor on the field in dealing with Burnside. The latter advanced boldly, captured a Confederate battery, and drove back, to near Sharpsburg, the division of D. R. Jones, and by 3 o'clock his 12,000 were ready to fall upon the 2,000 of Longstreet that were tenaciously holding the immediate front of Sharpsburg and the road leading thence southward toward the Potomac. That same hour brought A. P. Hill up from Boteler's ford, and across to the commanding plateau along which runs the road from Sharpsburg to the mouth of the Antietam. His men were wearied by a march of 17 miles, including the fording of the Potomac, in seven hours, but the fiery Hill, who was always ready and impatient to begin a fight, promptly formed his lines, poured a storm of shot and shell from his well-placed artillery, and then rushed forward his men, with a wild yell, upon the masses of Burnside's troops and forced them to seek safety, in flight, under cover of their guns, beyond the Antietam, after leaving one-third of their number upon the field of



carnage. This put an end to the famous battle, the result of which, to McClellan, was defeat and disaster, but to Lee the crown of victory, against a great disparity of numbers, in a series of stubborn combats that had lasted from before daylight until dark.

The battles and marches of the preceding months had greatly depleted Lee's army, and his wounded, footsore, and straggling men were strung all along through Virginia from Richmond to the Potomac, so that he could bring but 35,000 wearied, half-clad and half-starved men into the battle of Sharpsburg; against these, McClellan had hurled 60,000 well-equipped, well-fed and well-cared-for men, while 27,000 more were held in full view and could have been thrown into the contest. Four of his corps were not only routed, but scattered; and he could not collect them to renew the battle.

Sharpsburg was a stand-up, hand-to-hand fight, as brave and furious as any the world ever saw, and the Confederate soldiers had in it proved themselves more than a match, in a fair and open conflict, for their Federal foes. The losses on both sides indicate the nature of the struggle. Of the Southern men, 8,000, one-fourth of Lee's army, lay dead or wounded upon the field; regiments, and even brigades, had fought almost to annihilation.\* McClellan's losses were some 12,500. The living of both armies, as the sounds of battle died away, sunk to profound slumber, such as only follows a day of battle, in the very lines where they had fought and amid the horrors of the carnage of the bloody battlefield.

At nightfall Lee held the line of the Hagerstown turn-pike and of the road leading south from Sharpsburg, and the line on his left which Jackson had chosen, before the battle, as the one he would hold; and his unconquerable veterans were ready to renew the combat at his word of command. The Federals had really gained and held no advantages of position.

Col. Stephen D. Lee, the Confederate chief of artillery, stated, to the writer, that an hour after dark, on the 17th, Lee summoned his division commanders to meet him at his headquarters in the wood in the rear of Sharpsburg, and as each came up, he quietly asked him: "How is it

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\*Longstreet reported the loss of his corps in the Maryland campaign as 964 killed, 5,244 wounded, 1,310 missing; total, 7,508.

on your part of the line?" Longstreet replied, "As bad as can be;" Hill, "My division is cut to pieces;" Hood declared with great emotion, that he had "no division left." Colonel Lee asserted that all of these officers advised that the army should cross the Potomac before daylight, and that Lee, after a profound pause, said: "Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac to-night. You will go to your respective commands, strengthen your lines, send two officers from each brigade toward the ford to collect your stragglers and bring them up. Many others have come up. I have had the proper steps taken to collect all the men who are in the rear. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again."

Some 5,000 Confederate stragglers joined their commands during the night of the 17th, and the morning of the 18th dawned upon the lines of contending forces, drawn up face to face, at short range, and ready for an anticipated renewal of the mighty struggle; but both stood on the defensive, and not a gun was fired during the livelong day. Lee was not only willing, but eager to renew the battle, in which he was earnestly seconded by Jackson, who suggested that if fifty heavy guns were sent to the Nicodemus ridge, beyond his left, they could silence the Federal batteries on the Poffenberger ridge and open the way for falling on the Federal right. Col. S. D. Lee accompanied Jackson, at General Lee's suggestion, to reconnoiter the chances for success in such an attempt. The chief of artillery pronounced the undertaking not only impracticable, but extremely hazardous, and, to the great disappointment of both Lee and Jackson, the movement was abandoned.

Learning, during the afternoon of the 18th, that large reinforcements were advancing to McClellan, from both the north and the east, Lee determined to cross into Virginia; and that night, in good order, and leaving nothing behind him but his dead and the wounded who could not be moved, he crossed his army through the Potomac. At the same time Stuart crossed his cavalry through the river, at a ford on Lee's left, went up it to Williamsport and recrossed, and threatened McClellan's right and rear, thus engaging his attention while Lee took his long trains and his army back into Virginia. On the morning of the 19th, when it was discovered that Lee

had safely escaped him, McClellan sent three brigades across the Potomac in pursuit, and these captured four Confederate guns, placed on the bluffs above the ford, which were not sufficiently guarded; but Jackson with A. P. Hill, speedily punished this temerity and drove the Federals back, across the Potomac.

With the great river between them, the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia now rested and recuperated during the bracing autumn days that characterize the great Appalachian valley. McClellan called for reinforcements, declaring that his ranks were being weakened by straggling and desertion, while Lee called upon his government for shoes and clothes for his well-nigh half-clad army. In a letter to his wife, General Lee wrote:

My hands are improving slowly; with my right hand I am able to dress and undress myself, which is a great comfort. My left is becoming of some assistance, too, though it is still swollen and sometimes painful. The bandages have been removed. I am now able to sign my name. It has been six weeks to-day since I was injured, and I have at last discarded the sling.

From his headquarters in the vicinity of Winchester, on the 2d of October, Lee issued an address to his soldiers, in which he said:

In reviewing the achievements of the army during the present campaign, the commanding general cannot withhold the expression of his admiration of the indomitable courage displayed in battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and hardship on the march. Since your great victories around Richmond, you have defeated the enemy at Cedar Mountain, expelled him from the Rappahannock, and after a conflict of three days, utterly repulsed him on the plains of Manassas, and forced him to take shelter within the fortifications around his capital. Without halting for repose, you crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper's Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,000 men, and captured upward of seventy-five pieces of artillery, all their small-arms and other munitions of war. While one corps of the army was thus engaged, the other insured its success by arresting at Boonsboro the combined armies of the enemy, advancing under their favorite general to the relief of their beleaguered comrades. On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one-third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every attack along his entire front of more than four miles in extent. The whole of the following day you stood prepared to renew the conflict on the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the Potomac. Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy to follow you across the river have resulted in his complete discomfiture and being driven back with loss.

Achievements such as these demanded much valor and patriotism. History records few examples of greater fortitude and endurance

than this army has exhibited, and I am commissioned by the President to thank you in the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have won for their arms.

Much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens with invasion, and to your tried valor and patriotism the country looks with confidence for deliverance and safety. Your past exploits give assurance that this confidence is not misplaced.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

**W**HILE recuperating his army in the lower valley of the Shenandoah, General Lee, a few days after the battle of Sharpsburg, urged the Confederate authorities to send General Loring, with the army of the Kanawha, northward, through Morgantown, into western Pennsylvania, to break the Federal lines of communication between the east and the west and to disconcert any plans that McClellan might be forming for a new campaign into Virginia, as he desired not only to gain time for collecting together the fragments of his army, but for the people of Virginia, especially those of the fertile valley of the Shenandoah, to gather the harvest of Indian corn which was now ripe and ready for cutting and shocking. On the 25th of September he suggested to President Davis that the best move his army could make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and fall upon McClellan from that direction, saying: "I would not hesitate to make it, even with our diminished numbers, did the army show its former temper and disposition." He had every reason to believe that in a very short time his veteran army had recovered that "temper and disposition."

Lee had hoped that McClellan would cross the Potomac and offer battle in the lower Shenandoah valley; but that over-cautious commander was in no haste to try a third issue with the bold Confederate leader. To engage McClellan's attention and gather a supply of fresh horses from the farmers of Pennsylvania, Lee, on the 10th of October, dispatched the raid-loving Stuart, with 1,800 horsemen, across the Potomac at Williamsport, and thence along the western side of the Cumberland valley, to Chambersburg, where he halted on the morning of the 11th. Thence sweeping to the eastward, across the South mountain, he returned through the Piedmont region, and by noon of the 12th again crossed the Potomac into Virginia, after a rapid and extensive ride, not only with a fresh supply of much-needed horses, but with full information as to what was going on in and around McClellan's

army, of which he had made a complete circuit. This bold and memorable ride so irritated the Federal government that it peremptorily ordered McClellan to choose a line of attack and move against Lee in Virginia.

The experiences of the Federal army in the Great valley, both in Virginia and in Maryland, did not give them confidence in undertaking a new campaign, in that already famous region where "the strength of the hills" had hitherto proven an efficient ally of the Confederates; so McClellan determined to draw Lee from the valley, by crossing to the east of the Blue ridge and then following along its eastern foot, and see what military results could be secured in the Piedmont region, which had hitherto only been tried at Cedar run. Crossing the Potomac October 23d, he successively occupied, with detachments, the gaps of the Blue ridge, making demonstrations across the same toward the Shenandoah, thus guarding his flanks as his army marched southward.

Lee was not slow to comprehend the plans of his opponent, which involved a new "on to Richmond." He immediately sent Longstreet to place his newly-constituted First corps athwart the front of McClellan's advance. Crossing the Blue ridge at Chester gap, he placed his command in the vicinity of Culpeper Court House, where he arrived November 6th, the very day that McClellan's advance arrived at Warrenton, in the vicinity of the road by which Longstreet's corps had passed just before. Jackson, with the Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia (also recently organized, but not announced as such until he crossed the Blue ridge, a few days later, and his army ceased to be, officially, that of the Valley district), was left in the Shenandoah valley, to remain, as long as he could prudently do so, as a protection to that great Confederate granary, and as a menace to McClellan's right, as he would hesitate to push far into Virginia so long as that ever-ready fighter and unconquerable leader remained in the lower valley, to him the land of victory, to McClellan that of defeat and disaster.

With his usual boldness, Lee did not hesitate to post the two wings of his army 60 miles apart, as the crow flies, well satisfied that with Longstreet's ability as a stubborn fighter when once in position, he could resist a front attack from McClellan and trust to Jackson to descend

the mountains in ample time to fall on the enemy's flank and join in the fray, knowing also that the Federal authorities would hesitate to push forward the army of the Potomac and leave Jackson so near the gateway to the Federal capital. Could Lee have followed his own desires, he would have ordered Jackson to descend upon McClellan's flank while he moved to attack his front with Longstreet; but reasons of state required him to guard the approaches to the Confederate capital, and compelled him to stand upon the defensive.

McClellan now occupied Pope's former position, behind the Rappahannock, with fully 125,000 men; 80,000 held the defenses of Washington, and 22,000 watched the portals of the Shenandoah valley in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. Lee had less than 72,000 in the two corps of the army of Northern Virginia and in his cavalry corps, under Stuart, to again meet this great army of the Potomac.

Not satisfied with the tardy movements of McClellan, Lincoln supplanted him in command, at Warrenton, with Burnside, who at once hastened to execute an "on to Richmond," by way of Fredericksburg, thinking that by taking advantage of a shorter line of movement he could reach his objective without being intercepted by Lee; but when, on the 15th, he pressed his advance toward Fredericksburg, the alert Stuart promptly reported his movement to Lee, and the latter, with equal promptness, foresaw his plan of campaign and hurried Longstreet forward from Culpeper and placed him at Fredericksburg, across Burnside's track, in a strong position on the south bank of the Rappahannock, before Burnside's pontoons arrived on the Stafford heights, on the northern bank of that river, thus frustrating the Federal plan of campaign.

Jackson, who had been busy in the valley breaking up the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad and keeping the Federal authorities uneasy as to his whereabouts, promptly obeyed Lee's order to follow after Longstreet, but by ways farther to the westward. By making demonstrations at Chester and Thornton gaps, of the Blue ridge, he mystified those watching his movements by marching up the valley to New Market, thence taking the great highway leading across the Massanutton, the south fork of the Shenandoah, the Blue ridge at Fisher's gap and by Madison Court House, to the vicinity of

Orange Court House, and thence by the road to Fredericksburg; taking but two days to reach Orange Court House. He arrived in the vicinity of Fredericksburg near the end of November, having successfully concealed his march, and went into camp between Fredericksburg and Guiney's station.

It is well known that both Lee and Jackson would have greatly preferred to meet the new Federal commander nearer to Richmond, probably on the south bank of the North Anna, where the topographic conditions are more favorable for a complete victory, and where he would be farther from his base of supplies and be compelled to detach large bodies of men to protect his lines of communication. But the Confederate authorities were wedded to a plan of defensive operations, and were unwilling to permit the Federal army to approach so near to Richmond and to overrun any more of Virginia's territory than could be prevented; therefore Lee, always obedient to superior authority, although exercised contrary to his judgment, prepared to dispute the further progress of the army of the Potomac, by selecting and hastily fortifying a strong line of defense along the wooded terraces that overlook the broad bottoms of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and which, near that town, were the seats of numerous old-time Virginia mansions, up to where this Tidewater-bounding terrace is cut by the Rappahannock, at its falls, near Falmouth. Thousands of Lee's army were barefooted and destitute of clothing suitable for the rigors of the early winter, and many were even without muskets; and yet, Lee said, in a letter of that time, of this army of 72,000 veterans, that it "was never in better health or in better condition for battle than now."

Interrupted in carrying out his intentions, Burnside took ample time to muster his 116,000 men and 350 pieces of artillery, many of them guns of long range, upon the commanding plateau north of the Rappahannock, known as Stafford heights, from which he looked down upon the heroic town of Fredericksburg—trembling in expectancy of destruction between the two great contending armies on either side of it. These heights commanded, by their elevation, not only the terraces behind Fredericksburg, but all the more-than-mile-wide bottom extending for several miles below that city.



While awaiting the development of Burnside's local intentions and watching all the ways by which he might move toward Richmond, Lee sent D. H. Hill's division, of Jackson's corps, to watch the crossing of the Rappahannock, at Port Royal, below Fredericksburg, by which a highway led toward Richmond. Ewell's division, now commanded by Early, was encamped next above D. H. Hill, while the divisions of A. P. Hill and Taliaferro were placed near the railroad leading to Richmond, where they could readily move either to the aid of D. H. Hill or to that of Longstreet, as the exigencies of the occasion might demand. Jackson established himself in the vicinity of Guiney's station, near the divisions of A. P. Hill and Taliaferro, whence highways led to his divisions, those of Early and D. H. Hill, down the river, and to General Lee's headquarters, which were established on the old Telegraph road back from Fredericksburg. The mild weather that had prolonged the late autumn had given place to light snows, and the cold blasts from the North froze the ground and chilled Lee's veteran soldiery, who hovered around camp-fires in the dense forests, most of them without tents.

Burnside issued twelve-days' rations to his army, confidently expecting to make the next issue at Richmond, and on the morning of December 11th, in a dense fog that concealed his movements, his pontoon builders hastened to the bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, to throw a bridge for the passage of Sumner's corps, and another, a short distance below, for the crossing of Franklin's corps, while 143 of his big guns, along a line more than three miles in length, gave fearful warning against any opposing movement from the side of the Confederates. Lee's two signal guns gave notice to his army of this Federal advance, and the men were hurried forward from their bivouacs to the rudely intrenched positions that had been chosen for them. Jackson's men were sent for, and A. P. Hill and Taliaferro were put in position, on Longstreet's right, on the morning of the 12th; but D. H. Hill and Early remained near Port Royal until Burnside should more fully uncover his intentions.

Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians had been charged with the duty of defending the crossings of the Rappahannock in front of Fredericksburg, where that river is

but a few hundred yards wide. These fearless fighters, under the protection of the heavy walls of old colonial warehouses, shops and dwellings of brick and stone that fringed the south bank of the river, shot down repeated advances of the Federal pontoon builders, and frustrated nine successive attempts to lay the bridges, until the Federal commander, exasperated by the delay, turned loose his batteries upon the devoted town, and, amid flame and smoke and the fierce contention of sharpshooters, succeeded in crossing a body of infantry, which forced back Barksdale's men from the river and enabled him to lay his pontoons and commence the crossing of his army, but not until darkness had come. Barksdale's brave riflemen, by their tenacious contention, had snatched a day from the victory-anticipating Burnside.

Under cover of the darkness of the night of the 11th and of the dense winter fog of the next morning, 45,500 infantrymen and 116 guns, under Franklin, crossed the pontoon bridges at Deep run, below Fredericksburg, and spread themselves a few miles along the line of the railway to Richmond running through the broad bottom lands south of the Rappahannock; while Sumner led 31,000 into Fredericksburg by the upper pontoon. As the day of December 12th advanced and the fog lifted, and Lee looked out from the high hill in the center of his position, which he had chosen for his headquarters, and saw this great host stretching for miles in his front and to his right, in brave battle array, he knew at once that Burnside had adopted the perilous plan of a direct attack, which he had already made preparations to meet by the construction of a military road and the throwing up of protecting intrenchments for his artillery as well as his infantry. He promptly directed Jackson to concentrate his men on the right of the army and take command of the right wing. Capt. J. P. Smith, of Jackson's staff, rode, late in the day, 18 miles, to D. H. Hill's headquarters, down the river, and by marching over the same 18 miles that night, that capable commander brought his men into position, on Jackson's right, by dawn of the 13th; and by so doing before Burnside was ready to begin his assault, Lee was ready to receive it.

Not aware of the fleet-footedness of Jackson's men, and supposing from the information he had gathered by aerial reconnoissances, with balloons, that a large portion of

Lee's army was still down the Rappahannock, Burnside thought to turn Lee's right, secure the highway to Richmond, and defeat him by a flank and rear attack. A large and heavy forest concealed the Confederate right, and the Federal commander was quite surprised, when he began the execution of his flanking movement with Franklin's corps, to find Jackson in position at Hamilton's crossing, with A. P. Hill's 10,000 veterans drawn up in a double line, more than a mile in length, on the high ground just within the northern edge of the forest, with fourteen field pieces on his right and thirty-three on his left; while Early's and Taliaferro's divisions were in order of battle in A. P. Hill's rear, and D. H. Hill's division was in reserve, just to the rear of the right, ready to move against any attempt to turn that flank of Lee's army.

Stuart's cavalry hovered on the plain in advance of Jackson's right, across the Massaponax, whence his long range guns played enfilading havoc on the Federal lines as they advanced, and even paid their respects to Burnside's headquarters, at the Phillips house, nearly five miles away, on the Stafford heights. Jackson's line extended, in an east and west direction, from Hamilton's crossing to Deep run, along the front of a wooded upland promontory. At Deep run it was joined by Longstreet's line, which extended northeast, along the face of another upland promontory, to Hazel run, whence it deflected to the west of north, along Marye's heights, immediately west of Fredericksburg to the bluff bank of the Rappahannock above Falmouth.

General Lee's point of observation was on "Lee's hill," where the old Telegraph road, leading from Fredericksburg to Richmond, mounts to the summit of the promontory south of Hazel run. The divisions of Hood and Pickett, of the First corps, were placed along the front between Deep and Hazel runs. Marye's heights were crowned with batteries, while under them, in front, protected by a thick stone fence on the east side of a highway, were the divisions of Ransom and McLaws. R. H. Anderson's division occupied the left, from the Marye's heights to the Rappahannock. Marye's hill was like a bastioned fortress overlooking Fredericksburg and commanding the valley of Deep run, toward its mouth, where the corps of Sumner had crossed the river. The general features of the position were somewhat like those at the

Second Manassas, where Lee's two wings opened like great jaws of death to meet an advancing foe; but Marye's heights, on the left, were more formidable than those of Sudley, which Jackson had held, and that indomitable fighter was now on the right, in the weaker, and therefore the more responsible position.

Franklin was ordered to begin the battle by attacking the Confederate right. Under cover of the dense fog he deployed his 55,000 men on the wide plain in Jackson's front, and when the fog lifted, in the mid-forenoon of that chill December day, the Federal lines, infantry and artillery, were revealed, "in battle's magnificently stern array," along the embanked line of the railway, but a few hundred yards in front of the Confederate position. In anticipation of the coming fray, Lee joined Jackson to witness the opening. Meade's division led Franklin's advance, with near 5,000 men, forcing back Jackson's skirmishers, who had, up to that time, held the line of the railway. Eagerly watching Meade's forward movement, Stuart could not resist the temptation to give it a raking enfilade, with solid shot, from the gallant Pelham's guns, placed on a swell south of the Massaponax, in advance of Jackson's right. This fire checked Meade's advance, but brought into action five Federal batteries, the weight of which forced Pelham to retire; but the rousing of this line of combat, hitherto concealed in the way, induced Franklin to turn Doubleday's division facing to the south, where it guarded his flank during the entire day. Recovering from Pelham's blow, shortly before midday, Meade again advanced, only to have his left shattered by Jackson's batteries, under Lindsey Walker, and his entire advance driven back before the Confederate infantry could fire a gun.

Well satisfied with the condition of things on his right, after seeing the result of this first encounter, Lee returned to his left. Sumner had begun his attack on Longstreet at 11 o'clock, at about the same time that Franklin began his on Jackson, opening it with rapid and continuous discharge of shot and shell, from the 400 big guns on Stafford heights, upon the Confederate batteries on Marye's heights. For an hour and a half this steady roar of artillery continued, the Confederates promptly answering the challenge. While thus attempting to intimidate Lee with the noise of artillery, Burnside was hastening

Hooker, with his two grand divisions, down the river plain to reinforce Franklin for the great assault that he proposed to make on Jackson at 1 of the afternoon. At the same time he was ordering Sumner's troops, hesitating under the withering fire from the crest and from the foot of Marye's hill, to advance from the cover of the streets of Fredericksburg, of the embankments of the railway, and of the water-power canal, in a vain attempt to capture the batteries of the Washington artillery and of Alexander, then steadily belching destruction from the Marye hill. The broken plain between Fredericksburg and the sunken Telegraph road, with its stone fence in front and its battery-crowned ridge above, was swept by a cross-fire of heavy guns from front and from right and left.


French's division, of Sumner's corps, led the Federal advance toward Marye's heights along two of the streets of Fredericksburg. The head of these columns came into the Confederate view at about 11 o'clock. They marched across the canal bridges, then wheeled into line of battle, and with brigade front, at intervals of 200 yards, moved forward, under cover of the fire of long range guns from Stafford heights. The cannon from Marye's hill, at point-blank range, gashed them in front; those from Stanbury's hill, on the extreme Confederate left, raked them on their right; while those on Lee's hill, near the Confederate center, raked them on their left. Closing up from the death-dealing, long-range missiles, the brave Federal soldiery pressed forward toward the foot of Marye's heights, only to be met by a withering blaze of musketry from the 2,000 riflemen of Georgia and North Carolina that Gen. T. R. R. Cobb held in command, in the sunken road behind the stone fence at the foot of the heights, and by a like fierce fire from muskets behind earthworks along the face of the hill above them. In this rash assault 1,200 of these brave men fell, dead and wounded, and the living were forced to give way. Hancock's division then followed to assault, in like gallant style, which Ransom, who had succeeded Cobb, who fell in meeting the first Federal onset, met by adding another regiment to those already in position. Hancock's fierce attack, in three courageous lines of battle, was met by a Confederate yell, and by a sheeted infantry fire that was reserved until his front was but a few hundred yards



# MAP OF THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA., December 13, 1862.

Scale  
0 1 2 3 4 Mile

— Confederate  
— Union



away and then swept down 2,000 of Hancock's men and forced the remainder to seek the shelter of the houses and embankments in their rear.

At 1 o'clock, Howard's division essayed a third assault. Kershaw, now in command in the sunken road, added two regiments of South Carolinians and one of North Carolinians to the ranks of the well-nigh exhausted Confederates still holding the bloody front. Thus reinforced and ready, Howard's advance was met, as had been those of French and Hancock, and under a fire even fiercer than the preceding ones, nearly 700 of Howard's men went down and the survivors fled, in dismay, to cover. Sumner's corps of veteran soldiers had dared and done all that brave men could do, and there was no longer any spirit left in them for another grapple with Lee's doubly-mailed left hand. Nine Confederate regiments in the sunken road, and seven in reserve supporting the artillery on the crest, had not only unflinchingly held their positions, but had piled the very front of it with heaps of Federal dead.

At this same hour of 1 in the afternoon, Burnside, from his headquarters on the bluff behind the Rappahannock, had ordered a grand assault, by 60,000 men, against the half of that number under Jackson on Lee's right; thus seeking, by simultaneous right-hand and left-hand blows, to break either Lee's right or left, and gain one or the other of the two high-ways that led toward Richmond. Meade and Gibbon, two brave and capable commanders, supported by fifty-one guns, led the attack. A skillful reconnoissance by the Federal engineers had discovered that a tongue of forest, extending from the front of that highland well out into the plain, and near A. P. Hill's left, had been left unguarded, on the supposition that its swampy character would prevent its use as an approach. Through this weak and concealing point, the Federal advance came, to turn Jackson's left, and broke A. P. Hill's first line of battle. Gen. Maxcy Gregg gave up his life in attempting to stem, with the second line, the oncoming Federal tide of attack. Jackson, promptly informed of this assault, rode headlong from his right, and hurling Early and Taliaferro, that he had wisely placed in line along A. P. Hill's rear, upon the now disorganized and forward-rushing Federals, drove back



their divisions, in great disorder, to beyond the railroad, capturing their field artillery. The Sixth Federal corps, in reserve, made noisy demonstrations with its artillery, but rendered no other assistance to its discomfited comrades.

Near the middle of the afternoon, as Lee beheld the flight of Franklin's men from their assault on Jackson, he saw Sturgis' division, of the Ninth corps, move from the cover of Fredericksburg for a fourth assault upon Marye's heights. These met the same fate as did their predecessors, and a thousand of them were soon added to the dead and the dying already covering the narrow field between Fredericksburg and the sunken road; while the driven-back living remnants of the division crouched behind the embankments of the canal and any cover that the broken field presented. With the entire battlefield in his telescopic view, and doubtless satisfied, from the failure of his fourth assault, of the folly and uselessness of again attacking Lee's left, Burnside now ordered Franklin to renew the battle on his left. But that leader, sufficiently punished by his two previous assaults on Jackson, and losing confidence in his men, who hesitated to close in another conflict with that intrepid fighter, flatly disobeyed the commands of his superior, and so the contest on the Federal left was practically ended.

Stung almost to madness by the impending total defeat of his first essay in combat of the army of the Potomac with that of Northern Virginia, Burnside, against the advice of Hooker, ordered the Fifth corps to undertake the task in which the Second, in four heroic assaults, had so signally failed. Anticipating that another effort would be made by fresh troops in this direction, Lee had placed two fresh regiments in the sunken road and two on the crest of the heights, all in command of Ransom, and Alexander's guns were substituted for those of the Washington artillery. Humphreys' division, of the Second Federal corps, advanced to the ordered assault, with a spirit worthy of its intrepid leader (who had, in the old army, been one of General Lee's younger favorites) with fixed bayonets, across the field covered with the ghastly wreckage of the Second corps. A fiery sheet of shot and shell and musketry met them as they approached the sunken road, and one after another of Humphreys' brigades fled from the fearful slaughter, broken and disor-

ganized. The task imposed upon them, as upon their predecessors, was beyond the reach of human accomplishment. A thousand of Humphreys' men fell beneath the steady fire of the men of Kershaw, Ransom and Alexander, and added to the horrid harvest of death that already covered all the plain.

Hooker held Sykes' division to cover Humphreys' retreat, while he sent Griffin's division, reinforced by two brigades, up the valley of Hazel run to attempt to turn the right flank, or southern end of the sunken road and its bordering stone wall, and a fierce conflict raged for an hour, at the close of the day, all along the lines of Federal assault. Night ended the bloody conflicts of that raw winter day, which had brought only dire disaster to Burnside's right, where more than 30,000 men, from three different army corps, had been hurled against Longstreet's position, from which 7,000 Georgians and Carolinians had successively beaten them back, strewing their front with nearly 9,000 dead and wounded, while not a Federal soldier had touched the stone wall, fronting the sunken road, that they held in brave defense. When the day ended, the Confederates still held all of their positions, notwithstanding the bold and numerous assaults of the great Federal army of the Potomac. Both armies spent the cold and cheerless winter night where they had formed their lines of battle in the morning.

On the 15th, Burnside intended to renew his attacks upon Lee's positions, especially on his left; but he found all his subordinates bitterly opposed to further assaults, which must inevitably result as had the previous ones. So he abandoned all thought of further conflict and awaited a favorable opportunity for recrossing the Rappahannock, which he found during the storm of that night, leaving behind him 12,653 dead and wounded men, in attestation of their courageous fighting in obedience to his orders.

Lee's loss in this first battle of Fredericksburg was 5,309, mainly on his right, where Jackson had fought outside his slight breastworks. Fifty thousand Federals had been actively engaged in opposition to some 20,000 Confederates. Burnside's flanking movement on Lee's right had been discomfited by Jackson and Stuart, while the assaults on Lee's left, intended to relieve the pressure on Franklin's movement, had only resulted in a fearful loss of life to the Federals, with but a small one to Long-

street's Confederates. Burnside attributed his defeat to the fact that the "enemy's fire was too hot." Lee had expected Burnside to renew the battle on the 14th, had every reason to believe that he would do so, and had made every necessary preparation to meet it. When that renewal was not made, he greatly desired to deliver a counterstroke, but the Federal army was so covered by the numerous batteries on the Stafford heights, which could not be reached by flank movement, that prudence forbade any attack on the Federal right. Jackson received permission to attack the Federal left, and just at the close of day of the 14th, he and Stuart opened a fierce artillery fire on Franklin along the line of the Richmond road, but Franklin's hundred field cannon and the heavy guns on Stafford heights compelled an abandonment of the movement. Not satisfied with this, Jackson desired to make an assault with the bayonet, after nightfall; thinking that the Federal batteries would not open on such an attack when they could not discriminate between friend and foe. Lee deemed this too hazardous, as his army was too small for such an offensive movement. He was not only receiving no reinforcements, but was constantly being called on to send away portions of his already small army to defend points in different States.

On the 16th of December, after the retreat of Burnside to the Stafford heights, General Lee wrote to President Davis:

I had supposed they were just preparing for battle, and was saving our men for the conflict. Their hosts crowned the hill and plain beyond the river, and their numbers to me are unknown. Still, I felt a confidence that we could stand the shock and was anxious for the blow that is to fall on some point, and was prepared to meet it here. Yesterday evening I had my suspicions that they might return [to the Stafford heights] during the night, but could not believe that they would relinquish their hopes after all their boasting and preparation; and when I say that the latter is equal to the former, you will have some idea of the magnitude. This morning they were all safe on the north side of the Rappahannock. They went as they came—in the night. They suffered heavily as far as their battle went, but it did not go far enough to satisfy me.

In a letter to his wife, written on Christmas day, after the battle, he said, after recounting the mercies of God's providence to his people during the past year:

Our army was never in such good health and condition since I have been attached to it. I believe they share with me my disappointment that the enemy did not renew the combat on the 13th. I was

holding back all that day and husbanding our strength and ammunition for the great struggle for which I thought I was preparing. Had I divined what was to have been his only effort, he would have had more of it. My heart bleeds at the death of every one of our gallant men.

A Federal demonstration was made, opposite Port Royal, on the morning of the 16th, as if an attempt would be made to cross the Rappahannock at that point, far to Lee's right, and there resume the attempt to move on Richmond. This was promptly reported, and Stuart, followed by Jackson, marched to meet it. It was soon learned that this was only a feint, and so the Second corps went into winter quarters, in Caroline county, in the forests just back from the front of the wooded bluffs of the Rappahannock, and Jackson established his headquarters at Moss Neck, near Fredericksburg, while Longstreet's corps occupied the left from the rear of Fredericksburg up the Rappahannock to the vicinity of Banks' ford, above Fredericksburg.

Later in December, Stuart made a cavalry reconnoissance around Burnside's right and rear, to within a few miles of Washington and Fairfax and Occoquan. The larger portion of Longstreet's corps was sent south of the James, with its advance in the vicinity of Suffolk, to winter where subsistence was plentiful. The Federal army went into winter quarters along the line of the railway from Fredericksburg to Aquia creek, with its base of supplies at that Potomac landing, which was easily accessible by ship and steamer. Thus these two great armies, with their camp-fires in sight of each other, disposed themselves in winter quarters in the extensive forests behind the big plantations that bordered both banks of the Rappahannock, and each addressed itself to the work of preparation for another trial of arms during the coming year; the one fairly rioting in the abundance of its supplies of men and material, of all kinds, gathered from nearly the whole world, which was at its command, while the other could only strengthen its great poverty of men and resources by husbanding the scantiest of fare and of military stores, by strengthening its patriotic courage and devotion, and by increasing its trust in Divine Providence by constant religious observances and supplications and prayers from nearly every member of its army, from its humblest private to the noble Christian soldier that led and, by example, encouraged them.

Smarting under his failure to move on Richmond by way of Fredericksburg, Burnside was tempted, by a spell of mild weather, to try a movement toward Richmond around Lee's left, which he began by marching up the north bank of the Rappahannock, in January, 1863. But a storm set in, just after his movement began, which soon rendered the roads impassable and forced him to retire to his camps. He found the Confederates ready to dispute his crossing the Rappahannock at every point that he reached, and making fun of his attempts by erecting great signboards within their lines, visible to the Federal army, inscribed, "This way to Richmond." This movement is known in history as "Burnside's Mud Campaign."

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN AND DEATH OF JACKSON.

**D**URING the winter of 1862-63 and early spring of 1863, Stuart, by frequent raids across the Rappahannock, kept the Federal cavalry busy, protecting Burnside's right and rear, while in the Valley and in the Appalachian region, Imboden and Jones broke the Federal communications with the west by the Baltimore & Ohio railroad.

In one of his humorous moods, on the 3d of March, Lee wrote to his wife:

We are up to our eyes in mud now, and have but little comfort. Mr. Hooker looms up very large over the river. He has two balloons up in the day and one at night. I hope he is gratified at what he sees. Your cousin, Fitz Lee, beat up his quarters the other day with about 400 of his cavalry, and advanced within four miles of Falmouth, carrying off 150 prisoners, with their horses, arms, etc. The day after he recrossed the Rappahannock they sent all their cavalry after him . . . but the bird had flown. . . . I hope these young Lees will always be too smart for the enemy.

After the battle of Fredericksburg, Stuart's cavalry corps held the line of the Rappahannock up to the Blue ridge, with a considerable body in Culpeper, near the line of the Orange & Alexandria railroad, having its base of supplies at Gordonsville. Several times during the winter and early spring the Federal cavalry attacked the Confederates, who invariably drove them back. In an engagement, March 17th, at Kellysville, the first real battle between the horsemen of the opposing armies, the brave and beloved Pelham, commanding Stuart's horse artillery, was killed.

While tented in his winter quarters back of Fredericksburg, Lee was considering a plan of campaign for the coming spring, having frequent consultations with Jackson and Stuart; and Jackson, in the Corbin lodge at Moss Neck, although busy all the time strengthening his corps and putting it in a high state of efficiency by drill and inspection, and by using every possible effort to

have it clothed and fed, was also thinking about his favorite design for a campaign into Pennsylvania, to break up the mining operations in the anthracite coal-field, and so seriously cripple the enemy by cutting off fuel supplies for his manufacturing establishments, his railways, and his numerous steamships. Almost at the beginning of 1863 he directed the writer, his topographical engineer, to prepare a detailed map of the country between the Potomac and the Susquehanna; a map that was subsequently used in the Gettysburg campaign, but not by Stonewall Jackson.

Generals of lesser rank formulated plans of campaign, and so, doubtless, did every thoughtful and enterprising private in the ranks of the veteran army of Northern Virginia. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, of Ewell's division, made an offer to General Lee to bridge the Rappahannock and surprise the Federal army in its camps. To this Lee made reply, in his always courteous way:

I am much obliged to you for your suggestions presented in your letters of February and March. I know the pleasure experienced in shaping campaigns and battles, according to our wishes, and have enjoyed the ease with which obstacles to their accomplishment, in effigy, can be overcome. The movements you suggest in both letters have been at various times studied, and canvassed with those who would be engaged in their execution, but no practicable solution of the difficulties to be overcome has yet been reasonably reached. The weather, roads, streams, provisions, transportation, etc., are all powerful elements in the calculation, as you know. What the future may do for us, I will still hope, but the present time is unpropitious, in my judgment. The idea of securing the provisions, wagons and guns of the enemy is truly tempting, and the desire has haunted me since December. Personally, I would run any kind of risk for their attainment, but I cannot jeopardize this army.

The Official Records show that the Federal army under Burnside was thoroughly demoralized after the disasters of Fredericksburg and the failure of the "Mud Campaign." Not only were desertions numerous, but an alarming degree of insubordination was prevalent throughout the army. To remedy this condition of things, Burnside was displaced, and on the 26th of January, 1863, Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, the second in the command, was given charge of the army of the Potomac. He speedily restored it to a condition of efficiency and brought its strength up to nearly 134,000 soldiers, when, toward the last of April, he made ready to cross the Rappahannock and attack Lee's 63,000 veterans. Jackson

held the front of Lee's right, from Hamilton's crossing down to Port Royal, with the 33,000 well-tried men of the Second corps. Of the two divisions of Longstreet that remained with Lee, McLaws held the front, from Jackson's left to opposite Banks' ford, with 8,000 men; Anderson's 8,000 extended McLaws' left well toward Chancellorsville (to Mott's run), while Stuart's 2,700 cavalymen watched the fords of the Rappahannock up to the Orange & Alexandria railroad crossing.

Hooker had opposed Burnside's plan of campaign against Lee, and he now essayed to make trial of his own. He proposed to make a great show of having adopted Burnside's plan, by sending Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, at and below Fredericksburg, with three army corps, thus hoping to detain Lee in front of that desolated city while he, with four other army corps, marched rapidly up the north bank of the Rappahannock, concealed by its well-nigh continuous forests, crossed that river at Kelly's ford and the Rapidan at the Germanna and Ely fords, and thence, marching on roads leading from Orange through Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, should fall upon Lee's flank and rear and thus force him away from his tried lines of defense toward Richmond, when Hooker's reunited army would, with overwhelming numbers, follow in pursuit.

On the 13th of April, a fortnight in advance of his infantry movement, Hooker sent Gen. George Stoneman, with 10,000 of his cavalry corps, to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, in Culpeper, brush aside Stuart's cavalry, destroy his base of supplies, break the Virginia Central railroad at Gordonsville, then turn southeastward toward Hanover Junction, and, breaking Lee's railway connection with Richmond, there form an intrenched camp and be ready to fall upon Lee's flank as Hooker drove him in retreat toward Richmond. As Stoneman began his march, a heavy rain set in and so flooded the Rappahannock that he had not only to contend with Stuart at every ford he attempted, but also to wait upon its northern bank for the waters to subside; and it was not until the 27th that the three Federal corps, led by Slocum, followed after the cavalry. They crossed Kelly's ford of the Rappahannock in the afternoon of the 28th, and late on the 29th reached Germanna and Ely fords of the Rapidan. Lee had divined the purpose of



this movement, for on the 23d he wrote to Jackson that he considered the Federal preparations opposite Port Royal as only a feint that it was not necessary to move troops to meet, as he was satisfied that Hooker's purpose was to attempt a passage elsewhere, and closed by writing: "I will notify Generals McLaws and Anderson to be on the alert, for I think if a real attempt is made to cross the river, it will be above Fredericksburg."

During the night of the 28th, Sedgwick threw his pontoons across the Rappahannock, nearly in front of Hamilton's crossing, and on the morning of the 29th the Federal lines of battle again appeared on the broad river plain below Fredericksburg. That same morning Stuart informed Lee that the Federal flanking advance had crossed at Kelly's ford, and later in the day that two columns of Federal infantry were moving toward the Germanna and Ely fords of the Rapidan. This information confirmed Lee as to Hooker's intentions, and he at once ordered Anderson westward to support the opposition which he directed Stuart to make to the Federal movement toward Chancellorsville. At midnight Hooker's advance forced back from Chancellorsville the brigades of Mahone and Posey, of Anderson's division, and occupied that plantation. Anderson withdrew and formed his lines in the intrenchments that had been thrown up in front of Tabernacle church, across the three roads that there converged, from the westward, into the turnpike road leading to Fredericksburg.

On the night of this same 29th of April, Stuart sent Gen. W. H. F. Lee, with two regiments of cavalry, to intercept Stoneman's movement against Gordonsville, while in person he led Fitz Lee's brigade across the historic Raccoon ford of the Rapidan, and placed his cavalry in position to protect Lee's left. This brought him into conflict with the Federal cavalry advance on the morning of the 30th, near Todd's tavern, not far from Anderson's left at Tabernacle church.

Meade's corps of the Federal army, the Fifth, reached Chancellorsville during the night of the 29th, and by sunset of the 30th, Hooker had there concentrated 50,000 men, while 18,000 more, under Sickles, were near at hand. Sedgwick, with his 40,000 or more, was still threatening Lee's right, below Fredericksburg; at the same time some 13,000 Federal cavalry were threatening his railway communications.

Exulting in the success of his strategic movement which had placed him, without loss, on Lee's flank, Hooker issued to his command, on the 30th, a general order, in which he said, among other boastful things: "Our enemy must ingloriously fly or come from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." Lee quietly, but quickly, accepted the challenge, thus thrown out, and at midnight of the same day ordered Jackson's corps, which he had some days before concentrated in the vicinity of his battle line of the 13th of December, to march from Hamilton's crossing by the old Mine road toward Tabernacle church. By 8 of the morning of Friday, May 1st, a portion of Jackson's corps joined Anderson, and Lee was ready to meet any advances Hooker might make toward Fredericksburg.

Lee left Early in command at Fredericksburg, with his own division, Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division, and the reserve artillery under Pendleton, to watch the movements of Sedgwick. This disposition of forces placed Lee's army directly between the two widely-separated wings of Hooker's army, while the cavalry of the latter was still further detached, seeking to destroy Lee's lines of communication. These conditions compelled Lee to face his army in both directions, which he resolutely did, and prepared for the conflict, contrary to Hooker's expectations. Early, with 30 guns and 8,500 infantrymen, stretched his thin line along the whole length of Lee's defenses of the previous December, and with characteristic alertness awaited Sedgwick's movements.

The mass of Lee's army, some 41,000 men, under Jackson, Anderson and McLaws, were moved to within four miles of Chancellorsville, and these, just before noon of May 1st, advanced and drove back Hooker's skirmishers, who were in the act of opening the way to Fredericksburg. Lee himself spent the forenoon of the day with Early, watching, from his old battlefield position, the Federal demonstrations on Stafford heights and on the Rappahannock plain, and counseling Early to hold fast his position and not be deceived by Sedgwick's demonstrations; advice that he well knew would be implicitly followed by the courageous old fighter to whom he gave it.

When Jackson reached the vicinity of Tabernacle

church, he found Anderson busily engaged, with pick and shovel, strengthening his position. He, in command as the ranking officer present, immediately ordered the discontinuance of such operations, and that an immediate advance should be made to meet the one he shrewdly supposed Hooker was already making. McLaws was sent forward along the old turnpike, and Anderson along the plank road, while Jackson supported the more exposed left of the movement. The two roads thus taken converged at Chancellorsville. As Jackson had divined, Hooker, having started at 11 a. m., was at the same time marching a column along each of these roads toward Fredericksburg; consequently these opposing forces met about midway between Tabernacle church and Chancellorsville, and the issue of battle was joined in the fields along the roads and in the dense intervening forest. Alexander quickly placed one battery from his battalion in front, on the plank road, and sent one accompanying the skirmishers. Lee came up at about this time, and he and Jackson, riding side by side, followed in the line on the left. With wild cheers for these two trusted and beloved commanders, the Confederates rushed forward and drove back the oncoming Federals. Sykes' division of Meade's corps, advancing on the turnpike, was flanked by Jackson and repulsed in front by McLaws; while Anderson turned back to Chancellorsville Slocum's Twelfth corps, with loss, and Hooker's initial action-movement sought protection behind Sickles' line of 18,000 men that held the front of the fields at Chancellorsville. Lee's skirmishers followed until they found themselves confronted by formidable intrenchments of logs, protected by abatis, in the forest in front.

Hooker had concentrated his army in a most formidable position, which he had carefully and skillfully fortified, but he was surprised and mortified that his first movement had been unsuccessful. Informed, by his advance, as to Hooker's position and the disposition of his forces, Lee withdrew his army for a short distance, as the day closed, and his men slept in lines of battle covering the roads leading from Chancellorsville. In person he went into bivouac with Jackson, where the road to Catherine furnace turns southward from the plank road. During the night Talcott and Boswell, of Lee's engineers, reconnoitered the Federal front and

pronounced a direct attack impracticable. Lee then said to Jackson, "We must attack from our left;" and Jackson was directed to prepare for such a movement. These two leaders and their staffs then sought sleep, as best they could, in a cold night of the early springtime, wrapped in their overcoats, under the sheltering pines and oaks. Stuart, in the meantime, had informed Lee of the disposition of all of Hooker's forces on the field of action, especially of those of his right wing, which extended far out along the plank road to beyond its intersection with the Ely's ford road, held by the Federal cavalry.

By early dawn of the next morning, Jackson sent his topographical engineer, Capt. Jed. Hotchkiss, to Catherine furnace to ascertain whether there was a shorter road around Hooker's front and right to his rear, than the one by way of Todd's tavern. Informed, at an early hour, of the shortest way, Jackson, after a short conference with Lee, in which he secured permission to take his whole corps with him in his flank movement, promptly marched, first southward, then southwestward, to the Brock road, thence northwestward, by that road, to the plank road, thus traversing nearly the entire front of Hooker's position, and turning his right. He then formed his command in three lines of battle, with Rodes (D. H. Hill's division) in front, supported by Colston (Trimble's division), and he in turn by part of A. P. Hill's division. When the Orange road was reached, Paxton's "Stonewall brigade," of Trimble's division, was advanced on that road so that it constituted an extension of Rodes' right when the forward movement took place.

General Lee, in his report, describes the origin of Jackson's flank movement in these words:

I decided against it [an attack upon Hooker's central works] and stated to General Jackson, we must attack on our left as soon as practicable, and the necessary movement of the troops began immediately. In consequence of a report received about that time from Gen. Fitz Lee, describing the position of the Federal army and the roads which he held with his cavalry leading to its rear, General Jackson, after some inquiry concerning the roads leading to the furnace, undertook to throw his command entirely in Hooker's rear, which he accomplished with equal skill and boldness; the rest of the army being moved to the left flank to connect with him as he advanced.

The audacity of Jackson's flank movement, by which Lee entirely detached from himself the larger part of his

army, was only equaled by the audacity of Lee himself in his willingness to confront and attempt to hold in place the great mass of Hooker's army with the two divisions of Anderson and McLaws. The dense forest that covered Hooker's eastward front prevented his seeing the small force that Lee held opposed to him; while the fierce demonstrations that Lee made, all along this front, with infantry and artillery, keeping up an almost continuous fire, deceived Hooker as to his numbers, and made him hesitate to advance from his intrenchments and ascertain what was really opposed to him. Taking counsel of his fears, he allowed Lee to hold him all day in check, while Jackson was eagerly and swiftly marching around his right flank.

The morning sun of the 2d of May was barely visible when Jackson began his march with Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's old division in front, followed by Colston and A. P. Hill; 26,000 war and camp hardened veterans led by Jackson in person, with four regiments of cavalry, under Stuart and Fitz Lee, protecting his flanks. Sickles, from his elevated position in Hooker's south front, discovered Jackson's column moving southward, by way of Catherine furnace, and opened on it with his long range artillery. This caused Jackson to diverge to his left, after throwing out a brigade to protect his flank. Sickles advanced on this and captured a Georgia regiment, which induced the Federal officers to believe that Lee was in retreat toward Richmond. Sickles then organized a strong movement in pursuit of Jackson, sending three divisions after him; but Lee turned Anderson's guns upon Sickles and checked his movement. Sickles then called for reinforcements, and late in the afternoon he sent a brigade to the furnace; but it was then too late, for Jackson's column of march was already far beyond his reach, and so far he had successfully concealed the object and direction of his movement. The only result was that Hooker had sent 20,000 men away from his center, into the tangled wilderness, searching for Jackson, at the very time that the latter was ready to throw the weight of his whole corps upon Hooker's extended and weak right flank.

Jackson led his flanking movement with even fiercer energy than was his usual characteristic, constantly urging division commanders to "Press forward," and

kept all of his staff constantly moving along the line of march to see that it was closed up, and with map, made by his topographical engineer on the way, when wanted, and memorandum, he hourly apprised Lee of his progress. Dr. Hunter McGuire, his medical director, says of Jackson at this time:

Never can I forget the eagerness and intensity of Jackson on that march to Hooker's rear. His face was pale, his eyes flashing. Out from his thin compressed lips came the terse command, "Press forward! Press forward!" In his eagerness, as he rode, he leaned over on the neck of his horse, as if in that way the march might be hurried. "See that the column is kept closed, and that there is no straggling," he more than once ordered; and "Press on! Press on!" was repeated again and again. Every man in the ranks knew that we were engaged in some great flank movement, and they eagerly responded and pressed on at a rapid gait.

By the middle of the day Jackson's advance reached the plank road, two miles southwest of Hooker's right flank under Howard. There he detached the Stonewall brigade to support Fitz Lee's cavalry in an advance toward Chancellorsville, along the forest enclosed road, to cover his farther movement, and then pushed on to the Orange turnpike, to a point northwest of Hooker's right and about two miles distant, which he reached by 3 of the afternoon, when he sent his last message to Lee, in these words: "I hope as soon as practicable to attack. I trust that an ever-kind Providence will bless us with great success."

Fitz Lee, who with a cloud of cavalry had been hovering around Hooker's front and right, and keeping Jackson's movement concealed by guarding every road that approached it, now met Jackson in person and led him to the summit of a hill, in an open field, whence he could look over the intervening forest and see Hooker's great army stretching away to the eastward, along and near the plank road, to Chancellorsville. Taking in at a glance the strategic as well as the tactic advantages of position that he had gained, Jackson, giving no heed to Fitz Lee's presence, hurried an aide to order Rodes to cross the turnpike and form at right angles to it, along the concealed front of the field of observation and through the forest to the left, with his right extended nearly to the Orange plank road, which was held by the Stonewall brigade. Colston's division was formed in rear of Rodes, in almost equal length of line of battle; two brigades of

A. P. Hill's division were formed in the rear of Colston, with their right resting on the old turnpike, while the remaining brigades of Hill's division were left in column to follow along the old turnpike as a reserve. At 5 in the afternoon of Saturday, May 2d, two hours before the set of sun, just as a magnificent rainbow sprang its prismatic arch across the western sky in rear of his lines of battle, Jackson ordered an advance. With a wild "rebel yell," that startled the profound silence that had hitherto reigned in "the Wilderness," his veterans rushed forward through the forest, driving game of all kinds before them, and in an incredibly short time fell upon Howard's corps, holding Hooker's right, which, unconscious even of the near presence of an enemy, was engaged in cooking its supper. Thus unexpectedly attacked, a fearful panic ensued, and Howard's men rushed in dismay along the turnpike toward Chancellorsville, sweeping all organizations along with them in their flight. Six guns of Beckham's horse artillery, of Stuart's corps, galloped at even pace, along the turnpike, with Jackson's men, and by sections of twos poured canister into the retreating Federals.

Nothing could stand against the superior numbers that Jackson hurled against Hooker's flanked line, which he speedily crumpled up and drove back toward Chancellorsville, but two miles away. Many prisoners were taken, and it looked as though the whole Federal army would be routed by the flood of fugitives, followed by Jackson's fierce soldiery flushed with victory. At this juncture, Colquitt, commanding Rodes' right brigade in the woods south of the turnpike, thought he discovered a Federal force on his flank that required him to halt and face southward; and thus was held back, for nearly an hour, Jackson's forward movement, giving Schurz's division, which he would have struck in flank had he continued to advance, time to escape; but Howard's corps was completely wrecked, and all opposition was speedily brushed away as Jackson's men, his lines of battle indiscriminately mixed in finding their way through the dense forests of second-growth timber and over fields along the turnpike, sprang over the Federal works that had been thrown across the road at Dowdall's tavern, nearly two miles east of where Jackson had formed his lines of battle, and about the same distance from Chan-







cellorsville. Overcoming the slight opposition of a Federal rally at this point, Jackson still pressed forward, driving the Federals before him, until he reached a line of log breastworks and abatis that Hooker had thrown up a mile to the west of Chancellorsville, along a cross road leading to Hazel Grove and through the woods. Behind these and the divisions of Berry and Williams, the remnant of Howard's corps found refuge.

When Jackson reached these formidable obstacles the sun had set and only twilight of the day remained. In their hot pursuit through the tangled forest his men had, of necessity, become completely mixed and all organization lost. Availing himself of the opportunity offered by these obstructions to his progress, and at the urgent solicitation of Rodes and Colston, he called a halt, and ordered that the men should sort themselves and the commands be reorganized. He fell back a little for this purpose, in order that A. P. Hill might form a new line of battle with his men, who had, up to this time, been following in column along the turnpike; intending to press the pursuit as soon as he could reform his army.

Jackson now held possession of the field of combat to within a mile of Chancellorsville, and covered the junction of the numerous roads that led from the turnpike, where the Federal works crossed it, and among others the road leading northeast to Bullock's, where that crossed the road leading from Chancellorsville to either Ely's or the United States ford, and immediately in Hooker's rear, less than a mile north of Chancellorsville. Another turning of Hooker's right, along the leading of this road, would cut off his line of retreat and throw him into the arms of Lee, who, with his two divisions, was keeping up a bold contention on Hooker's eastern front and holding the roads against a movement toward Fredricksburg.

After urging A. P. Hill to promptness in forming his line of battle, and giving him the order to "Press them. Cut them off from the United States ford, Hill. Press them!" Jackson, accompanied by his staff and escort, rode forward along the turnpike, through the twilight intensified by the heavy forest on each side of the road, and up to his skirmish line to reconnoiter, the accompanying engineers even riding up to a Federal battery which had halted in the road, and where one of them, Captain

Howard of A. P. Hill's staff, was captured. The ringing of the axes of the stalwart brigade of Federal pioneers told Jackson that Hooker was already throwing obstacles in the way of his advance, so he promptly turned back and rode at a trot toward his own command. As he approached Hill's newly formed line of battle, some one called out, "A Yankee cavalry charge," for such was suggested by the sudden appearance of Jackson and the score or more that accompanied him, coming through the darkness of the forest; when, without orders, the Eighteenth North Carolina fired a volley, of ounce musket balls, which desperately wounded Jackson, killed Captain Boswell, his chief engineer, and one of his escort.

Jackson's condition required that he be taken at once from the field to the hospital near the Old Wilderness tavern, and the command devolved on A. P. Hill, who was soon after wounded in the firing that the Federals opened after Hill's men had fired on Jackson. Rodes now succeeded to the command of the Second corps, but declined to take the responsibility, and upon consultation, Stuart, who was guarding the rear against the Federal cavalry which was on the road leading to Ely's ford, was sent for, and, as the ranking officer present, he took command of the corps, at about midnight, and with his accustomed and well-nigh tireless energy, spent the remainder of the night getting the command in readiness to resume offensive operations with the dawn of the coming day.

Near the time of Stuart's taking command, Sickles reached the vicinity of Hazel Grove, a farm and farmhouse at the southern end of the Chancellorsville open plateau, returning from his fruitless advance to Catherine furnace. The heavy condition of the atmosphere and the dense intervening forests had so deadened the sound of Jackson's attack, which was mainly one of infantry and light guns, that neither Lee nor Sickles had heard the noise of Jackson's battle until it neared Chancellorsville; but when the nearby sound reached Lee, he promptly ordered McLaws to move a heavy skirmish line along the old turnpike against Hooker's left. Anderson failed to respond to a like order to attack Hooker's center, and suffered Sickles to retire unmolested; but when he advanced his skirmishers northward from Hazel

Grove toward Jackson's front, they were driven back by Hill's skirmishers. Sickles then turned the larger part of his command against the flank of Hooker's retreating Twelfth corps, and entered into a fight with Slocum's men, of his own army, claiming that in this fight with his associates he had recaptured the plank road and that his men had inflicted the fatal wound on Jackson.

After Jackson had been removed to the field hospital and his arm had been amputated, and before the arrival of Stuart, after a consultation with Adjt.-Gen. A. S. Pendleton, Captain Hotchkiss, guided by a young Doctor Chancellor, of the vicinage, by a wide detour to the southward, rode to Lee, informed him of the position of the Second corps, and of what had happened up to the time of his leaving. Lee, thus informed, gave orders for Stuart to incline his lines to the right, while he would incline those under his immediate command to the left, and thus form a connected line of battle, which would, on the morning of the 3d, make a front attack on Hooker and drive him back from Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock.

Captain Wilbourne, signal officer of the Second corps, reached Lee at about the same time that Captain Hotchkiss did, and gave further information from his points of observation. Choked with emotion, General Lee received the news of the wounding of Jackson, and sadly remarked: "Any victory is dearly bought which deprives us of the services of General Jackson, even for a short time." Soon after, having had his arm disabled by the springing aside of his horse against a tree, Lee dictated this letter to Jackson:

I have just received your note informing me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead. I congratulate you upon the victory which is due to your skill and energy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
R. E. LEE, General.

This letter was read to Jackson the next day, while the fierce battle was raging in the immediate vicinity of Chancellorsville. Turning aside his face from the one who read it, Jackson said: "General Lee is very kind, but he should give the praise to God."

Dawn of the morning of Sunday, May 3d, found Lee

ready for an assault upon Hooker in his intrenched position around Chancellorsville, and saying to his staff, as he mounted his horse: "Those people shall be pressed immediately." No one in the army was more fitted to take the place of Jackson and lead his hardy veterans to victory than fearless "Jeb" Stuart, and with the rising of the sun he promptly ordered forward A. P. Hill's division to the south of the plank road, inclining it to the eastward, while, at the same time, Lee moved McLaws westward, along the plank road, and Anderson northward and westward, south of the plank road, inclining to the left, to fill up the line of interval between his left and Stuart's right.

During the night of the 2d, Hooker was reinforced by 17,000 men of the First corps, under Reynolds, and he now had concentrated at Chancellorsville some 80,000 men, disposed in a bluntly acute salient, projecting southward from each side of Chancellorsville, with the apex at Hazel Grove. The western side of this salient extended for over a mile to the northward from the apex, covering the approaches from the west and the ground held by Jackson's corps. The eastern side of the salient extended about a mile to the northeast, from the apex to the old turnpike, east of Chancellorsville, then reached about a mile to the west of north, to near the Bullock house, thus covering all approaches to Chancellorsville from the eastward. Hooker's lines were nearly those he held the night before, after the retreat of his right from Jackson. His left, facing eastward, was held by 20,000 men of Geary's and Hancock's divisions and the remnant of Howard's corps. In front of these, on Lee's right, were the 14,000 of McLaws and Anderson. Hooker's right was held by the 23,000 men in the division of Williams and the corps of Sickles. Within these two Federal wings were 37,000 more men of the corps of Meade, Reynolds and Couch, in reserve, in the open fields, ready to support either wing. Facing Hooker's right was Stuart with the 20,000 veterans of the Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia.

Stuart began the battle at early dawn by moving against Hooker's right, mainly north of the plank road and against the heavy line of defenses of timber and abatis that the active Federal army had thrown up before and during the preceding night. Stuart, in person, rode

behind the line of battle, his black plume waving as, in merry mood and clear, sharp voice, he sang, "Fighting Joe Hooker, come out of the Wilderness!" His right soon took the lead and attacked Hooker's center near Hazel Grove, capturing four Federal guns and gaining a position on the south end of the Chancellorsville plateau. As the light of day increased, Stuart's quick military eye detected the advantages of this Hazel Grove position, and he ordered Walker to concentrate thirty guns upon that point. These gave him an enfilade, as he was at the apex of Hooker's salient, along both the right and the left wing of the Federal army. Anderson's guns, under Hardaway, coming forward from toward Catherine furnace, also secured an enfilading position, and under the concentrated fire of these well served big guns, Hooker's position became untenable in about an hour.

While Lee's artillery was doing this effective work, McLaws assaulted Hooker's left; Anderson his center, from the south; while Stuart pressed line after line against his right. By 8 of the morning, Lee's wings were joined in front of Chancellorsville, in continuous line of battle, and a stubborn fight, of stroke and counter-stroke, began. Three times the bold Confederates took the Federal line of defenses, and three times were they driven from them by Hooker's brave fighters. His many well-handled guns aided in the repulses; but those of Lee finally overcame those of Hooker. A Confederate shell striking a heavy brick column of the Chancellor house, disabled Hooker himself, and Couch was compelled to take the command without having any definite plan of defense.

By 10 o'clock Stuart had broken through the Federal lines on the westward and gained the central point of the Chancellorsville plateau, at the little Fairview cemetery, thus forcing Hooker's men to retreat, driven by the desperate courage of inferior numbers, from their strongly-intrenched positions on three sides of Chancellorsville, past that burning mansion, into the strong line of intrenchments (the most formidable the writer ever saw constructed from timber) which Hooker had thrown up, as a refuge of last resort, during the preceding night, extending across from the mouth of Hunting run of the

Rapidan, to the Rappahannock at the mouth of Mineral Spring run, a line nearly six miles in length.

Lee rode in the midst of his line of battle as his men pressed forward in pursuit, pouring volley after volley into Hooker's retreating army, while the shells of the numerous Confederate batteries were thrown over their heads, to burst in the Federal ranks and add to their confusion. The surrounding forests were soon in flames, the accumulated leaves of the preceding autumn having been fired by the burning cartridges and fuses, while flames burst from the large Chancellor house and added to the smoke of the conflict and of the burning forest. Col. Charles Marshall, Lee's military secretary, describes the scene, as Lee spurred "Traveler" up to the burning house, in these words:

Lee's presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who has not witnessed them. The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed with a common impulse. One long unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle and hailed the presence of a victorious chief. He sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of—triumph; and as I looked at him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from some such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of gods.

The victory won and the field of contention in his possession, Lee turned his first thoughts to rescuing the Federal wounded and his own from the conflagrations raging in the forest and at the Chancellor house. Marshall relates that just then there came a message from Jackson, with congratulations for the great victory Lee had won, adding: "I shall never forget the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face as he listened. With a voice broken with emotion he bade me say to General Jackson that the victory was his, and that the congratulations were due to him. . . . I forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence for the generosity that refused the glory."

Lee at once made preparations to assault Hooker's new position, when a message came from Early calling his attention to affairs at Fredericksburg. On Sunday, May 2d, Early was holding on tenaciously to the posi-

tions in front of Fredericksburg in which Lee had placed him, and was keeping Sedgwick from making an advance, when a member of Lee's staff brought him an order, which he had misunderstood, directing Early to abandon his position and march toward Chancellorsville. This withdrawal of Early from the right which he was holding with his division, all along Jackson's old position down to Hamilton's crossing, uncovered Barksdale's right on Marye heights back of Fredericksburg, and opened the way for Sedgwick to march against him in safety. The order to Early was countermanded, and on the morning of Monday, the 3d, he marched back to his former position only to see Sedgwick move 20,000 men against Barksdale's flank of 1,000 soldiers with artillery. Sedgwick won the much fought for and much coveted position, but with great loss, as Barksdale clung to it till overwhelmed by numbers. This capture enabled Sedgwick to move his corps, of 30,000 men, past Early's left on to the plateau west of Fredericksburg, and to the possession of the river and plank roads leading toward Chancellorsville, thus giving him opportunity to fall on Lee's rear while Hooker was contending with his front.

Wilcox, of Anderson's division, who had been left in observation near Banks' ford, promptly threw his brigade across the plank road, at Salem church, in a strong position, and informed Lee of the situation. He immediately dispatched McLaws with four brigades down the old turnpike and the plank road to reinforce Wilcox, thus meeting the emergency and providing, for a second time, against a rear attack by Sedgwick. McLaws marched rapidly to Salem church and at once joined Wilcox in an issue with Sedgwick, forcing him back a mile toward Fredericksburg, beyond the ravine of Colin run, just as the day closed. Summing up the events of the 3d of May, Lee sent a message to President Davis, saying: "We have again to thank God for a great victory."

On Monday, May 4th, leaving Trimble's (Colston's) and D. H. Hill's (Rodes') divisions in front of the formidable works at Chancellorsville, behind which Hooker had sought safety, Lee in person led Anderson's brigades to Salem church, where by midday he placed a formidable line of battle in position, with numerous batteries, covering the front of Sedgwick's lines, which extended across the bend of the Rappahannock, from



near Banks' ford, southward, along the crest above Colin run across the plank road, then along, south of that, to within a mile of Fredericksburg, then north to the Rappahannock at Taylor's hill. The same morning Early, marching along the Telegraph road, had recaptured Marye heights, and moving westward joined the right of the troops Lee already had in position. By 6 in the afternoon the Confederate lines had advanced from the west, the south and the east, and forced Sedgwick back to the Rappahannock; but McLaws, on the left, was slow in his movements, and Sedgwick was enabled to escape, by pontoons, across the river below Banks' ford and under shelter of the river bluffs. This large left wing of Hooker's army was thus finally disposed of, but after a spirited resistance. Lee, late in the day, returned to Chancellorsville and gave orders to again concentrate his army for a final assault upon Hooker's intrenched position.

Tuesday, May 5th, was spent by Lee in reassembling his army at Chancellorsville and making preparations to assault Hooker's last-held position. He sent the writer to reconnoiter Hooker's right and ascertain whether his flank could be turned in that direction. Just at dawn, on the morning of the 6th, as Lee was about to order an advance, General Pender came galloping to his field headquarters under a tent fly at Fairview cemetery, and informed him that his skirmishers had advanced and found Hooker's gone. In surprise, he exclaimed: "Why, General Pender! That is what you young men always do. You allow these people to get away. I tell you what to do, but you don't do it." Then, with an impatient wave of the hand, he exclaimed: "Go after them and damage them all you can." A heavy rain (such as almost invariably followed great battles in Virginia) had set in during the preceding night, and under cover of that, and concealed by his formidable intrenchments and the unbroken forest through which the roads led to the United States ford, Hooker had safely withdrawn his army over the pontoon bridges that he had placed across the Rappahannock below the United States ford, only leaving behind the debris of a well-conducted retreat.

The morning of the 7th found Hooker ordering that "General headquarters to-night will be at the old camp near Falmouth," and thence, before nightfall, issuing

"congratulations" to his army. His campaign was a total failure; he had left, south of the Rappahannock, as victims to Lee's combats, over 17,000 killed, wounded and captured men; 14 field guns, 20,000 muskets and 31,000 knapsacks; and yet, in his congratulatory order he said: "The events of the last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army," and saying, in conclusion, "Profoundly loyal and conscious of its strength, the army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may demand."

Lee's losses during the Fredericksburg-Chancellorsville campaign were 13,000. Among these were the very pick and flower of his veteran army officers, as well as privates. Among the former were the brave Paxton, an intimate of Jackson, who fell leading the Stonewall brigade to victory, and, above all, the matchless Jackson, Lee's "right arm," as he called him; and, beyond question, the main reliance of the Confederacy for the success of its cause. At least so thought not only the veterans in its armies but many of those at the head of its civic affairs, and the men and women at home, when, amid tears, they heard of his death. In his official report, Lee wrote: "The conduct of the troops cannot be too highly praised. Attacking largely superior numbers in intrenched positions, their heroic courage overcame every obstacle of nature and art, and achieved a triumph most honorable to our arms." He truthfully added: "To the skillful and efficient management of the artillery the successful issue of the contest is in great measure due."

Lee's regard, affection and admiration for Jackson scarcely knew bounds. While the great hero lingered in life, near Guiney's, Lee sent him many messages of condolence, and when word came that his wounds, complicated by illness, would probably prove fatal, he said, almost overcome with emotion: "Surely General Jackson must recover. God will not take him from us now that we need him so much. Surely he will be spared to us in answer to the many prayers which are offered for him."

Jackson died on Sunday, the 10th of May, and the next day Lee issued this general order:

With deep grief, the commanding general announces the death of Lieut.-Gen. T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th instant, at 3:15 p. m. The daring, skill and energy of this great and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise Providence, are now lost to us, but

while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and our strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who has followed him to victory on so many fields. Let officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defense of our beloved country.

When, in the autumn of the year, Lee wrote his official report of this famous campaign, after calmly reviewing it, he said:

The movement by which the enemy's position was turned and the fortune of the day decided, was conducted by the lamented Lieutenant-General Jackson, who, as has already been stated, was severely wounded near the close of the engagement on Saturday evening. I do not propose here to speak of the character of this illustrious man, since removed from the scene of his eminent usefulness by the hand of an inscrutable, but all-wise Providence. I nevertheless desire to pay the tribute of my admiration to the matchless energy and skill that marked the last act of his life, forming, as it did, a worthy conclusion of that long series of splendid achievements which won him the lasting love and gratitude of his country.

In a letter to his wife, written May 11th, concerning "the loss of the good and great Jackson," Lee wrote: "Any victory would be dear at such a price. His remains go to Richmond to-day. I know not how to replace him, but God's will be done. I trust He will raise some one in his place."

In an article on "Stonewall Jackson's Place in History," by Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, professor of strategy in the British Staff college, contributed to the "Life of Jackson," by his wife, he wrote:

When Jackson fell at Chancellorsville, his military career had only just begun, and the question, what place he takes in history, is hardly so pertinent as the question, what place he could have taken had he been spared. So far as his opportunities had permitted, he had shown himself in no way inferior to the greatest generals of the century, to Wellington, to Napoleon, or to Lee. That Jackson was equal to the highest demands of strategy his deeds and conceptions show; that he was equal to the task of handling a large army on the field of battle must be left to conjecture; but throughout the whole of his soldier's life he was never intrusted with any detached mission which he failed to execute with complete success. No general made fewer mistakes. No general so persistently outwitted his opponents. No general better understood the use of the ground or the value of time. No general was more highly endowed with courage, both physical and moral, and none ever secured to a greater degree the trust and affection of his troops. And yet, so upright was his life, so profound his faith, so exquisite his tenderness, that Jackson's many victories are almost his least claim to be ranked amongst the world's true heroes.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE CAMPAIGN IN PENNSYLVANIA.

**C**LOSING up the ranks of his victorious but decimated army, the veterans of which he could not replace, Lee did all in his power to follow up the victory of Chancellorsville by an aggressive movement on the army of the Potomac. But for his meagerly supplied commissariat he would, earlier in the spring of 1863, have moved upon Milroy at Winchester, in the lower Shenandoah valley, confident that by so doing he could draw Hooker from the northern neck of Virginia into the more open country, where he could find opportunity for striking him an effective blow. He had urged this view upon President Davis before the campaign of Chancellorsville, and had asked that troops might be drawn from the more Southern States to reinforce his army, confident that his plan of campaign would furnish more relief to the Confederacy than could be gained by holding scattered forces to defend distant positions.

Longstreet rejoined Lee in May at Fredericksburg, with the portion of his troops that had been wintering near Suffolk, south of the James, where supplies were more abundant and easy of access. The general commanding then proceeded to reorganize his army, by dividing it into three corps—the First under Longstreet, the Second under Ewell (who having lost a leg at Second Manassas, had just returned from hospital), and the Third under A. P. Hill—and worked untiringly to get his army into condition for a forward movement, constantly urging the Confederate government to add to his numbers in Virginia, and to those of Johnston and Pemberton in Mississippi, so that these two armies might be strong enough to strike efficient and simultaneous blows on the great Federal armies that opposed them, leaving local defenses to the local soldiery. His pleadings were unheeded, but he continued resolutely to prepare for another campaign, apprehensive lest Hooker's vastly

superior numbers might possibly force him back to the trenches around Richmond.

Lee's plan of campaign, as he detailed it to Col. A. L. Long, of his staff, in his tent in the rear of Fredericksburg, was to maneuver Hooker from his almost unreachable stronghold between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and bring him to battle at Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, in the Great valley, or at York or Gettysburg in the Piedmont region of the same State, thus transferring the destructive agencies of war to northern soil, where he could readily subsist his army on the country; and by a decisive victory cause the evacuation of Washington and compel the Federal government to withdraw Grant from the siege of Vicksburg. This was, doubtless, the identical campaign that Jackson had in view, and which he probably had discussed with Lee during the preceding winter, when he ordered the preparation of a detailed map extending from the Rappahannock to the Susquehanna.

Lee's army at this time consisted of Stuart's cavalry corps, of about 6,000 men; the artillery corps, under Pendleton, with some 200 guns, and his veteran infantry, in all about 60,000 men, whom he had ready to march northward by the close of May. On the 3d of June he directed his right, under Longstreet, to move toward Culpeper, marching across the whole length of the scene of his recent victories at Salem church and Chancellorsville; followed by Ewell, who with eager interest scanned the field of victory as he rode across it at the head of Jackson's old troops. With his usual heroic audacity, Lee left his smallest corps, that under A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, to restrain Hooker from any "on to Richmond" he might rashly attempt to make.

By the 8th Lee had concentrated the commands of Stuart, Longstreet and Ewell in front of Culpeper Court House, with his advance pickets on the Rappahannock. On that day Stuart had a grand cavalry review on the broad and then unobstructed open around Brandy Station, which was witnessed by most of the principal officers of the infantry corps in the vicinity and by Lee in person. That night the Federal cavalry forced the passage of the Rappahannock, and on the morning of the 9th fell upon Stuart's encampment, when a furious, and at times hand-to-hand, engagement followed, which lasted

the greater portion of the day. Stuart, after a most valourous fight, finally succeeded in driving the Federal cavalry back across the Rappahannock, with very considerable loss. Hooker had ordered this reconnoissance, with cavalry followed by infantry, to find out what Lee was doing; for as yet he was in profound ignorance concerning his northward movement.

After the repulse of the Federal cavalry, Lee ordered Ewell with the Second corps to cross the Blue ridge at Chester gap, and drive the Federal force under Milroy, at Winchester, from the Valley; ordering Jenkins, at the same time, to move his cavalry brigade down the Valley, in the same direction, while Imboden moved his brigade down the South Branch valley, in the mountain country, to threaten Milroy from Romney on the west. On the 13th, Ewell appeared in front of Winchester and a portion of his advance at Martinsburg, while Jenkins broke the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, thus preventing reinforcements to Milroy from the west. Closing around Winchester on the 14th, Ewell, by a bold and well-planned flank movement of Early to the left, drove Milroy, late in the day, from his strong intrenchments, captured a large portion of his army and his military stores, and scattered the troops that escaped, following them on the 15th to Harper's Ferry, thus again relieving the lower valley and the patriotic city of Winchester from a detested and tyrannical foe, such as Milroy had proved himself to be in waging war on defenseless women and children. Ewell's captures were 4,000 prisoners, many wagons, and a large quantity of military stores. On this same 15th of June, Jenkins moved on Chambersburg with his cavalry, and Ewell's advance crossed the Potomac, while Longstreet followed, from Culpeper, to hold the passes of the Blue ridge, closely followed by Hill to Culpeper, who had remained in front of Fredericksburg until he saw the army of the Potomac disappear, marching to the northward toward Washington.

Thus was Lee steadily pressing the army of Northern Virginia northward, to the Chambersburg objective of his premeditated plan of campaign, the way having been opened by disposing of Milroy's 10,000 at Winchester, by capture and rout, and driving the other scattered forces in the lower valley into Harper's Ferry, which he now passed by, leaving a small force in observation to

hold its garrison in position. By the 17th of June the long column of the Confederate army was stretched from Culpeper in Virginia to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, Jenkins' cavalry holding the latter place. Ewell's advanced division was encamped, in the midst of abundance, near Hagerstown; another was in a like favorable encampment near Sharpsburg, while his third division was approaching the fords of the Potomac, near Shepherdstown. Longstreet was crossing the Blue ridge to the banks of the Shenandoah, guarding the passes of that mountain chain from the eastward; while Stuart held the Piedmont country and the passes through the Bull Run mountains, thus keeping Hooker within bounds with his great army encamped from Manassas, near Bull run, to Leesburg, near the Potomac, striving to keep pace with Lee's speedy northward movement.

For five days Stuart held steady contention with Hooker's cavalry, effectually veiling Lee's movements, and then holding Ashby's gap of the Blue ridge against superior numbers, but with Longstreet just behind him, all along the ridge, while A. P. Hill passed the rear of the latter, by Chester gap, and rested in the Great valley, in and on the borders of which Lee had now gathered all of his army, except the cavalry immediately in charge of Stuart, which continued to hover around Hooker's flanks and rear. Lee had offered Hooker battle with Longstreet's corps, looking threateningly from the eastern slopes of the Blue ridge; but when that was not accepted, and Hooker still continued south of the Potomac, Lee boldly withdrew Longstreet to the western side of the Shenandoah, and on the 18th, from the vicinity of Millwood, ordered Longstreet and Hill to follow Ewell across the Potomac, satisfied that by so doing he would draw Hooker into Maryland. Hill crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 18th, followed by Longstreet, except McLaws' division, which was left with Stuart to watch the passes of the Blue ridge and the roads of the Shenandoah valley until Hooker should have crossed the Potomac. Imboden was also ordered into Pennsylvania, moving to the west of the Great valley, and it was suggested to Gen. Sam Jones that his cavalry should march his command into northwestern Virginia and menace the line of the Baltimore & Ohio. Lee also asked that the brigades left at Richmond should be sent

to join him. His force in hand for this important, aggressive northern campaign was about 60,000 men. As he entered Pennsylvania he issued an order instructing his army that "No private property shall be injured or destroyed;" an order that was rigidly enforced during all the campaign that followed.

Feeling that his left was securely guarded by Jones and Imboden, and his advance by Jenkins, Lee, looking after the safety of his right, wrote to Stuart, on the 22d: "Do you know where Hooker is, and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army." On the same day he directed Ewell to move toward the Susquehanna and, "if Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it."

On the 23d of June, Ewell was marching rapidly up the Cumberland valley toward Carlisle, while Lee was preparing to lead the First and Third corps across the Potomac to follow him. Stuart was enjoined to keep two of his brigades of cavalry along the eastern foot of the Blue ridge between Lee and Hooker, while a large discretion was granted him in the movement of the three other brigades under his immediate command, with the sole condition that he should, "as speedily as possible," join Ewell's advance, which, he was informed, had been sent under Early across the South mountain to York, to gather supplies and levy contributions on that wealthy Pennsylvania town. Lee's last word to Stuart reached the latter during the night of the 23d of June. On that day Lee wrote to Davis again urging him to gather all the troops he could and send them, under Beauregard, to Culpeper Court House, as a menace to Washington, and therefore a virtual reinforcement to his own movement, but without leaving Richmond defenseless.

Justly alarmed by Lee's bold and rapid movement toward the very heart of Pennsylvania, the Federal government called for 100,000 new troops to defend that State; concentrated a considerable force in Maryland,



and ordered Hooker to the north bank of the Potomac, to interpose his army between Lee and Washington. The chronicles of the day record this remarkable prayer, by President Lincoln: "O, Lord, this is your fight; but we, your humble followers and supporters here, can't stand another Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville."

From Williamsport, on the 25th, where Longstreet was crossing the Potomac, Lee wrote to President Davis saying, that if the whole of Hooker's army was concentrated upon him he could accomplish nothing, and would be compelled to return to Virginia; but urged that it would be a great relief to him if even the effigy of an army, under Beauregard, were concentrated at Culpeper. He insisted that he would have to abandon his line of communication because he had not the men to hold it; but he still thought he could draw Hooker across the Potomac and compel the Federal government to bring troops from the South, to defend its capital, and thus defeat its plans of invasion. Another letter followed, the next day, again urging an advance upon Washington from Culpeper.

On the 27th, Ewell was in Carlisle; his advance, under Early, had crossed the South mountain and was nearing York. The same day that Lee, in person, crossed the Potomac, June 25th, Hooker began crossing the same river, a fact of which Lee was still in ignorance, at Chambersburg, on the 27th; as Stuart was that day crossing the Potomac, at the mouth of Seneca creek, not far from Washington, between Hooker's army and that city, and was rapidly riding northward into Pennsylvania, cumbered with the spoils he had captured in the rear of Hooker's army.

By the 28th Hooker had concentrated four corps of his army at Frederick and three at Middletown, on the National turnpike, a few miles to the westward; so that seven Federal corps were available for a rapid movement across South mountain to Hagerstown, to the rear of Lee's army, which was now some miles to the northeast of that town in the Cumberland valley. At this juncture of affairs, Hooker demanded that the 10,000 men, left in garrison at Harper's Ferry, should join his command in the field. This brought on an issue with his government, which resulted in his displacement and the putting of Gen. George Meade in command of the army of the Potomac, on the 28th day of June, the fourth change in the

leadership of that army in the little more than a year since Lee took command of the army of Northern Virginia.

On the 27th Lee issued, from Chambersburg, a general order to his troops which is worthy of more than a passing notice. One of its paragraphs reads: "It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove vain."

The lack of knowledge as to the whereabouts and intentions of Meade, because of the absence of his cavalry, delayed Lee at Chambersburg; but on the night of the 28th, Harrison, a daring Virginia scout in the service of Longstreet, reached him with the information, the first he had received, that the army of the Potomac had crossed that river on the 25th and was then threatening his line of communication at Hagerstown, as above stated. This news led Lee to at once recall Ewell's divisions from the Susquehanna, near Harrisburg and Columbia, and order a concentration of his army at Cashtown, in the Piedmont country of Pennsylvania, just east of the South mountain, on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, where the topographic conditions were all favorable for a defensive battle, and where he could draw supplies from the fertile Cumberland valley in his rear. Moreover, a movement in that direction was one threatening, not only Washington and Baltimore, but also Philadelphia, as was fully realized by the Federal government when it at once ordered the throwing up of defenses in front of the "city of brotherly love." Lee well knew that such a strategic movement would draw the army of the Potomac from menacing his rear that it might interpose itself between the army of Northern Virginia and the important cities and lines of communication that its movements threatened.

The Third corps, A. P. Hill's, marched, on the morning of the 29th, from Chambersburg toward Cashtown, Lee remaining in the former with the First corps, watching the development of his plans. Late in the same day Ewell received, at Carlisle, Lee's order of concentration,

just as he was about to follow his cavalry advance to attack Harrisburg, where the governor of Pennsylvania, with the militia of that State, was in constant expectation of his appearance before that city, which he was ready to evacuate. Ewell promptly sent orders to Early, at York, to fall back to Cashtown, and prepared to move in that direction the next morning with the remainder of his command.

Meade, informed of the advance of Ewell to York and toward Harrisburg, at once changed the direction of his army, as Lee had anticipated he would, and on the evening of the 29th two of his corps bivouacked near Emmitsburg, and one near Taneytown, just south of the Maryland-Pennsylvania line and on highways leading toward Gettysburg; while four others of his corps encamped in the rear of these, along Pipe creek, an eastern tributary of the Monocacy, in a good defensive position covering the approaches to Baltimore. Buford's cavalry covered the Federal front within the Pennsylvania line near Fairfield, guarding the approaches from Cashtown and Gettysburg. These two great contention-seeking armies were now but a few miles apart; and yet there is evidence that neither leader was aware of the exact whereabouts of the other.

Stuart, entirely out of communication with Lee, broke the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad on the morning of the 29th, thus interrupting Meade's communication with Washington, and that evening rested at Westminster, but a few miles to the eastward of Meade's bivouacs. On the 30th he again rode northward, fighting his way through the Federal cavalry at Hanover, on the railway from York to Gettysburg, but much delayed by the long train of mule teams that he had captured in the vicinity of Washington, and in utter ignorance of the fact that the famous battle of Gettysburg had already begun, but a few miles to the westward from his line of march. Stuart was pressing forward to join Ewell's advance, under Early, in the vicinity of York, marching all night toward his destination, passing but seven miles to the eastward of Early's bivouac, still believing that the latter was at York, where the rendezvous with him had been appointed by Lee, and whither he rode but to find Early gone. Having no knowledge of the direction he had taken, Stuart continued to Carlisle, and thence, by a wide

circuit, his men well-nigh exhausted, to Gettysburg, where he appeared on Lee's left.

A. P. Hill's advance, under Pettigrew, reached Cashtown, where by its orders it should have awaited the concentration of Lee's army, its mission being the taking and holding of Lee's chosen defensive position. Unfortunately, on the 30th, while Longstreet was still west of the mountains, at Greenwood, and before even Hill's corps was closed up, Pettigrew's brigade, of Heth's division, was allowed to march over the eight miles from Cashtown to Gettysburg in search of shoes. In the vicinity of that town it came in collision with Buford's Federal cavalry, and the great battle of Gettysburg was thus unwittingly and unordered begun, though but in a skirmish. Pettigrew hastened back to Cashtown, late in the day, and on the morning of July 1st, at 5 a. m., A. P. Hill, always ready and anxious for a fight, but so far as known without orders from General Lee, sent the divisions of Heth and Pender toward Gettysburg, as Hill says in his report, "to discover what was in my front." He soon found out; for when he advanced his skirmishers to near Gettysburg, expecting to find only Buford's Federal cavalry, he brought on an engagement with two corps of Meade's army, which Buford had called to his aid the evening before, when he found that infantry was in his front.

In the fierce combat which Hill brought on, just to the west of Gettysburg, on the 1st of July, he soon got the worst of it, as the power of numbers was arrayed against him; so he sent messengers to Ewell, who was, in obedience to orders, approaching Cashtown from the east, asking for help. Giving heed to this urgent call, Ewell turned toward Gettysburg, and on arriving in its vicinity on the north, he promptly moved into line of battle, nearly at right angles to the pending combat between Hill and the Federals under Reynolds; fell upon the right flank of the latter and well-nigh demolished his command, killing the leader with many of his men, capturing numerous prisoners, and driving the remainder of the two corps in confusion through the streets of Gettysburg, to the southward, toward Meade's main army.

On this same 1st day of July, Lee, with Longstreet, crossed the South mountain, and heard with amazement the noise of the battle that Hill had begun at Gettysburg

at sunrise, for his express orders had been, both to Hill and to Ewell, that they should not bring on a general engagement until after the concentration of his army at Cashtown; and now Hill was engaged, at the very beginning of the day, in hot contention, eight miles away from Lee's selected defensive position, where the "strength of the hills" would have been his, in the open country about Gettysburg, where mere numbers would have greatly the advantage in an engagement. General Anderson, of Longstreet's command, reports that Lee was listening intently, as he rode along, to the sound of Hill's guns, miles away to the eastward, and then saying: "I cannot think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory, these defiles and gorges through which we were passing this morning will shelter us from disaster."

Reaching Cashtown by the middle of the forenoon, Lee anxiously awaited information from the front. This he soon had, in a call from Hill for assistance, when at once he gave orders to Longstreet to close up his command, and rode rapidly to the scene of action, where he arrived in time to witness the grand advance of his Second corps through Gettysburg, between 4 and 5 in the afternoon, by which 5,000 or more Federal prisoners were captured; four Confederate divisions having snatched victory from the five Federal ones that had defeated Hill, and not only fought bravely, but held tenaciously the field of combat and inflicted severe losses on the victors. The old fighting spirit of Jackson's men was fully aroused by the great success they had again won over the Federal corps that they had so recently routed at Chancellorsville, and they were eager to follow in pursuit of the 6,000 Federals remaining of the 20,000 that had been engaged, in refuge behind the stone walls and outcropping rocks of the Gettysburg ridge, or Cemetery hill. Lee himself was fired by a like desire, and through Adj.-Gen. Walter H. Taylor he sent an order to Ewell: "Press those people and secure the hill if possible."

At that hour, big with promise, the Confederates had also possession of the chief point of vantage, for their advance was entirely through the town of Gettysburg and beyond its southern border, up to the very gates of the now famous cemetery, and Early, also flushed with victory, the credit for which was in large part due to his division, was forming two of his brigades to the east of the town, and requesting Hill to join his right with a division from Seminary ridge, to move forward and dispossess the small Federal force that still heroically held on to Cemetery hill and covered the roads by which Meade must advance from the southward. At this same time, about 5 in the afternoon, General Ewell sent Capt. J. P. Smith to General Lee, asking that the forward movement he was preparing might be supported by Hill or Longstreet. Lee was found on Seminary ridge, accompanied by Longstreet, and Hill was near at hand. The latter was reluctant to send to Ewell his two divisions, which so recently had been hotly engaged. Lee then urged Longstreet to hurry forward McLaws and Hood, who were advancing from Cashtown to join Ewell's advance, and sent word to the latter, by Captain Smith, that he would support his advance on his right as soon as he could, concluding: "I wish him to use whatever opportunity he has to advance and hold the ground in his front."

As Ewell was holding his men in check, impatient to advance as soon as they were reformed, to the south of Gettysburg, a young staff officer came riding rapidly from the rear, with a message to General Early from Brig.-Gen. William Smith, who had recently been sent to the army to take command of Early's old brigade, which Early had left as a rear guard on the road to York, north of Gettysburg, as he advanced, distrusting the management of its leader in an engagement. Smith's message was that a Federal force was advancing upon his rear, from the direction of York. Instead of paying no attention to this report, which he well knew could have no foundation, Early halted his advance movement and countermarched one of his best brigades, under Gordon, to assist Smith in meeting this imagined Federal movement on his rear. The delay caused by this episode chilled in Ewell the ardor of pursuit, and he refused the appeal of Early and Rodes for an immediate assault upon

the Federals, who still showed a bold front by a constant firing of infantry and artillery, desiring to have Gordon again in place and to have Johnson's division, which had been marching forward from Cashtown, in advance of Longstreet, to extend his line to the eastward, that he might scale Culp's hill and turn the Federal right at the same time that he made attack in front. The reinforcements from Longstreet did not appear, but Johnson arrived upon the field after sundown and then halted north of the town, in the vicinity of Pennsylvania college. This lack of energy and failure of concerted action by Lee's corps commanders lost to the Confederates the great advantages they had gained during the day, which, if followed up in "Stonewall's way," would, in so far as one can forecast events, have resulted in crushing the Federal army in detail, as it was stretched along the road for miles to the southward from Gettysburg, marching in wearied columns and encumbered with its great army trains.

The plan of pushing the attack abandoned, Lee met Early, Ewell and Rodes in conference after dark, to the north of Gettysburg, near the road leading to Carlisle. He now had information of the arrival of more Federal troops upon the scene of action; that Hancock was in command, and had 8,600 men, under Slocum, in line of battle to the south of Gettysburg, holding the crests of Cemetery ridge and Culp's hill, and thus fully protecting Meade's advance. Lee, in this conference with his subordinates, expressed an earnest desire to attack the Federals at daylight the next day, July 2d, if at all practicable, asking Ewell if he could not, with his corps, attack the enemy's right on the morrow. These Second corps leaders called General Lee's attention to the rugged hilltops already occupied by Federal troops, that loomed before them in the late twilight of a midsummer day, and argued that gradual approach to the Federal position from the westward was more favorable for an attack by the Confederate right. It is reported, by one of these officers, that Lee's next question was, "Perhaps I had better draw you around toward my right, as the line will be very long and thin if you remain here, and the enemy may come down and break through it." Early reports that Ewell then asserted that he could not only hold the ground already in his possession, but that

he could capture Culp's hill and threaten the Federal right; an offer he would have hardly made had he known the formidable character of the rocky ascent to that hill. After this, writes Early, Lee said: "Well, if I attack upon my right, Longstreet will have to make the attack." Then pausing, with head bowed in reflection, he looked up and added: "Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow."

After his conference with Ewell, Lee formed his plans for the 2d of July. It was his intention to strike with his right at daylight, or as soon as practicable after that time; this to be followed by Ewell on his left. Returning to his headquarters, Lee met Hill and Longstreet. The latter urged that he withdraw his army from before Gettysburg and place it between Meade and Washington, and thus force the Federal commander to offensive battle. This was but an extension of Lee's second suggestion to Ewell about a concentration on his right. Trusting to Ewell's promise as to what he could do the next day, Lee adhered to the plan he had already adopted, of an assault by both his wings; hoping that by so doing he could defeat the Federal advance before its rear could close up, and bring about its defeat in detail. He then ordered Longstreet to move McLaws and Hood to open the battle on his right, while Hill engaged the center, and repeated his order to Ewell for attacking Culp's hill on the left, but not until he should hear Longstreet's guns and thus be sure of a simultaneous movement and attack.

The divisions of Hood and McLaws, of the First corps, left their camps at Fayetteville in the valley west of the South mountain, on the morning of July 1st, and reached the valley of Willoughby run, northwest of Gettysburg, by midnight of that day, having been retarded by Ewell's wagon train, in charge of Johnson's division, which was on the road in their front. The leading brigade, under Kershaw, bivouacked within two miles of Gettysburg. Pickett's division was left at Chambersburg, in charge of the reserve trains, and Law's brigade at New Guilford. During the night of the 1st Longstreet ordered McLaws to march forward at 4 a. m. of the 2d, but later this was changed to "early in the morning." The same night he ordered Law and Pickett to march to Gettysburg on the 2d.



Lee's official report sets forth the state of affairs confronting him, and his reasons for making battle, in these words:

It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base of supplies unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was not favorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and a success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

At sunrise of July 2d, less than 10,000 men of the First and Second corps of Meade's army held Cemetery hill, with 8,600, under Slocum, on their right and left, and 9,000 of the Third corps, under Birney and Humphreys, in supporting distance. If Lee had attacked at the rising of the sun, at about half-past 4, as he had expected to do; or at any time before 7 o'clock, he would have found but 27,000 Federals to oppose his assault; but at 7 the Second Federal corps and two divisions of the Fifth reached the field; by 8 another brigade of the Fifth arrived; by 9 two brigades of the Third appeared; and by half-past 10 Meade's strong reserve artillery was in place on Cemetery ridge. By midday another division of the Fifth corps came, while Sedgwick, still far from the field, was at that hour urging forward the 15,000 men of the Sixth corps; arrivals that could have been successively met and defeated in detail, had Ewell followed up the advantages of the day before, at the moment of victory, without taking "counsel of his fears," and relying on the enthusiasm of his well-tried and reliable veterans to "press forward" after a retreating foe.

Lee dispatched his breakfast and was in the saddle before daylight of the 2d, eager to grasp victory from the opportunity that he knew he then had, of falling upon but a portion of the Federal army while the larger part of it was still miles away and but wearily advancing to the field of battle. Before the sun was up, he had an officer on Round Top, looking along the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads to see whether Federal reinforcements were advancing, and as the morning fully dawned, he swept with his fine glasses, from the Seminary ridge, the Federal lines on Culp's and Cemetery hills, in the mean-

time anxiously watching for the coming of Longstreet's two divisions, those of McLaws and Hood, and for that of Anderson's of Hill's corps, that he might begin the battle on his right at the hour appointed with Ewell. But Anderson did not move until 7, and not until 8 did his skirmishers, under Wilcox, drive in those of the Federal center, and it was 9 before Hill's line of battle, on Seminary ridge, with its right resting on the Emmitsburg road, was ready to advance. Longstreet's movements were still tardier than Hill's. His two divisions did not leave their Willoughby run bivouac until after sunrise, and it was 8 o'clock when his first brigade, Kershaw's of McLaws' division, reached Seminary ridge, where Lee was impatiently waiting—seated on the trunk of a fallen tree consulting a map, writes McLaws—with Longstreet “walking up and down a little way off, apparently in an impatient humor.”

Hood's division followed McLaws, but that intrepid leader had ridden to the front, and joined Lee at his post of observation soon after daylight. Hood thus describes what he saw and heard: “General Lee, with coat buttoned up to the throat, saber belt around his waist, and field glass pending at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought.” Lee said to Hood: “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.”

Longstreet had joined Lee in the early morning, but hours passed before any of his men appeared, and victory, which the fighting ancients pictured with wings, took her flight to the ridge held by the army of the Potomac. Longstreet importuned Lee to move around to the right, but when the latter would not agree to change his plan, Longstreet asked that the attack on the right be delayed until the arrival of Pickett's division. It was characteristic of Longstreet, as of most stubborn men, that he always desired to follow a plan of his own suggestion, rather than that of his commander-in-chief, and so, with dogged persistence, he continued to urge his own plan upon Lee, but without avail, as he had determined to attack as soon as Longstreet's men should arrive. His advance appeared at about 8 o'clock, having consumed three hours of the day in a march of from two to four miles. The head of his column was at once

turned southward, behind Hill's corps posted on Seminary ridge, and halted near the Black Horse tavern, where the Hagerstown road crosses Marsh creek. Hill did not get into his assigned position until about 9.

The most opportune time for the assault had passed, but there was yet time to rout Meade's left, if the attack were promptly made. The Federals had not yet occupied the two commanding heights of Round Top and Little Round Top, that dominated their left on the south, and Meade's army in hand was held within a narrow compass on the Cemetery and Culp hills. Lee pointed out to McLaws, on the map, the position on the Emmitsburg road, at right angles to that near the peach orchard, that he desired him to occupy, telling him to gain that, if possible, without being seen by the enemy. Longstreet interposed, directing McLaws to place his line parallel to the turnpike. Lee promptly made reply: "No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmitsburg road," thus clearly indicating his design to move squarely upon the Federal left. Shortly after 9, Lee informed Hill that Longstreet would thus take position, nearly perpendicular to Hill's line, and drive the enemy toward Gettysburg. After having given these orders for immediate attack by Longstreet and Hill, Lee rode to Ewell's position, on his left, finding the latter still confident that he could turn the Federal right on Culp's hill with Johnson, while Early, who had been waiting in line since 2 o'clock in the morning, was ready to advance on Cemetery hill, from the streets of Gettysburg. After waiting impatiently, with Ewell, for Longstreet to begin the attack, Lee rode back, at about noon, to Seminary ridge, to ascertain what had detained Longstreet. The latter, in his official report, after stating the orders he had received from Lee to attack, adds: "Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division (Hood's)." Law arrived about noon, after a march of 24 miles in the preceding half day, and at 1 o'clock Longstreet began his forward movement. Two hours were consumed in marches and countermarches, in a vain effort to conceal the movement from the Federal signal station on Round Top, and it was about 4 in the afternoon before the corps was in position for beginning the attack.

At an early hour on this same July 2d, Meade directed the preparation of an order for the retreat of his army, and his corps commanders were in council considering this, when Longstreet's guns, in the mid-afternoon, called them to their posts of duty and the defense of their left. Just at that time Sickles, of his own motion, pushed his corps forward on the Emmitsburg road and took position between the peach orchard and Little Round Top, thus facing Longstreet's movement under McLaws. Hood, farther to the right, was expected to fall on the left flank of the Federal line and force it toward Gettysburg.

Meade's lines at this time extended from his left, near Round Top, almost due north along the western side of the Taneytown road to Cemetery hill, then curved to the eastward around the front of that hill and the crest of Culp's hill, with his extreme right turned in reverse to the westward. One corps was on his left, the Second under Hancock in the center, and the Twelfth and the fragments of the First and Eleventh held the right on the Cemetery and Culp hills. The Fifth was in reserve in the valley of Rock creek, on the road leading southeast toward Baltimore. Longstreet and Sickles now confronted each other, each with about 12,000 men.

Law ascertained, as he advanced, that the Federal left flank was unprotected, and he and Hood urged Longstreet to move farther to the right and occupy Round Top, and thus turn the Federal left, rather than advance along the Emmitsburg road, which was commanded by the Federal artillery, while its infantry was well protected by the stone fences and outcropping rocks along its position. Longstreet's reply to the thrice-repeated request and protest was, "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road." So the advance began, against a furious cannonade in which Hood was wounded, attacking Sickles' left in the rocky and brush-tangled point known as the Devil's Den. Law took his assigned place, and pressing boldly forward drove the Federal brigades from their position, which they held with great tenacity, and captured three pieces of cannon. His right then crossed the northern slope of Round Top and advanced toward Little Round Top, while his center rushed to gain that important point in the field of contest; but Warren promptly led a brigade and a battery,

from the Fifth corps, and gaining the summit of this little mountain before Law, drove him back to the shelter of Devil's Den.

Longstreet's chief of artillery, Col. E. P. Alexander, got the better of the Federal artillery in the peach orchard, and McLaws pressed rapidly forward, as soon as Longstreet would let him go, took issue with Sickles, and drove his men back, over the stone fences at the peach orchard, in a fierce contest. Alexander joined in the charge with six batteries. Three Federal divisions, numbering 13,000 men, were then sent in quick succession to the aid of Sickles; but these were all forced back with the loss of half their numbers by Longstreet's courageous men, now flushed with success. It was 6 o'clock when the brigades on Hill's right moved up the Emmitsburg road, fell upon Sickles' right and drove it in retreat toward Cemetery ridge. By 7, Meade's left was completely driven back in defeat, and Longstreet's men were pressing forward to a new position at the base of the two little mountains. Three of Hill's brigades were at the same time advancing against Meade's center, but these failed to support, although one of them, under Wilcox, advanced to the very foot of Cemetery ridge and captured eight guns, while another, under Wright, in steady order ascended the long slope, crossing stone fences, and took the very crest of the ridge a little distance south of the Cemetery, where for a short time they were in possession of twenty Federal cannon. Meade's line was cut in two, and had Wright been supported it must have been forced to retreat. Even the brigades that started with him failed to support him, and Hill held his other divisions in line a mile to the rear. Longstreet's bold fight had, undoubtedly, won the day, if Hill's corps had, in its entirety, performed its assigned duty. The writer witnessed, from Seminary ridge, the hurried movement of troops, from Meade's right on Culp's hill and the Cemetery, toward his broken center and left. Fortunately for the Federal commander, just then his Sixth corps, under Sedgwick, arrived upon the field and joined in driving back Wright's advance and checking the tide of defeat which had already set in.

Just before sunset, but after Longstreet's battle was ended and the Federal left re-established, Ewell began his tardy and long-delayed attack, which should have

been a simultaneous one, on the Federal right; and Stonewall Jackson's old division, under Edward Johnson, assaulted Culp's hill, fought its way up its rocky and brushy slope, and captured the first line of Federal intrenchments. Early also advanced, on Ewell's right, under a withering fire of infantry and artillery, overran the Eleventh corps and established himself in the Federal works on the summit of Cemetery hill; but Rodes, on his right, failed to advance, and so rendered no assistance to Early and held back Hill's left, which was to move in concert with Rodes. The Federal right was now reinforced by Hancock, from its center, and Early, flanked on his right, where Rodes should have protected him, was forced to retire. Night fell and ended the bloody conflict on the field of battle, but with Lee still sanguine of success, although he had lost heavily; for he knew that Meade had lost more in proportion. Lee's army was in fine spirits, satisfied that the combats of the day had resulted in their favor, and that a complete victory would have been won had Lee been able to secure a simultaneous attack by his right, his center and his left. Law held the Devil's Den, at the bases of the Round Tops; Johnson held the crest of Culp's hill, nearly around to the flank of the Federal right and the Baltimore road. Wright, in the center, and Early on the left, had broken through the Federal lines, and would doubtless have held the Cemetery ridge had they been adequately supported. Stuart had now arrived on the field, and was ready to still further threaten the Federal left and rear and the road leading toward Baltimore. Lee's artillery, a body, in its personnel, leading and equipment, of unsurpassed excellence, was in a good position and ready for duty.

Meade, disheartened by the results of the day's contests and alarmed for the safety of his army, was ready to retreat. Calling his twelve chief subordinates in council, they discussed the situation. Three of his corps had been badly shattered; 20,000 of his veterans were missing; but two of his army corps remained intact. Hancock's chief of staff records, "It was indeed a gloomy hour." The councilors were greatly divided in their opinions, and the only conclusion reached, after a long conference, was to remain another day and await Lee's assault. During the night Dahlgren, a Federal scout,

who had waylaid, in the Cumberland valley, a courier from Davis to Lee and captured his dispatches, reached Meade's headquarters. These dispatches showed that, through fear of a threatened Federal attack on Richmond, it would be impossible to comply with Lee's urgent request for concentrating a force in Culpeper, under Beauregard, and threatening Washington. This information relieved Meade's apprehensions about the safety of the capital which he had been charged to guard, and nerved him to hold on at Gettysburg for another day. The weight of testimony, especially that of President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton, shows that but for this timely arrival Meade would have fallen back that night to the line of Pipe creek, and there halted in defensive position, covering the approaches to Baltimore and Washington.

Lee determined to renew the attack on the 3d of July, as he had first planned it. Longstreet, now reinforced by Pickett's division, which had arrived from the Cumberland valley during the afternoon of the 2d, was to again attack the Federal left, advancing from the position he had gained at the Devil's Den; while Ewell was at the same time to assail the Federal right, after reinforcing Johnson with two brigades from Rodes and one from Early. Hill was again to advance from the center. When the morning of the 3d came, it was found that the Federal Fifth corps, supported by the Sixth, had during the night taken possession of the Round Tops, with both infantry and artillery strongly intrenched in that naturally strong position which dominated Lee's right and protected Meade's left. This wise action of the Federal commander forced Lee to change his plan. Ewell's artillery was already opening the way for his assault, and delay was dangerous. Lee promptly ordered Longstreet to organize a column of attack against Meade's center on Cemetery ridge, and breaking that to join Ewell by taking the Federal right in reverse. Hood and McLaws were to engage the Federal left, and if opportunity offered, to attack it. The two columns of attack by Longstreet were made up of Pickett's division on the right, and Pettigrew's (Heth's) division of Hill's corps on the left. Wilcox and Perry, of Anderson's division, were to guard Pickett's right, while Trimble, with the brigades of Lane and Scales, was to guard Pettigrew's

left. The rest of Hill's command was held in reserve, to be used as occasion might require. Ewell was already in hot and close contention on Culp's hill, when Lee gave the order to advance, confident that his column of attack could break through Meade's line where Wright had broken through it the day before, and then aid Ewell in crushing the Federal right. In person he pointed out to Longstreet a clump of trees, near the middle of Hancock's line, as marking the point to be attacked. From his position that part of the Federal line did not seem to be a strong one, except for the stone fences that bordered the roads and separated the fields, and thus gave protection to Hancock's men.

Lee prepared for the assault by opening on the Federal lines with masses of artillery. At 10 a. m. Alexander was in position with seventy-five guns, on the swell west of the Emmitsburg road; and R. Lindsey Walker with his sixty-three, from the Seminary ridge farther to the northward. It was expected that their heavy concentrated fire would silence the batteries on Cemetery ridge and open a safer way for Longstreet's assault, which these same batteries were to follow up, keeping pace with the infantry, protecting their flanks, and joining in the final onslaught, as they had at Chancellorsville.


By 9 o'clock, Pickett and Pettigrew were in line, on Seminary ridge, and Ewell had made his desperate attack on Culp's hill, from which he was driven back with great loss, and left in no condition to resume the offensive and again make a simultaneous attack with Longstreet. At 12 o'clock the assaulting columns were advanced to the edge of the woods, in rear of the Confederate guns, ready to move forward at the word of command, which Longstreet states that he requested Colonel Alexander to give at his discretion. The artillery did not open until 1 o'clock, when it drew upon it the fire of seventy Federal cannon, and a mighty conflict, between great guns, raged across the 1,400 yards of interval between the opposing ridges. The long bolts from the Whitworth guns of the Confederates, on Seminary ridge, cut wide gaps in the Federal lines on Cemetery ridge; and the well-aimed shells from the same quarter wrought havoc as they fell within the enemy's lines, but these quickly closed up, in obedience to orders. Flame and smoke rose from the long lines of the opposing



ridges; the thunder of the cannon was deafening to the ears of all within miles of the conflict, and soon a dense volume of smoke settled down between the opposing armies, concealing each from the other. Gen. Francis A. Walker, Hancock's chief of staff, describes the effect of the Confederate artillery in these words:

The whole space behind Cemetery ridge was in a moment rendered uninhabitable. General headquarters were broken up; the supply and reserve ammunition trains were driven out; motley hordes of camp followers poured down the Baltimore pike or spread over the fields to the rear. Upon every side caissons exploded; horses were struck down by the hundreds; the air was filled with flying missiles; shells tore up the ground and then bounded for another and perhaps more deadly flight, or burst above the crouching troops and sent their ragged fragments down in deadly showers. Never had a storm so dreadful burst upon mortal man.

After enduring for a half hour the withering fire of the Confederate batteries, Meade retired eighteen of his guns from the Cemetery, when Alexander sent a note to Pickett, saying, "If you are coming at all, you must come at once." Seeking his corps commander, Pickett said, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet made no reply. Pickett saluted, and in firm voice said, "Sir, I shall lead my division forward;" and he promptly ordered the charge of his own three brigades of Virginians and Heth's four of North Carolinians, Tennesseans, Mississippians and Alabamians, under Pettigrew. These columns moved slowly from the woods that had concealed them, toward the Emmitsburg road. Trimble, with two brigades of North Carolinians, marched in the rear of Pettigrew's right. Wilcox had been ordered to guard Pickett's right with his Alabama brigade. Now 12,000 veteran infantrymen were marching, with steady step, across the 1,400 yards of open country between the contending armies. Once clear of the Confederate batteries, Pickett diverged his division to the left and moved toward the salient in Hancock's line. For a time the two opposing armies were silent spectators of this sublimely heroic advance, and not until half the ground to be gone over had been covered, did the batteries from Cemetery ridge and Round Top open on the Confederate assault, which then changed its steady pace, first to a double-quick, then to a rushing charge, closing up its ranks as they were broken by shot or shell, crossing the strong post and rail fences on the Emmitsburg road,





and unflinchingly facing the musketry and the canister of Meade's guns.

To General Lee's amazement, his batteries did not support this movement by engaging those of Meade. He did not know that the hour of furious and rapid cannonade that preceded the charge, had nearly exhausted his artillery ammunition, and his on-rushing columns were now meeting the fire of both infantry and artillery without the support even of the guns that were to have gone forward in the attacking column. Alexander had ordered nine howitzers to move with Pickett to the very front of the battle, but these had disappeared without his orders. Securing fifteen guns that still had ammunition, Alexander moved these up behind Pickett's division.

Firing diagonally upon his left, the Federal guns, from the Cemetery, wrought sad havoc in Pettigrew's line, and Trimble's men, with quickening pace, were soon mingled with those of Pettigrew's right, which a Vermont brigade, by bold attack, forced toward his left. The guns from Round Top secured an enfilade on the Confederate columns, but these pressed forward to within 100 yards of the wall held by the Federals, when they began filing to the rear. With rapid fire and wild yell, Pettigrew's right, Pickett's left and Trimble mingling in a charge, rushed upon and took possession of the stone wall held by the enemy, capturing prisoners and silencing batteries. Pouring in, from right and left, the Federals then engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the heroic Confederates who had so courageously broken their center, and a fearful contest and carnage ensued, where the men of equal valor strove for the mastery. Nearly every field officer present, on either side, fell among the dead and wounded men of their commands.

Pickett's second line, Armistead's Virginia brigade, rushed to the stone wall almost as soon as the line that preceded it, and for some minutes his men were masters of the deserted front. The commander of a Federal brigade, who had been forced back under a heavy fire, says of this supreme moment, "The enemy was rapidly gaining a foothold; organization was mostly lost; in the confusion commands were useless, while a disposition on the part of the men to fall back a pace or two at a time to load gave the line a retiring direction."

For the time the grand assault was successful, and

Meade's center was completely broken, and if Lee's artillery had been at hand, as ordered, Pickett would doubtless have held the captured works and forced the Federals from Cemetery ridge. A fresh line of Federal infantry soon advanced along the crest and fired, but the Confederates drove these back. Then Armistead, with his hat on the point of his uplifted saber as a guide, leaped over the stone wall, shouting, "Boys, we must use the cold steel. Who will follow?" Every man obeyed the call, and the charge reached to the crest of the ridge, to seize the Federal guns; but there the leader fell, and his men retired behind the stone wall, anxiously awaiting reinforcements. Lieutenant Finley (now, 1898, Rev. George W. Finley, D. D.), looking back over the track of Pickett's bold advance, was surprised to see it marked by so few dead or wounded men. At this critical juncture an unknown voice, from the ranks, called out, "Retreat!" and many turned to flee; most of them to fall under the Federal fire that followed after them. The reassured Federals swarmed in from every side and captured the 4,000 Confederates that, unsupported, were still holding the stone fences.

Pickett's columns had been moving, for at least a half hour, before Longstreet ordered Wilcox, supported by Perry, to move forward to the support of Pickett's right. These were only in time to meet the retreating fragments of Pickett's right and the fierce Federal fire that followed them. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, stood ready to advance on Pettigrew's left, thus extending Pickett's line in that direction; McLaws was also ready to move on Wilcox's right, but Longstreet gave no orders. Had these steady veterans become the right and the left arms of Pickett's famous charge, Lee would, in all human probability, have not only held what Pickett won, but would have routed Meade's right and left from his widely broken center.

Lee, with the calmness of a trained soldier, sat his horse, on Seminary ridge, amid Alexander's batteries, and watched the charge and repulse of his heroic veterans. Colonel Fremantle, of the British army, writing from the standpoint of an eye-witness, says: "General Lee was perfectly sublime. He was engaged in rallying and encouraging the broken troops and was riding about a little in front of the wood, quite alone, . . . his face,

which is always placid and cheerful, did not show any signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance, and he was addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement; such as, 'All this will come right in the end; we will talk it over afterward; but in the meantime all good men must rally.' . . . He spoke to all the men that passed him, and the slightly wounded he exhorted to bind up their hurts and take a musket in this emergency. Very few failed to answer his appeal, and I saw badly wounded men take off their hats and cheer him." To General Wilcox, who, in tones of sadness, mingled with vexation, told him of the condition of his brigade, Fremantle says, "Lee replied: 'Never mind, General; all this has been my fault. It is I that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it the best way you can.'" These things moved this onlooking English colonel to conclude: "It was impossible to look at him or to listen to him without feeling the strongest admiration."

A Federal cavalry charge on the Confederate right, during the afternoon, was repulsed with loss to the attacking troopers. On the left, Stuart repeatedly charged Gregg's cavalry, in attempts to gain the Baltimore turnpike, but without success.

With his repulsed troops rallied along the lines from which they had advanced to the fierce battle, and with his artillery replenished with ammunition, Lee awaited, on Seminary ridge, a counterstroke from Meade; but the Federal commander was in no condition for such an effort, and was more than satisfied that he had been able to hold his strong lines against Lee's furious assaults. The slaughter in both armies had been great, and each was satisfied to face the other in silent defiance and await developments. Of Meade's 95,000 in the field of action, 23,000 had fallen; of Lee's 58,000, including his cavalry that had participated in the fight, over 20,000 lay dead or wounded, or were missing. Some of the latter were stragglers who afterward returned. Among the dead leaders of the Confederates were Generals Armistead, Garnett, Pender, Barksdale and Semmes; Archer was left a prisoner, and Kemper, Pettigrew, Hood, Trimble, Heth, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Jenkins and Hampton were severely wounded.

In his official report, Lee writes of this day: "The

severe loss sustained by the army, and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy unadvisable, and it was therefore determined to withdraw." But he was in no haste to do this in such a way as to suffer damage to his command or to his trains. He spent the whole of July 4th awaiting Meade's pleasure for an attack, which the latter, in the wisdom he had learned during three days of contention, did not make. After caring for his wounded and burying all his dead within reach, Lee started his trains for the Potomac, by the great highway leading southwest from Gettysburg, through Fairfield, across the South mountain by Monterey Springs, and through Hagerstown to Williamsport. These he followed with his army during the night of the 4th, leaving Ewell, as a rear guard, in front of Gettysburg until the forenoon of the 5th; and by thus holding on he forced Meade to follow in pursuit by circuitous routes to passes of the Blue ridge (South mountain), farther to the southwest. The disciplined courage of Lee's army was unbroken, and his veterans were as ready as ever to accept any offered battle. They knew, as well as did their leaders, why failures had come at Gettysburg. The Federals had all possible tactical advantages. They had strength of position, superiority of numbers, and abundant supplies of ammunition. The Confederates mourned the losses they had sustained, but were cheered with the reflection that they retired from the famous battlefield of Gettysburg with their previous honors well sustained.

As usual, after great battles during the Confederate war, heavy rains followed that of Gettysburg, swelling all the tributaries of the Potomac, making that stream impassable at the Williamsport ford, and endangering Lee's pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Imboden, withdrawing from the Cumberland valley, covered with intrenchments Lee's trains concentrated at Williamsport, manned his works with several batteries of artillery, and stood ready to repulse any cavalry attacks that might be made upon him.

As he fell back, Lee sent forward his engineers to select a new line of battle covering the approaches to Williamsport and Falling Waters. An admirable position was found near Hagerstown, which met with General Lee's approbation, when he arrived on the 6th and rode over

it. He at once ordered his army into this chosen position, and his men began to throw up rude intrenchments and look with grim satisfaction at the topographic difficulties in the way, should Meade venture offensive battle. The Federal cavalry made some attacks on Lee's trains as they were passing through the eastern defiles of the South mountain, but these were quickly repulsed by the train guards, and Stuart held the large body of Federal cavalry in check by his tireless covering of the rear and flanks of Lee's retiring movement.

Meade, with 47,000 effectives, about the half of his original army, gave Lee a wide berth and cautiously marched due south to Frederick and Middletown, thus placing himself on the National road between Lee and Washington and Baltimore. To his army 11,000 veterans were added, also large numbers of militia that had responded to Lincoln's call when Lee invaded Pennsylvania. Yielding to urgent orders, from Washington, that he should at once destroy Lee's army, which was vainly supposed to be shattered and in full retreat, Meade took the highway that McClellan had taken the previous September, crossed the South mountain at Boonsboro, on the 11th of July, and after having carefully bridged the Antietam, appeared, on the 12th, in front of Lee's now well protected defensive position, and took up a line which he at once proceeded to fortify. This done, he called a council of war and found that his subordinates were unwilling to attack Lee's lines, well knowing that such an attempt could result only in defeat and disaster.

On the appearance of Meade's advance, on the 11th, Lee issued a stirring address to his soldiers, in which, among other things, he said:

After long and trying marches, endured with the fortitude that has ever characterized the soldiers of the army of Northern Virginia, you have penetrated the country of our enemies, and recalled to the defense of their own soil those who were engaged in the invasion of ours. You have fought a fierce and sanguinary battle, which, if not attended with the success that has hitherto crowned your efforts, was marked by the same heroic spirit that has commanded the respect of your enemies, the gratitude of your country and the admiration of mankind. Once more you are called upon to meet the army from which you have won on so many fields a name that will never die. . . . Let every soldier remember that on his courage and fidelity depends all that makes life worth having—the freedom of his country, the honor of his people, and the security of his home.

By the 13th the Potomac had fallen to within its banks,



and during that night the Second corps forded it at Williamsport, while the First and Third began crossing the pontoon at Falling Waters, a few miles lower down the river. Stuart so engaged the attention of Meade that the latter was not aware of Lee's crossing until it was well-nigh done. The Federal cavalry pressed against Hill's rear guard, composed of Heth's division, but to be repulsed with loss. The most serious damage to the Confederates was the death of the heroic Pettigrew in the rear-guard skirmish. By noonday of the 14th the three army corps were again in Virginia, and the Federal army was left in amazement at the skill with which Lee had withdrawn from their front and crossed a great river, practically without loss. It was evident that there was no fight left in the Federal army, and Meade was quite content to remain north of the Potomac and carefully watch between Lee and Washington.

Before recrossing the Potomac, and while awaiting an attack from Meade, Lee wrote again, urging President Davis to gather an army, under Beauregard, and threaten Washington, as he had persistently asked should be done before and during his invasion of Pennsylvania. He asserted that he was not discouraged, had not lost faith in Providence or in his army, the fortitude of which had not been shaken, and that the Federal army, though it had been much shattered, could easily be reinforced, while he could expect no addition to his numbers; hence the necessity for an immediate demonstration toward Washington.

## CHAPTER XXIII:

### THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGNS OF 1863.

**D**READING to follow Lee and unable to resist importunate orders from Washington for an advance, Meade, after Lee returned to Virginia, recrossed the South mountain and then followed McClellan's route of the previous autumn, across the Potomac into Piedmont Virginia, guarding the passes of the Blue ridge, as he advanced, against attacks from Lee in the Valley. Lee, on the alert, anticipated this movement, and, on the 24th of July, placed his army across Meade's thin line of advance, in front of Culpeper Court House. The necessities at other points put a stop to military operations for a time in Virginia. Portions of Meade's army were called to New York city, to suppress riots and enforce the drafts to recruit the Federal armies. Lee was embarrassed by the calls for soldiers for other fields, after the fall of Vicksburg, which not only cut the Confederacy in twain, but opened to Federal gunboats and steamboats, for the transportation of troops and supplies, the thousands of miles of navigable waters in the Mississippi basin.

With the Trans-Mississippi portion of the Confederacy isolated, there only remained in the control of the Confederacy central and southern portions of the Atlantic highlands—the Appalachians and their slopes. The combined land power and sea power of the Federal government completely surrounded and enclosed the remnant of territory now left in the control of the Confederate government. Only through the port of Wilmington was there an outlet to the outer world, and only through that single port could supplies come from abroad to eke out the scanty stores of the Confederacy. The executive was besieged by calls for the defense of vital points, threatened from all directions. Rosecrans was advancing into the Great valley in east Tennessee. The fate of Charleston was but a question of a short time. Environed by such gloomy surroundings and threatenings, Lee

wrote to President Davis, from "Camp Orange," on the 8th of August, thanking him for his efforts to supply the wants of his army, commending the proclamation he had issued to the people, and hoping that would "stir up their virtue . . . that they may see their duty and perform it;" cheerfully and hopefully adding, "Nothing is wanted but that their fortitude should equal their bravery to insure the success of our cause. We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come right in the end." After mentioning the proneness of men to censure those who do not meet their expectations, Lee said: "The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is removal. This is natural, and, in many instances, proper. For, no matter what may be the ability of an officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later ensue."

The general commanding further stated, that since his return from Pennsylvania he had been intending to propose that another commander should be selected for his army; he had noted the discontent of the newspapers at the result of his campaign; did not know how far such feeling might exist in the army, as he had had no evidence of it from officers or men, but it was fair to suppose that it did exist, and, as success is a necessity, nothing should be risked to secure it. He continued:

I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inabilities for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? In addition, I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations in the field which I feel necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon Your Excellency from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader—one that could accomplish more than I could perform and all that I have

wished. I hope Your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason—the desire to serve my country and to do all in my power to insure the success of her righteous cause.

In reply, President Davis wrote, among other things:

I am truly sorry to know that you still feel the effects of the illness you suffered last spring, and can readily understand the embarrassment you experience in using the eyes of others, having been so accustomed to making your own reconnoissances. . . . But suppose, my dear friend, that I were to admit, with all their implications, the points which you present, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which you believe to be required? . . . To ask me to substitute you by some one in my judgment more fit to command, or who would possess more of the confidence of the army, or of reflecting men of the country, is to demand an impossibility.

Lee's morning reports show that by the 10th of August, by returns from hospitals and elsewhere, his army had increased to 58,600 men. On the 9th of September, he detached Longstreet, with two of his divisions, to help Bragg, in Tennessee, keep back Rosecrans from marching farther up the Great valley toward Virginia, leaving with himself some 46,000 men. Longstreet wrote, in farewell to Lee, speaking for himself and his corps: "Our affections for you are stronger, if it is possible for them to be stronger, than our admiration for you."

On the 13th of September, Meade advanced, from beyond the Rappahannock, to learn what Lee was doing; the latter awaited an attack in the position he had chosen and partially fortified, in front of Orange Court House, overlooking the Rapidan. Meade took a distant look at the preparations made for him, and then withdrew to camps in Culpeper.

After learning of the battle at Chickamauga, Lee, on the 25th, wrote pleasantly to Longstreet:

My whole heart and soul have been with you and your brave corps in your late battle. It was natural to hear of Longstreet and Hill (D. H.) charging side by side, and pleasing to find the armies of the east and west vying with each other in valor and devotion to their country. . . . Finish the work before you, my dear general, and return to me; I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.

On the 9th of October, Lee again took the offensive and crossed the Rapidan to attack Meade, taking a concealed and circuitous route, hoping to flank him and bring him to battle on the plains of Culpeper; but the Federal commander, who professed to have marched all the way from Gettysburg seeking a battle,

promptly retreated during the night of the 10th, to beyond the Rappahannock. Lee then tried by another flank movement, by way of the Fauquier Springs and Warrenton, to bring on an engagement on the plains of Fauquier; but while Lee was halting to ration his troops, Meade hastened to the south side of the Orange & Alexandria railroad, by way of Bealeton, then took the road still farther to the southward, leading through Brentsville toward Alexandria. The two armies now engaged in a race, at times within sight of each other, on opposite sides of the railroad; Meade hastening to escape Lee, and Lee hurrying to intercept Meade and bring him to battle.

As he passed through Brentsville, Meade detached a portion of Warren's corps and sent it across to Bristoe Station, to guard his flank from attack by the highway from Lee's route that there crossed the railroad. This covering force was adroitly concealed in the cuts and behind the fills of the railway at Bristoe Station. A. P. Hill, leading Lee's advance, sent Cooke's superb North Carolina brigade to the same point, from the northward without advanced skirmishers. As these approached the station, Warren's men met them, with unexpected volleys, and drove the brigade back in confusion, with a loss of nearly 1,400 men. Lee met Hill with stern rebuke for his imprudence, then sadly directed him to gather his wounded and bury his dead. This disaster, at the head of the column, and the failure of Ewell to close up on Hill, gave check to Lee's advance, which enabled Meade to make good his escape to the fortifications at Centreville, on the northern side of Bull run. Lee followed to the vicinity of Manassas Junction and then retraced his steps to the Rappahannock, subsequently saying, in his report concerning this campaign:

Nothing prevented my continuing in his (Meade's) front but the destitute condition of the men, thousands of whom are barefooted, a greater number partially shod, and nearly all without overcoats, blankets or warm clothing. I think the sublimest sight of the war was the cheerfulness and alacrity exhibited by this army in the pursuit of the enemy under all the trials and privations to which it was exposed.

Stuart, with his usual vigilance and daring, covered the fords on either side of the railroad, and two of Early's brigades were left on the intrenched trap-dyke hill, on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, at the railroad

bridge, which had been destroyed, as a tête-de-pont to the pontoon Lee had there laid. In the midst of a sudden and heavy rain, late in the evening of November 7th, Meade, seizing this opportunity, made a rush upon and captured these two brigades, before help could reach them, securing 1,600 prisoners, eight flags and several guns.

After Lee had reached the southern bank of the Rapahannock, everything indicated that his army would remain in Culpeper for some time. Writing to his wife he said:

I moved yesterday into a nice pine thicket, and Perry is today engaged in constructing a chimney in front of my tent, which will make it warm and comfortable. . . . I am glad you have some socks for the army. Send them to me. They will come safely. Tell the girls to send all they can. I wish they could make some shoes, too. We have thousands of barefooted men. There is no news. General Meade, I believe, is repairing the railroad, and I presume will come on again. If I could only get some shoes and clothes for the men I would save him the trouble.

The disaster at the bridge-head broke up all this, and Lee again retired with his army beyond the Rapidan, and put his men in winter quarters on the sunny side of the "little mountains of Orange," finding another dense pine thicket, on the mountain slope eastward from Orange Court House, where he fixed his headquarters for the winter.

The winter quiet of Lee's camps was rudely disturbed by Meade when he began his Mine Run campaign, on the 26th of November, by ordering the First and Fifth corps to cross the Rapidan at the Culpeper mine ford, near the mouth of the Wilderness run, the boundary between Orange and Spottsylvania counties, to be followed by the Second corps crossing at the Germanna ford, a few miles further up the river, and the Third and Sixth corps, that were to cross still higher up the stream, expecting these three strong columns of attack to converge upon the old turnpike and the plank road, both leading to Orange Court House, and turn the right of Lee's encampments. Meade found it no easy matter to overcome the steep banks and the chilly waters of the Rapidan, and unexpectedly lost a day in the beginning of his movement. His Third corps moved too far to the north to strike its ordered ford, and on the 27th, Johnson's division of Ewell's corps repulsed its attempted crossing.

Stuart's sleepless vigilance gave Lee ample time to bring Hill from his left to Ewell on his right, and the two, advancing eastward to meet Meade, quickly found an admirable defensive line along Mine run, of the Rapidan, which flows directly northward, in a deep stream valley, crossing all the roads, and not far eastward from the right of Lee's encampments. The weather was intensely cold, but this only added to the vigor of Lee's poorly-clad veterans in fortifying their line with material from the adjacent forests and fences, warming themselves by labor and huge fires, so that when Meade appeared in their front on the 28th, they were ready to receive him in a strong line of battle, well punctuated with 150 guns, Johnson, in the meantime, holding the Third corps in engagement along the Rapidan. Finding a front attack uninviting, Meade sent Warren with his Second corps and a part of the Sixth in an effort to turn Lee's right, while Sedgwick thought he had found a weak place from which to attack Lee's left.

Warren took 26,000 men for his movement, which began early on the morning of the 30th; but when he reached the vicinity of Lee's right, he found that his coming had been anticipated, and that during the previous night the Confederates had there thrown up earth and timber works and planted artillery. Driven back with loss, he retired, and as nothing had come of Sedgwick's attempt, and the cold was increasing in intensity, Meade withdrew, in disgust, on the night of December 2d, across the Rapidan to his previous encampments in the vicinity of Brandy Station; not having had the courage, with his greatly superior and far better appointed force, to attack his staunch and ever-ready opponent.

After the Mine Run campaign, Lee's army was permitted to remain undisturbed in its cantonments in Orange county during the remainder of the winter of 1863-64, picketing 20 miles of the front of the Rapidan, from where Ewell's right rested on that river, near the mouth of Mine run, on the east to near Liberty mills, where the highway leading from Gordonsville, by way of Madison Court House, to New Market in the valley, crosses that stream on the west. The Orange & Alexandria railroad, passing between the camps, connected Lee with his base of supplies at Gordonsville, only a few miles away. Ewell established his headquarters at "Morton hall,"

the country seat of Hon. Jere. Morton, near the middle of the encampment of his corps, which was mainly along the waters of Mountain run, and the tributaries of Mine run from the west. Lee betook himself again to his pine thicket.

Here, in the county of Orange, Lee's army contended, during the long and severe winter of 1863-64, with foes more difficult to overcome than Federal soldiery. These were want of food and want of clothing, which they met and endured, with heroic fortitude, in the log cabins that they constructed from the trees of the surrounding forests and on beds of straw, mainly without blankets, but fortunately with abundant supplies of fuel near at hand. The rations were reduced to a minimum; a quarter of a pound of pork and a scant portion of meal, or flour, per day, to a man—and even this was sometimes wanting. A depreciated currency added an enormous value, in paper dollars, to all the necessities of life, and the high tide of starvation prices prevailed everywhere, and especially in the army, where the pay, of even officers of the highest grade, was scarcely sufficient to meet the most common wants. Corn meal was \$50 a bushel; beans, \$60; bacon, \$8 and sugar \$20 a pound. The redeeming features of these days of gloom and suffering were the bright shining of the heroic virtues, not only of the men but of the women and children of the Confederacy, and the steadfast faithfulness of all the negroes, most of them slaves, who, in quiet submission to home authority, cultivated the fields, and by the arts of handicraft helped to support the people of the Confederacy and their armies. Lee not only dwelt among his men, in simple fashion, but fared as they fared, saying, when luxuries were sent him, as they often were, and which he invariably sent to the sick and wounded in hospitals, "I am content to share the rations of my men."

The luster of the heroic virtues of the army of Northern Virginia was brightened and heightened by their sublimer faith. A marked spirit of devotion characterized every portion of it. From nearly every tent and cabin could be heard the voice of prayer and the singing of hymns of devotion. Spacious, though rude, log chapels were constructed by willing hands, for religious services, and the country churches within and near the camps were utilized for like holy purposes. Not only army chap-



lains, but the best and ablest of the preachers of the Gospel from all accessible parts of the Confederacy, ministered in these rude army churches to the soul-hunger of Lee's reverent, and most of them God-serving officers and men.

On the 6th of February, 1864, Meade sent a division to Morton's ford, near Ewell's right, to again try the winter temper of Lee's veterans. It was met with the old spirit and driven back across the Rapidan with considerable loss. Early in March, Kilpatrick and Dahlgren crossed their Federal cavalry at Ely's ford, of the Rapidan, and raided southward, through Spottsylvania toward Richmond, following the great highways leading in that direction. Dahlgren's special object was to burn the capital of the Confederacy, capture its officials, release and arm the Federal prisoners there held, and work general havoc. He was met, not far from that city, and repulsed, losing his own life, and failure was the only result of the expedition worth mentioning.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST GRANT.

CONVINCED by his failures that Meade could not lead the army of the Potomac to victory, Lincoln called Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant from the West, to the oversight of military operations in Virginia. Meade's army had not only been brought to a high degree of efficiency, by drill and discipline, during its winter encampment in Culpeper, but large numbers of fresh troops were added to it during the closing days of April. Early in that month Grant arrived at Culpeper Court House, having in mind a definite plan of campaign toward Richmond, which he proceeded to put into execution by ordering an advance of Meade's army to the Germanna and Ely fords of the Rapidan, instructing him, "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there will you go;" and adding, that the characteristic of his campaign would be "to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if nothing else, there shall be nothing left him but submission." His expressed desire was "to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond, if he will stand."

Sufficiently informed of what was going on in Meade's army, and expecting an early advance, now that the spring was fully opened, Lee rode, on the 2d of May, 1864, to the signal station on Clark's mountain, near Ewell's camps, to overlook for himself—from that grand point of observation, which took within its sweep more than a score of Virginia counties, and from which was plainly visible every Federal camp in the nearby county of Culpeper—any evidences of Meade's intentions. This trained master of the art of military reconnoissance, carefully studied, through his glasses, the field outspread before him, and soon concluded, from the bustle in the Federal camps, that an early movement was in contemplation. It was also evident to him that this movement

would be to his right, toward the old fields of unsuccessful Federal venture. Looking eastward, Mine run and Chancellorsville were in sight. Beyond, in mental vision, he could see Salem church and the twice-attacked and twice-defended Fredericksburg. He doubtless asked himself just where—in that historic region where his famous ancestor, Spotswood, had built the first blast-furnace for making iron, in America—the impending conflict would begin, immediate preparations for which he took in hand on returning to his camp.

Lee was accompanied to his point of observation by Longstreet, just returned from his Tennessee campaign; Field, commanding Hood's old division, and Kershaw, that of McLaws; Ewell, and his division commanders, Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes; A. P. Hill, with his division commanders, R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox. It is said that after his information-seeking overlook of the Federal camps, Lee turned to these officers, and pointing toward Chancellorsville, said, that in his opinion, the Federal army would cross at Germanna or at Ely's; and that he then bade them prepare to take up the line of march whenever orders were given from the signal station.

When Grant ordered his forward movement, on the 4th of May, there were 147,000 men under his command, in and near Culpeper, disposed in three grand army corps; the Second led by Hancock, the Fifth by Warren, and the Sixth by Sedgwick. Burnside held the Ninth, as a sort of rear guard, north of the Rappahannock. It took 20,000 men to care for Grant's vast army train, leaving about 120,000 for fighting duty. With these were 274 field guns, of the most improved kind; while Sheridan, with some 13,000 cavalry, guarded the advance and flanks of the movement. This, said one of Grant's subordinates, was "the best clothed and best fed army that ever took the field." Its supply train, if extended in single line of march, would have covered more than 100 miles of distance.

To meet this mighty host, which was about to pass his flank, Lee had, at the end of April, less than 62,000 men for battle; 22,000, under A. P. Hill, near Orange Court House; some 17,000, under Ewell, in the Mountain run valley; 10,000 in Longstreet's two divisions, encamped near Gordonsville; 224 guns in his batteries, manned by 4,800 artillerymen; and 8,300 cavalymen, under the lead-

ership of "Jeb" Stuart. The cavalry corps was in two divisions, of three brigades each; the First, led by Wade Hampton, of South Carolina; the Second, by Fitz Lee, of Virginia. Fitz Lee's three brigades, commanded by W. H. F. Lee, L. L. Lomax and Williams F. Wickham, were all from Virginia. At the opening of the campaign, Stuart's cavalry held the line of the lower Rapidan and of the lower Rappahannock, guarding Lee's right flank.

Stuart informed Lee of the arrival of Grant's army, on the north bank of the Rapidan, opposite the Germanna and Ely fords, on the 3d of May, and of the crossing of those fords by his advance on the next day. Knowing this, Lee, on the morning of the 4th, issued his usual precautionary orders against the destruction of private property of all kinds, and, at 9 a. m., when the signal officer from Clark's mountain waved that Grant's columns were in motion toward the Confederate right, he gave orders for his army to advance, as prearranged, to meet the Federal movement. Two parallel roads led from his camps toward the Wilderness. Ewell moved, at noonday, across to the Orange turnpike, then followed that eastward, toward "The Wilderness." At the same time two of Hill's divisions marched from Orange Court House, along the plank road, in the same direction. At 11, Longstreet was ordering his advance, under Field, followed by Kershaw, from Gordonsville, across the country, to the same objective point; but he did not get his march under way until 4 of the afternoon, because he was unwilling to take the direct road assigned him by Lee, and waited for permission to take one of his own choosing, which led to delay and later held him from the field of battle at a critical moment. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, was left to guard the rear.

With the 28,000 men of Hill and Ewell, Lee hastened to the front, his artillery moving with his infantry, to support Stuart, who, in joyful combat, was already fighting back every step of the Federal advance. Lee rode with Hill at the head of the right-hand column, on the Orange plank road, sending message after message to hurry up Longstreet, to support the Confederate right when the battle should be joined.

At the close of the 4th of May, Grant telegraphed, from Germanna ford, to Halleck, chief of staff of the

army at Washington: "The crossing of the Rapidan effected. Forty-eight hours now will demonstrate whether the enemy intends giving battle this side of Richmond. Telegraph Butler that we have crossed the Rapidan." He then had with him not less than 127,000 men, that, almost without opposition, had reached the old fighting ground of "The Wilderness." He had told Butler that he would let him know when he had made this much progress in his campaign, and had ordered that he should make simultaneous movement from Fort Monroe, up the James, to an assault upon Richmond and Petersburg.

Hancock's corps, crossing at Ely's ford, had encamped on the battlefield of Chancellorsville, whence a good highway led southward, by way of Spottsylvania Court House, into the main roads leading directly to Richmond. Gregg's cavalry, moving along a parallel road to the southwest, toward Todd's tavern and Spottsylvania Court House, protected his flank from the incursions of Stuart's cavalry. Warren's corps had led the advance across Germanna ford and advanced to the valley of Wilderness run, a point where the old turnpike, on which Ewell was marching, crosses the road to Spottsylvania Court House, that Warren was following to the southeast. The Sixth corps, under Sedgwick, followed close behind the Fifth and encamped in the open fields just south of the Rapidan. Cavalry also watched the right of the movement, guarding it from Stuart. Grant's army was now well closed up, facing to the southward, along the Orange and Fredericksburg road, on the high watershed between the Rappahannock and the head branches of the Pamunkey.

In the evening of the 4th of May, Ewell established his headquarters near Locust Grove, on the old turnpike, with his advance but an hour's march from Grant's passing flank, on the same road, at the Wilderness run. Lee's second column, under Hill, which Lee accompanied, had its headquarters at Verdiersville, some four miles to the southwest from Ewell's, while Longstreet, that night, reached Brock's bridge, on the North Anna, on the old road that Lafayette had cut through the forest, to the northeastward, to Verdiersville, in order to form a junction with Wayne, and which, to this day, is known as the "Marquis' road."

During the night of the 4th, Lee sent orders to Ewell to march upon the enemy at daylight of the 5th, desiring "to bring him to battle now as soon as possible." He ordered Hill forward at the same hour, and himself promptly rode to the front, along the plank road, and was with the pickets when the skirmish opened, at Parker's store, on that road, at the head of the Wilderness run, three miles south of the old Wilderness tavern, where Grant and Meade, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of War Dana, had established their headquarters. Stuart's cavalry were already skirmishing with those of Gregg, on the Brock road, in front of and far to Lee's right, toward Todd's tavern, while Ewell's skirmishers were in lively engagement with those of Warren, advanced to protect his flank on the Germanna road. Now and then a field piece opened from either side.

Lee sent word to Ewell to regulate his advance by that of Hill in the center, and his engineers reconnoitered the front, and the skirmish lines along the whole were soon made continuous. Lee reluctantly held back his two columns, unwilling to bring on general battle until his strong right, under Longstreet, was in position. He impatiently awaited the arrival of Longstreet until 8 in the morning (5th), maintaining, in the meantime, a vigorous skirmish, which held the Federals in check as Meade developed his lines of battle, along the fields bordering Wilderness run and fronting its wooded western watershed, which covered the deployment of Ewell and Hill.

Lee, Stuart and Hill, riding to near the pickets in advance of Parker's store, had halted to look down the open valley of Wilderness run, at the long lines of Federals drawn up in battle array, when Meade's skirmishers suddenly advanced from the pine thickets to the eastward. Hill's line sprang forward to meet these; he then reinforced that with Heth's division, and a general battle appeared to have begun on Lee's right. Near the same time, about 11 of the morning, Ewell advanced Johnson's division, with Jones' brigade in skirmish front, pressed back Warren's skirmishers, and came in full view of his column, marching southward across the turnpike but ready to face to line of battle; which they promptly did and so forced an engagement before Lee was ready for it. Jones met the attack with a vigorous fire of musketry and

artillery, and had good promise that he would cut Meade's line of movement. Just then Ewell received Lee's warning not to bring on a general engagement, and ordered Jones to "fall slowly back, if pressed." Interpreting this as an order to fall back at once, Jones began to withdraw the field pieces in his skirmish line, which Griffin's division, of Warren's corps, took for a retreat, and so pressed upon Jones vigorously and drove his men back with the loss of their leader, who fell in trying to stem the tide of retreat. Ewell promptly moved forward the brigades of Gordon and Daniel, crushed Griffin's victory-disordered advance, and fell on the flank of the divisions of Crawford and Wadsworth. These he routed, and captured four Federal guns and many prisoners. Warren closed up his corps front, with his left retired, through the forest, toward Wilderness run, and extended his right with Sedgwick's corps, through the woods to the westward, with its right retired toward Flat run, thus covering Ewell's front, which, as reformed, had Rodes' division on the right of the old turnpike with Johnson's on his left, followed by Early, extending the line to and beyond Flat run, where an open field furnished excellent positions for batteries, which were also placed along the cross road leading toward the Germanna plank road, in and near the old turnpike, and at the cross road near Ewell's right, whence A. P. Hill extended his lines to the southward, still covering the position that belonged to Longstreet. These lines of contending forces were now near together, at the center less than 500 yards apart, and each (not the Confederate alone, as Grant unfairly states, repeatedly, in his messages and report) hastened to make its position strong with rude breastworks of logs and earth, and whatever other material active veterans could lay hands on.

Ewell now held the Fifth and Sixth Federal corps in check, in desultory engagement, and forced Meade to hesitate in pressing an advance beyond Lee's right, or rather his center, where Heth had met and driven back Crawford, leading Warren to the southward. Heth pushed his advantage in driving Crawford back along the plank road, met Getty at the crossing of the Brock road, and forced him to halt on the direct way to Richmond, which Grant, in his order of march on the morning of the 5th, expected his army to traverse, having already

ordered Hancock to Shady Grove church, on the headwaters of the Po, and Warren to Parker's store, in the same general direction, and Sedgwick to close up at the Wilderness tavern. Hancock, obeying his orders, had reached Todd's tavern, on the Brock road, and was turning to the southwest, by the Catharpin road, toward Shady Grove church, scarcely three miles away, at 11 a.m., just as Ewell and Heth were in hot engagement with Getty, when he was ordered back to Getty's contest, on the Brock road, which he had only reached at 2 of the afternoon, and to aid in the work of throwing up formidable fortifications along that road, to hold back Hill.

Had Longstreet come to his assigned position, before this juncture of combat, with his 10,000 men, Lee could not only have crushed the advance of Crawford and Getty, as he did with Hill's men, but could have rolled it back into Ewell's battle, and to the probable discomfiture of most of Warren's and Sedgwick's corps. He could also, with the wide interval already made between Warren and Hancock, have struck the latter in flank, with good prospect for defeating him as he turned back from Grant's "on to Richmond." The three hours between 11 and 2 were quite enough for this work, had Longstreet's veterans been there to be directed by Lee. Longstreet wandered along the many roads that led through the great forests of Orange and Spötsylvania, making but 12 miles of easting during all the 5th, and halting at night at Richards' shop, miles away from Hill's right. Under Lee's orders of urgency, Longstreet marched again at midnight, and the morning of the 6th was well advanced when he appeared with his veterans to join in the hotly contested battle that had again begun.

When, in the afternoon of the 5th, Hancock halted on the Brock road, with his right near the plank road, he was not satisfied with having thrown up along that road one line of formidable breastworks, upon its western side, toward Lee's front, but he reared a second, equally formidable, on the other side of the road, making that a covered way—a sort of Spanish trocha. Not satisfied with these two, his busy men erected a third; so each of his triple lines of battle was well hedged in, behind a most formidable line of breastworks, awaiting Hill's attack from the rude line of slight defenses that his men had thrown up; although, according to Grant, the Federal



soldiers, during all this campaign, never fought from behind breastworks, or had breastworks to fall back to when defeated.

Concealed by a dense forest of pines, of young growth, extending to the right and left from the turnpike, with skirmishers in advance, Heth's division, strengthened on both flanks, but especially on the left to keep touch with Ewell, and with Poague's battalion of artillery in the roadway, awaited Hancock's attack, which was in preparation but a few hundred yards in advance. Shortly after reaching the scene of conflict, at about half past four, Hancock strengthened Getty's waiting division with portions of Gibbon's and Owens', and four Federal divisions, with other troops in reserve, advanced to engage with Hill's two. A furious combat followed, in which the contending lines met each other, face to face. Hill's men, crouching behind their slight breastworks, sheltered themselves as best they could, as a storm of Federal bullets, cutting off the tops of the dense growth in front, sped to the Confederate line, which met the Federal advance with deliberate aim and drove it back, although held to its work by a strong line of bayonets in its rear.

The battle continued until after nightfall, and the darkness was lighted up by the flashes of the opposing musketry and artillery. Nearly half of Grant's army took part in this attempt to drive Hill's two divisions from safeguarding Lee's right. To relieve the pressure of the unequal combat, Lee ordered Ewell to assume the offensive, drive the Federals from his front, take possession of the Germanna road, and cut Grant's line of communication. Ewell promptly sent two brigades to attack Sedgwick's center, followed by a supporting force; but Sedgwick was found too well protected, by a heavy breastwork of logs, for a successful assault, so Ewell merely held him in combat.

Not content with merely holding his position on the right, Lee ordered a counterstroke from Hill's center and captured a Federal battery, but lost it when forced back by a vigorous Federal repulse, which Hancock followed up with repeated and desperate but unsuccessful assaults on Hill's line. Stuart, on the extreme right, drove back the charges of Sheridan's cavalry. After this first day of Wilderness battle was over, Lee telegraphed to Richmond, "By the blessing of God we maintained our posi-


tion against every effort until night, when the contest closed."

During the night of the 5th, Hill's and Ewell's men held the lines from which they had fought during the day. Lee ordered Longstreet to make a night march, which he began at 1 a. m., expecting to have him in position, on his right, by daylight of the 6th, to help in an aggressive fight which he proposed to make at the dawn of day, advancing his entire battle line against Grant's. Ewell opened this battle, at 5 in the morning, by attacking Warren and Sedgwick. The engagement quickly extended to Lee's right, against which Hancock made prompt advance, again assaulting Hill's weak line (that Lee had expected to replace with Longstreet, before daylight), but which he could not force from its position. Wadsworth moved against Hill's left flank, at the same time that Hancock developed a large force around his right. Thus flanked, Hill was forced from the field, stubbornly fighting as he fell back to just behind Poague's artillery, which defiantly held the broad highway, and checked Hancock with canister and grape at short range. Near these guns Lee watched his broken right, which had courageously endured an hour of unequal contention, saying, again and again, to his surrounding staff, "Why does not Longstreet come?"

One division of Burnside's corps crossed Germanna ford on the morning of the 5th, and another on the morning of the 6th. Grant ordered these fresh troops to make attack on Lee's center, while Warren and Sedgwick assaulted the right and Hancock the left. Ewell's men strengthened their line, during the night of the 5th, with breast-works, and planted batteries all along it, and so were able to drive back the Federal assaults with heavy losses. Poague's guns, on the plank road, were able to give check to Hancock's advance, until Longstreet's corps, in double column, and well closed up, came down the plank road at a double-quick, Field's division on the left and Kershaw's on the right. Lee caught sight of these long-expected reinforcements and rode to meet them. "What boys are these?" he asked, as he met the head of the column under Field. The word passed, as by electric flash, and the quick reply came, from the men of Hood, who had led many a brave assault, "Texas boys." When the voice of the great leader clearly rang out, "My Texas boys, you must

charge." The response of the 800 present for duty was an answering cheer that gave assurance of victory when the charge should be ordered. A line of battle was promptly formed, and the men, rushing forward, passed Poague's battery, and were advancing on Hancock's men, when they heard behind them, and almost in their midst, from Lee himself, the shouted command, "Charge! Charge, boys, charge!" Glancing back and discovering that Lee in person was joining in, if not leading the charge, the Texans shouted, "Go back, General Lee! Marse Robert, go back!" Poague's men, from amid their guns, also called out, "Come back! Come back, General Lee!" But Lee, waving his hat, rode on with the charge, while from every side, like a shout of command, the soldiers cried out, "Lee to the rear! Lee to the rear!" Then a tall Texas sergeant stepped from the ranks, caught the bridle rein of "Traveler," and turned him to the rear. Lee reluctantly obeyed this order of his men, who, waving back to him a salute of gratification, rushed forward to meet the solid ranks of Hancock's oncoming host, and the most of them to meet death. Part of Poague's guns moved forward in the charge, and the men with them shouted back to their comrades, "Good-bye, boys!"

The Texas brigade, now led by Gregg, struck the masked front of Hancock's corps, in the plank road, and was soon fairly enveloped in a circle of fire; but it flinched not, and soon staggered the Federal column, and then, when Anderson and Benning brought up their Georgians and Law his Alabamians, in support, Hancock's line was forced to yield, not to numbers, but to courage, and was driven back toward his line of defenses, but not until the half of Gregg's men, in ten minutes of fighting, had fallen beside their successful comrades. Lee now deployed Field to the left and Kershaw to the right, and the combat surged back and forth through the tangled and marshy forest. The crisis of the engagement was at hand. Hill's rested men were again sent to the front. At 10 of the morning, Longstreet sent Mahone, with his four brigades, to turn Hancock's left, which they did, under shelter of the cuts and fills of the partially graded Orange railroad, and then, moving forward, struck Hancock's flank and rolled it up, as Hancock himself said, "like a wet blanket." By 11 o'clock, Lee's counter-





stroke, on Hancock's front and flank, had driven back his brigades and broken up his right, under Wadsworth; and by noon, Grant's entire left had been defeated and disorganized. Hancock's chief of staff, the truth-telling Walker, says of this time: "Down the plank road from Hancock's center a stream of broken men was pouring to the rear, giving the onlooker the impression that everything had gone to pieces."

Longstreet urged forward his men to press the enemy. The dried leaves of the preceding autumn took fire from blazing cartridges, and their smoke, joining with that of battle, clouded the day and concealed the combatants from each other. Forming Kershaw's division in line of battle, across the plank road, Longstreet, in person, led it against Hancock's retreating men, but failing to note, in the heat of pursuit, that his flanking brigades, under Mahone, had halted in line and were facing the roadway down which he was rushing. Mahone's men, mistaking Longstreet and his following for a Federal officer and his staff and escort, turned on them a full volleyed flank fire, which killed Jenkins and severely wounded Longstreet, thus checking an onset which promised to turn the Federal retreat into a disastrous rout.

As Longstreet was carried to the rear, Lee rode rapidly to the front to reform his now disordered attack, and at 4 he again pressed forward his lines, through the smoking forest, to fall upon Hancock in the Brock road. Hill had already repulsed Burnside's feeble attack on Lee's center, and the time was opportune for renewing the attack on Grant's flanks. As Lee moved to assault the Federal left on the plank road, Ewell detached Johnson's and Gordon's brigades from his extreme left, under the leadership of Early, to wheel to the right, from their intrenchments, fall upon Sedgwick's right flank, and sweep the rear of his breastworks. The sun was low as this masterly movement began, but these men, that Stonewall Jackson had often led to flanking victory, knew what was in the air when the order to march was given, and they at once, with a wild yell, swung into line, fell upon Milroy's old brigade which they had routed in the Valley the preceding spring, just as its men were cooking their suppers, as was Hooker's right when struck at Chancellorsville, and quickly routed

a mile of Sedgwick's line, capturing 600 of his men and two of his brigadiers; and they were still sweeping on to victory, even through the gathering darkness, when Ewell called a halt.

Not knowing of the existence of Hancock's formidable intrenchments, Lee's right, consisting of the divisions of Field and Anderson, charged against Hancock, on the Brock road, to find themselves confronted by a wall of fire, made by the burning of the front line of Federal breastworks, which had been set on fire by the burning forest, and by a more dangerous, blazing line of infantry and artillery, that poured rifle ball and shot and shell into their ranks from behind Hancock's second line of breastworks, which he now held in force. The Confederates drove back the Federals, even from this double-fire line, and planted their flags on the front line of breastworks, but for a short time only. They were repulsed by the fierce artillery fire that was poured upon them, as night put an end to the fierce struggles of this 6th day of May. At the close of this day, Lee held, all along his lines, a position advanced from that held in the morning, and the great army of the Potomac found itself in the toils of a defensive struggle, in aid of which it was throwing up new lines of breastworks, along the positions to which it had been forced back on its right and along its center, and was grimly holding on to the triple line of defenses that guarded its left.

On the morning of the 7th, at 10, Grant telegraphed to Washington, from the Wilderness tavern:

We were engaged with the enemy nearly all day, both on the 5th and the 6th. Yesterday the enemy attacked our lines vigorously, first at one point and then another, from right to left. They were repulsed at all points before reaching our lines, except once during the afternoon on Hancock's front, and just after night on Sedgwick's front. In the former instance they were promptly and handsomely repulsed; the latter, Milroy's old brigade was attacked and gave away in the greatest confusion, almost without resistance, carrying good troops with them. Had there been daylight the enemy could have injured us very much in the confusion that prevailed; they, however, instead of getting through the break, attacked General Wright's division of Sedgwick's corps, and were driven back.

After confessing that his loss had been about 12,000, and mentioning his killed, wounded and captured generals, he added: "I think the loss of the enemy must exceed ours, but this is only a guess based upon the fact that they attacked and were repulsed so often"—a state-

ment that is rather remarkable, in the light of his subsequent reports, when he accounts for his enormous losses by saying that, during all the campaign, he had to attack Lee protected by breastworks. His dispatch concludes: "At present we can claim no victory over the enemy, neither have they gained a single advantage. The enemy pushed out of his fortifications to prevent their position being turned, and have been sooner or later driven back in every instance. Up to this hour the enemy have not shown themselves in force within a mile of our lines." He does not say that he had withdrawn his lines, in many places, and thus secured the mile of interval that he mentions.

Well-nigh exhausted by the desperate struggles of May 5th and 6th, each army was quite content to rest behind its defenses, care for its wounded and bury its dead, during the 7th; neither caring to again attempt to carry the breastworks of the other, each formidable with well-placed artillery. Grant, having now found out that Lee was still willing to give battle "this side of Richmond," for which information he had paid dearly by the loss of 17,000 men, now attempted, by a sidling movement to the left, to steal by Lee and renew his interrupted march toward the Confederate capital. To open the way for this, his cavalry, during the 7th, pressed southward on the Brock road, where Fitz Lee held them in sharp contention, and on the Catharpin road, where they were equally well met by Hampton's division. He also gave orders for a night march by the Fifth corps, under Warren, along the Brock road, in the rear of Hancock's well fortified line, which the latter was to continue to hold, to Spottsylvania Court House; while Sedgwick, withdrawing from Ewell's front after dark, was to march eastward to Chancellorsville, and then southward to Piney Branch church, and Burnside was to withdraw from Hill's front, and, marching to the eastward of Chancellorsville, then turn south, thus covering the road to Fredericksburg, in his rear, along which Grant was sending his wounded to Aquia creek, and by which he had communication with his base of supplies, which he had now shifted to the same point on the Potomac.

These movements, during the night of the 7th, would leave two corps in front of Lee and withdraw two farther to the east. Grant and Meade were apprehensive, dur-



ing all the 7th, that Lee might again attack them, as indicated by the dispatch Grant sent to Washington, about noon of the 8th, in which he said:

The army commenced moving south at 9 p. m. yesterday, and when closed up to the position assigned for the first day's march will stand thus: General Warren's corps at Spottsylvania Court House; Hancock at Todd's tavern; Sedgwick on the road from Piney Branch church to Spottsylvania, and General Burnside at Aldrich's. It is not demonstrated what the enemy will do, but the best of feeling prevails in this army, and I feel at present no apprehension for the result. My efforts will be to form a junction with General Butler as early as possible, and be prepared to meet any enemy interposing. The result of the three days' fighting at the Old Wilderness was decidedly in our favor. The enemy having a strongly intrenched position to fall back on when hard pressed, and the extensive train we have to cover, rendered it impossible to inflict the heavy blow on Lee's army I had hoped. My exact route to the James river, I have not yet definitely marked out.

These lame excuses for his failures in the Wilderness battles, are ample confessions that Lee had thoroughly deranged Grant's confident plan of campaign. He was no longer urging Meade to hunt for Lee, and was looking anxiously for co-operation with Butler and the army of the James.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE— THE DEFEAT OF SIGEL AND BUTLER.

**D**URING Grant's next move, Lee occupied the morning of the 7th in cutting a direct military road southward, through the forest, from the plank road toward Shady Grove church, south of the Ny, to the highway leading eastward to Spottsylvania Court House, so he could have a continuous march of his entire army, by its right flank, when the time came for again placing that army across some other road, leading toward Richmond, that Grant might desire to follow. Grant's inaction led Lee to suspect the movement that he had ordered, and when Stuart, later on, sent him word that Grant's trains were moving in the rear of his army, and word came from Ewell that the Germanna road had been abandoned, Sedgwick leaving his dead unburied and many of his wounded uncared for, Lee issued orders for Longstreet's corps to take up the line of march, at dark, along the new military road toward Spottsylvania Court House, be followed by Ewell withdrawing by Hill's rear, while the latter remained guarding the rear of the army.

Anderson with the First corps, which, in Longstreet's absence, he now commanded, marched at 11 p. m., and, before daylight of the 8th, rested in a grove near Spottsylvania Court House, forming a strong support to the cavalry that was keeping back Grant's new advance. Ewell was held at the plank road, near Parker's store, until the early morning of the 8th, when the Second corps, with the exception of Early's division, which was left near Todd's tavern in support of Hill, marched to a junction with the First corps near Spottsylvania Court House. Grant, in person, tarried with Hancock until noon, after sending minute instructions to his advance for marching beyond Spottsylvania Court House toward Richmond and Butler; but learning, soon after, that Warren had met with a severe check on the highway to

Spottsylvania Court House, and that Lee, although having the longer march to compass, had won the race for position, and a second time blocked his "on to Richmond." During the night of the 7th, Fitz Lee, dismounting his cavalry division and using his men as infantry, had succeeded in throwing rude defenses of trees and rails across the Brock road, and had successfully driven back repeated attacks of the Federal advance, keeping Warren miles from the position which Grant had ordered him to occupy that night.

Early on the morning of the 8th, Anderson moved the First corps about a mile to the northern front of Spottsylvania Court House, to support Fitz Lee's hard pressed cavalry, where his men, in an incredibly short time, threw up hasty breastworks and were ready for Warren's corps, as it advanced in assault, and to drive it back in a disastrous repulse. Stuart was on the field in person, for the last time, as it soon proved, to cheer the army of Northern Virginia on to victory, contributing, by his great tactical skill and ready but always practical advice, to Warren's defeat, and joining enthusiastically in the cheers of victory that followed the repulse of the Federal advance, making certain the holding of the position which Lee's superior energy had secured.

At 1 p. m. of the 9th, Grant's dispatch, from "near" Spottsylvania Court House, to Halleck read: "If matters are still favorable with Butler, send all reinforcements you can. The enemy are now moving from our immediate front either to interpose between us and Fredericksburg or to get the inside road to Richmond." It is incredible that at that hour of the day the Federal general commanding did not know that, instead of moving from his immediate front, Lee was, at that very time, in line of battle across his front; since at 5 in the afternoon of the preceding day, he had arrived with Ewell, and, with his First and Second corps in position, had met a second Federal attack, which he had driven back, and Ewell, in a countercharge, had gained an advance of a half mile, on the right of the Catharpin road leading to Todd's tavern, while the First corps held his right, across the Brock road, leading to the same point along the divide between the Ny and the Po rivers, the two most northerly of the four, that, not far to the southeast, unite and make the Mattaponi.

During the night of the 8th, the Confederates threw up rude and irregular defenses along the emergency line which they had taken, a part of it after dark. On the morning of the 9th, Lee rode along the line that had been occupied, but was not favorably impressed with it. At Ewell's suggestion, a somewhat elevated point, projecting between some of the southward branches of the Ny, near the right center, was taken into the lines and occupied by artillery; orders were also given for providing a second line of defenses, beyond the incurred line, as taken, on the right. Lee's position, as now occupied, extended from the Po river on the southwest, where the Louisa road to Spottsylvania Court House and Fredericksburg crosses the big bend of that river, in the arc of a circle, eastward, across the Brock road and the Po-Ny watershed, to a branch of the Ny river; while from its right center sprang a horseshoe salient, northward, eastward and southward, around the crest of the spur between two small branches of the Ny and overlooking that river to the northeastward. Ewell's men were disposed within this salient, which conformed, in a general way, to a broad bend of the Ny. Hill's men were to extend the line to the left, to the Po, and Longstreet's were to extend it to the right, from the Bald hill southward and then southeastward, covering the front of Spottsylvania Court House and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, thus leaving open no way to the southward on which Grant could move toward Richmond, as he had planned on the 7th. Held back by Hampton and Early, the most of Hancock's corps had been detained on the Brock road, near and behind Todd's tavern, during the 8th, while Anderson with the First and Ewell with the Second corps were engaged with Grant's advance near Spottsylvania Court House.

On the 9th, Grant sent Sheridan, with his cavalry, on a raid, moving from Alsop's at 4 in the morning, to first destroy Lee's ammunition train, then strike the James and open communication with Butler. Stuart safely guarded the ammunition train, but was not strong enough to prevent Sheridan passing his right and gaining the highway to Richmond. Early on the morning of the 9th, Burnside advanced across the Ny, on the road leading from Spottsylvania Court House to Fredericksburg, which he had reached by a circuitous march to the east-

ward, and was moving to strike Lee's right and rear. Early, temporarily in command of the Third corps, arrived in time to meet this attack, which had to advance across open fields, with infantry and artillery, and give it a handsome repulse. Thus brought into position, the Third corps held Lee's right, from the horseshoe salient around the front of Spottsylvania Court House; it also occupied a portion of the eastern front of the salient, while Ewell held the remainder of that front, its north projecting apex and its western face. Favorable positions for artillery were found throughout the line, which was made stronger with each passing hour while awaiting Grant's attack from the north and west, after the repulse of that of Burnside from the east.

Advancing on the 9th, Hancock took position on Grant's right and sent three divisions across the Po to menace Lee's left and rear from the west. These movements revealed to Lee that Grant intended to attack his entire front, and, with his superior numbers, which were double those of Lee, attempt to turn both his flanks. During the night of the 9th, in anticipation of Grant's attack, Lee sent Heth's division, of Hill's corps, across the Po, by a circuit to the southward, under the command of Early, who, moved into line across the Louisa road, fell upon Hancock's flank and rear, at dawn of the 10th, just as he was obeying Grant's recall to join in his proposed front attack. Heth severely punished Barlow's division, of Hancock's corps, on which his attack fell, and captured one of his guns, in this engagement, which became known as the "battle of Waite's Shop."

About the time of the failure of Hancock's flanking movement to Lee's left, at 9:30 of the 10th of May, Grant dispatched to Washington, still from "near" Spottsylvania Court House:

The enemy hold our front in very strong force and evince a strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward steps but may be compelled to send back to Belle Plain [below Aquia creek on the Potomac] for further supplies. Please have supplies of forage and provisions sent there at once and 50 rounds of ammunition (infantry) for 100,000 men. Send General Benham with the necessary bridge train for the Rappahannock river. We can maintain ourselves at least, and, in the end, beat Lee's army, I believe. Send to Belle Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape. With present position of the armies, 10,000 men can be spared from the defenses of Washington, besides all the troops that

have reached there since Burnside's departure. Some may also be brought from Wallace's department. We want no more wagons nor artillery.

This dispatch tells the condition of things within Grant's lines and his view of the situation, on the morning of the 10th, in a way that needs no comment.

At noon of the day before, May 9th, C. A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, who had joined Grant to watch events, reported to Secretary Stanton various matters that he had heard about, among others:

General Wilson, with his division of cavalry, occupied Spottsylvania Court House yesterday morning for an hour; but as Warren's corps had not yet made its appearance, and as columns of rebel infantry were gaining position on both his right and left, he fell back to Alsop's. Prisoners were taken by Wilson, who reported that two divisions of Longstreet's corps had just come, they having marched all night. General Grant at once gave orders for attacking these troops with the whole of Warren's corps, to whose support Sedgwick was hurrying up, in order to destroy them before the rest of the rebel army could arrive. Warren, however, proceeded with exceeding caution, and when he finally did attack, sent a single division at a time and was constantly repulsed. The general attack, which Generals Grant and Meade directed, was never made, for reasons I have not yet been able to learn; but successive assaults were made upon this and that point in the rebel positions with no decisive results. The last assaults were made just before dark, when the fighting was very sharp. . . . General Grant's orders, last night, were not to renew the fighting to-day; but if, as now appears to be the case, Lee has left anything open in front of our right, by massing on our left, he may attack at this weakened point of their lines with a view of passing toward Richmond on that side.

Hancock found Early, at the "open place" Grant was seeking, the next morning. At 11 of the morning of the 10th, Grant began his massed attack on Lee's left, which was met by Field's division and driven back by a withering fire of musketry and artillery. At 3 in the afternoon, a second massed attack was made on the First corps, near Lee's center, on the line of the Brock road, through the piney woods of the Po-Ny watershed. This also met a bloody repulse, after which the Confederates sprang over their breastworks and collected the guns and ammunition the enemy had left behind, and distributed these so that each Confederate was doubly armed. For a third time, near the close of the day, Grant made assault, with Hancock and Warren, against Lee's weak left. This front line, under Hancock, was driven back by Field's division, but his second line rushed bravely forward and leaped over the breastworks of Gregg's Texans,

who, refusing to yield, obtained aid from an adjacent brigade, which turned on the flank of the bravely-fighting Federals and forced them to retreat from the stubborn fight they had made.

At about the same hour of the closing day, Grant made assault on Ewell, along the western face of the great salient, a brigade of Sedgwick's corps attacking Dole's, in Ewell's center, and driving him from his works. The brigades of Daniel and Steuart then fell upon the flanks of Upton's Federal brigade, while those of Battle and Johnson met it in front. Upton tenaciously held against these what he had won; but when Gordon and Walker reinforced the attack on his flanks, he was compelled to retire with heavy loss. Ewell's guns, raking the front with furious fire, had prevented all attempts to reinforce the gallant Upton.

The Confederate right, under Early, was also attacked, several times, during the 10th, by Burnside's corps, on the Fredericksburg road. There the Confederate artillery had full play on the Federal lines, as they essayed to cross the broad fields in front, and Pegram and Cutts, with their big guns, easily repulsed all of Burnside's attacks. Gen. F. A. Walker, commenting on Grant's tactics, writes: "To assault 'all along the line,' as was often done in the summer of 1864, is the very abdication of leadership."

At 8:30 of the 11th, Grant dispatched to Halleck:

We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting, the result to this time in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers, killed, wounded and missing, and probably 20,000 men. . . . I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible and in as great numbers. . . . I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond.

It was the condition of his own army and of his own method of campaigning and not Lee's, that Grant thus described. He little knew, although what he had so recently encountered should have taught him, the spirit of the men that, under Lee, confronted him.

The shifting about of troops in the Federal lines, on the 11th, led Lee to the conclusion that Grant was about to draw back from the Spottsylvania Court House field of combat; so he made preparations to meet any new movement he might attempt by ordering all the artillery, placed in difficult positions, to be withdrawn to where it could be quickly assembled for marching. Obeying this order, General Long withdrew the guns from the northern portion of the great salient, so that Edward Johnson's division, at its apex, was left on guard with only muskets and two pieces of artillery. Near midnight, of the 11th-12th of May, Johnson discovered, through the dense foggy mist then prevailing, that the Federal troops were massing in his front, and asked General Ewell to have the supporting artillery returned. Not fully realizing the importance of time under the existing conditions, Ewell gave orders, not for the immediate return of the guns, but that they should be returned at daybreak of the 12th. Before that time arrived, Hancock's superb corps, in solid mass, rushed upon the apex of the salient, expecting to carry it by assault. Johnson's command, a mere remnant of the division that had stormed Culp's hill, at Gettysburg, was on the alert and met this attack bravely; but musketry alone was not sufficient to drive back Hancock's many, massed battalions, which swarmed over the log breastworks and captured Johnson and 2,800 of his men. Just then, the batteries that had been ordered back came forward at a gallop, but only in time to fall into Hancock's hands and add their twenty cannon to his captures.

Flushed with victory, the Federal columns prepared to continue their assault, by dashing forward, through the salient, to the southward; but Lane's brigade, on Ewell's right, which had not been involved in the capture, as had Stuart's on its left, faced about, and, pouring a rapid and well-directed fire upon Hancock's advancing left flank, forced it to recoil. Promptly forming his men across the base of the salient, and taking direction from the noise of the advancing fire of the Federals, Gordon made ready to go forward and meet and drive back the Federal onset. At this juncture, Lee, roused from his quarters in the rear of the salient, by the mighty roar of the conflict in progress, came riding rapidly to Gordon's line and quietly took position to lead it forward. Gordon, in a tone clear, but not loud, spoke out: "This is no place for General



Lee." His men caught the words and instantly shouted, "General Lee to the rear," while Gordon, his mobile face showing the incarnation of heroic daring, fairly shouted to General Lee: "These men are Georgians and Virginians. They have never failed you; they will not fail you now." Just then a veteran stepped from the ranks, and seizing his bridle turned "Traveler" backward, and again the imperative order came from his soldiers: "Lee to the rear," and as he obeyed, Gordon's men rushed forward to death and to victory.

The steady roar of the battle, which had been continuous since half past 4 of the morning, from the dawning of the day, now swelled in volume as Gordon met Hancock in the pine thickets embraced within the salient. The Federal left was soon thrust back and Gordon held the works on the east. Ewell hurried forward Ramseur's brigade, which had occupied the extreme left of the salient, in attack upon Hancock's right; while from Early's command, the Third corps, came the brigades of McGowan and Harris, following up the advance of Gordon and Ramseur. Lee, remaining where Gordon had left him, again rode forward to lead Harris' Mississippians, who, seeing this, in turn shouted: "Lee to the rear," as they followed up Ramseur's attack on Hancock's right.

These rapid combinations and charges of Lee's men soon drove Hancock outside the salient, and only left him in possession of the outer trenches at its apex and along its northern front. Two divisions, from the Sixth corps, were hurried forward to support Grant's line along the northern and northwestern side of the salient. These engaged in combat with the brigades of Harris' Mississippians, McGowan's South Carolinians and Ramseur's North Carolinians, and from opposite sides of these log breastworks, a bloody struggle continued from early morning until late afternoon, with unflinching desperation on either side, fairly filling the trenches and piling their borders, on each side, with the slain and the wounded, and giving to this portion of the famous salient the name of "the Bloody Angle."

Grant continued to hurl division after division and corps after corps, in fierce and continuing attack, upon every portion of Lee's line. The Fifth and part of the Sixth corps were charging his left, while Burnside, with another corps, was charging his right. A division of the

Fifth corps was added to Hancock's attack in the center. Lee had not another man to spare, but the few hardy veterans that sustained the keystone of this arch of defense, held it with a desperate and unyielding courage unsurpassed in the annals of human conflicts.

The Federal engineers had, by careful triangulations, mapped the great salient and, guided by this information, batteries were so placed, in all available positions, as to bring cross-fires to bear upon its defenders. Big mortars were placed in position that dropped their heavy shells into the Confederate lines. Cannon were dragged to the front, and their muzzles thrust through or across the Confederate log intrenchments, and fired upon Lee's three brigades of heroes, who, unhesitatingly, stood to their assigned duty. Infantrymen, from opposite sides of the works, climbed up and fired into the faces of their opponents; they grappled one another and attempted to drag each other across the breastworks; bayonet thrusts were made through crevices; the continuous musketry fire cut off large trees standing in the line of the works; the dead and the dying had to be flung to the rear to give room for the living, fighting ones, in the trenches; and, to add to the horrors of the combat, a cold, heavy rain set in and partly filled the trenches, where the combatants stood, until they seemed to fairly run with blood.

Lee's charges and lines of defense were greatly strengthened by his grandly served artillery, which, when not assigned to fixed positions, hastened to the battle, took every point of vantage it could find, and poured shot and shell, with telling effect, into every portion of Grant's advancing lines, breaking their ranks and often driving them to the rear. Wherever they found an open front, where they would not fire on their comrades, the unaided artillery drove back Federal attacks. The writer, who was on this field of awful combats, does not believe that human ear ever listened to a more steady and continuous roar of musketry and artillery than that which rose from that field of fierce contention, from the dawning of the day until late in the afternoon. The slackening fight continued until night closed the scene, when Hancock withdrew his surviving and nearly exhausted veterans from the ditch in which they had fought so long, leaving but a regiment behind as a picket. Gordon's men worked throughout the succeeding night, throwing

breastworks across the base of the salient, and not until near the dawn of the 13th were Lee's well-nigh exhausted men withdrawn from the long-held and much-fought-for horseshoe salient, to find rest behind the new works their comrades had constructed, thus straightening his front and giving him a shorter and more formidable line than he had held before. Notwithstanding the capture of Johnson's division, at the opening of the combat, Lee's losses, from his 50,000 present, were only some 8,000 men; but these were 18 per cent of his army. Grant had thrown twenty-two brigades against Lee's center, at the salient, but had failed to reach his rear, and had really gained nothing but great losses for his strenuous efforts; from his 100,000 in hand, 16,000 were killed or wounded.

At 6:30 of the afternoon of the 12th, after the close of the famous battle of Spottsylvania Court House, Grant dispatched to Halleck: "The eighth day of battle closes. . . . The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organization," etc. Dana, a half hour later, telegraphed to Stanton:

The battle has raged without cessation throughout the day. Wright and Hancock have borne the brunt of it. . . . Burnside's troops generally have borne themselves like good soldiers. I should here mention that only his white troops have been engaged, the colored division having been kept in the rear to guard the trains. Warren has gained nothing. His attacks were made in the forenoon, with so much delay, that Grant and Meade were greatly dissatisfied; but when they were made they were unsuccessful, though attended with considerable loss. The rebel works in his front were very strong, and finally, at about 1 o'clock, the chief portion of his troops were withdrawn from his lines and brought to the support of Wright. It was then intended to attempt a grand assault, with a very powerful column under Wright, at about 5 o'clock; but when the men were brought up, they were so tired from the long day's work, and the chances of success were so much short of certainty, that General Wright advised General Meade to postpone the attempt, and accordingly the obstinate battle was allowed to pause here. The results of the day are, that we have crowded the enemy out of some of his most important positions. . . . Our troops rest to-night upon the ground they have so victoriously fought for.

At 8 next morning, May 13th, Dana telegraphed again:

Lee abandoned his position during the night—whether to occupy a new one in the vicinity or to make a thorough retreat is not determined. . . . Though our army is greatly fatigued, from the enormous efforts of yesterday, the news of Lee's departure inspires the men with fresh energy. The whole force will soon be in motion, but the heavy rain of the last thirty-six hours renders the roads very difficult for wagons and artillery. . . . The proportion of severely

wounded is greater than either of the previous days' fighting. This was owing to the great use made of artillery.

At 6 in the afternoon of the same day, he dispatched:

The impression that Lee had started on his retreat, which prevailed at the date of my dispatch this morning, is not confirmed. Our skirmishers have found the rebels along the whole line, and the conclusion now is, that the retrograde movement of last night was made to correct their position after the loss of the key-points taken from them yesterday, and they are still before us in force. Of course we cannot determine, without a battle, whether their whole army is still here, and nothing has been done to-day to provoke one. It has been necessary to rest the men, and accordingly we have everywhere stood upon the defensive.

He then claimed that, in changing his lines, Lee had uncovered the roads leading southward along his right, and that Grant had ordered Meade to withdraw Warren from the right and Wright from the center, around to the left, turn Lee's flank, and force him to move southward.

On the evening of the 12th, that ever-to-be-remembered day of fearful carnage, the sad news came to Lee of the death of Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart, the "Jeb" Stuart of the Confederacy and of history, who had fallen, the day before, at the Yellow Tavern, a few miles to the north of Richmond, in repulsing an attempt of Sheridan to capture that city. Fully occupied with the enemy in his front, Lee waited until the quiet of the 20th before officially announcing to his army the great loss he had sustained, a loss only second, in its far-reaching consequences, to that of "Stonewall" Jackson. In his tribute to this grand leader of his cavalry corps, he said:

Among the gallant soldiers who have fallen in this war, General Stuart was second to none in valor, in zeal, and in unflinching devotion to his country. His achievements form a conspicuous part of the history of this army, with which his name and services will forever be associated. To military capacity of a high order and to the nobler virtues of the soldier, he added the brighter graces of a pure life, guided and sustained by the Christian's faith and hope. The mysterious hand of an all-wise God has removed him from the scene of his usefulness and fame. His grateful countrymen will mourn his loss and cherish his memory. To his comrades in arms he has left the proud recollection of his deeds and the inspiring influence of his example.

Notwithstanding Grant's recorded assertion, "I never maneuver," he spent from the 13th to the 18th of May in front of Lee, maneuvering and waiting for reinforcements, until he had rested his "tired" men, and 25,000 fresh troops were added to his numbers. On the 14th, at 7:10 of the morning, his dispatch read:

The very heavy rains of the last forty-eight hours have made it impossible to move trains of artillery. Two corps were moved, last night, from our right to the left, with orders to attack at 4 a. m., but owing to the difficulties of the roads, have not fully got into position. This, with the continued bad weather, may prevent offensive operations today.

The next morning he again telegraphed:

The very heavy rains of the last three days have rendered the roads so impassable that little will be done until there is a change in the weather, unless the enemy should attack, which they have exhibited but little inclination to do for the last week. I believe it would be better to strengthen the corps here, with all reinforcements coming, than to have them formed into separate commands.

The next morning he dispatched:

We have had five days of almost constant rain without any prospect yet of its clearing up. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits and feels the greatest confidence in ultimate success. . . . The promptness with which you have forwarded reinforcements will contribute greatly to diminishing our mortality list and insuring a complete victory. You can assure the President and secretary of war, that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

An attack was made by Grant on the morning of May 18th, with his Second and Sixth corps, in another attempt to break Lee's center. Advancing to Lee's new line, which had excluded the great salient, these 12,000 Federals were broken, in retreat, by the heavy fire of twenty-nine of Lee's guns, before they came within rifle range. In like manner Burnside's simultaneous attack on Lee's right was similarly repulsed. Grant could find no weak point for breaking through, so he drew back, farther to his left, and sought for a third road to Richmond. On the next day, the 19th, Lee sent Ewell around Grant's right, to ascertain what he was doing. In this movement Ewell was repulsed, with a loss of 900 men, but he had detained Grant another day in front of Spottsylvania Court House and inflicted a severer loss than he himself suffered, as Grant confessed.

On the afternoon of May 19th, Grant wrote: "I shall make a flank movement early in the morning, and try to reach Bowling Green and Milford station," and wished his base, in that event, changed to Port Royal. At 10 p. m., of the same day, he again wrote: "The enemy came out on our right, late this afternoon, and attacked, but were driven back until some time since dark. Not knowing

their exact position, and the danger our trains at Fredericksburg will be in if we move, I shall not make the move designated for to-night, until their designs are fully developed." On the 20th he reported that his casualties of the previous day were 196 killed, 1,090 wounded, and 240 missing.

When Grant began his forward movement, on the 4th of May, he not only ordered Butler forward, but also directed Sigel, in the Shenandoah valley, to make a simultaneous advance to capture Staunton and break Lee's communications with the Shenandoah valley, with the 6,500 men and 28 guns in his command. Apprised of this movement, Lee ordered Gen. John C. Breckinridge to collect at Staunton the infantry and cavalry outposts that had wintered in the mountains west of the Great valley, and had called upon the governor of Virginia to add to these the cadets from the Virginia military institute, and with these march down the valley to meet this new irruption. Breckinridge had some 4,500 men, including Gen. John Daniel Imboden's cavalry and McLaughlin's artillery company with eight guns. These met Sigel at New Market, on the 15th of May, and completely routed him, capturing six guns and nearly 900 prisoners. Breckinridge's infantry made a front attack, aided by the artillery, while Imboden fell on Sigel's flank. The mere boys from the institute fought like veterans in this, their first engagement. Halleck telegraphed to Grant, on the 17th: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run. Never did anything else." The day before, Grant received the unwelcome news that the "army of the James," under Gen. Ben Butler, from which he expected so much assistance, and which he was longing to join, had been successfully repulsed from a position it had gained on the railroad between Richmond and Petersburg, and driven back into the angle between the James and the Appomattox, where, as Grant says in his official report, "his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond, as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked."

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE MANEUVERS ON THE NORTH ANNA RIVER.

ON the night of May 20, 1864, Hancock led Grant's third southward movement, far to the eastward of Lee's position at Spottsylvania Court House, and followed the road along the line of the Richmond & Fredericksburg railroad toward Richmond, his advance reaching Milford station during the night of the 21st. Grant's losses, since he crossed the Rapidan, on May 4th, had been over 37,000; half of these in the Wilderness battles and the other half in those of Spottsylvania Court House. Lee had lost about one-third of that number. Dana states that the Federal losses were "a little over 33,000," and that when Grant "expressed great regret at the loss of so many men," Meade remarked: "Well, General, we can't do these little tricks without losses."

Apprised, by his scouts, of Grant's movement, Lee dispatched Ewell, whom he accompanied, at noon of the 21st, from the right of his position at Spottsylvania Court House across the country to Mud tavern and on the Telegraph or old stage road from Washington via Fredericksburg to Richmond as far as Dickinson's mill, where he encamped that night, nearer to Hanover Junction than was Grant's advance at Milford station, although Dana was of the opinion that Grant had slipped away without Lee's knowledge.

On the morning of the 22d, Grant telegraphed, from Guiney's station, the position of his advance, and ordered the transfer of his depot of supplies from near Aquia creek to Port Royal on the Rappahannock. During the forenoon of that day, Lee and Ewell reached Hanover Junction, having crossed the North Anna at the Telegraph road bridge; Anderson, with the First corps, followed at midday, and Hill, with the Third corps, crossed, at the same place, on the morning of the 23d, when Lee's whole army took position on the south bank of the North Anna, covering the roads leading to Richmond and the junction of the Virginia Central and Richmond, Freder-

icksburg & Potomac railroads, thus controlling two railways to his base of supplies at Richmond and one to his other base at Staunton, and to a connection with Lynchburg. By this timely and well-executed movement, Lee had again, without loss or interruption, anticipated Grant's progressive, but indirect, "on to Richmond," and placed himself directly across the roads the latter desired to follow to the Confederate capital. Dana says, "Now, for the first time, Lee blocked our southward march;" a remarkable assertion, in view of the bloody stoppage in the Wilderness, which had diverted Grant toward Spottsylvania, far to the eastward, to find a new road to Richmond.

Breckinridge, coming from the valley, after his defeat of Sigel at New Market, and Pickett, from toward Richmond, with 9,000 men, awaited Lee at Hanover Junction. Thus concentrated and reinforced, the army of Northern Virginia was quickly posted in one of the best defensive positions it had ever occupied; with its sturdy First corps in the center, across the Telegraph road; its flanking and fighting Second corps on the right, across the railway to Fredericksburg and extending to the North Anna, where that river runs southward in front of the Cedar farm bridge; and its gallant Third corps on the extreme left, extending to the road that crosses the Ox ford of the North Anna, and covering the eastward approaches to the line of the Virginia Central railroad. Pickett and Breckinridge were held in reserve, in the rear of the center, near Hanover Junction.

The march of the Federal army, on the 23d, was much embarrassed by ignorance of the country and the incorrect and misleading maps used as guides; but by 1 p. m., its Sixth corps, in the advance, reached the vicinity of the North Anna, at the Telegraph bridge, and, later in the afternoon, forced Lee's First corps guard across that bridge, and, without much opposition, secured a foothold on the south bank of the river and soon crossed over a large force, which, later in the day, repulsed a vigorous attack by Anderson. Grant's Second corps soon followed his Fifth and took position on its right, covering the Telegraph bridge and road, and later, his Ninth corps extended this line, on the south bank of the river, to a junction with his Fifth corps, which, with the Sixth, he had detached from his direct line of march, at Harris' shop,



and sent to the right, to Jericho ford, a few miles above the crossing of the Telegraph road, where it succeeded, late in the day, in making a crossing and falling upon Lee's left. Forcing back the Third corps for some distance, the Federals advanced and established a line, to the southwest, across the Virginia Central railroad, about a mile northwest from Anderson's station, and, with its right returned, covering the roads leading to the rear. This bold and well-executed, aggressive movement not only cut Lee's line of communication westward and threatened the turning of his left, but gave great confidence to the Federal arms and an eager anticipation of victory. At 6 p. m., Hill sent Wilcox's division to drive the Federals back, but without success; for they had not only seized, but had at once fairly well fortified the line they had secured. The opposing forces spent the night in throwing up lines of defensive works. Early the next morning, Lee rode to his left and sharply rebuked his lieutenant for having allowed Warren to cross the South Anna and secure a position that cut his line of communication with the great storehouse of the Valley, saying to him: "Why did you not do as Jackson would have done—thrown your whole force upon these people and driven them back?"

His left having been forced back, Lee shortened his line by retiring his center, until it was nearly in the form of a right-angled triangle, with the right angle opposite Quarles' mill, or the Ox ford. The left, under Hill, was extended northeast and southwest, from the North Anna, across the Virginia Central railroad to Little river, facing the Fifth and Sixth Federal corps. The First and Second corps were extended southeast to near Hanover Junction, and thence eastward and southward in a salient.

Lee's new disposition of his army cut Grant's army into two parts. Finding himself in this predicament, after several unsuccessful attempts to break Lee's lines, Grant dispatched to Halleck, from Quarles' mills, on May 26th:

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible, on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by his left, leaves Little river, New Found river and South Anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of an army, to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right, by crossing at or near Hanover town, thus crossing all these streams at once, and leave us still where we can draw supplies.

He then stated, that during the preceding night he had withdrawn the teams and artillery from his right, across the river, and moved them down in the rear of his left, and would commence "a forced march for Hanover town to seize and hold the crossing." So he withdrew from Lee's front, on the night of the 26th, and sought another road to Richmond, farther to the southeast. General Lee, having been taken seriously ill, was unable to fall upon Grant on the north side of the North Anna, as he fully intended to do.

Grant had utterly failed to accomplish his purpose, after crossing the North Anna, as was confessed by his lame statement as to the position of Lee's army, and by his withdrawal during the night of the 26th. The remarkable conclusion of his dispatch, of that day northward, is:

Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we have show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already insured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements have contributed to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men and to break down that of the enemy. We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap in the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rails from elsewhere.

Not quite sure of the future, after having broken so many promises as to a direct march on Richmond, Grant added a postscript: "Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover town, it will probably be necessary for us to move down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected;" and advised that his base of supplies should be changed to the White House, the very place where McClellan had his, when Lee met him in front of Richmond about two years before this time.

It is interesting to recur to Grant's previous dispatches from the North Anna. On the morning of the 24th of May, after Lee had shortened his lines and well-punctuated them all along with artillery, Grant wrote: "The enemy have fallen back from North Anna; we are in pursuit. Negroes who have come in state that Lee is falling back to Richmond. If this is the case, Butler's forces will all be wanted where they are." At noon of the next day he wrote: "The enemy are evidently making a determined stand between the two Annas. It would

probably take us two days to get in position for a general attack or to turn their position, as may prove best. Send Butler's forces to White House, to land on north side and march up to join this army. . . . If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed, beyond possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he should find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville, join this army." At the same hour Dana wrote: "If a promising chance offers, General Grant will fight, of course; otherwise, he will maneuver without attacking. Our forces are strongly intrenched and perfectly safe, even if Lee should attempt to push his whole army upon either division of ours." He concluded a dispatch of the morning of the 26th, after telling of Grant's new movement, in these words: "One of the most important results of the campaign, so far, is the entire change which has taken place in the feeling of the armies. Rebels have lost all confidence and are already morally defeated. This army has learned to believe that it is sure of victory. Even our officers have ceased to regard Lee as an invincible military genius. On the part of the rebels this change is evinced, not only by their not attacking, even when circumstances seemed to invite it, but by the unanimous statement of prisoners taken from them. Rely upon it, the end is near, as well as sure;" this, after confessing, the day before, to disasters from Confederate attacks.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

AS soon as apprised of Grant's withdrawal from the North Anna, on the 27th of May, Lee ordered the Second corps, now temporarily under Early, to march southward, between the two railways, then cross the Central at Atlee's, and take position covering the roads to Richmond from the Hanover town crossing of the Pamunkey, which he was confident Grant would now seek. The First corps followed, by the parallel Telegraph road. The next day, after a march of thirty hours, in which 24 miles of road were covered, these corps were in line of battle between the Totopotomoy and the Chickahominy, covering the roads leading to Richmond that Grant was now seeking. Fitz Lee's cavalry withstood the Federal advance until the entire army of Northern Virginia was in position, in the afternoon of the 28th, having a severe engagement with the Federal cavalry at Haws' shop, north of the Totopotomoy.

From the north side of the Totopotomoy, from Hundley's corner, Grant sent dispatch to Halleck, May 30th, saying:

There seems to be some prospect of Lee making a stand north of the Chickahominy, his right near Shady Grove. I have heard nothing yet of Smith's troops reaching White House. If I can get up to attack, will not await his arrival. I wish you would send all the pontoon bridging you can to City Point to have it ready in case it is wanted.

He was evidently now anticipating defeat in front of Richmond, and that he would need pontoons by which to escape to Butler on the south side of the James, even after a fresh corps, under Smith, should reach his right. On the morning of the 31st, from Haws' shop, Grant reported: "The enemy came out on our left last evening and attacked. . . . To relieve General Warren, who was on our left, speedily, General Meade ordered an attack by the balance of our line. General Hancock

was the only one who received the order in time to make the attack before dark. He drove the enemy from his intrenched skirmish line, and still holds it."

Lee now asked that his army might be reinforced with that of Beauregard from south of the James. These two armies held the interior defensive line, while Grant and Butler held the exterior offensive one. Beauregard, in turn, urged the Confederate authorities to send him part of Lee's army, that he might fall upon and capture Butler, while Lee held Grant in check, and that he could then come north of the James and join Lee in forcing Grant to a surrender. Lee did not approve of this suggestion, and again urged that Beauregard should come to aid him in continuous battle against Grant. Beauregard, persistent in his determination, telegraphed to Richmond: "War department must determine when and what troops to order from here." Lee's prompt response was: "If you cannot determine what troops you can spare, the department cannot. The result of your delay will be disaster. Butler's troops will be with Grant to-morrow."

On the 1st of June, Grant made an attack, late in the afternoon, from his left, with the Sixth corps and the corps under Smith, holding Warren, Burnside and Hancock in position to advance, all along his lines, to his right. Attacking at about 5 p. m., and continuing until after dark, he forced back Lee's front lines, under his initial attack, but finding a second line which commanded the one captured, he made no further progress, but repulsed several counterstrokes. During the night of that day he withdrew his right and moved it to his left, beyond the road leading to Cold Harbor, extending his right to defend his own flank in the same direction, now resting his right on the famous Turkey hill, from which McClellan had been routed, after a desperate struggle, in the first battle of Cold Harbor, in 1862.

The intense heat of the June days of lowland Virginia, intensified by the clouds of dust raised by every movement, and the want of drinkable water, brought suffering and weariness upon both the contending armies. To these there were added for Lee's men the pangs of hunger. A credible witness, in the artillery, states that his command had received but two issues of rations since leaving Hanover Junction; one of these was three army

crackers and a small slice of pork; two days later a cracker was issued to each soldier. This was all that could be done to give physical strength to the grim veterans that stood behind the breastworks they had hurriedly thrown up to meet Grant's last contention for reaching Richmond from the north side of the James.

On the morning of the 1st of June, from near Bethesda church, then in front of Lee's center, Dana wrote to Stanton, that, at about 5 of the previous afternoon, Sheridan drove a force of Fitz Lee's cavalry, supported by Clingman's infantry, after a severe fight, from Cold Harbor, and took possession of the place, which the Sixth corps, at 10 p. m., set out to occupy, to be followed by a still larger force. He was in ignorance of the fact that Lee was moving a heavy column in the same direction. Later, he wrote that the Sixth corps reached Cold Harbor at 9 a. m. of that day, closely followed by Smith's; that these maneuvered, and at 2 p. m. found that there was no longer any enemy before them, except a few holding part of the road between Bethesda church and Cold Harbor. Warren, who had been ordered to attack the Confederate column marching toward Cold Harbor, had only opened on it with artillery, and, "at 3 p. m., reported that the intrenchments of the enemy were exceedingly strong, and that his own lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to attack with." Dana added that Wright had blundered in executing his order to attack Cold Harbor, and Warren had failed to execute his orders, and "both Generals Grant and Meade are so intensely disgusted with these failures of Wright and Warren, that a change has been made in the disposition of the corps, which will give us a heavy, movable column, for attack or defense, under a general who obeys orders without excessive reconnoitering;" and concluded by saying: "Sheridan, with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, has moved around Lee's right flank to attack him in the rear. We are now (6 p. m.) waiting to hear Sheridan's guns. General Grant's present design is to crowd the rebel army south of the Chickahominy, then he means thoroughly to destroy both the railroads, up to the North Anna, before he moves from here; besides, he wishes to keep the enemy so engaged here that he can detach no troops to interfere with the operations of Hunter."

Two hours later, Dana dispatched: "At about 5 o'clock we heard the cannon of Sheridan, and soon after Wright and Smith attacked Lee's right wing with their whole force. They moved from Cold Harbor in the direction of Mechanicsville. Judging from the sounds of artillery and musketry, the fight was furious. . . . At about 6 o'clock Warren attacked in the center, but apparently not with much force. His firing is that of a lively skirmish. Immediately upon Wright's attack, the enemy moved out on his left against Hancock, as if to try what strength we had in that direction. He was decisively repulsed. Hancock followed up the repulse, but was not able to get over the rebel works, and fell back to his own lines." At 6 a. m., of the 2d, Dana again wrote, of the contests of the 1st:

It appears that the rebels three times assaulted the lines of Griffin, and they came up in three lines. They were terribly slaughtered by canister, and went back in disorder every time. Wright carried the rebel works before him, but withdrew afterward on account of an enfilading fire. It appears that Sheridan did not attack, his order not having reached in time, and his troops being scattered. He will go in the morning. . . . Hancock moved during the night to Cold Harbor, where his advance arrived about daylight. His rear is now (6 a. m.) marching past these headquarters. In conjunction with Wright and Smith, he will this morning fall upon Lee's right. . . . Warren and Burnside are ordered to open as soon as they hear that the three corps on our left have begun the battle. . . . Our line now extends from near the Chickahominy to Totopotomoy creek, but Burnside is ordered to withdraw from the right to the center, as rapidly as possible.

In a dispatch to the secretary of war, June 1st, Lee wrote:

There has been skirmishing along the lines to-day. General Anderson and General Hoke attacked the enemy, in their front, this afternoon, and drove them to their intrenchments. This afternoon the enemy attacked General Heth and were handsomely repulsed by Cooke's and Kirkland's brigades. Generals Breckinridge and Mahone drove the enemy from their front.

On the 2d, Lee again wrote:

Yesterday afternoon the enemy's cavalry were reported to be advancing, by the left of our line, toward Hanover Court House and Ashland. General Hampton, with Rosser's brigade, proceeded to meet them. Rosser fell upon their rear, and charged down the road toward Ashland, bearing everything before him. His progress was arrested, at Ashland, by the intrenchments of the enemy, when he changed his direction and advanced up the Fredericksburg railroad. Gen. W. H. F. Lee came up at this time, with part of his division, and a joint attack was made. The enemy was quickly driven from his place and pursued toward Hanover Court House until dark.

General Lee added that Fitz Lee was forced to retire from Old Cold Harbor, and that he had extended his own lines in that direction, placing Hoke on the extreme right; and as the enemy's movements were still continuing to his right, on the morning of the 2d, he had moved Breckinridge's corps and two divisions of Hill's to the right. In concluding he said:

General Early, with Ewell's corps and Heth's division, occupied our left, and was directed to get upon the enemy's right flank and drive him down in front of our line. General Early made the movement in the forenoon, and drove the enemy from his intrenchments, following him until dark. While this attack was progressing, General Hill reinforced Breckinridge with two brigades of Wilcox's division, and dislodged the enemy from Turkey hill, in front of our extreme right.

Lee's center under Anderson, the First corps and Hoke's division, were now in line across the River road between New Cold Harbor and Old Cold Harbor, facing eastward and covering a highway to Richmond. The corps of Breckinridge and Hill extended the right to the Chickahominy, while the Second corps, under Early, extended Lee's line to the left, covering the roads leading from the northeast, strengthened on the left by Heth's division of the Third corps.

In the afternoon of the 2d, Lee took the offensive, by ordering Early to assail Grant's right and sweep down toward his left; but he found Grant's right returned with formidable works, and, as his offer of open battle was not accepted, he built strong earthworks in front of Grant's, where he spent the night of the 2d.

At 4 p. m. of the 2d, Dana dispatched Stanton:

There has been no battle to-day. Hancock's men were so tired with their night march, of nearly 12 miles, from their previous position on our extreme right, and the heat and dust so oppressive, that at 2 p. m. to-day, General Grant ordered the attack to be postponed till 4:30 a. m. to-morrow. The weather is now changed, and we are having a violent rainstorm. Our entire losses yesterday were, in round numbers, 2,500 killed and wounded. . . . The right of our lines is now at Bethesda church, and on the left the cavalry hold, down to the Chickahominy. [Of Rosser's fight, he said:] Wilson fought his way out without great loss, but was obliged to leave his dead on the field. There joined this army, yesterday, ten old and new regiments, making an additional force of 2,327 men. [A post-script reads] I omitted to state, in cipher, that Sheridan had a smart fight this morning, near Gaines' mill, but was unable to force the line of the enemy, owing to the commanding position of their batteries.

On the morning of June 3d, at half past four, Grant



opened the culminating battle of his "on to Richmond" campaign by direct roads. Lee's veterans had, by this time, all become skillful military engineers, and of their own impulse had thrown up lines of defense, abounding in salients whence heavy guns could send forth searching cross-fires, at short range, against every portion of an attacking enemy. The infantry were well provided with loop-holes, and crevices between logs, from which to fire, also at short range, with deliberate aim. Hunger but made them fiercer combatants, and as Grant's great host advanced, it was met all along the line by a furious fire from artillery and infantry that no body of soldiers, no matter how brave and determined, could long withstand. Hancock assailed Lee's right with double line of battle, followed by supports. His daring men, rushing forward, captured one of Lee's salients, which Breckinridge recovered, by a prompt fire of artillery, under which 3,000 of Hancock's men fell upon the field. The equally bold assaults upon Lee's center and left met with the same fate, and within ten minutes the whole front of Grant's line of assault was shattered, and his troops, in dismay, fled to cover.

At 9 o'clock Grant ordered another attack. Hancock refused to even give it to his men. Smith, with the Eighteenth corps, writes, "That order I refused to obey." McMahon, chief of staff of the Sixth corps, says that Grant sent a second, and then a third order for renewed attack, and when it "came to corps headquarters, it was transmitted to the division headquarters, and to the brigades and the regiments without comment. To move that army farther, except by regular approaches, was a simple and absolute impossibility, known to be such by every officer and man of the three corps engaged. The order was obeyed by simply renewing the fire from the men as they lay in position."

Unable to force his men to again attack Lee's position, Grant ordered the construction of regular approaches, as if he would lay siege to the Confederate position, professing that he did this to keep Lee from sending troops against Hunter, who had now entered the Shenandoah valley and was advancing on Staunton, there to meet an army coming from the westward, and follow out Grant's orders to advance to Charlottesville and Lynchburg to destroy railways and canals—an expedition which came

to grief, through the operations of General Early, as related in a subsequent chapter.

In these two Cold Harbor battles, of June 1st and 3d, Grant lost fully 10,000 men, of his 110,000, the larger portion of them in the assault on the 3d. From the time of his crossing the Pamunkey up to the date of his retreat to the James, on the night of the 12th, he had lost over 14,000 men, besides the 3,000 sick that he had sent to the North, reducing his numbers by over 17,000. Lee's losses were about 1,700 of his 58,000, but 3 per cent.

In fleeing from Lee's front, on the 3d, Grant left the ground intervening between Lee's and his own intrenchments, strewn with wounded, who lay exposed to intense heat and the glare of a June sun, enduring suffering that cannot be described, until the 5th; Grant, unwilling, thinking it a confession of defeat, as it really was, to send a flag of truce and ask permission to remove them. When he did send, it was with the remarkable proposition, "that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send, to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men, bearing litters, to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party." Lee made reply that Grant should follow the regular course and ask for a truce. This he did, but to find his wounded men dead and to blame Lee for the delay. Gen. F. A. Walker, in his history of Hancock's corps, writes: "If it be asked why so simple a duty of humanity as the rescue of the wounded and the burial of the dead had been thus neglected, it is answered that it was due to an unnecessary scruple on the part of the Union commander-in-chief. Grant delayed sending a flag of truce to General Lee for this purpose because it would amount to an admission that he had been beaten on the 3d of June. It now seems incredible that he should, for a moment, have supposed that any other view could be taken of that action."

At two of the afternoon of the 3d, Grant dispatched to Halleck:

We assaulted at 4:30 this morning, driving the enemy within his intrenchments at all points, but without gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now occupy a position close to the enemy, some places within 50 yards, and are intrenching. Our loss was not severe, nor do I suppose the enemy to have lost heavily.

His next dispatch from Old Cold Harbor, on the 5th of June, reads:

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would not be practicable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use it for supplying the army. . . . My idea, from the start, has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James river, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee, in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies which they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive, immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan: I will continue to hold, substantially, the ground now occupied by the army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central railroad, from about Beaver Dam, for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected, I will move the army to the south side of James river, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on the north side and crossing there. To provide for this last, and most probable contingency, six or more ferryboats, of the largest size, ought to be immediately provided. Once on the south side of James river, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy, except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, while our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy whenever and wherever he can be found without this protection.

The preceding was Grant's last dispatch from north of the James. Notwithstanding Grant's assertion that his army was "confident of protecting itself without intrenchments," he had been making intrenchments of the strongest character, during his whole campaign, whenever he had halted, or wherever he had taken position after crossing the Rapidan, as the writer personally knows from having sketched them, from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, immediately after they were evacuated.

Dana reported on July 3d: "The working parties of each of those three corps (Hancock's, Wright's and

Smith's) carried forward their approaches. Hancock's lines were thus brought within some 40 yards of the rebel works;" and again at 4 p. m. of the 9th: "Our engineers, under General Barnard, are now at work on an inner line of intrenchments to cover the withdrawal of the army from this position."

Informed of Hunter's progress up the Valley and the results of the battle of Piedmont, on the 5th of June, and of Hunter's junction with Crook, from the Kanawha region, at Staunton, on the 8th, Lee detached Breckinridge's division on the 10th, to prevent Hunter from crossing the Blue ridge toward Charlottesville and destroying the Virginia Central railroad, thus again anticipating and interfering with Grant's plan of campaign. On the 8th, Butler sent a body of cavalry and infantry to capture Petersburg and destroy the bridges across the Appomattox. Grant says of this movement, in his official report: "The cavalry carried the works on the south side and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one." Thus failed the first Federal attempt to capture the "Cockade City."

On the 7th of June, Grant sent, as he reports, "two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, on an expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and, after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions." This raid of Sheridan was met by Hampton's cavalry at Trevilian's station of the Virginia Central (now Chesapeake & Ohio) railroad, on the 12th, and after a hotly-contested battle that lasted several hours, Sheridan was forced to retreat to Grant's rear, without having accomplished the mission on which he was sent.

Notwithstanding the assertions of Grant, previously quoted, as to the condition and tactical operations of the army of Northern Virginia, Lee, on the 12th of June, before Grant began drawing back from his front to retreat to the James, ordered his Second corps, now in command of Lieut.-Gen. Jubal Anderson Early (General

Ewell having been put in command of the troops in Richmond), to march to Charlottesville and thence by rail to Lynchburg, as expeditiously as possible, to intercept Hunter's advance, which he was making, by way of Lexington, toward that important railway center and depot of supplies. Early, by his energetic movements, was enabled to meet Hunter in front of Lynchburg, on the 17th and 18th, and drive him in disaster across to the Valley, at Salem, and into the Appalachians, in continuous retreat to the Kanawha, while he turned northeast and moved on Washington, as related in detail in a subsequent chapter.

After providing a new line of intrenchments, in front of Lee, for his rear guard, Grant, during the night of June 12th, began his retreat; or, as some would call it, his fifth flank movement, but far away from Lee's left, from Cold Harbor to the James. A division of cavalry under Wilson, and his Fifth corps, crossed the Chickahominy at the long bridges and guarded his flank to White Oak swamp, while his other corps, marching farther to the east, reached Wilcox's landing and Charles City Court House on the James, during the night of the 13th, all marching through a country familiar to the army of the Potomac from the operations of McClellan in 1862. On the morning of the 14th, Grant's Second corps began crossing the James, in ferryboats, at Wilcox's wharf, while pontoons were being laid, which were completed by midnight, on which the rest of his army crossed rapidly, and on the 15th, the whole of it was safely concentrated in Butler's rear, on the south side of the James.

The impartial historian, having in hand the records of the leaders of the army of the Potomac and of the army of Northern Virginia, with all their detailed statements, made during and after this bloody campaign from the Rapidan to the James, from May 4 to June 14, 1864, is forced to the conclusion, that, in so far as Grant's leadership was concerned, it was a disastrous failure. He had not accomplished one of his strategic plans, unless that be called one which placed his army on the banks of the James, below Harrison's landing, to which McClellan had retreated after his disastrous campaign of 1862, after a loss of more than 42,000 men from the vast army of over 140,000 which was under his command during the

campaign, when he might have secured the same position, by moving by water, without the loss of a man. The only claim that he could make for recognition as a capable military leader, based on what he did in these campaigns, is that he had thinned Lee's ranks some 20,000 veterans, by his bulldog method of conducting war, which Lee could not replace, and to that extent had weakened the resisting power of the Confederacy.

The condition of Grant's entire army, after this remarkable campaign, may be inferred from what Gen. F. A. Walker, the historian of Hancock's corps, acknowledged to be the best in Grant's army, writes concerning that body of famous veterans:

As the corps turned southward from Cold Harbor to take its part in the second act of the great campaign of 1864, the historian is bound to confess that something of its pristine virtue had departed under the terrific blows that had been showered upon it in the series of fierce encounters which have been recited. Its casualties had averaged more than 400 a day for the whole period since it crossed the Rapidan. . . . Moreover, the confidence of the troops in their leaders had been severely shaken. They had again and again been ordered to attacks which the very privates in the ranks knew to be hopeless from the start; they had seen the fatal policy of "assaults all along the line" persisted in, even after the most ghastly failures; and they had almost ceased to expect victory when they went into battle. The lamentable story of Petersburg cannot be understood without reference to facts like these.

General Grant, in his report, written July 22, 1865, thus summarizes this campaign:

During three long years the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight without materially changing the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they had only defended their capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part and victories for them. And their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party, and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery had rarely been surpassed, are given in the reports of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

In his dispatch of June 5th, Dana states, that since his report of June 2d, 19,190 men had reinforced Grant's army, and that, at that date, it contained 115,000 fighting men. He concludes: "Generals Grant and Meade agree that Lee's whole command, here and south of Richmond, is now 80,000, exclusive of any mere militia that may have been at Richmond." In reality Lee had, at that time in his immediate command, less than 30,000 men, all told.

On the afternoon of June 5th, Dana, for the first time, intimates a retreat to the James by saying: "Sheridan thinks we shall have no difficulty in crossing the Chickahominy at Jones' bridge and below." On the morning of the 7th, he says: "Grant is now nearly ready to strike for the James; and he means to stay here but a short time," meaning at Cold Harbor. Again on the 8th: "Two officers of General Grant's staff are now with General Butler, making arrangements for the movement of this army to Bermuda Hundred. They ought to be back to-morrow. Possibly the march may begin to-morrow night." On the afternoon of the 9th, he reported: "Our engineers, under General Barnard, are now at work on an inner line of intrenchments to cover the withdrawal of the army from this position. Very probably this movement will begin to-morrow night." Again, on the morning of the 10th, Dana wrote: "General Grant is waiting for the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock and Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, the officers sent Tuesday to General Butler, before deciding as to movement of the army. Possibly it may be necessary to send an army corps to General Butler, in order to make his position perfectly safe, while this army is moving to James river, and Lee is temporarily released from the danger of being attacked. . . . General Grant does not expect to be able to cross the Chickahominy higher than Long Bridge, but he will try to get over at Bottom's bridge and secure a road connected with that crossing." On the morning of the 12th, Dana reported the return of the messengers from Butler, and wrote: "Army moves to-night after dark. . . . If not opposed by enemy in force, column will strike James river opposite Bermuda Hundred. If resisted, they will move to point opposite Fort Powhatan. General Butler has been ordered to throw a bridge and corduroy across the marsh at the latter place."

Lee discovered, at daybreak of the 13th, that Grant had left his front. After advancing his skirmishers for nearly two miles, without finding the enemy, he moved his army to conform to Grant's movement, sending Anderson and Hill to the right to cover his front from White Oak swamp to Malvern hill, and Hoke to Petersburg, to anticipate Grant's next attack. His whole force north of the James, when Grant retreated, was less than 30,000 men. On the 14th, the Federal cavalry came to Malvern hill, to make a demonstration to cover Grant's crossing the James. Gen. W. H. F. Lee easily drove these back, while a brigade of infantry, supporting the cavalry at Smith's store, drove the enemy from that point.

On the 16th of June, Lee sent the divisions of Pickett and Field across the James, and on the 17th these drove Butler from a portion of Beauregard's old line, which he held in front of Bermuda Hundred. A cheerful dispatch from Lee reads: "We tried very hard to stop Pickett's men from capturing the breastworks of the enemy, but couldn't do it." The spirit of the Confederate army, and of its leader, at this time, could not well have been better expressed.

Satisfied that Grant would make no further attacks north of the James, but would again essay to make one in force on the south and against Petersburg, from the stronghold which he had secured south of the Appomattox to fall back upon in case of disaster, Lee sent the rest of his army across the James, and, on the afternoon of the 18th of June, joined Beauregard, who, from the 15th to the 18th, with some 10,000 men, had beaten back numerous assaults of nearly half of Grant's army, decreasing his numbers by fully 10,000 men during four days. These, added to those lost between the Rapidan and the James, made Grant's aggregate loss up to June 18th, nearly 65,000 men, which had been made good by the addition of 55,000 reinforcements to his ranks.

The armies of the Potomac and the James, and that of Northern Virginia, under their respective generals commanding, now confronted each other, south of the James, and the long and memorable siege of Petersburg began. Grant, after Butler's repulse of the 18th, wrote to Meade, giving the keynote of his future intentions: "Now we will rest the men and use the spade for their protection, until a vein can be struck."



## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### EARLY'S LYNCHBURG AND VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

CONSIDERING the great disparity of forces engaged and the results accomplished, the Shenandoah Valley campaigns of 1864, by Lieut.-Gen. Jubal Anderson Early against the forces of Gen. David Hunter at and beyond Lynchburg, including the advance on Washington and the subsequent numerous contentions with the large army commanded by General Sheridan, were among the most remarkable and brilliant of the Confederate war in Virginia and Maryland. Unfortunately the record of these campaigns, as officially published, is a very meager one, as scarcely any reports concerning its operations were sent in to the Confederate government, and consequently few were found among the archives that were captured by the Federal forces during the retreat from Richmond, and since so impartially published. The Confederate portion of the story of these campaigns is mainly told by the maps and accompanying brief report and personal diary of the writer of this volume, which were furnished to the United States war department and are published in serial No. 90 of the War Records of the Union and Confederate armies, and in part 17 of the great Atlas accompanying these records. Aided by these, General Early wrote and published his brief, truth-telling narrative of the events of these campaigns. The Federal reports of these campaigns, as published in the Official Records, are voluminous, and numbers of the officers connected with the portion of the Federal army that Early contended with, have published narratives and magazine articles concerning these unique and but little understood campaigns.

The Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia, after participating in all the battles and engagements of the Wilderness campaign, from the 3d of May until the 8th of June, 1864, was resting, in reserve, in a camp to the west of Gaines' mill, until the morning of the 13th

of June. Just preceding this date, two Federal armies—one under Hunter, coming up the Shenandoah valley, and another, under Crook, coming from the Kanawha from the west by way of the White Sulphur Springs—had made a junction at Staunton and moved up the valley to Lexington. Hunter had, on the 5th of June, encountered and defeated a small Confederate force, under Jones and Imboden, at Piedmont, a hamlet some fourteen miles northeast of Staunton, on the road leading to Port Republic. The force that was there defeated fell back to and held Rockfish gap, of the Blue ridge, where the Virginia Central railroad runs through a tunnel, and thus diverted Hunter's army from going in that direction toward Richmond to join Grant, and decided him to follow up the Valley to Lexington, where he had skirmishes with the cadets of the Virginia military institute and with a small force of Confederates that had fallen back as he advanced. Thence, after burning the Virginia military institute and committing other deeds of barbaric vandalism, he moved on to Buchanan, where he had another skirmish, June 14th, after which he turned across the Blue ridge toward Lynchburg, in front of which he appeared on the 17th of June; thus menacing not only Lee's communications with one of his principal bases of supplies, but also the rear of his army.

On the 13th of June, Lieut.-Gen. Jubal A. Early, who had been promoted and put in command of the Second corps, was detached from the army of Northern Virginia, and marched, at 3 a. m., by way of the Mountain road, to Auburn mills, on the South Anna, where he encamped that night. On the 14th, he marched to Gardiner's cross roads; on the 15th to the vicinity of Trevilian's, and on the 16th to the vicinity of Charlottesville. Thence, on the 17th, a portion of his command was taken by the trains of the Orange & Alexandria railroad to Lynchburg, and a portion of it marched to North Garden depot, whence, later, it was carried to Lynchburg by rail. Arriving at Lynchburg with Ramseur's and Gordon's divisions at 1 p. m., of the 17th, Early at once marched out on the Salem road, and taking command, put his men in position with those of General Breckinridge's command, consisting of Wharton's division of infantry, King's artillery, and Jackson's, Imboden's, McCausland's and Jones' brigades of cavalry, which he found holding

and constructing a line of defenses in front of that city.

On the 18th, Rodes' division arrived, brought by rail from North Garden. Early, his command now concentrated, formed a line of battle some three miles west and in front of Lynchburg; in the afternoon met and repulsed Hunter's attack, and compelled him to retreat that night by the Salem road. The next morning the "army of the Valley District," which the Second corps had again become, promptly pursued Hunter, over a hot and dusty road, and attacked his rear in a skirmish at Liberty, and there encamped for the night. On the 20th, Early continued the pursuit to the entrance to Buford's gap, where he had another skirmish with Hunter's rear guard. From Liberty he had sent most of his cavalry across the Blue ridge, by way of the Peaks gap, to Buchanan, to hold the Valley and prevent Hunter from retreating in the direction of Lexington. This force turned from Buchanan toward Salem, and was ready to fall on Hunter's right flank and co-operate with Early's pursuit, on the 21st, to Big Lick, and then across to Hanging Rock, a gap in the North mountains, on the Salem and Sweet Springs turnpike. There it struck the flank of Hunter's retreat, which had been expedited by Imboden's cavalry, which had marched to the left and crossed the Blue ridge southwest of Buford's gap and fallen upon Hunter's rear and left flank at Big Lick (now Roanoke) and forced him in rapid retreat through Salem, harassing and damaging his rear and capturing a portion of his train at Hanging Rock, as he escaped into the mountains west of the Valley. Imboden followed the rear of Hunter's retreating army across to New Castle, on the 21st and 22d. Ransom's cavalry, the command that had marched by way of Buchanan, attacked Hunter's line of retreat at 11 a. m. of the 21st, at Hanging Rock, and also in the vicinity of Salem, aiding Imboden in creating dismay in the ranks of the baffled and retreating army at the latter place; Early's strategy having attacked it in the rear and on both flanks at the same time.

The night of the 21st, the Valley army encamped between Big Lick and Hanging Rock, and there it remained on the 22d, except Ramseur's division, which moved eastward to the vicinity of Botetourt Springs, where headquarters were established, while Ransom's cavalry marched northward to the vicinity of Fincastle.

Hunter's army now disposed of and sent in disastrous defeat through the mountains to the Kanawha, and the Valley of Virginia now cleared of the enemy, Early started on June 23d, by easy marches, for Staunton, whither he had been ordered by Lee, there to await further instructions. He encamped the night of the 23d at Buchanan, and that of the 24th at Buffalo creek. On the 25th, reaching Lexington, he divided his command; one portion followed the Middlebrook road and encamped at Brownsburg, and the other the Greenville road and encamped at Midway, both of these roads leading to Staunton. A portion of the army marched to Middlebrook on the 25th. Ransom's cavalry had proceeded from Fincastle across to Clifton Forge, to intercept a possible turning of Hunter to the eastward, and thence, by way of Lucy Salina furnace, across the North mountain, and encamped at Collierstown on the 24th, then had marched to Middlebrook for the night of the 25th, thus covering widely the flank and front of the infantry movement against any possible attack by a force of the enemy coming in by any of the great highways leading from the west to Early's line of march. On the 26th, the cavalry continued along the highway on the western side of the Shenandoah valley and encamped near Buffalo gap and Churchville, covering the two great highways leading from Staunton toward the west and northwest. The same day the infantry reached Staunton, where it rested and refitted during the 27th.

Having received instructions from General Lee to march down the Shenandoah valley and make demonstrations toward Washington, General Early lost no time in obeying his orders, and on the 28th, took up his line of march down the Valley turnpike, with most of his command, and encamping that night near North river, while the remainder of his infantry, taking the Keezletown road at Mt. Sidney, encamped on the south bank of the same North river at Rockland mills. The cavalry followed the back road parallel to and on the left of the infantry advance. On the 29th, a long march was made, through Harrisonburg and Keezletown, to Sparta, where the command was reunited and encamped.


The troops, animated by the familiar scenes of the Shenandoah valley and inspired by these with the remembrance of their famous exploits under Stonewall

Jackson, marched briskly forward, on the 30th, through New Market and Mt. Jackson, to the vicinity of Hawkins-town. The next day, July 1st, with like alacrity, the march was continued, through Edenburg, Woodstock and Maurertown, to a camp near Fisher's hill. On the 2d, the march was through Strasburg, Middletown and Newtown, to the Opequan at Bartonsville; all places that recalled glorious victories. On the 3d, a long march carried Early's men through grand old Winchester, with its ever zealous and patriotic people, all of whom that were not in the army, cheering, meeting and welcoming the passing soldiery. A portion of the command went to Martinsburg and another portion to Leetown, on the way to Harper's Ferry. Part of the cavalry advanced from Winchester, by way of the Back Creek valley, to North Mountain depot, of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy at Martinsburg, and protected the flank of the army moving in that direction; while another portion led the advance to Leetown, where it encountered the enemy's cavalry, and after a severe engagement drove it through Kearneysville.

On the 4th of July, Ramseur's division marched, by way of Flowing Springs and Brown's, to Halltown, and Rodes' division to the same point by way of Charlestown. This combined force drove the enemy from Halltown and Bolivar heights, and took possession of the latter with its skirmishers, the enemy shelling these from Maryland heights, where they had planted 100-pounder guns, also from Fort Duncan, north of the Potomac, and from works in front of Harper's Ferry. After dark the enemy evacuated the latter place, and Early's skirmishers took possession of it. The other divisions of the army marched from Martinsburg to Duffield's, on the Baltimore & Ohio, not far from Harper's Ferry, and the infantry was again united in that vicinity. McCausland's brigades of cavalry attacked North Mountain depot of the Baltimore & Ohio early on the morning of the 4th, took 200 prisoners, and then marched to Hainesville.

On the 5th of July, Gordon's division crossed the Potomac, at the familiar Boteler's ford, and then marched down the river, on the Maryland side, and encamped near the mouth of the historic Antietam. Vaughn, in command of Breckinridge's division (Breckinridge himself commanding a corps which Early had formed from Breck-





inridge's old division and Gordon's division), marched to Sharpsburg and encamped on the famous battlefield. McCausland advanced his cavalry to Shepherdstown, while Ramseur and Rodes spent the day at Harper's Ferry. On the 6th, Gordon continued his march down the Potomac to near Maryland heights, threatening the Federals holding that formidable position; while Ramseur and Rodes marched to the vicinity of Sharpsburg, leaving one brigade on guard at Harper's Ferry. The cavalry advance marched to Boonsboro, at the foot of the South mountain, while McCausland brought his force to the Antietam in front of Sharpsburg.

On the 7th, Gordon drove in the enemy's outposts at Fort Duncan and Maryland heights, and supported by Wharton (Breckinridge's division), he engaged the enemy to within 600 yards of these frowning and commanding fortifications. Rodes, threatening the rear of these same intrenched Federal forces, advanced to near Rohrer'sville, while Ramseur marched to near Sharpsburg. Lewis' brigade of Ramseur's division remained on Bolivar heights until late in the afternoon, when it rejoined him at Sharpsburg by the usual route. McCausland marched to Hagerstown, and there had an engagement with some United States regular cavalry, which he forced to retreat. The remainder of the cavalry marched across the mountains to the vicinity of Frederick City, where it had a slight engagement with the enemy's outposts.

On the 8th, Ramseur marched, by way of Boonsboro and Middletown, to the summit of the Catoctin mountain, where he found Early's cavalry advance in position, and where he encamped. Gordon and Wharton marched from Rohrer'sville, by way of Fox's gap and Middletown, to the foot of the Catoctin mountain; while Rodes, from Rohrer'sville, crossed the South mountain by Crampton's gap and encamped near Jefferson, also at the foot of the Catoctin mountain, but a few miles south from the camp of the other divisions, and in position to meet any demonstration from the enemy's force left on Maryland heights. McCausland marched all night, passed the Boonsboro gap at daylight and went on to Frederick City, where he skirmished with the enemy, and then encamped in front of the infantry at Middletown.

The battle of the Monocacy, a short and bloody battle, was fought on the 9th of July. Ramseur, at an early

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hour of that morning, drove in the enemy's pickets, near Frederick City, and followed them through that town toward Monocacy Junction of the Baltimore & Ohio, on the eastern side of Monocacy river, where a Federal army, under Gen. Lew Wallace, occupied a strong position, protected by two well-constructed block-houses, one of them flanked by strong earthworks on a nearby hill, its main force occupying a commanding plateau extending southward from the block-houses and overlooking the lovely valley of the Monocacy. Ramseur promptly engaged the enemy in his front, skirmished with them, and brought several batteries into position to reply to those from the plateau that had opened on him. Having reconnoitered the enemy's position, Early ordered McCausland's brigade of cavalry, which had moved from Middletown by way of Jefferson, to cross the Monocacy, below the enemy, and get upon his flank. This movement was successful, and he quickly drove away the Federal cavalry and skirmished with its infantry. Gordon's division soon followed McCausland, struck the enemy's flank and drove it back in confusion, having turned its works, to a second line, which he also broke and completely routed, pursuing them for some distance and capturing many prisoners, until night closed the pursuit. McCausland's brigade followed the enemy's cavalry to Urbana, on the road to Washington city, and there had an engagement with them, after which he fell back to the Monocacy.

Rodes' division moved out on the road to Baltimore and had a brief skirmish with Wallace's discomfited and retreating army. Early's troops encamped on the battlefield, resting from their decisive, but dearly bought victory. Gen. Bradley Johnson's brigade of cavalry, formerly Jones', started on an expedition to the vicinity of Baltimore, riding by way of Liberty, Unionville and Westminster, then along the Western Maryland railroad to Relay and to Gunpowder bridge, on the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore railroad, which they destroyed; detached parties visited other important points to the north of Baltimore, and all returned, by way of Brookeville, to the vicinity of Washington, where they rejoined the main body on the 12th.

On Sunday, the 10th, the enemy retreated toward Baltimore. Early destroyed the iron bridge of the Balti-

more & Ohio railroad across the Monocacy, and the block-houses at the junction, and, having buried his dead and cared for his wounded, continued his march toward Washington City, by way of Urbana, with Gordon in front and Ramseur in the rear, who had some skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, to near Gaithersburg, where he encamped. McCausland's, in advance, drove Wilson's cavalry contending with him to Rockville, where he encamped that night. On the 11th, with Rodes in front, Early advanced to Silver Spring, on the Seventh Street turnpike, on the borders of the District of Columbia and in sight of the dome of the capitol, where he engaged the enemy's skirmishers and drove them into the fortifications surrounding the city. The day was intensely hot, and the army much exhausted by its many long marches and by the severe and sanguinary battle it had fought at Monocacy. The forts and other works around Washington were found to be of a very formidable character, and fully manned; the whole surrounding country had been cleared off, so that every line of advance was exposed to the fire from the numerous forts and batteries that crowned the heights surrounding the Federal city. McCausland's cavalry brigade, in advancing from Rockville, took the Georgetown road, and had an engagement with the Federal cavalry near Tennallytown, while Colonel Mosby's command made a demonstration at the Chain bridge, northwest of Washington, on the Virginia side of the Potomac.

General Early learned, from a reliable source, soon after reaching the vicinity of Washington, that while his unexpected arrival had created great alarm, large reinforcements, consisting of two corps from Grant's army, were already beginning to arrive in Washington, by way of the Potomac, so that very soon the force of veteran soldiers in that city would be larger than his own. The delay caused by the well-contested battle of Monocacy had given the Federal authorities opportunity for bringing forward these reinforcements, and had made it not only inadvisable, but extremely hazardous for him to make an assault upon the works and attempt to capture the city. The 12th was spent in front of Washington, and Rodes' division had a heavy skirmish with the enemy in the afternoon on the Seventh Street turnpike, in front of Silver Spring, where Early had established his headquarters.

McCausland's cavalry was attacked on the Georgetown road, and he was forced, by superior numbers, to retire until infantry supports came to his relief.

At dark of the 12th of July, the trains were started to the rear, with Wharton's division in front, and at 11 p. m. the other divisions followed, with Ramseur in the rear, McCausland falling back by the river road and thus guarding the left flank of the march. Rockville was reached by daylight of the 13th, and Seneca creek at about noon of that day, where the army halted and rested until dark. McCausland marched to Edwards' ferry. The enemy's cavalry followed the main body to Rockville and attacked the rear guard, Jackson's brigade of cavalry, but were handsomely repulsed. The march was continued during the night, by way of Poolesville, the army reaching White's ford of the Potomac about midnight and resting there until dawn of the 14th, when it crossed the Potomac and went into camp on the Virginia side, on the road leading to Leesburg. The cavalry crossed into Virginia at Conrad's ferry, and then marched to Edwards' ferry, where it had an engagement with the Federal cavalry from the Maryland side.

The 15th was spent in camp, while the trains and prisoners were sent toward the Valley, by way of Upperville and Ashby's gap, convoyed by McCausland. The enemy made demonstrations along the Potomac, shelling the cavalry guarding the fords. On the 16th, the army again marched, by way of Leesburg and Purcellville, through Snicker's gap of the Blue ridge, with Jackson's cavalry in advance; and Gordon's and Wharton's divisions crossed the Shenandoah and encamped on its western side, between Snicker's ferry and Berryville, while the other divisions encamped on both slopes of the Blue ridge. McCausland followed after the trains to Ashby's gap, and Johnson marched on roads to protect the right flank from the enemy at Hillsboro, who had come in from Harper's Ferry, but he failed in doing this and an attack was made on the train, in passing through Purcellville, and some damage done; but the attack was soon repulsed, and a piece of artillery captured from the attacking party. McCausland crossed the river and went to the vicinity of Millwood.

On the 17th of July, the entire army got into camps on the western side of the Shenandoah, near Castleman's

ferry. Imboden went to Millwood, McCausland to Salem church, Jackson toward Charlestown, and Johnson farther to the left. The cavalry holding the rear fought the enemy's advance, on that day, at Snicker's gap of the Blue ridge. On the 18th the pursuing enemy crossed the Blue ridge at Snicker's gap, and made a furious attack on the Confederate camps, with their artillery on the bluffs overlooking the Shenandoah from the east. They attempted to cross the river at Cool Springs, but were met by Rodes and Wharton and driven back with considerable loss, Gordon engaging them at the same time near Castleman's ferry. In advancing across the mountain, the enemy met a lively cavalry contention. On the 19th an attempt was again made to cross the Shenandoah at Berry's ferry, from Ashby's gap, but this was frustrated and considerable loss inflicted on the enemy by the cavalry brigades of Imboden and McCausland.

On the 20th of July, Ramseur's division, with the cavalry of Vaughn and Jackson, which had been sent to Winchester the night before, marched out three miles toward Martinsburg, when it was vigorously attacked at Rutherford's farm, by Averell's Federal division of cavalry, its left flank turned and the entire force signally defeated, but saved from utter rout by Jackson's cavalry, which charged to the front and covered the retreat. One of the most notable instances of womanly courage and devotion was displayed upon this battlefield during the succeeding night, when one of the many noble women of the Valley that had gathered to care for the Confederate wounded, Miss Russell, held in her lap, during the entire night, the head of a Confederate soldier who could not be moved without the risk of his life, and thus saved him from death.

In the afternoon of the 20th, the trains were started up the Valley toward Newtown, and during the night Breckinridge's corps, consisting of Gordon's and Wharton's divisions, followed by McCausland, marched to Cedarville by way of Millwood, and on the 20th, to Middletown on the Valley turnpike. Rodes marched through White Post and on to Newtown, while Ramseur, having covered the evacuation of Winchester, marched to Kernstown.

The army marched to Cedar creek on the 21st, slowly followed by the enemy with a large force; on the 22d the march was continued to the vicinity of Strasburg, the

army encamping on Hupp's hill. McCausland moved to the vicinity of Front Royal. On the 23d, the enemy's cavalry attacked Early's rear guard near Newtown, but was driven back to Kernstown. McCausland's brigade marched up the North Fork of the Shenandoah from near Front Royal, to the vicinity of Buckton; the army remaining in camp near Strasburg, resting and cleaning up.

Having sent his prisoners, and the trains not needed, to the rear, and concentrated and rested his army, General Early again made a forward movement on the 24th, and marched toward Winchester, Gordon in front, preceded by Vaughn's cavalry, with Johnson on the right flank, Jackson on the left on the middle road, and Imboden on the back road. The enemy's pickets were driven in at Bartonsville, and the cavalry engaged them, at Kernstown, at 10 a. m. The infantry following soon came up, and a line of battle was formed, with Wharton on the right and Gordon on the left of the Valley turnpike, and Ramseur still further to the left on the middle road. Wharton soon turned the enemy's left flank, and they retreated in confusion from Stonewall Jackson's first battlefield of his famous Valley campaign. Johnson engaged the enemy's cavalry on the Front Royal road, and Rodes was moved across to cut off their retreat. They made desperate efforts to repulse the Confederate attack, but were pressed vigorously, not only by the cavalry, but also by Rodes and Gordon, through Winchester, and the infantry pursuit continued to Stephenson's and the cavalry to Bunker Hill, forcing them to burn and abandon 70 wagons and 12 caissons. The Confederate artillery did excellent work during this second Kernstown-Winchester engagement. The army went into camp between Winchester and Stephenson's. McCausland's cavalry marched that day by way of Cedarville to Winchester and on to Stephenson's. The Federal forces retreated toward the Potomac, the Confederate cavalry following to Martinsburg, where it had a lively skirmish with the Federal rear guard.

On the 25th, there was a heavy rain in the morning, after which the army marched to Bunker Hill. The cavalry, following the enemy to Martinsburg, again had a lively skirmish with its rear guard, covering its retreat across the Potomac. On the 26th, General Early marched to Martinsburg and encamped in its vicinity; the cavalry

continuing to opposite Williamsport, Md. The 27th and 28th were spent in destroying the Baltimore & Ohio railroad in the vicinity of Martinsburg, the cavalry guarding the flanks of the army.

On the 27th of July, McCausland, with his own and Johnson's brigades of cavalry, started on a memorable raid to Chambersburg, Pa., by way of Clear Spring, Md., where he encamped that night, reaching Chambersburg, by way of Mercersburg and St. Thomas, on the 30th, and demanding a named sum of money as an indemnity for the wanton burning of the house of Hon. A. R. Boteler, near Martinsburg, and that of Governor Letcher, by Hunter, in Lexington; declaring, at the same time, that if the indemnity were not paid, he would burn the town in retaliation and to put a stop to such vandalism. Payment was not made, and the town was given over to the flames. The same day McCausland marched to McConellsburg for the night, and on the 31st fell back to the Potomac, at Hancock, then followed the National road to Cumberland, August 1st, and thence down that river to Old Town, where he crossed into Virginia and encamped that night at Springfield. The next day he marched up the South branch of the Potomac to Romney, where he spent the 3d; then on the 4th he crossed over to New Creek, then back to Burlington and on to Moorefield on the 6th, where he was attacked and surprised in his camp by Averell's cavalry that had been following him, and driven out with loss and in confusion toward Lost river, which his shattered forces reached on the 7th. On the 8th, he rejoined the army at Mt. Jackson, in the Shenandoah valley.

On the 29th of July, Rodes and Ramseur marched to Williamsport, their skirmishers driving the enemy to Shepherdstown and clearing the way for McCausland to cross at McCoy's ford. The enemy's cavalry fired on their line of march at Falling Waters. After the passing of McCausland, the infantry returned to the Virginia side to encamp. These divisions fell back to Martinsburg on the 30th, and on the 31st to Bunker Hill, between which and Darkesville the entire army encamped, and where it remained during the 1st, 2d and 3d of August.

On the 4th of August, Breckinridge's corps, to draw attention from McCausland, advanced to Shepherdstown, by way of Leetown, while Rodes and Ramseur marched,

by way of Martinsburg, to Hainesville. On the 5th, Breckinridge crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and encamped near St. James college, between Williamsport and Hagerstown. On the 6th, Rodes and Ramseur returned to Virginia, by way of Williamsport, and encamped at Hammond's mill, while Breckinridge recrossed to the Virginia shore opposite Williamsport, by way of Tilghmanton. Some of the Confederate cavalry made a demonstration as far as Hagerstown.

On the 7th of August, the march of the army was continued, through Martinsburg, to the former camps at Bunker Hill and Darkesville. There General Early received information that a large Federal force was being concentrated at Harper's Ferry; and on that day the Middle military division of the United States army, consisting of the Middle department and the departments of Washington, of the Susquehanna and of West Virginia, was constituted, and Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, of the United States army, was assigned to its command. Upon that day it is generally considered that the Valley campaign of Early and Sheridan began.

The preceding details as to the marches, encampments and engagements of the army of the Valley District, commanded by General Early, may be thought confusing and uninformative; but in no other way can so good an idea be given of the boldness and energy, as well as of the strategic and tactical ability of the commander of that army. It is hoped that these details will also show the reader that Early had not only toughened and disciplined his little army, by keeping it constantly employed and in fighting trim, but had, in the best manner possible, impressed upon the authorities at Washington the necessity for bringing from Grant's army a large contingent of veteran troops and placing them in command of a leader of acknowledged ability and forceful activity, if they would protect the capital of the nation from assault, prevent incursions into the rich territory of the adjacent States of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and especially if they would keep open the great line of communication for the transport of supplies and the moving back and forth of armies that the Baltimore & Ohio railroad had proven to be.

It is well for the narrative to pause, to call attention to the fact that the bold movements of Early had not

only removed the apprehensions of Lee as to an attack in his rear by the large force that had been intrusted to Hunter, but had relieved Lee in the defense of Richmond by the distraction caused by the Maryland campaign, and the withdrawal of so many men from Grant's besieging army; also to consider the heroic achievements of this little army of men in the brief period from June 13th to August 7th, during which it had made direct marches from Richmond to beyond Lynchburg, into the Valley near Salem, then down the Valley into Maryland and to the very gates of Washington, fighting two important battles and engaging the enemy in uncounted skirmishes and engagements worthy of record. No less remarkable was Early's masterly retreat from Washington, back into the Shenandoah valley, warding off blows that from all sides were aimed at his movements, and giving better ones in return, so that he was not only able to maintain himself and provide for his army in the lower valley, but to destroy long stretches of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and exact tribute from a wealthy Pennsylvania town for the wanton destruction of the private property of prominent citizens in Virginia.

The student of military history can but be impressed with the way in which Early dealt with Hunter; with the boldness and ability of his treatment of the defensive garrison occupying the strong position on Maryland heights at Harper's Ferry, merely toying with it in advancing and then, unhesitatingly, leaving it in his rear and ignoring it in passing on to Washington, a treatment quite unlike that of Lee's ever memorable Maryland campaign; the promptness and originality of his attacks on Lew Wallace, at Monocacy, when he landed a brigade of infantry on his enemy's flank, across a deep river, by the unheard of device of having each man of a brigade of cavalry take an infantryman behind him, in a dash through the river, and thus enable him to surprise the enemy by turning his flank with an infantry force, supported by a wing of cavalry, from a direction supposed to be unapproachable, and, so far as the writer knows, introducing to armies a novel method of movement and attack.

After spending August 8th and 9th in his camps at Bunker Hill and Darkesville, Early fell back to Stephenson's depot and sent Breckinridge to the mouth of



Abraham's creek, where he encamped, while Ramseur marched to Winchester, to meet a reported advance of the enemy from Romney, Rodes remaining at Stephenson's. The Federal advance made demonstrations on the Martinsburg, the Berryville and the Millwood roads, in the afternoon of the 10th, but was easily repulsed. On the morning of the 11th, Early concentrated his forces and formed a line of battle covering the approaches to Winchester from the east and southeast, also from the south and southwest. Ramseur observed the Front Royal road, Breckinridge the roads leading to Berryville and Millwood, and Rodes the one leading to Martinsburg. Some skirmishing and cannonading took place on the Millwood road, but it was soon ascertained that the Federal forces were aiming to reach the Valley turnpike, in Early's rear; to check this, Gordon was moved to the vicinity of Newtown, and took position covering the approaches to that place from the south and southeast, the remainder of the army following. About dark, Gordon had a brisk skirmish with the enemy, repulsing them, at the double toll-gate, where the turnpike road leading from Charlestown, by way of Berryville, Millwood and White Post, intersects the turnpike leading from Winchester to Front Royal, by which Sheridan was advancing to get in Early's rear. The latter encamped in the vicinity of Newtown.

On the morning of the 12th, the Confederate army marched, took position, and formed a line of battle behind Cedar creek, the enemy forming on the north side, and the armies engaged in skirmishing. In the afternoon Early retired beyond Strasburg to Fisher's hill, posting cavalry on his flanks and in front. The next day a line of defense was selected on Fisher's hill, following the bluff on the south bank of Tumbling run and extending from the North Fork of the Shenandoah northwest across the valley to the back road and the Little North mountain. Along this, rude intrenchments were made. On the 14th the enemy's skirmishers advanced across Cedar creek and engaged those of Early. A detachment of Federal troops drove the Confederate signal men from the peak on the end of Three-top mountain, or Massanutton; but this was soon driven off, with loss, by a detachment of sharpshooters, and this admirable point of observation recovered. On the 15th the

enemy's pickets were driven across Cedar creek and his position reconnoitered from the commanding point in the Valley turnpike, near Stickley's, overlooking his camps along Cedar creek.

The reinforcements sent by Lee to Early, under Anderson, marching by way of Front Royal, had their pickets attacked by the enemy at Guard hill, on the road from Front Royal to Winchester, to Anderson's disadvantage. This was followed by the Kernstown-Winchester engagement. On the morning of the 17th, apprised of the approach of additional troops to Early's assistance, by the skirmish at Guard hill, the enemy fell back from Cedar creek, burning barns and hay and grain ricks as they retired down the Valley, in order to destroy the subsistence on which Early depended for a supply for his army. Pursuit was immediately begun, down the Valley turnpike, with McCausland's cavalry in front, followed by Gordon, and with Jackson's cavalry on the Middle road and Johnson's on the back road. The enemy was overtaken at Kernstown and his skirmishers driven in, when it was found that his cavalry was supported by a brigade of infantry, posted on Bower's hill, in front of Winchester. Early promptly formed in line of battle, with a brigade of Wharton's division on his left and Ramseur's sharpshooters on his right. These advancing about dark, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, drove the enemy from the hill and through Winchester, McCausland having helped the movement by marching to the right of Winchester and coming in by the Berryville road. General Anderson, with Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's of cavalry, advanced by the Front Royal road and encamped on the Opequan.

On the 18th, Rodes pushed out a reconnoissance on the Berryville road and Ramseur on the Martinsburg road, while Anderson came forward and encamped on the Front Royal and Millwood road, and Wharton and Gordon encamped on Abraham's creek, near Winchester. McCausland pushed the advance to Stephenson's depot, on the road to Martinsburg and Shepherdstown. On the 20th there was some cavalry skirmishing along the Opequan.

On the 21st, Early marched from Bunker Hill to the vicinity of Charlestown, driving the Federal cavalry from the line of the Opequan back upon an infantry sup-

port near Cameron station, and, engaging these about 9 a. m., he drove them toward Charlestown, in front of which some severe skirmishing took place; he also shelled the enemy's position. The Federals threw up rude fortifications in front of their lines and boldly resisted. Early encamped in front of the enemy near Cameron station. Vaughn's, Johnson's and Jackson's brigades of cavalry advanced to Leetown and then crossed to the vicinity of Charlestown; while McCausland's cavalry brigade followed the enemy's cavalry from the Opequan to Summit Point and covered the left of Rodes' advance. Fitz Lee, advancing his cavalry division by way of Berryville, engaged the enemy on that road, while Anderson forced them back on the Summit Point road. The enemy retired during the night, and on the morning of the 22d his cavalry was driven through Charlestown, and Early established his line of battle in the immediate front of that place, with Fitz Lee on his right and Lomax on his left. Anderson came to the vicinity of Charlestown. The army remained in this position on the 23d and 24th, extending its left along the Leetown road. The Federals drove in Early's pickets on the 24th; but they were easily repulsed and driven to within the defenses of Harper's Ferry.

On the 25th of August, leaving Anderson in front of Charlestown, with cavalry on his flanks, Early marched for Shepherdstown, by way of Leetown, with Wharton in front, and while on the march stumbled on Wilson's and Merritt's large divisions of Federal cavalry, which were starting on a reconnoissance up the Valley and had halted in a piece of woods to feed and rest, about two miles from Leetown, neither party expecting to meet the other. After some confusion, which was soon checked, Early formed a line of battle and boldly advanced, forcing the enemy back rapidly, although he met with bold and determined contention, during which artillery was used, through Kearneysville, on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, to near Shepherdstown, where another brave stand was made and the opposing forces engaged in combat until dark, when part of the Federal cavalry, under Custer, escaped across the Potomac and part of it toward Harper's Ferry. Early's infantry encamped near Shepherdstown. The cavalry divisions of Fitz Lee and Lomax, preceding Early from Charlestown, met at Lee-

town, advancing by way of Smithfield, and went on to the Potomac at Williamsport, by way of Martinsburg, where they had an artillery duel with the enemy across the river, the next day. During the Kearneysville combat, Early sent Gordon's division around to the Federal flank, where that incomparable fighter and his fighting division made valorous and telling charges, in one of which Gordon was wounded in the face, by a saber slash.

On the 26th the army marched back to Leetown, with Ramseur in advance. The cavalry marched to Shepherdstown, after its artillery engagement at Williamsport. In the afternoon, the Federals from Harper's Ferry made an attack on Anderson's comparatively small force at Charlestown, which he repulsed. On the 27th the army marched to its old camps at Bunker Hill; Rodes by way of "The Bower," and Ramseur by way of Smithfield. Anderson fell back from Charlestown, by way of Smithfield and Brucetown, to Stephenson's. The cavalry that had been left at Charlestown retired to Smithfield, but was ordered back to hold its position in front of Charlestown. On the 28th the enemy's cavalry attacked Early's and compelled it to cross the Opequon. After a brisk engagement at Smithfield, Fitz Lee retired toward Brucetown, and Lomax toward Bunker Hill, thus allowing the enemy to occupy Smithfield, in the vicinity where they burned barns and houses. To stop this vandalism, Ramseur was advanced and crossed the Opequon, driving in the Federal cavalry; and Early's infantry, aided by sharp artillery practice, drove the Federals back across the Opequon, and from some rude works which they had constructed in front of Smithfield, and then returned to camp, leaving the cavalry behind. These the enemy again engaged in the afternoon and drove them back across the Opequon. McCausland advanced videttes on Gordon's right, from his position at Beeson's ford. Quiet prevailed on the 30th; but the enemy made some demonstrations along the Opequon on the 31st, which were met by the cavalry. On that day Anderson moved back to near Winchester, and Rodes marched to Martinsburg and back, on a reconnoissance.

Quiet prevailed September 1st, but on the 2d the enemy was reported as moving in force from Harper's Ferry and Charlestown toward Berryville. Early marched

three divisions of infantry, preceded by cavalry, across the country to near Stone's chapel, on a reconnoissance, Vaughn's brigade of cavalry, which had been left at Bunker Hill, having been stampeded by Averell's, the enemy was enabled to get on Johnson's flank and rout the whole command, capturing wagons, etc. Rodes, who had been left at Stephenson's, learning of this attack, moved forward rapidly and drove the enemy back to Bunker Hill. In the afternoon, in consequence of this attack, Early returned to camps in the vicinity of Bruce-town and Stephenson's, McCausland moving from Bruce-town to Rodes' right. Fitz Lee and Anderson moved toward Berryville, intending to recross the Blue ridge the next day, on the way to Richmond; Lee, hard pressed at Petersburg, having requested Early to return to him these troops. Early intended to move toward Charlestown the next day and engage the enemy's attention during Anderson's movement.

On the 3d of September, Sheridan started two divisions of cavalry, from near Charlestown, through Berryville and White Post, to raid on Early's rear, while he followed with his large infantry force to reoccupy his former position near Berryville. Fitz Lee, marching to cover Anderson's right, encountered the advance of Sheridan's cavalry, on the 3d, near White Post. He retired toward Newtown to guard Early's rear. Anderson, resuming his march on the 4th, crossed the Opequan, and between that stream and Berryville unexpectedly encountered part of Crook's corps, the advance of Sheridan's infantry movement, occupying an earthwork in front of Berryville and barring his progress. He promptly massed an attack and drove the enemy out of its works and back upon the main body of Sheridan's army, which he found occupying and fortifying a strong position, extending for over two miles along the Berryville and Summit Point road.

Informed of Anderson's engagement and the host he had encountered, and comprehending the critical position in which he was placed, Early abandoned his contemplated movement toward Charlestown, and at daylight, on the 4th, marched with three of his divisions for relief and support, leaving Gordon's division, the infantry portion of Anderson's command, audaciously extended as a strong skirmish line along Sheridan's entire front; aware that the Federal cavalry, returning from its raid, which

Fitz Lee had frustrated, was to Sheridan's rear, between Berryville and the Shenandoah. Early placed Ramseur's division on Kershaw's left and then moved, with Wharton's and Rodes' divisions, along the enemy's front toward his right, to reconnoiter and attack that flank if a favorable opportunity offered. Early, in his "Memoirs of the Last Year of the War for Independence, in the Confederate States of America," writes of this reconnoissance:

After moving in this way for two miles, I reached an elevated position from which the enemy's line was visible, and within artillery range of it. I at first thought that I had reached his right flank, and was about making arrangements to attack it, when casting my eye to my left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach with the aid of glasses, a line extending toward Summit Point. The position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he was busily engaged fortifying it, having already made considerable progress. It was not until I had had this view that I realized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that his line was too long for me to get around his flank, and the position was too strong to attack in front, I returned and informed General Anderson of the condition of things. After consultation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack the enemy in his intrenched lines, and we determined to move our forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he would not move out of his works.

After remaining in front of the enemy at Berryville until 2 p. m. of the 5th, Early returned the divisions of Rodes, Wharton and Ramseur to Stephenson's, by way of the burnt factory. Rodes, in front, reached Stephenson's just in time to form a brigade on the right of the Confederate cavalry, which was falling back before superior numbers, commanded by Averell, and to aid in driving him back, for several miles, through a hard rain with considerable loss. On the morning of that day Anderson retired from the front of Berryville to the west side of the Opequon, having concluded to remain with Early, who was now confronted by such a large army of the enemy. It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy made demonstrations at the Yellow House, near Brucetown, and on the Martinsburg road, and also on the Millwood and Front Royal roads, not far from Winchester. These were all repulsed. There was enforced quiet on the 8th owing to a hard rain, but on the 9th the enemy advanced to the Opequon, below Brucetown, and burned some mills. They retired when met by Wharton.

On the 10th Early marched, with Rodes in front, preceded by some of Lomax's cavalry, through a very hard rain, and encountered the enemy's cavalry near Darkes-

ville, compelled it to retreat, followed by Lomax, through and beyond Martinsburg. The infantry returned to Bunker Hill, but the cavalry remained at Darkesville. The next day, leaving the cavalry at Darkesville, the infantry marched back to Stephenson's. It was quiet along the lines on the 12th, but on the 13th the enemy again advanced, by the old Charlestown road, and an artillery duel took place, across the Opequon, lasting most of the day, the Federals withdrawing at night. On the 14th of September General Anderson again marched away, unmolested, from Early's command, with Kershaw's infantry division and Cutshaw's artillery, by way of Front Royal. Early's army remained in camp, near Stephenson's, on the 15th and 16th.

On the afternoon of the 17th, the divisions of Gordon and Rodes, preceded by Jackson's brigade of cavalry, marched to Bunker Hill. On the 18th Gordon advanced to Martinsburg, meeting the enemy's pickets at Big Spring and driving them through the town, making some captures and burning Baltimore & Ohio railroad bridges, and afterward returning to Bunker Hill, Rodes continuing to Stephenson's.

Capt. L. W. V. Kennon, U. S. A., in a paper criticising Sheridan's campaign, states that while Early was at Martinsburg, at this time:

He learned at the telegraph office that Grant was with Sheridan at Charlestown. Early's movements up to this time had been conducted with conspicuous skill and judgment, although with audacity that bordered on rashness. He states, however, that the events of the last month had satisfied him that the commander opposed to him was "without enterprise, and possessed of an excessive caution which amounted to timidity." Otherwise he would not have volunteered to make so perilous a move as this one to Martinsburg. It is evident that he held a different opinion of Grant, for on learning of his presence in the Valley he "expected an early move," and at once sent Gordon back to Bunker Hill, with orders to march to Stephenson's depot by sunrise the next morning. Rodes' division was moved the same night to Stephenson's, where, also, Early himself returned.

The appearance of Grant in this part of the theater of war was, in truth, indicative of his urgent desire for speedy action. Early's continued presence in the lower valley was not merely annoying and humiliating, but it was retarding the progress of the campaign in front of Richmond, and was a hindrance of which Grant was very anxious to rid himself.

The battle of Winchester, of September 19th, was opened by an advance of the enemy along the Berryville

road toward Winchester, and across the Opequon, at 3 a. m. Ramseur, on the west bank of the Opequon, with Johnson's and Jackson's cavalry on his right, opposed and delayed this advance. Rodes came up from Stephenson's at 10 o'clock and formed on Ramseur's left, and Gordon, arriving about noon from Bunker Hill, formed on Rodes' left. These dispositions placed Early's army facing in a semi-circle to the south, southeast and east of Winchester, along the Opequon and its Red Bud branch, across and in advance of the Winchester and Berryville road. Wharton was formed to the rear and left of Gordon, extending the line northward across the Martinsburg road, on which he drove back several advances of the enemy's cavalry. The Federal infantry, about midday, made a furious attack all along the line; but its advances were all repulsed, with great slaughter, by the Confederate infantry and artillery. At 1 p. m. Sheridan massed his large body of cavalry and attempted to turn the Confederate left, but this attack was also repulsed. At 4 p. m. this attempt was renewed, and this great force, consisting of two divisions of cavalry backed by a fresh corps of infantry, turned and got in the rear of Early's left, when the whole line gave way and the army retreated, near sundown, some of it in confusion and disorder, but most of it in an orderly way, followed by the enemy's cavalry to Kernstown, where they were gallantly repulsed by Ramseur, who brought up the rear. The Confederates fell back to Newtown, with Gordon in advance, where they encamped about midnight, the enemy having been too roughly handled to follow up with vigor the advantages it had gained, mainly through the efforts of its great cavalry corps, of more than 10,000 well mounted and ably led men, which Early had no corresponding force to meet.

On the 20th, at daylight, Early continued his retreat, falling back through Strasburg to Fisher's hill, and there taking the position he had previously occupied. The brave Maj.-Gen. Robert E. Rodes having been killed at Winchester, Ramseur was put in command of his division, and Brig.-Gen. John Pegram took command of Early's old division, which he had hitherto commanded. Fitz Lee's cavalry retired to Front Royal, and one division of the enemy's cavalry came on to near Strasburg. Early spent the 21st in his works on Fisher's hill, the enemy



making some demonstrations, in the forenoon, with infantry on his right and center and cavalry on his left. Late in the afternoon the enemy drove in the Confederate skirmish line on the middle road and gained possession of the end of a ridge, the summit of which was cleared, but which was screened in front from Early's view by a skirt of forest occupying the slope to Tumbling run. Upon this point, which commanded Early's position, Sheridan massed his artillery, protecting it with earthworks. Wickham, in command of Fitz Lee's cavalry, fell back from Front Royal, up the South Fork of the Shenandoah, to Milford.

The battle of Fisher's Hill, on the 22d of September, was opened by an advance of Sheridan's infantry, in line of battle, all along the Confederate front, at an early hour, and an engagement of skirmishers. At 9:30 a. m. the infantry contention was hot in front of the center; at 1 p. m. Sheridan advanced several lines of battle, close to the front of Ramseur, the left of Early's infantry line, but only succeeded in driving in his skirmishers; at 4:30 p. m. the enemy drove in Gordon's skirmishers, on Early's center, between the Manassas Gap railway and the Valley turnpike, and at the same time opened a heavy and most destructive fire from the commanding ridge on the bluff between the railway and the North Fork of the Shenandoah. At the same time Crook's corps of Federal infantry, having made a concealed detour, through the woods, westward, to the foot of the Little North mountain beyond the back road, formed in line of battle, and advancing, fell upon Early's left flank, which was extended beyond Ramseur's division by a weak body of cavalry, compelling that to retreat in confusion, and then pushing forward in attack on the left and rear of Early's infantry. About 5:30 p. m. Early attempted to withdraw his whole line, especially retiring his left to meet this flank movement of the enemy; but Sheridan's attack was so rapid and vigorous, on both flank and front, that the left of the Confederates gave way in great confusion, and admitted Crook's corps to the rear of the whole line northwest of the railway. Under the overwhelming pressure of this attack the entire line gave way, and the whole army of the Valley, at about dark, retreated in great disorder, except some of Wharton's division which formed a rear guard, and some of the

artillery brigade, which continued fighting until Early ordered them to desist. The success of Sheridan's movement was greatly aided by the plunging fire of his massed artillery on the commanding ridge in front of Early's center.

A few infantry and some artillery rallied on the hill at the Four-mile house, not far back from Fisher's hill, and for a time checked the rather feebly sustained pursuit of the enemy. The Confederate army retreated rapidly, the enemy following to Tom's brook, some three miles in the rear of Early's position at Fisher's hill, where they were again checked by Smith's brigade, of Wharton's division, and gave up the pursuit. The retreat continued all night, the army reaching Mt. Jackson at an early hour on the morning of the 23d, where it remained in line of battle during the day, skirmishing some with the enemy's cavalry, which came up and threw a few shells, but made no earnest attempt to advance. The trains were sent across the North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a bridge that the engineering company of Captain Hart had completed the day before. After dark Early retired across the river and encamped at Rude's hill.

Forming a line of battle on Rude's hill on the morning of the 24th, Early remained there until noon, Averell's division of cavalry advancing to the river and throwing a few shells at Early's front, at the same time moving a large cavalry force up the opposite side of the river to turn Early's flank, his largely superior numbers enabling him to drive Early's cavalry rapidly back on the middle road. Early then withdrew in line and in column, and formed again in the rear of New Market, to meet this flank movement. In the same way, skirmishing and using his artillery, he took position as the enemy advanced, and fell back to Tenth Legion, where he formed a line of battle late in the afternoon, which he held until after dark, when, leaving Jackson's cavalry on picket, he followed his trains by the Keezletown road, Ramseur in front, five miles to Flook's, where he arrived and went into camp about midnight. The Federals pursued his cavalry to near Harrisonburg.

September 25th the trains moved on at an early hour, by way of Peale's cross roads and Port Republic, to Brown's gap, and at daylight the troops followed, with

Pegram in advance, and occupied Jackson's old camp within the western entrance to Brown's gap, the cavalry encamping between the South and the Middle rivers, covering the infantry position. The enemy advanced to Harrisonburg.

On the 26th, Kershaw's division, which had been ordered back to Early from Culpeper Court House, on its way back to Lee, and had crossed the Blue ridge at Swift Run gap, came up the South Fork of the Shenandoah, and turning off from the River road to Lewiston, joined the rest of the army, in Brown's gap, after having had an encounter with the enemy's cavalry and artillery, on the old battlefield of Port Republic, as he was about to turn off from the river road. This attack was from Fremont's old position, across the river, but was repulsed by Kershaw's artillery. In the early morning of the same day, the Federal cavalry came on from Harrisonburg and drove the Confederate cavalry across South river. Pegram's division, with artillery, was advanced into the plain in front and east of Weyer's cave, and engaged the enemy, repulsing several charges of cavalry. Ramseur, with his skirmishers, repelled an advance of the enemy on the Port Republic and Brown's Gap turnpike at about the same time that Kershaw's line of march was attacked at Lewiston. Wharton and Gordon were moved out and put in position to support the other divisions, if necessary. Wickham's cavalry brigade (which had come up the Luray valley and joined Early at Port Republic) was moved to the left, to Patterson's ford, or South river, in the afternoon, to meet a reported move of the enemy. The Federal cavalry went into camp between Weyer's cave and Mt. Meridian, and also between the South and the North rivers, with skirmishers on the eastern side of South river.

The Weyer's cave attack was made on information by Engineer Hotchkiss in reference to the position of the enemy's camp, and that it could be readily reached by roads concealed by forests, by way of Patterson's ford. Wickham's cavalry led the advance, followed by Gordon with artillery, and by Ramseur, Wharton guarding the right flank of the movement while Pegram engaged the enemy's attention in front, and Kershaw guarded, on the right, the approaches to Brown's gap from the north-east. The movement was a success and the troops were

in position for a surprise, when the artillery, without orders from Early, opened prematurely upon the enemy's camp. Thus warned, they fled precipitately, pursued by the cavalry, with which their rear skirmished, toward Mt. Meridian. A portion of the enemy fled across North river toward Cross Keys, followed by Pegram, who crossed that river and joined with Gordon and Ramseur in the pursuit, damaging the enemy considerably with artillery from the hill above Port Republic, as they fled across North river. Returning, the army took Jackson's old camp between the rivers, except Kershaw, who remained in Brown's gap.

On the morning of the 28th, after some delay from a misunderstanding of orders, Early marched for Waynesboro, the enemy having gone thither by way of Staunton. The trains crossed South river at Patterson's ford and went up the east side of that stream, with Ramseur in front, followed by Gordon. Pegram marched on the right flank by the Waynesboro road, from Mt. Meridian, turning by the Dogtown road, five miles from Waynesboro. Early, with Kershaw's division, followed by Gordon, marched by the way of New Hope and Hermitage, striking the outpost of the Federal cavalry at the latter place and driving it in toward Dogtown. Pegram also encountered the enemy, about four miles from Dogtown, and drove them to that place, then formed a line, after dark, and pursued them to the Waynesboro and Staunton road and toward Fishersville, the Confederate cavalry having previously gone, by a byroad, to near the tunnel of the Virginia Central railroad through the Blue ridge, which the Federal cavalry was seeking to destroy, and driven it back across South river and through Waynesboro to where Pegram struck its camp. The army encamped, after dark, in the vicinity of Waynesboro, where it remained on the 29th and 30th, while the engineer troops and pioneers were rebuilding the Central railroad bridges across South river and Christian's creek, which the enemy had destroyed. The Federal cavalry, which had been routed near Waynesboro, retreated through Staunton, Spring Hill and Mossy creek near Mt. Crawford, wantonly burning barns, mills, factories, grain and hay ricks, and driving all the live stock they could find before them, as they went, in obedience to Sheridan's orders to destroy the Valley "so that even a crow travers-

ing it would have to carry a haversack." Early's cavalry, on the 30th, followed the enemy as far as Middle river.

On the 1st of October the Confederate forces moved to the vicinity of Mt. Sidney: Gordon, Kershaw and Pegram marching by the direct old Winchester road, to the Willow Spout, and then down the Valley turnpike to three miles beyond Mt. Sidney; while Ramseur and Wharton moved by the Mt. Meridian road and across by Piedmont to within three miles of Mt. Sidney. The cavalry took position along North river. On the 2d, Sheridan's cavalry drove in the Confederate pickets near Mt. Crawford, but the Stonewall brigade, of Gordon's division, drove them back and held the turnpike bridge over North river at that point. The cavalry had an engagement with the enemy at Bridgewater, forcing Custer's Federal division of cavalry to retire, by a well-planned attack on his front and flanks. Quiet reigned on the 3d and 4th, with the exception of some skirmishing along the line of North river. On the 5th, Gordon advanced to near Naked creek and Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Rosser joined the army with his cavalry brigade of some 600 service and toil-worn men and horses, which had come up from Richmond by way of Lynchburg. This brigade was attached to Fitz Lee's division, to the command of which Rosser was assigned, Wickham having resigned.

On the morning of the 6th the enemy left the camps near Harrisonburg, Mt. Crawford and Bridgewater, after destroying crops, burning buildings in every direction, before and during their march, and driving before them all the live stock, both old and young, they could find. The Confederate cavalry was soon in pursuit, and the infantry, Gordon in front, followed at 11 a. m., and marched to the vicinity of Harrisonburg; three of the divisions encamping beyond that town. Lomax's cavalry went by the Keezletown road to Peale's, while Rosser, with Fitz Lee's division, took the back road and fell on the enemy's rear at Brock's gap, with vigor, capturing a portion of its train and pursuing it to Timberville. Kershaw had reinforced Early, at Brown's gap, with 2,700 muskets for duty and Cutshaw's artillery, about making up for his losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and he had determined to attack Sheridan on the 6th if he had not retreated down the Valley.

On the 7th the march was continued to New Market, Pegram and Wharton encamped on the Timberville road; Gordon and Ramseur on the Forestville, and Kershaw on the Luray roads. The cavalry pursued the enemy to the line of Stony creek, the strong position that Jackson had held against Banks' advance in the spring of 1862. Early's infantry remained in camp in the vicinity of New Market on the 8th, while Rosser on the back road drove the enemy to Round hill, having an engagement with them near Tom's brook, while Lomax drove them to the same stream on the Valley turnpike.

Custer's cavalry turned on Early's on the 9th, and drove it back, with a loss of artillery; Lomax to Mt. Jackson, on the Valley turnpike, and Rosser to Stony creek, on the back road, where the latter rallied and turned upon the pursuing foe and routed them, capturing their train and eight pieces of artillery. Ramseur and Kershaw were advanced to Rude's hill to meet the enemy, coming up the Valley turnpike; but they retired to Edenburg, and at night Early's advance again held the line of Stony creek. On the 10th and 11th, the infantry remained in camp while the pioneers were repairing the telegraph line from Staunton to New Market. On the 11th, Lomax's division of cavalry crossed over from New Market to the Page valley. On the 12th the march was resumed, Ramseur in front, and the army advanced to the vicinity of Woodstock, preceded by Payne's cavalry brigade, which halted at Pugh's run while Rosser marched from Timberville to Stony creek.

Early continued his advance on the 13th, with Gordon, preceded by Payne's cavalry, in the lead, and reached Hupp's hill, beyond Strasburg, by 10 a. m. Concealing his infantry behind the hill and a screen of woods, Early put his artillery in position and surprised Sheridan's camp, on the opposite side of Cedar creek, by opening on it with several batteries, and driving the Federals from their posts and camps, on the left of their position, in great disorder. Sheridan promptly advanced a brigade across Cedar creek, from his center, and opened from the batteries on his right, on the Belle Grove ridge. Early's artillery shelled the advancing column, while his infantry, still concealed, slowly withdrew. The enemy, supposing Early was retreating, advanced rapidly, when Conner's brigade of Kershaw's division and the skirmish-

ers of Gordon and Wharton, suddenly charged on them from their ambush and handsomely routed them, with severe loss. Rosser advanced, on the back road, to Cedar creek, and engaged the cavalry guarding that approach to Sheridan's rear. Lomax continued down the Page valley, through Luray and Front Royal, and drove the Federal pickets from Guard hill, above the forks of the Shenandoah, on the Front Royal and Winchester turnpike. After this bold, well-planned and successful attack on Sheridan's camp (one that should have shown him its vulnerable location), Early's first Cedar creek battle, he fell back to Fisher's Hill and went into camp. The Federal cavalry continued the burning of crops, barns, etc., in the vicinity of Front Royal, until driven away by Lomax.

Early remained at Fisher's hill during the 15th, having some skirmishing with the enemy on Hupp's hill, as he reconnoitered, and found them busily fortifying the north bank of Cedar creek and the camp which they had reoccupied, with so little judgment and in apparent ignorance of the weakness of that position, as they learned to their cost a little later, when the famous battle of Cedar Creek was joined.

All was quiet during the day of the 16th, but at night Rosser's brigade of cavalry, each cavalryman taking an infantryman of Grimes' brigade of Ramseur's division, mounted behind him, marched to surprise the cavalry camp of the enemy on the back road, near Cedar creek; but he found only a picket, which he captured, the camp having been moved. On the 17th of October, Early's troops were advanced a mile or more, to between Tumbling run and Strasburg, to cover Rosser's movement, and reconnoissances were made in front of Strasburg, while General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss of the engineers went to the signal station, on the end of Three-top mountain, to reconnoiter the enemy's position with reference to an attack; Captain Hotchkiss, from this lofty point of observation, which overlooked all of Sheridan's camps, making a map showing the position of Sheridan's army and its defensive works, and locating all its guards and pickets. Pegram advanced to Cedar creek, on the back road, to ascertain the feasibility of an attack from that direction.

From the reports of General Gordon and Captain

Hotchkiss, and the remarkable location of Sheridan's camps, as shown by the map that was exhibited, General Early became convinced that, notwithstanding the great disparity of the opposing forces (knowing that his own numbered but about 10,000 of all arms, while those of the enemy numbered 50,000 effective men), an unexpected and successful attack could be made on Sheridan's camps. Accordingly he summoned his division commanders to headquarters, and after the situation had been explained by General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, it was decided, with but one dissenting voice, that the attack should be made, and the plan proposed by General Early should be carried into effect that night and the following day.

Early's plan assigned to each division its place and time of attack, almost precisely as it was subsequently carried into execution. Gordon, with the Second corps, composed of Gordon's, Ramseur's and Pegram's divisions, was to march, after dark, from the Fisher's hill encampment to a crossing of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, near its right, which the pioneer corps was to bridge for it, then along and around the base of the Three-top mountain, by a blind and concealed pathway, to its northeastern end, and then, by fording the North Fork of the Shenandoah at Bowman's ford, with a squadron of Payne's cavalry in advance, to capture the enemy's picket and turn his left flank. Kershaw was to march to Strasburg at a later hour, then by a country road to Bowman's mill, on Cedar creek, and attack the enemy; Wharton, at a still later hour, was to move along the Valley turnpike, followed by the artillery of the army, past Strasburg to Hupp's hill, and remain there and be ready to second the other attacks. Rosser's cavalry was to advance by the back road and engage the enemy's cavalry, which had its extensive camp on its right and not far from the back road. The marches were so arranged that each of the attacking forces should be in position and ready to begin the assault at precisely 5 o'clock, about daylight of the morning of the 19th; Rosser to attack first, on the left, then Gordon on the right, and lastly, Kershaw in the center. The precise time of Wharton's attack was to depend on circumstances. During the day the materials were secretly collected for the foot bridge across the North Fork of the Shenandoah,



and about dark that stream, and other small ones on Gordon's route, were bridged, and the path along and around the mountain was cleared out by the pioneers under Captain Hart, and Gordon commenced his march, across the river and around to a place in the woods near the end of the mountain, at 8 in the evening.

At midnight following October 18th, Kershaw and Wharton marched from Fisher's hill along the turnpike to Strasburg, where Kershaw turned to the right along the byroad leading to Bowman's mill, while Wharton continued along the turnpike to near the crest of Hupp's hill. Before 5 a.m. of the 19th, Kershaw and Wharton were resting in their assigned positions, and Gordon had been waiting for some time, not far from Bowman's ford on the south bank of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, opposite the Federal cavalry picket guarding the road leading to the Belle Grove farm and around to the flank and rear of the Federal encampment, especially that of the Eighth corps, along which this byroad led, on to the east. Rosser, with his cavalry, was also in position on the Back road, and ready to attack.

As the hour appointed for the assault drew near, General Early, who had accompanied Kershaw's division, the head of which was resting on the bluff above the south bank of Cedar creek, was considerably disturbed by a movement in the Federal camp (the moving of a wagon train, as was afterward learned), which, unconscious of impending danger, lay before him, slightly concealed by the fog that was rising from Cedar creek and from the river. This stir in the camps led him to suspect that his movement had been discovered. Fortunately, the appointed hour came at about this time, when, practically without further orders and with remarkable precision, the three prearranged simultaneous attacks began. Payne's cavalry dashed across the river, in front of Gordon, and captured the outer pickets; Gordon followed with the bold rush characteristic of the famous Stonewall brigade, which was in his advance, and soon fell on the rear of the encampment of the Nineteenth corps, with a line of battle having Ramseur's division on the right and Gordon's division on the left, supported by Pegram's. At the same time Kershaw's division fairly sprang down the steep slope of the south bank of Cedar creek, rushed across that stream, and deploying, with Wofford on the

right, Humphreys in the center and Bryan, with Conner in echelon, on the left, charged rapidly up the long slope north of the creek, captured the battery that crowned its summit, turned its guns upon the as yet profoundly sleeping Eighth corps, rushed upon its flank, then bore to the left, and crossing the Valley turnpike fell upon the flank of the Nineteenth corps, there encamped on the Belle Grove farm. By these rapid and nearly simultaneous advances Kershaw's command and that of Gordon were, practically, brought into line of battle, with Gordon on the right and Kershaw on the left, that swept like wildfire through the camps of the Eighth and Nineteenth corps, routed the sleeping soldiers from their tents, and drove them, some half-dressed and all dazed, to retreat in wild confusion or to promptly surrender, and giving little opportunity for any rally except by some of those in the more distant parts of the encampment, who were quickly aroused and formed by their officers, and who, with desperate courage, vainly strove to check the on-rushing tide of the victorious Confederates.

When the sun rose and tempered the sharp air of that frosty October morning, it beheld Kershaw and Gordon in full possession of the camps and earthworks of the Eighth and Nineteenth corps of Sheridan's army and the captors of a large number of prisoners, many pieces of artillery, most of the camp equipage and the trains belonging to these two large bodies of infantry, and preparing to attack the Sixth corps, which was encamped farthest to the enemy's right and on high ground beyond Meadow branch, a tributary of Cedar creek, that, running from the northeast and on the western side of the Valley turnpike, enters the former stream at Hottle's mill, where several roads converge to a ford across Cedar creek.

As soon as the Valley turnpike was uncovered by the movements of Kershaw and Gordon, and the way was clear, Wharton's division moved forward, and the artillery galloped rapidly across Cedar creek and along the turnpike, and was soon ready to join in, on the right, in the attack on the Sixth corps, which had already been begun by Kershaw, Ramseur and Pegram in that order from the left. The gallant and indomitable Col. Tom Carter soon had his own and some of the captured artillery playing on the Sixth corps and its batteries, that

brave body of Federal soldiery having had time to rally and deploy before the Confederates had reached its position. The infantry attack on the Sixth corps, especially that by Wharton's division on the right, was but partially successful, as the swampy character of the ground along Meadow run prevented it from getting across, and the furious fire of the enemy drove it back; but the Confederate artillery, formidable in the number and character of its guns and in the magnificent handling of these by its officers and men, soon forced the Sixth corps from its position, so that before noon the entire infantry command of the Federal army had been routed and driven nearly two miles beyond Middletown, and Early had halted in the pursuit, apprehensive that the 10,000 Federal cavalry, which Rosser had merely routed from their camps on Sheridan's right, might cross over and fall upon his little army which he had drawn up in line of battle on a road having stone fences along it, leading northwestward from the Valley turnpike, from near the northeastern end of Middletown; with Gordon on the left extending into a body of woods along the Middle road, followed on the right by Kershaw, Ramseur and Pegram up to the turnpike, and with Wharton on the right of that great highway, in the very position that Stonewall Jackson had taken, but for a brief interval only, when preparing to advance against Banks' retreating army on the 24th of May, 1862.

As soon as the Federal cavalry was apprised of the disaster that had fallen upon Sheridan's infantry, it broke camp, started its trains for the rear, sent a portion of its force to meet Rosser's attack, and at once moved its main body to the eastward into deployment covering the retreating and demoralized infantry and artillery, bringing its numerous batteries into position, especially occupying the commanding ridge, or high rising ground to the north of Middletown, in front of the position that Early had taken, thus giving opportunity to the Federal officers to rally and reorganize their discomfited forces, which they speedily did; the panic that had taken possession of them having subsided when they found they were not being pursued, and that their well-mounted and well-trained cavalry force was on hand to protect them from further molestation.

Unfortunately for the Confederate cause, General

Early, though an able strategist, a most skillful commander, and one of the bravest of the brave, as all know, and as had been well attested—literally on scores of battlefields—did not possess the sublime confidence that characterized Stonewall Jackson in periods of emergency, and at this critical moment, intoxicated with success (but not with liquor, as some have falsely asserted), hesitated; unwilling to believe, although informed to the contrary by some of his officers who had reconnoitered its new position, that the Sixth corps was still intact, concealed in the forest in front of his left. Therefore he did not advance, although repeatedly warned of the dangerous character of the position he had taken if the Federal forces should be concentrated, for a counterstroke, on the commanding ground in his front. The handful of thinly-clad men who had cheerfully waited during the long chilly night for the hour of attack to come—part of whom had unhesitatingly waded through a cold and deep river, and won a magnificent victory over nearly five times their number—had been held in battle array, with only cold rations to warm them, in the biting north winds of a late October day, ready and eager to advance again upon the foe, and do again what they had done for Stonewall Jackson upon the same ground. This inexcusable delay, although abundant excuses have been offered for it, enabled the commanders of the Federal regiments, brigades and corps to rally and reform their men, so that when Sheridan, who had been absent, reached them from Winchester not long before noon, after a ride, not of 20 miles at a headlong speed, but of 10 miles in about two hours, he found his army reformed by Crook and ready to advance, with all arms of the service, overlapping, on either flank, the little band of Confederate heroes that, from his position, he could plainly see stretched out in a thin line not far in front. When all was ready, at about 4 p. m., with a great mass of cavalry upon his flanks, and especially upon his right, Sheridan ordered an advance and attacked Early's line, turning his left; and the mere weight of numbers, especially of cavalry, forced the whole line to give way and retreat just before dark, throwing most of it into confusion, although several bodies of its well-trained and tried soldiers, especially Ramseur's men, in whose front, bravely fighting, he fell mortally wounded,

effectually held in check, in position after position, and seriously damaged, with well-directed volleys of both musketry and artillery, the overwhelming force that pressed upon them. Most of the Confederates made good their retreat, and the Federal infantry did not pursue them beyond Belle Grove house, near the middle of their old encampment, but was quite content to go into camp not far from where they had been so unceremoniously and badly routed in the early morning.

When the sun set, the Confederates, although discomfited and retreating, were still in possession of the fruits of victory, having sent to the rear the 1,500 prisoners they had taken, a long line of captured wagons and stores, and many pieces of artillery, with their caissons and other equipments, when a small body of Federal cavalry, crossing Cedar creek at Hottle's mill, came by a blind way to the top of Stickley's hill, on the Valley turnpike to the west of Cedar creek, and following along the crowding and retreating, but unguarded trains, drove off the drivers with their sabers and turned wagons and guns across the road. The trains had been checked after dark at Spangler's mill, just west of Strasburg, where a short bridge, not more than 20 feet long, across the high banks of a small creek, had broken down under the weight of a heavy gun, and so cut off further retreat for all of the train of wagons and artillery, including a large portion of the captured guns, that had not yet crossed the bridge. The Confederate infantry, in its retreat, had avoided the main road, giving that up to the trains, and was falling back on roads more to the west, so that none of them were in position, in the gathering darkness, to defend these trains, and even if they had been, nothing could have been done toward replacing the bridge.

These accidental captures enabled Sheridan to claim that he had turned the disgraceful rout of his great army, in the morning, into a grand victory in the evening; when, in truth, but for this easy and unpreventable capture, by an insignificant body of cavalry, Early could have made the substantial claim that he had not only won an almost unexampled victory in the morning, but that he had brought away the fruits of it, even though driven by superior numbers from an untenable position that he had unwisely and too long held, when he should have either promptly followed the retreating foe, when on the run in

the morning, or quickly retired with the grand honors he had won.

Early's men retreated up the Valley, in and by ways that no man can describe, during the whole night, but they nearly all answered to roll calls the next day in their old camps at New Market. Rosser brought up the rear with his cavalry, which the enemy's cavalry slowly followed to Edenburg and the line of Stony creek, where Rosser had halted. Sheridan was quite content to rest, the next day, and reorganize his demoralized army, in his old Cedar creek camps. His pursuit of the retreating Confederates was without vigor or results.

Having learned, by sad experience, the weakness of his former position, Sheridan, on the 21st, brought his infantry across Cedar creek and took and fortified, with great care, a new position on Hupp's and the adjoining hills, between Strasburg and Cedar creek, so slowly had he learned the lesson of the important part that the topographical element plays in war, and which Early so well understood and had made such good use of in the two attacks he had made on Sheridan's Cedar creek camp. Lomax's division of cavalry, which came from Front Royal to the vicinity of Middletown on the 19th, but too late to be of any value in Early's attack on Sheridan, fell back by the way it advanced to Milford, in the Page valley, where it took and fortified a position which the Federal cavalry, following, attacked on the 26th, but was repulsed. All was quiet in the infantry camps up to that date, when Rosser's brigade marched from its camp near Timberville across, by New Market, to Luray.

The army remained undisturbed in its camps in the vicinity of New Market, holding the line of Stony creek with its cavalry, as well as its position at Milford in the Page valley, and at points along the Rappahannock, east of the Blue ridge, until the 10th of November, on which day Early again marched down the valley, with Kershaw's division in front, and bivouacked in the vicinity of Woodstock, Rosser's cavalry advancing to Fairview on the back road, and Lomax's to Front Royal in the Page valley. Marching again at 6 a. m. of the 11th, Pegram in advance, preceded by Payne's brigade of cavalry, Early drove the enemy's pickets from Middletown and up to a line of fortifications that Sheridan was holding beyond Newtown. He then formed a line of battle between Middle-

town and Newtown and had some skirmishing with the enemy, Rosser coming in by the back and middle roads, to the north of Newtown, and joining in the skirmishing on the left, came up on the right and extended the line toward Cedarville. The 12th was spent in line of battle at the same place, "Rosser having an engagement with the enemy's cavalry, which drove part of his force back for some distance along the back road, but bringing up the rest of his division, he, in turn, drove Custer back and resumed his former position. The enemy also attacked McCausland's brigade, of Lomax's division, near Cedarville, and was several times repulsed, but finally made a successful attack and drove him back, toward Front Royal, with the loss of two pieces of artillery." While Early was holding this advance, Captain Hotchkiss, his topographical engineer, was enabled to go over and sketch the battlefield of Cedar Creek, or Belle Grove, and gather the data for the map that is published in the War Records Atlas. After dark, on the 12th, the army fell back to and encamped on Fisher's hill. On the 13th, Grimes' brigade in front, it marched to camps between Edenburg and Hawkinstown; and on the 14th, Gordon in front, it returned to its old camps in the vicinity of New Market, headquarters having been established the day before at that place.

Kershaw's division started up the Valley, en route for Richmond, on the 15th. Up to that date, General Early's command had marched, since the opening of the campaign, on the 13th of June, 1,670 miles, and had engaged in seventy-five battles and skirmishes.

On the 17th, Pegram's division marched up the Valley to Big Spring. On the 22d, two divisions of the enemy's cavalry came as far as Rude's hill. To meet these, Early marched three divisions of infantry, Gordon's, Wharton's and Grimes', from their camps near New Market, and took position on Rude's hill to meet them. The enemy came boldly across the broad expanse of Meem's bottoms to make attack, but there met with such a hot fire of infantry and artillery that they went back, in great disorder, considerably damaged by the reception they had met. They were followed, by Early's infantry skirmishers, to Hawkinstown, and by a brigade of cavalry to below Edenburg. The army returned to its New Market camps that night, after hav-

ing marched 25 miles and had an engagement during the day.

On the 29th, Rosser, after a long march, surprised, by able strategy, the enemy's camp at New Creek, on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, capturing 800 prisoners and eight pieces of artillery. The army remained in its New Market camps until December 6th, taking the cars at Staunton on the night of the 7th. Wickham's brigade retired that day from Mt. Jackson to Timberville. This movement of the Second corps from the Valley was brought about by a report that the Sixth corps of Sheridan's army had already gone to Richmond to join Grant, and that more of the same army were moving in that direction. Grimes' division of Early's army left for Richmond on the 14th of December.

The famous Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia, Jackson's old command, embracing the remnants of his old division and his old brigade, now left the Shenandoah valley for the last time, under the command of Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon, one of the ablest, bravest and boldest of the surviving brigade and division commanders of the immortal Stonewall Jackson, General Evans, of Georgia, succeeding to the command of Gordon's division. This remarkable body of veterans, a mere fragment of its former self when, in the meridian of its strength of numbers and efficiency, Jackson led it against Pope at Cedar run, had, in four successive campaigns, played a most important part in the great military operations in the Shenandoah valley, that have not only made that region famous in the annals of history, but have made its movements and conflicts with superior forces opposed to them, the subjects of admiration and study of the military men of all the civilized fighting nations of the world. Thenceforward the small remnant of the Second corps, the few surviving veterans who had passed through so many memorable conflicts, became a portion of the army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg, participating, with unflinching manliness, in the remarkable defense of that beleaguered city, until the fall of Richmond and General Lee's retreat to Appomattox Court House, where it was actually repulsing an attack of a portion of the Federal army, and successfully driving it back when the truce was called that led to the surrender, when, with the intrepid Gordon at its head, it

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laid down its arms and left its memory, without a stain, embalmed in the undying history of Virginia and of the Confederacy.

General Early remained at New Market until December 16th, when Wharton's division fell back to near Mt. Crawford, Rosser's cavalry toward Swoope's, near Buffalo gap, west of Staunton, and Lomax's cavalry to Swift Run gap. Wharton's division, a mere regiment in numbers, the only infantry now left with Early, went into winter quarters near Fishersville, between Staunton and Waynesboro, on the 19th; on which day two divisions of Federal cavalry crossed the Blue ridge, at Chester gap, near Front Royal, and made demonstrations toward Gordonsville. The same day the signal stations reported an advance of the enemy up the valley to Woodstock. On the 20th, Early again started down the valley, with Rosser in advance, followed by Wharton, the former marching to Harrisonburg, and the latter to Naked creek beyond Mt. Sidney. The Federal cavalry came to Lacey's Springs. On the 21st, through a blinding snow-storm, Early moved forward to attack the enemy. Rosser, marching at dawn, fell on Custer's division, consisting of Pennington's and Chapman's brigades, at Lacey's, or Big Spring, on the Valley turnpike, having, in crossing over from the middle road, struck the Federals in flank, with Payne's brigade in front, followed by Morgan's, just as they were saddling their horses to advance on Wharton. Rosser routed their First and Second brigades, capturing 35 prisoners and their wagons and ambulances; but they rallied on their Third brigade, compelled him to fall back, and recaptured their wagons, when they at once retreated down the valley. Rosser was unable to get his whole command together for this attack, and so had joined issue at a disadvantage. Wharton was halted at the Big Spring, some two miles southwest of Harrisonburg.

On the 22d, Wharton marched back to near Staunton, as did also Payne's and Wickham's brigades. On the 23d, two brigades of Wharton's division took cars at Staunton for Gordonsville, to assist in repulsing the movement of cavalry that had crossed the Blue ridge at Chester gap, on the 19th. One of Wharton's brigades went into its former camp at Fishersville.

On the 24th, the brigades of Jackson, Imboden and

McCausland met the advance of the Federal cavalry on the Liberty Mills road, northwest of Gordonsville, destroying the stores there collected, and breaking General Lee's line of supply over the Virginia Central railroad. This engagement closed the contentions of General Early with the Federals for the year 1864. He then established his headquarters at Staunton, put Wharton's division in winter cantonment near Fishersville; Long's artillery battalion went into camps near Waynesboro, the rest of the artillery that had been with Early having gone to Richmond. Early located remnants of his war-worn cavalry in small camps in Piedmont, in the Valley, and in the Appalachia, far out to the front, to the east, northeast, north and northwest, where forage could be had for their horses, and where they could prevent incursions of the enemy and give Early intelligence of any forward movements. Signal stations were located and telegraphs put in order connecting these cavalry camps with headquarters at Staunton.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

**F**OILED in his attempts to turn Lee's flank south of the James by the capture of Petersburg, through Beauregard's brave resistance for four days against his repeated assaults, Grant drew back and commenced throwing up formidable lines of intrenchments, all along his front, during the night of June 18th and the following Sunday. Lee's army, facing to the eastward, was as busily occupied in throwing up equally strong defensive works, preparing to hold Petersburg as the key to the defenses of Richmond, in obedience to the Confederate authorities, although Lee himself would have preferred to draw Grant farther into the interior, away from his tidewater base and fortress, where he could have maneuvered against him in the open country and amid Nature's great fortifications, which so abound among the mountains of Virginia.

At this time, Beauregard's left rested on the navigable Appomattox, about one mile north of east from Petersburg, where the Appomattox turns northward, for five miles, to the vicinity of Port Walthall, and thence eastward, for about four miles, to City Point, where that river enters the James. On his right, Anderson, with the First corps, extended the Confederate line for some three miles to the southward, in front of Petersburg, crossing the Norfolk & Petersburg railroad in the vicinity of the Jerusalem plank road, thence westward, for some two miles; the Third corps, under A. P. Hill, extended the Confederate right, on the south of Petersburg, to the Weldon & Petersburg railroad. Pickett's division took up the line on the west side of the Appomattox and extended it north to the James, at the big bend opposite Dutch gap. The fortifications on the north of the James, from Chaffin's bluff northward, along the front of Richmond, were held by batteries and by local troops, in command of Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell.

Subsequently the Confederate works were extended to the southwest of Petersburg for more than 10 miles, to beyond Hatcher's run, until Lee's line of defensive works, consisting of forts and redoubts connected by breastworks and strengthened by all means known to the art of war, extended for nearly 40 miles.

The Federal fortifications, commencing on the river road north of the James, in front of the Confederate lines, extended for four miles to the south, to Fort Brady, above Dutch gap; then were resumed, opposite the big bend of the James, and extended across the neck of the Bermuda Hundred peninsula, for nearly four miles, to the big bend of the Appomattox; then again resumed, upon the south side of that river and along its eastern side, and extended for over four miles, by redoubts and detached works, to the City Point railroad, on the bank of the Appomattox, and were thence prolonged, for 15 miles or more, around the front of Petersburg, to beyond Hatcher's run, frequently as double lines. South of these main defensive works, a line of formidable intrenchments protected the rear of the besieging army; while numerous forts, connected by heavy breastworks, extended across the City Point peninsula, making an enclosed camp for the base of supplies and the headquarters of the Federal army.

Grant "rested his men," as he had promised, with the vigorous use of intrenching tools, until near the end of June, constructing works far more formidable than those opposing him, and making such preparations as are only made when a great fortress is to be taken by protracted and regular siege operations. Within these well-fortified lines Grant collected more than 107,000 men, most of them veterans of the armies of the Potomac and of the James. To oppose these, Lee had, in his 40-mile line, for the defense of Richmond and Petersburg, some 54,000 men, the remaining veterans of the army of Northern Virginia, and of the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Beauregard's army. Grant's supplies easily reached him by water, up the broad navigable James to City Point. Lee drew his, mainly from the South, by three railroads that met at Petersburg and were thence continued by single line to Richmond. The first Federal assault cut the roads leading to City Point and Norfolk.

Grant's first movement was to cut the road leading south to Weldon, that he might extend the strong arm of his fortifications westward, across that road, and hold it from Lee's use. On the 21st of June, he sent his Second and Sixth corps southward, across the Jerusalem plank road, which ran from Petersburg south, between the Norfolk and the Weldon railroads, and directed these to take position, on the left of his Fifth corps, thus, by a great wheel of his left, hoping to flank Lee's right south of Petersburg. The battle line, when formed, was composed of the Fifth corps on the right, the Second in the center, and the Sixth on the left. This formidable line of attack was extended still farther to the left, by 6,000 cavalry, under Wilson, designed to strike the railway still farther to the south and then sweep up to the northward. Lee, in person, was at his right, on the morning of the 22d, when the Federal columns advanced to his front. Three of A. P. Hill's brigades were moved southward to meet the Federal columns, the movement of which was not in concert, and the Confederates discovered a wide gap between the Sixth and the Second corps. Into this, Mahone led Hill's brigades, through the pine forests, and fell, in fierce assault, on the left flank of the Second corps, driving it back in confusion, behind defensive works, with a loss of 1,700 men and four guns.

The next day the Sixth corps renewed the attempt to reach the railroad, when it was driven back with a loss of 500. Wilson's cavalry reached the railroad, at Reams' Station, nine miles south of Petersburg, on the 22d, and, after breaking the track, moved westward to the Southside railroad, where, on the 23d, after a vigorous attack on the division of W. H. F. Lee, it was driven back, and on the 24th, retreated toward Petersburg, having been turned back from Staunton river bridge by the local militia, closely followed by Lee. Hampton, who had hurried southward from his victory over Sheridan at Trevilian's, joined Lee in the pursuit. Reaching Reams' Station, Wilson found Mahone across his track, with two brigades of infantry, while Lee was closely pressing his rear. Thus assailed, his troops were routed, leaving behind them, not only a long supply train and thirteen guns, but loads of plunder robbed from private houses, and a thousand negro slaves taken from Virginia planta-

tions. Wilson's raid had been one of pillage, and he well merited the punishment he received at Reams' Station.

Early's Valley campaign and his advance on Washington, brought confusion to Grant's plans, in the early part of July, as narrated in the preceding chapter, and compelled him to organize a large force, under Sheridan, to look after Early, while he continued to hold his well-fortified lines and intrenched camps on the James and on the Appomattox.

During all the month of July, Grant's great army was busy throwing up parallels and driving mines in advancing upon Petersburg. In front of the Blandford cemetery, to the northeast of that city, there was a salient in the Confederate line known as Elliott's. At that point, the Federal lines, under Burnside, were but a hundred yards away, and in their rear was a deep ravine, from which Pennsylvania miners drove a main gallery, for 510 feet, under Burnside's works, the intervening space, and to well under the Elliott salient in the Confederate line. From this main gallery lateral ones were extended, right and left, and in these works were placed 8,000 pounds of powder, and the appliances for its explosion under Confederate works and the guns of Pegram's and Elliott's batteries. Grant proposed to spring this mine and thus blow open a way, through the Confederate intrenchments, by which he could send three of his corps, nearly half of his army, and capture Petersburg from Lee. The preparations for this peculiar kind of strategy by one who was always desiring open-field fighting, were all complete on the 28th of July.

On the 27th of July, Grant sent Sheridan's cavalry, and Hancock with the Second corps, across to the north side of the James, to attack the Confederate works at Chaffin's bluff, hoping to there break through and capture Richmond, or, at least, to create a diversion that would draw a large portion of Lee's army to the north of the James, and thus help to secure success for Burnside's attack, after the explosion of his mine. Crossing the river at Deep Bottom, Hancock drove back Kershaw's division and captured four pieces of his artillery, but on following up his success he encountered an intrenched line of battle, which brought him to a stand. On the 29th, Lee hurried cavalry and five divisions of infantry over the James, to aid in keeping back Hancock, leaving

Pickett between the Appomattox and the James, and but three divisions in the defenses of Petersburg, with but 13,000 men of all arms, to receive Burnside's assault on the morning of the 30th.

Meade was reluctant to spring his mine without having the steady Hancock behind Burnside, so Grant recalled the half of the Second corps, gave up the idea of a direct movement on Richmond, and reinforced Burnside, as Meade desired. Sheridan's cavalry was also brought back, to create a demonstration on Lee's right, and so, by threatening his wings, divert attention from the intended assault on his center.

In his official report of 1865, Grant thus describes this battle of the Crater:

On the morning of the 30th, between 4 and 5 o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed by the Ninth corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete) and get forces to this point for its defense. The captured line thus held, being untenable and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

This explosion partially destroyed Elliott's brigade and opened a wide gap into Petersburg, without a single Confederate soldier present to contest the passage of Burnside through to the rear of Lee's lines. More than one hundred and sixty Federal guns concentrated their fire on the Confederate works, to the right and left of this breach, to engage attention while Burnside made his assault. This terrific explosion, for the time being, naturally terrified the nearby men of both armies, and twenty minutes passed before Burnside's leading brigade advanced, cautiously, up the slope of the crater and took shelter in its yawning opening, which was 135 feet in length and 30 feet in depth. The commanding hill of Blanford cemetery, within the Confederate lines, was just in front of the assaulting column and undefended; but Burnside's men lingered within the crater and failed to move on to this point of vantage. Another brigade

of the assaulting column followed, and that also took shelter in the great pit, and there an entire Federal division remained, as a confused mass, which its officers tried in vain to move forward, in face of the scattering fire that the Confederate infantry, now rushing in from all directions, poured into the crater.

Haskell's battery, the one nearest at hand on the plank road, was speedily moved forward and its fire was added to that of the musketry. Hamilton Chamberlayne, though sick in a near hospital, hastened to reinforce Haskell with his guns, while Wright and Langhorne, from the left, screened by a small body of pines, raked with canister, from their position in a salient, the ground between the crater and the Federal line of intrenchments, across which Burnside must send reinforcements. Grant's artillery showered shot and shell upon these Confederate batteries, but they stood bravely to their work. Burnside sent two more divisions to push forward the hesitating assault, but most of the men of these found refuge in the swarming mass that already nearly filled the bottom of the crater. Meade, watching from the rear, and learning, on demand, from Burnside the cause of this delay, excitedly asked: "Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance?" Burnside wrote reply: "I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest."

At 8 o'clock a negro division was sent forward to march over the white Federal soldiers in the crater. These quickly sought refuge in the adjacent, unoccupied Confederate rifle-pits. A division of the Tenth corps was now added to the assaulting column, which, encouraged by the power of numbers, was bracing itself for an advance to the Cemetery hill. At this juncture of affairs, General Lee, from beyond the Appomattox, arrived and took charge of the defense. Two of Hill's brigades were drawn from his right, and Mahone promptly ordered these to cover the breach; Pegram's battery came forward to join the combat; through the covered way, which led from the plank road to the ravine in front of the crater, Weisiger's brigade, of Mahone's division, rushed to the brink of the crater. The negro division fled from the rifle-pits, at sight of the charging Virginians, and leaped into the crater, followed by most of the other Federal troops that had ventured beyond it.



Wright's Georgia brigade soon came to the aid of Weisiger, and by about midday the Confederate line was re-established by the capture of its broken works. Volleys were poured into the crater, until the mass of Federal soldiers, there entrapped, surrendered at discretion. Grant had brought 65,000 of his soldiers to this grand assault, which, through the lack of audacious courage in his officers and men, brought to him not only failure, but a loss of nearly 5,000 of his soldiers. A howl of despair arose in every portion of the North. Gold went up to \$2.80 for a dollar, as compared with greenbacks. The New York Herald advised that an embassy should be sent to the Confederate government, "to see if this dreadful war cannot be ended in a mutually satisfactory treaty of peace."

Early in August, Grant sent Sheridan, with the Sixth corps of infantry and Torbert's and Wilson's divisions of cavalry, to the Shenandoah valley to look after the troublesome Early. To meet these, and aid his lieutenant, Lee dispatched Fitz Lee's division of cavalry and Kershaw's division of infantry from his First corps, in the same direction. Believing, from information received, that Lee had sent three divisions of his army away from Petersburg, thus greatly weakening his defensive force, Grant decided, on the 13th of August, "to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent his sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent." That night he moved the Second corps and Gregg's division of cavalry from the army of the Potomac, and the Tenth corps from Butler's army of the James, to the north of the river, and the next day these assaulted the Confederate lines in front of Richmond, only to be repulsed, with the loss of 1,000 men; although Grant claims to have captured six pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and to have detained troops that were under marching orders to Early. Gen. F. A. Walker writes of this movement: "It should be frankly confessed that the troops on our side engaged, behaved with little spirit. . . . When it is added that the two brigades most in fault were the Irish brigade and that which had been so long and so gloriously commanded by Brooke, it will appear to what a condition the army had been reduced by three months of desperate fighting."

Having drawn a portion of Lee's army north of the James, Grant, on the 18th, sent Warren, with the Fifth corps, to his left, to capture the Weldon railroad and attack Lee's right. Following the plank road southward to the Globe tavern, on the railroad south of Petersburg, Warren then turned northward, along the railway, toward Petersburg, until Heth's division of Hill's corps struck his exposed left flank and captured nearly a thousand of his men. The next day, A. P. Hill confronted Warren with two divisions, assailing his left with Heth's, while Mahone's fell on his right. Warren, after a loss of 2,900 men, threw up works and assumed the defensive. Hill attacked him again, on the 21st, but was repulsed with considerable loss.

During this affair between Hill and Warren, Grant withdrew Hancock and Gregg from the north side of the James, and, on the 21st, sent these to Reams' Station, south of Petersburg and beyond Warren's division, to tear up the track of the railway, in the meantime holding some old Confederate works at the station. To interfere with this destructive work, Lee sent A. P. Hill, with eight brigades of infantry, preceded by Hampton's division of cavalry. On the 24th these attacked Hancock. Pegram's artillery secured a position which took Hancock's lines in both reverse and enfilade, with eight guns at very short range. This unexpected and rapid fire opened the way for a charge, by Heth's division, when the larger portion of Hancock's men took a panic and broke in flight, leaving their works, 9 guns, 12 flags, over 3,000 muskets, and 2,150 prisoners, in Hill's hands, with a loss to him of but 720 men. It was an unheard-of thing for the veteran soldiery of Hancock to be thus discomfited, and they were only saved from utter rout by the desperate fighting of a small number of steadfast men, led by Hancock in person. Walker, in his *Life of that great soldier*, attributed this defeat to "the weakened spirit of our (Hancock's) men," adding:

Hancock had seen his troops fail in their attempts to carry the entrenched positions of the enemy, but he had never before had the mortification of seeing them driven, and his lines and guns taken, as on this occasion; and never before had he seen his men fail to respond, to the utmost, when he called upon them, personally, for a supreme effort; nor had he ever before ridden toward an enemy, followed by a beggarly array of a few hundred stragglers, who had been gathered together and pushed toward the enemy. He could no longer conceal from himself that his once mighty corps retained but

the shadow of its former strength and vigor. . . . "I do not care to die," cried Hancock, "but I pray God I may never leave this field." The agony of that day never passed away from the proud soldier.

Grant's only mention of this affair in his final report is: "On the 24th, the Second corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams' Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy."

The various combats between the two opposing armies at Petersburg, during the month of August, resulted in a loss of about 8,000 men to Grant and 2,000 to Lee. Grant persistently continued his attacks on Lee's flanks, but mainly on his right, his object being to so extend his left to the westward as to capture and hold Lee's lines of communication with the South. In his report, Grant writes: "By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City Point & Petersburg railroad to the Weldon road, enabling us to supply without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg. The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defense of Richmond." This railway extension was between two lines of formidable intrenchments, safely guarding it from attack.

After reaching the conclusion just mentioned, Grant, on the night of September 28th, sent the Tenth corps, under Birney, and the Eighteenth corps, under Ord, to the north of the James, by the way of Deep Bottom (a way by which he had already so many times sent expeditions for the same purpose), to attack the "few troops" which he supposed Lee now had at Chaffin's farm, or Fort Harrison, for the defense of his right, resting on the James. The Federal attack was made on the morning of the 29th, as Grant reports, "carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was followed up by a gallant attack on Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Chaffin's farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the

enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly." Grant's loss in this affair was 2,300 men.

Supposing that Lee's right at Petersburg had been weakened in meeting the attack north of the James, Meade, on the 30th of September, sent four divisions to attack Lee's right, at Poplar Spring church. Hill met the flank of these with two divisions and forced them back, with a loss of over 2,000 men. Parke, commanding the Ninth corps, attributed this disaster to "the large amount of raw material in the ranks [that] has greatly diminished the efficiency of the corps."

On the 7th of October, Lee attacked Kautz's cavalry, north of the James, and, as Grant reports, "drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery—eight or nine pieces. This he followed by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter." On the 13th, Butler essayed to drive the Confederates from his front, where they were constructing some new defensive works, but he was driven back with heavy loss.

On the 27th of October, it was said to strengthen Lincoln's prospects in the near-at-hand presidential election with the report of a victory, Grant sent a column, consisting of 3,000 cavalry and 32,000 infantry, to turn Lee's right at Hatcher's run, 14 miles to the southwest of Petersburg. His plan of engagement provided that Hancock should march westward, following the Vaughn road across Hatcher's run, and place himself across the Boydton plank road. He was then to march northward, recross Hatcher's run and the Southside railroad in the rear of Lee's right. Gregg's cavalry and the Fifth and Ninth corps were moved to the Federal left to support Hancock. In the morning the Ninth corps attacked the extreme right of Lee's intrenchments, to engage attention while Hancock made his flanking movement. Finding Lee's men ready for the attack, the Ninth corps halted and threw up breastworks for its protection. Hancock reached his assigned position, across the Boydton plank road, but when he would advance he found Hill standing ready, on the northern bank of the

run, to oppose his northward march. A division of the Fifth corps was then moved to the left to strengthen Hancock, but most of its regiments lost their way in the intricacies of the forest roads in that region. The Federal line was not well established, and its left was broken into fragments in the bewildering forest. Heth promptly met Hancock's flank movement with one of his own. He sent Mahone's division westward, across the run, and, hurrying them into the gap that had been left between the Fifth and Second corps, fiercely attacked Hancock's right, while Hampton's cavalry fell on his left. Hancock's superior force enabled him to repulse these attacks and re-establish his lines, but Hill captured six of his guns and 700 prisoners.

During the succeeding night, Grant withdrew his unsuccessful movement, after a loss of 1,761 men, and left Hill in possession of the field of contention. In his final report, after describing the movement to where the battle of Hatcher's Run took place, Grant wrote:

At this point we were six miles from the Southside railroad, which I had hoped, by this movement, to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified lines. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after dark the enemy moved out across Hatcher's run, in the gap between Generals Hancock, and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

On this same October 27th, Grant ordered Butler to make a demonstration north of the James, on the defenses of Richmond on the Williamsburg road and on the York River railroad, to the west of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. Grant reports that "in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterward abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former position." Butler had attempted to steal into Richmond by way of the concealed roads through the White Oak swamp, but Longstreet, who had just returned to his command, not only drove him back, but inflicted upon him a loss of more than 1,000 men.

"From this time forward," says Grant in his report, "the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defense and extension of our lines and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send South. By the 7th of February (1865), our lines were extended to Hatcher's run, and the Weldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford." In December, Grant recalled the Sixth corps from the Shenandoah valley to his army, when Lee at once brought the Second corps, from the same region, to the trenches at Petersburg. Sheridan's big army of 56,000 men had neither cut the Virginia Central railway at Staunton, Charlottesville or Gordonsville, nor had it captured Lee's base of supplies at Lynchburg, having been held in the valley by Early, who had inflicted upon him a loss of 17,000.

Dr. Henry Alexander White, in his every way admirable *Life of Lee*, says of the army of Northern Virginia, at this time:

Winter poured down its snows and its sleet upon Lee's shelterless men in the trenches. Some of them burrowed into the earth. Most of them shivered over the feeble fires kept burning along the lines. Scanty and thin were the garments of these heroes. Most of them were clad in mere rags. Gaunt famine oppressed them every hour. One quarter of a pound of rancid bacon and a little meal was the daily portion assigned to each man by the rules of the war department. But even this allowance failed when the railroads broke down and left the bacon and the flour and the meal piled up beside the tracks in Georgia and the Carolinas. One-sixth of this daily ration was the allotment for a considerable time, and very often the supply of bacon failed entirely. At the close of the year (1864) Grant had 110,000 men. Lee had 66,000 on his rolls, but this included men on detached duty, leaving him barely 40,000 soldiers to defend the trenches that were then stretched out 40 miles in length from the Chickahominy to Hatcher's run. With dauntless hearts these gaunt-faced men endured the almost ceaseless fire of Grant's mortar batteries. The frozen fingers of Lee's army of sharpshooters clutched the musket barrel with an aim so steady that Grant's men scarcely ever lifted their heads from their bomb proofs.

On the 5th of February, Grant again sent a large force to his left to capture Lee's defenses on Hatcher's run. This was driven back by three divisions of Confederates, and the Federal line of the Fifth corps was broken by a charge of Gen. C. A. Evans' division. During this engagement, the brave Gen. John Pegram, who commanded at Rich mountain in July, 1861, was killed,

Lee's small force fought, with its usual vigor and obstinacy, during the severe weather of the three days and nights of this second Hatcher's Run engagement. Lee wrote of them: "Under these circumstances, heightened by assaults and fire of the enemy, some of the men had been without meat for three days, and all were suffering from reduced rations and scant clothing, exposed to battle, cold, hail and sleet. . . . The physical strength of the men, if their courage survives, must fail under this treatment."

Environed by defeats in every direction, except in the immediate neighborhood of Richmond, and seeing the Federal armies closing in upon this last stronghold of the Confederacy, President Davis, grasping the last straw offering relief, on the 6th of February, 1865, appointed General Lee commander-in-chief of all the Confederate armies. In his first general order, after reluctantly accepting this added responsibility, Lee said, in substance: "Deeply impressed with the difficulties and responsibilities of the situation, and humbly invoking the guidance of the Almighty God, I rely for success upon the courage and fortitude of the army, sustained by the patriotism and firmness of the people; confident that their united efforts, under the blessing of Heaven, will secure peace and independence." In a second order on the 14th, he said of his soldiers: "The choice between war and abject submission is before them. To such a proposal, brave men, with arms in their hands, can have but one answer. They cannot barter manhood for peace, nor the right of self-government for life or property. But justice to them requires a sterner admonition to those who have abandoned their comrades in the hour of peril."

At this crisis the homes of those beyond the confines of Virginia, which heretofore had not felt the presence of the enemy, were being overrun with ruthless destruction, as by Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea, and the wanton damages of scattered bodies of Federal soldiers. Large numbers of absentees were unable to return to their commands, and Lee's army was being depleted by constant desertions. He appealed to these sorely tried men to come back, offering pardon; adding, "Our resources, wisely and vigorously employed, are ample; and with a brave army, sustained by a deter-







mined and united people, success, with God's assistance, cannot be doubted."

The urgent need for recruits to Lee's army brought to the front the question of employing negro slaves as soldiers. During the secret discussion of this matter, in the Confederate Congress, Lee, in reply to a letter from one of its members, wrote on the 18th of February: "I think the measure not only expedient, but necessary. The enemy will certainly use them against us if he can get possession of them. . . . I believe we should provide resources for a protracted struggle—not merely for a battle or campaign. . . . In my opinion, the negroes, under proper circumstances, will make efficient soldiers. . . . I think those who are employed should be freed. It would be neither just nor wise, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves."

On the 19th of February, when Sherman's great and victorious army was driving Johnston's back to the vicinity of Charlotte, Lee wrote: "It is necessary to bring out all our strength, and, I fear, to unite our armies, as separately they do not seem to be able to make head against the enemy. . . . Provisions must be accumulated in Virginia, and every man in all the States must be brought off. I fear it may be necessary to abandon all our cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency." On the 25th he wrote an earnest letter to Governor Vance, of North Carolina, in reference to desertions from his army and the causes that induced them, concluding: "I think our sorely tried people could be induced to make one more effort to bear their suffering a little longer, and regain some of the spirit that marked the first two years of the war."

At a conference between President Davis and General Lee, early in March, 1865, it was decided that Lee should march his army to Danville, and there, joining to it the 18,000 under Johnston, give battle, in North Carolina, to Sherman's 90,000, before Grant could reach him. Before doing this, Lee proposed to check Grant's efforts at extending his left toward the Southside railroad, leading to Danville, by assaulting Fort Stedman near the center of Grant's line of works near the Appomattox, and almost immediately in front of the famous Crater. On the 25th of March, Lee placed the remnant of the Second corps, now under command of Gen. John B. Gor-

don, in front of the Blanford suburb of Petersburg, with its left resting in reserve. At the word of command, just before the dawning of the day, Gordon's men leaped over their intrenchments, rushed across the 150 yards between these and Fort Stedman, and captured that and three adjacent batteries. The attack had been delayed by the tardiness of Longstreet's supporting detachment, and the plan of assault was but half carried out on the approach of full daylight. Gordon tried, in vain, to capture the forts on his right and left, as his efforts were not seconded by the advance of his supporting forces. Daylight enabled the Federal batteries, from a commanding position, to rake Gordon's lines, and Federal infantry were pushed forward in overwhelming numbers to attack him. After inflicting a loss of 2,000 upon Grant, and suffering one of 3,000 in his own command, Gordon was compelled to retire. Grant reports that, after this repulse, "General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket line, in front of the Second and Sixth corps, and captured 834 prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was 52 killed, 864 wounded, and 207 missing."

Writing of this period, Grant says, in his final report:

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, three divisions of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth corps, preceded by McKenzie's cavalry, took up the line of march, and was in position, near Hatcher's run, on the morning of the 29th. The Fifth corps moved at 3 a. m. of that day, the Second at 9. Sheridan's cavalry reached Dinwiddie Court House the night of the 29th, and the left of the infantry advance extended to the Quaker road, near its junction with the

Boydton plank road, and Grant now had an unbroken line from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie Court House. He now had, in his immediate command, 124,700 men, 13,000 of whom were well mounted cavalry. To oppose these, Lee had about 45,000, less than 5,000 of whom were cavalry, under Fitz Lee, mounted on mere skeletons of poorly-fed horses. So far, Grant's movement had met with but little opposition, but Hill held, threateningly, his line in front of the position that had been gained. Lee quickly transferred his cavalry and Pickett's division from his left to his right, and at the close of March 30th, with 10,000 infantry and cavalry, under Pickett, Lee's right menaced Grant's advance at Five Forks. The next morning, Lee, in person, led three brigades from his right and drove Warren's corps behind Gravelly run. Pickett forced Sheridan back to Dinwiddie Court House, but, finding Federal infantry in support, he withdrew to Five Forks, where, detached from support, Sheridan's cavalry and Warren's corps, overlapping his flanks, fell upon and routed him on the 1st of April.

On the morning of the 2d of April, the Federal Sixth corps broke through Lee's attenuated line, four miles southwest of Petersburg. In an attempt to recover that captured line, the brave and impetuous A. P. Hill lost his life, and Lee lost one of the ablest of his corps lieutenants. A fierce contention was kept up all along the lines, the Confederates continuing to fight, in broken masses, with desperate courage. Heavy blows were inflicted upon Grant's solid lines, but numbers at last won, and the enemy gained the rear of Lee's lines on his right. Riding back toward Petersburg from this disaster, General Lee remarked to one of his aides, "This is a sad business, Colonel." And soon after, he added, "It has happened as I told them at Richmond it would happen. The line has been stretched until it is broken." As he continued slowly riding to his rear, the shells from the advancing batteries of the enemy began to burst about him. An eye-witness of the scene writes: "He turned his head over his right shoulder, his cheeks became flushed, and a sudden flash of the eye showed with what reluctance he retired before the fire directed upon him. No other course was left him, however, and he continued to ride slowly toward his inner line—a low earth-

work in the suburbs of the city—where a small force was drawn up, still ardent, hopeful, defiant, and saluting the shells, now bursting above them, with cheers and laughter. It was plain that the fighting spirit of his ragged troops remained unbroken; and the shout of welcome with which they received him, indicated their unwavering confidence in him, despite the untoward condition of affairs."

That Sunday night, the 2d of April, 1865, under cover of darkness, Lee evacuated Petersburg and turned the head of his army, along both banks of the Appomattox, to Amelia Court House, on the line of the Richmond & Danville railroad, which the officials of the Confederate government had passed over, late in the day, after General Lee had telegraphed to President Davis, when in church at Richmond, near the middle of the day, that his lines were broken and he must evacuate Petersburg. The forces in front of Richmond, under Ewell, were called in and marched across the James, by two roads, also toward Amelia Court House, after unwisely setting fire to the storehouses of Richmond and destroying, in conflagration, a large part of the city which for four long years army of invaders had tried in vain to capture.

The cheerfulness with which a veteran soldier accepts whatever the fortunes of war may bring him, was well illustrated by Lee's soldiers in the beginning of this, their last march. One of their comrades writes of them: "In excellent spirits, probably from the highly agreeable contrast of the budding April woods with the squalid trenches, and the long, unfelt joy of an unfettered march through the fields of spring. General Lee shared this hopeful feeling in a very remarkable degree. His expression was animated and buoyant; his seat in the saddle erect and commanding, and he seemed to look forward to assured success in the critical movement which he had now undertaken."

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### CLOSING EVENTS IN SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA AND THE VALLEY.

VERY serious damage was inflicted on the Confederates in Virginia in the last of December, 1864, by the raid, or expedition, of Gen. George Stoneman, of the Federal army, from east Tennessee into southwest Virginia, mainly for the purpose of destroying the salt works at Saltville, from which not only the State of Virginia and the Confederate armies, but also adjacent States of the Confederacy, drew their supplies of salt; the lead mines and works on New river, in Wythe county, from which the Confederacy obtained the larger proportion of its supply of lead for its ordnance department, and the numerous niter works in operation in that part of Virginia. The further object of this expedition was to drive away the Confederate cavalry that was wintering in east Tennessee and Virginia, not far from the Virginia line, and at the same time to damage, as much as possible, the Virginia & East Tennessee railroad, extending from Lynchburg to Bristol, from which large supplies of food and forage were sent to the army of Northern Virginia.

Leaving Knoxville, December 10, 1864, General Gillem's command united with Stoneman's, which had advanced from Cumberland gap, near Bean's Station, east Tennessee, on the 12th, and had a skirmish with the outposts of Gen. Basil Duke near Rogersville; then an action with his advance at Kingsport, Tenn., on the 13th, defeating Duke and driving his command toward Bristol, near which place, at Papertown, on the 14th, Stoneman attacked Vaughn's Tennessee brigade, of the Confederate army, which was guarding the railroad and the main turnpike road leading into the southwestern part of the Great valley of Virginia, and forced him back toward Abingdon. Another skirmish took place on the 15th near that place, and another near Glade Spring, as Vaughn, in falling back, resisted the advance of the Federal raid.

Gen. J. C. Breckinridge, in command of the Confederate forces in southwest Virginia, having been duly advised of the movements of Stoneman's command, promptly made every effort to collect his scattered men to meet them; but in that inclement season it was impossible to get them together at so short a notice. Witcher's regiment of cavalry was nearly 100 miles away, in and near Mercer county, across the mountains to the northeast. A small body of militia, under General Preston, occupied the earthworks that defended the salt works at Saltville.

Pushing forward with great energy, and having at his command some 5,500 men, nearly twice as many as Breckinridge could get together, Stoneman drove Vaughn's and Duke's commands before him, and pressing on passed Glade Spring, paying no attention to the Confederate force at Saltville, until he was delayed, by an action at Marion, on the 16th, but only for a short time, as his superior force enabled him to flank Breckinridge's command and compel the larger portion of it to retreat southward toward North Carolina. Riding rapidly still further up the valley, Stoneman was again opposed, in a skirmish at Mt. Airy, on the 17th and 18th. Detaching a portion of his command from Marion to destroy the lead works, by way of the Rye valley, he sent another portion on to Wytheville, where it destroyed a number of warehouses filled with army supplies, burning a church that had been used for this purpose, and destroying the railway bridges and stations for a few miles northeastward of Wytheville.

Having accomplished so much in the way of damaging the Confederacy, Stoneman retired to the vicinity of Glade Spring, and on the 20th and 21st drove away the small force at the salt works and greatly damaged that important and indispensable salt-making establishment. On the 22d he retired from Saltville. Burbridge's portion of his command then returned westward, by the way of Pound gap, on the 27th, to Catlettsburg, at the mouth of the Big Sandy in Kentucky, and Gillem's command returned to Knoxville on the 29th, reporting that it had marched 461 miles during this expedition, in intensely cold and inclement weather.

The damage inflicted upon southwest Virginia by this Federal raid, in the destruction of railway and turnpike

bridges, railway stations and warehouses, iron works, woolen mills, lead works, and army supplies of all kinds, was very injurious to the Confederacy, greatly crippling its defensive power in that region, and was also a serious blow to the army of Northern Virginia by depriving it of supplies from that great storehouse of agricultural wealth. But the damage inflicted was by no means as great as was claimed by the Federal officers, in command of the expedition, in their official reports. Much of it was soon repaired, and the lead and salt works were again quickly put in operation and the railway trains to running.

Instances of heroism and fidelity to the Confederate cause in these days of extremity were not wanting. Colonel Witcher marched his command 90 miles in twenty-five hours, and reached Marion in time to aid in forcing the enemy to retire, although he was greatly inferior in numbers. Maj. J. Stoddard Johnston, General Breckinridge's adjutant-general, who was at Wytheville without any force, collected six or eight men and held the enemy at bay for two hours, by establishing a picket post, to which they sent in a flag of truce and demanded an unconditional surrender. He agreed, but required a half hour in which to withdraw his troops. The terms were declined, but by his ruse he gained an hour and a half of time, and then left with his four men, having in the meantime saved a considerable quantity of stores by sending them eastward on the railroad. He continued to picket with his handful of men, and kept up communication with General Lee by telegraph, and probably by his bold doings prevented the enemy from advancing further. Adj.-Gen. H. T. Stanton, of the Confederate army, reported that when the Federal forces came to opposite the lead works on New river, and found the ferryboat was on the other side, they offered \$500 to any one who would bring it over; but no one was mercenary enough to respond. They only reached the lead works by having a few bold troopers swim their horses across the deep river.

On the 2d of January, 1865, General Early had a conference with Gen. R. E. Lee, at Richmond, in reference to the difficulties that confronted him in the Shenandoah valley, the lower portion of which was still held by a large army under Sheridan, while but the fragments of an army, chiefly of broken down cavalry, remained in his command. Lee told Early that he was left in the Valley to



create the impression that his force was much larger than it really was, and he instructed him to put on a bold front and do the best he could in holding Sheridan at bay.

In consequence of a great drought, during the summer of 1864, the corn crop in the Valley was a short one, and Sheridan had destroyed much of the crops of small grain and hay. This scarcity of subsistence compelled Early to send Fitz Lee's two brigades of cavalry and part of his artillery to General Lee at Petersburg, and King's battalion of artillery to southwest Virginia. Subsequent withdrawals left Early's army consisting of two small brigades, less than a full regiment in numbers, of Wharton's infantry division, Nelson's battalion of artillery, and the cavalry of Lomax and Rosser.

Early established his headquarters in Staunton, placed his artillery in a camp near Waynesboro, cantoned Wharton's infantry near Fishersville, and widely and far to the front distributed his cavalry—practically almost disbanded it—on outpost duty, in Piedmont, in the Valley and in Appalachia, in camps where forage could be obtained for their horses. Wickham's brigade of cavalry at Barboursville, held the line of Robertson river from its head near Milam's gap, and down the Rapidan to the vicinity of Raccoon ford. Rosser's brigade, with headquarters at Swoope's, eight miles west of Staunton, had its advanced pickets at Milford, in the Page valley of the Shenandoah, on the line of Stony creek near Edenburg, in the main Shenandoah valley, at Harper's Ferry, on Lost river, and on the South Fork of the Potomac, some miles south of Moorefield, while on the west it occupied McDowell. Imboden's brigade, with headquarters at the Upper Tract in Pendleton county, some ten miles north of Franklin, picketed the South Branch of the Potomac, well toward Moorefield, and the North Fork of the Potomac, on the road leading northwest from Franklin. William L. Jackson's brigade, with headquarters at the Warm Springs, picketed the line of Jackson's river, at Hightown and points to the south of that, Cheat mountain, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, near the Big Spring beyond Marlinton, and points in the upper Greenbrier valley. McCausland's brigade, with headquarters at Callahan's, west of Covington, had a camp of observation near the White Sulphur Springs and picketed at Lewisburg. Lomax had his headquarters at Mill-

boro, on the Virginia Central railroad, and Payne's brigade was encamped near Lexington. Such was the disposition, in widely scattered camps of a few cavalymen at each place, many miles from headquarters, with numerous intervening mountains and streams to cross, when Sheridan began his second Valley campaign, starting from Winchester on the 27th of February, 1865.

Rosser's expedition to Beverly, western Virginia, was one of the striking episodes of the early part of the year 1865. Leaving his camp, near Swoope's, on the Virginia Central railroad, eight miles west of Staunton, on January 7th, he crossed the Big North, Shenandoah, Shaw's ridge and Bull Pasture mountains, and encamped that night at McDowell, on the Bull Pasture river. On the 8th, crossing Jackson's River mountain, passing through Monterey and crossing the Alleghany mountain, he encamped at Yeager's, on the Back Alleghany, near the old encampment of Gen. Edward Johnson during the previous winter. On the 9th, crossing Greenbrier river and the Cheat mountains and river, he encamped at Stipe's, near the western foot of Cheat mountain, not far from Huttonsville. On the 10th, marching through Huttonsville and down Tygart's valley, he attacked the Federal camp, that night, at Beverly, having proceeded from Huttonsville on byways east of the Tygart's Valley river, and thus was enabled to attack the enemy's camp in the rear, turning its fortifications, which were constructed with reference to an attack from Parkersburg on the west to Beverly. Just before crossing Files creek, on the north side of which was the encampment of the Eighth and Thirty-fourth Ohio volunteer infantry, General Rosser divided his command into two portions—the Eighth Virginia mounted infantry, commanded by Colonel Cooke moved to the left and attacked the eastern side of the Federal camp, interposing itself between that camp, which was just to the north of Beverly, and its fortifications, thus preventing its occupation; while Rosser's brigade, composed of the Eleventh, Twelfth and Seventh Virginia cavalry regiments and the Eighth Virginia of Payne's brigade, moved farther to the right and attacked the northern side of the camp. The attack was a complete surprise and success.

After caring for his prisoners, destroying the encampment and recuperating his command, on the morning of

the 11th, Rosser, later in the day, started upon his return, and on the 18th reached his old camp near Swoope's.

On the 18th of January, Echols' old brigade of Wharton's division, left for Dublin Depot in southwest Virginia, and McCausland's came to Fishersville, en route to its winter quarters in Alleghany and Greenbrier counties. On the 20th, Jackson's cavalry came, from toward Gordonsville, on its way to winter quarters in Bath and adjacent counties. On the 22d the Federal cavalry captured Early's picket at Edenburg, but was repulsed and the picket retaken. The month of January was very cold and stormy, with intervals of thawing which broke up the roads and made traveling very difficult.

On the 2d of February, two battalions of artillery, under Col. Thomas L. Carter, left the vicinity of Waynesboro and went to Richmond. On the 7th snow fell to the depth of eight inches, interrupting railway communication. On the 8th, Payne's brigade received orders to cross the Blue ridge, from Lexington, where it had gone into camp. There was sadness at headquarters on hearing of the defeat of the Second corps near Petersburg, and of the death of Gen. John Pegram, commanding one of its divisions, who had begun his military career at Rich mountain in the early part of July, 1861. On the 9th, Gen. Fitz Lee left for Richmond. On the 20th a portion of the general hospital of the army, which had so long been located at Staunton, was removed to Richmond, and on the 22d the Churchville company of cavalry also marched for Petersburg.

On the 24th of February, Major-Generals Crook and Kelley, of the Federal army, were brought as prisoners to Staunton, by a squad of McNeill's company of partisan rangers, having been boldly and adroitly captured from their beds at Cumberland, Md., in the midst of an army of 5,000 men, and brought out on the night of the 21st, mounted on their own horses. General Early interviewed these two Federal officers, and General Crook, who was in command of the Federal army at the battle of Cedar Creek, on the morning of September 19th, in the absence of General Sherman, confessed to him that the Sixth corps was as badly damaged, or nearly so, as were the Eighth and Ninth, by Early's attack, and was, in his opinion, in no condition to resist a third attack, if such had been made.

On the 27th of February, the regular monthly court day of Augusta county, there was a large meeting of the citizens of the city and county, which was earnestly addressed by Hon. John Randolph Tucker, Hon. A. H. H. Stuart and others, in reference to supplying the wants of Lee's army. The meeting was quite enthusiastic, and a large subscription of supplies and money was promptly made by those present.

On the 28th of February the enemy was reported as again marching up the Valley with a large force, rumor saying that it was Hancock with 20,000 men. Its advance reached Mt. Jackson the night of the 27th and approached Harrisonburg late on the 28th. Great excitement prevailed in Staunton, military stores were removed and arrangements made for breaking up camp. Many citizens left for places of greater safety. On the 1st of March, General Early broke camp at Staunton and the last train left for the east at 4:30 p. m., just after Early and his staff left Waynesboro, where the army had been ordered to concentrate. The enemy came on rapidly, driving before it the small force of cavalry that opposed its progress, capturing the wagons and cattle of refugees that were trying to escape along the Valley turnpike, and encamped south of Middle river, some four miles from Staunton, some of its scouts coming into the city during the night. It was afterward reported that quite a number of "Jessie scouts," dressed as Confederate soldiers, had not only been in Staunton during the day, but that they had actually assisted in loading the railway trains. A thaw had taken place so that the roads were badly broken up and the mud very deep, except on the macadamized Valley turnpike. The mud was particularly deep between Staunton and Waynesboro, making it very difficult to move trains and artillery. Wharton strongly picketed the road at Fishersville and spent the night in his old camp. The movement of the enemy was so sudden and unexpected that it was impossible to collect the widely scattered cavalry, and Rosser had but about a score of men to watch the enemy's movements. Early's wagon train encamped beyond South river at Waynesboro, in the entrance to Rockfish gap.

On the 2d of March, Wharton's division reached Waynesboro at an early hour, and was put in line of battle, his whole force being only about 800 men, with his left on

the northwest front of the town and his right near the Central railway. He was located on a ridge, on the western edge of the town, with four pieces of artillery placed on his right, near the railroad and on the River road, and on the road leading to Staunton. His left rested in the edge of a small body of woods. The day was bitterly cold, with a biting wind and a steadily falling, heavy sleet. Sheridan came on, at an early hour, and drove in Early's pickets, having destroyed the railroad bridge over Christian's creek as he advanced. He first made a feint of attacking and then fell back, creating the impression that he had retired and gone into camp.

At about 2 p. m. he again advanced in force and formed in line of battle about a mile in front of Waynesboro, across and at right angles to the Staunton road, with skirmishers in front and deployed some distance to the left. Early's artillery opened on this advance, especially that near his left, breaking the enemy's line and compelling them to fall back, seemingly, as could best be observed through the blinding sleet for some distance; but about 3 p. m. a heavy mass of cavalry that had been moving, concealed, from the Federal right, came through the open woods and turned Early's left, which made but a feeble resistance, with its little band of benumbed men, against the mass of well-mounted cavalry that fell on them. The whole line at once gave way, and wild panic and stampede took place. The enemy, its whole force being cavalry and mounted infantry, dashed furiously forward into the swarm of flying men, following those that escaped across the river and the Blue ridge at Rockfish gap, capturing all the artillery and trains and about 1,000 prisoners, many of them citizens and convalescents who had retreated with the army from Staunton. General Early and most of his staff escaped to the mountain. The discomfiture was complete, and nothing was now left to oppose the advance of Sheridan across the Blue ridge and along the line of the Central railroad toward Richmond, or toward James river to cross to Lee's rear, which it did that night and on the morning of the following day, after sending a brigade back down the Valley, with the prisoners and a few of the captured wagons and artillery, but leaving many of the latter stuck in the mud between Staunton and Waynesboro.

On the 4th, Rosser, having collected a portion of his

command, followed down the Valley, after the force conveying the prisoners, and encamped at Middle river. On the 5th, William L. Jackson arrived at Buffalo gap and sent a portion of his cavalry to aid Rosser, by way of the War Springs turnpike to Harrisonburg, where Rosser fell on the enemy's rear, late in the day, and pursued them to Melrose. On the 6th, Colonel Smith's brigade followed down the Valley to join Rosser, who pursued the enemy to Rude's hill, where he again made a vigorous attack on their rear, on the 7th, and came very near recapturing the Confederate prisoners, McNeill having placed his rangers in front of them, at the bridge over the North Fork, thus bringing them between two fires, but they escaped by a ford on a farm road leading westward. Rosser made his attack at 10 a. m. This was probably the last noteworthy engagement that took place in the Shenandoah valley, where more than a hundred notable conflicts had been engaged in during the Confederate war.

On the 9th of March, General Rosser, who was now the ranking officer remaining in the Valley, having collected quite a body of his cavalry and learning that Sheridan's cavalry had turned from Charlottesville toward Lynchburg, determined to intercept and turn them back. Imboden's brigade, from the South Branch valley, reached Staunton on the 10th, and on the 11th Rosser marched, at sunrise, with about 500 men, toward Lexington, encamping at Bell's, beyond Midway; marching at sunrise of the 12th, crossing the Blue ridge at Tye River gap, then by way of Massie's mills and Fleetwood and on by Hubbard's to Harris', three miles beyond Lovingston, where he went into camp at midnight. Sheridan had been frustrated in his attempt to get to the rear of Lee's army by finding that the bridge across the James, at Hardwickville, was burned, and had turned down the river toward Scottsville, destroying property of all kinds as he went.

On the 13th, Rosser took the old stage road leading toward Charlottesville as far as Rockfish river, where he turned, through byways, toward Scottsville on the James, which he passed through, and marched down the river for five miles, following Sheridan's rear, along desperately muddy and badly cut up roads, until 10 p. m. On the 14th the pursuit was continued for 20 miles to

Columbia, where a rest of three hours was taken, and then the march was continued across to the "Three-Chop" road, some 15 miles, to Hadensville, where camp was taken at 11 p. m. Evidence of destruction of property of all kinds lined the roads that Rosser followed.

Marching again on the 15th, by way of Thompson's cross-roads, Payne's mill, Salem church, the Louisa road and Goodall's tavern, Ashland was reached and bivouac taken at 11 p. m., the enemy having been driven from that place about dark, by a force from Richmond. On the 16th Rosser moved toward Hanover Court House. On the 27th of March the brigades of Jackson and Imboden, returning to the lower Valley, reached Churchville, eight miles northwest of Staunton, having turned back from following after Sheridan at Hanover Junction. On the 30th, Gen. L. L. Lomax was ordered to take command of the Valley district.

On April 3d rumors reached Staunton, first that Richmond had been evacuated, and second that the Federals were again coming up the Valley, and that some 300 had reached Woodstock, but that Col. C. T. O'Ferrall had attacked these in their camp at Hawkinstown and routed them. Lomax at once impressed teams to haul his stores to Lexington. On the 4th the enemy advanced to Fisher's Hill and on the 5th to Maurertown, the Confederate cavalry skirmishing with them as they advanced. On the 6th, report having arrived that the enemy had again retired down the Valley, Lomax started toward Lexington and marched ten miles. On the 7th, passing through Lexington and by way of the mouth of Buffalo, the march was continued to the Rope Ferry, on James river below Balcony Falls, a distance of 46 miles. Great excitement prevailed among the people, and wild rumors of every kind were flying about.

On Saturday, April 8th, Lomax continued his march down the James, by the Amherst road, to Lynchburg, reaching there with his staff about 2 p. m., followed by his command after dark. That city was found greatly excited at the near approach of the enemy from the west, a few hundred as reported, and the citizens had determined to surrender the place. General Lomax soon restored confidence, and collecting convalescents and other soldiers that had straggled in, he took possession of the trenches covering the front of the city; but soon learning that the

force from the west had retired, and hearing rumors that disaster had overtaken General Lee's army at Appomattox Station, he marched toward Farmville, but returned and encamped near Lynchburg, his command having traveled 36 miles.

On Sunday, April 9th, General Lomax, accompanied by Engineer Hotchkiss, made an inspection of the defenses of Lynchburg, then went to his camp, three miles down the James, where rumor after rumor came in, saying that General Lee had had a battle on the 8th, losing most of his train and artillery; and that there was further combat on the morning of the 9th, when he had surrendered. These rumors were confirmed, later in the day, although there were some officers present who were of the opinion that Lee had escaped, with part of his army, toward Danville. Gloom and sadness pervaded the entire community. Later in the day Generals Rosser and Munford arrived, with the remnants of their forces and Lynchburg swarmed with broken and fugitive fragments of commands.

On the 10th, Lomax marched, at 6 a. m., toward Danville, by way of Rustburg, his command reaching Pannill's bridge, on the Staunton, or Roanoke river. He established his headquarters four miles further on at McDaniel's, after a ride of 30 miles. Rosser, with his staff, rode on to Danville, expecting to meet Gen. R. E. Lee and his army at that point. The whole country was full of soldiers claiming to have escaped from Lee's surrender. On the 11th, Lomax's command marched, by way of Chalk Level, to seven miles beyond Pittsylvania Court House, toward Danville. On the 12th positive and reliable information was received that Gen. Robert E. Lee had surrendered himself and the army of Northern Virginia. As soon as the troops were reliably informed as to this momentous and opinion-changing event, a complete demoralization and disintegration of the cavalry and artillery of Lomax's command took place; nearly all the Virginia troops determining to go home, as the surrender of General Lee led them to firmly believe that there was no further hope for the Confederacy. Large numbers of soldiers swarmed across the country that had left the army of Northern Virginia without surrendering, though but few had brought away their arms. A portion of the cavalry went away during the night of the 11th. On the 12th



Col. William Nelson, one of the most chivalric of an army of chivalrous men, disbanded his artillery battalion, leaving his guns at Pittsylvania Court House, and distributing the horses among his men, as he sadly bade them God-speed to their homes. General Lomax went to Danville to see the secretary of war; his cavalry division melted away during the day, and but few were left to follow the gallant Gen. William L. Jackson, as, indulging a forlorn hope, he turned back toward the Valley. General Rosser, after having conferred with the secretary of war, John C. Breckinridge, at Danville, rode back to Lynchburg and disbanded his division. Nearly every house in all the region westward from Appomattox was full of soldiers returning to their homes, and of deserters and skulkers that were coming out of their holes.

The cavalry from Grant's army reached Lynchburg on the 13th. The remnants of Jackson's and Lomax's divisions of cavalry, that had retired to the Valley, disbanded at Buchanan, on the 15th, until the 1st of May. On the 17th it was learned that General Hancock, in command of the Federal forces in the lower Valley, had invited all soldiers in that region, belonging to the army of Northern Virginia, to come in and be paroled on the same terms as were those that were captured at Appomattox Court House, saying that all that did this would be permitted to remain, undisturbed, at their homes. The proposition of President Lincoln that Virginia should come back to the Union, without conditions, gained circulation on the 18th, and exercised a favorable influence upon the entire community.

Late in the month of April, bands of marauders terrorized the people by gathering up what they claimed to have been Confederate government property. In reality they were stealing cattle, sheep and other things, wherever they could find them. A conflict of citizens took place with some of these, three miles from Staunton, on the 20th, on which day word came to the Valley that Lincoln had been assassinated. There was a general expression of indignation and profound regret at this sad and untimely event.

On the 24th of April the full bench of the justices of the peace of Augusta county, one of the leading ones of Virginia in all respects, met in Staunton, to take steps to prevent the plundering and stealing that was going on

throughout the county by these bands of men pretending to gather up public property, and issued an address to all the people, calling on them to abide by the laws; the sheriff was also ordered to go on with the collection of taxes. Many men of the soldier element were still in a state of uncertainty as to what to do.

On the 29th, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, some 800 Federal soldiers marched into Staunton and went into camp near the city. They were very quiet and disturbed no one. Generals Rosser and William L. Jackson, who were in Staunton, left in the morning of that day. On Monday, May 1st, the Federal provost marshal commenced paroling soldiers of the Confederacy, more offering for parole than could be accommodated. Large numbers of negroes collected at the Federal camp. Rosser and Jackson, with a few followers, left for the southwest of the Valley on the morning of the 2d, and the Federal troops left Staunton, returning toward Winchester.

On Monday, May 8th, many of the citizens of Augusta county met in Staunton, declaring that armed resistance had ceased in Augusta county and that the only way to make the laws conform to those of the United States was, from necessity, to call a convention of the State of Virginia, on the basis of the members of the house of delegates, and recommending the appointment of a committee to go to Richmond and ascertain whether the Federal authorities would allow such a body to meet and deliberate. Gen. John B. Baldwin endorsed the resolutions, in forcible and patriotic remarks, and they were unanimously adopted, and the chairman was authorized to appoint the committee. This action by this influential county and the able committee named to represent it, finally led to the appointment of a committee of nine, representing the whole State, that had much to do in securing the political rehabilitation of Virginia and her ultimate restoration to the Union.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN AND LEE'S SURRENDER.

ON Sunday, April 2, 1865, the day following the defeat of Pickett at Five Forks, the day of the breaking of the Petersburg lines and the death of A. P. Hill, General Lee sent the following dispatch to Gen. J. C. Breckinridge, the Confederate secretary of war:

I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till night. I am not certain that I can do that. If I can I shall withdraw to-night north of the Appomattox, and, if possible, it will be better to withdraw the whole line to-night from James river. The brigades on Hatcher's run are cut off from us; the enemy have broken through our lines and intercepted between us and them, and there is no bridge over which they can cross the Appomattox this side of Goode's or Beaver's, which are not very far from the Danville railroad. Our only chance, then, of concentrating our forces is to do so near the Danville railway, which I shall endeavor to do at once. I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond to-night. I will advise you later, according to circumstances.

This dispatch was received in Richmond at 10:40 of the morning of Sunday, April 2, 1865, and was at once sent to President Davis, who was at that time attending service at St. Paul's church, not far from the war department. He at once left the church and preparations were begun for the immediate evacuation of Richmond; and late in the day the officials of the Confederate States government took a train for Danville, and those of the State of Virginia started toward Lynchburg.

On the afternoon of the 2d, at 4:55, a dispatch from General Lee read: "I think the Danville road will be safe until to-morrow;" but at 7 p. m. he communicated:

It is absolutely necessary that we should abandon our position to-night or run the risk of being cut off in the morning. I have given all the orders to officers on both sides of the river, and have taken every precaution that I can to make the movement successful. It will be a difficult operation, but I hope not impracticable. Please give all orders that you find necessary in and about Richmond. The troops will be directed to Amelia Court House.

On the 5th of April the most of Lee's army reached Amelia Court House, where, he had been officially informed, he would find a food supply for his army. Of this he subsequently wrote: "Not finding the supplies

ordered to be placed at Amelia Court House, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence for the men and horses. The delay was fatal and could not be retrieved." That day General Grant, accompanied by the Second and Sixth corps, reached the Richmond & Danville road at Jetersville, beyond Amelia Court House, and placed a superior force across Lee's advance. It is more than probable that if Lee could have rationed his army at Amelia Court House, he would have pushed his way through Sheridan's opposition and marched to Danville. The same night the Ninth corps, following along the Southside railroad, reached Nottoway Court House, within a short march of Burkeville Junction of the Richmond & Danville road. It was evident, and doubtless well known by Lee, that the entire Federal army could now be concentrated, in a few hours, to oppose his march toward Danville and a junction with Johnston. Under these circumstances, on the night of the 5th, Lee left Amelia Court House and marched northward and westward, seeking to reach Farmville, on the way to Lynchburg as his objective, hoping to thus place his army west of Grant and in a position to draw supplies from the depot at Lynchburg.

On the 6th, Sheridan's cavalry, accompanied by the Sixth corps, interposed between the breaks in Lee's marching columns at the passage of Sailor's creek, not far from where that stream enters the Appomattox. Lee's strong arm, the artillery, which had always rendered most efficient service whenever called on, was not at hand in this emergency, and the Federal Second corps fell upon the rear guard of the Confederate Second corps under Gordon, and captured nearly 8,000 of Lee's men, together with Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Hunton, Corse, DuBose and G. W. Custis Lee. Many of those captured were the men that Ewell had brought, from the immediate defenses of Richmond, to Lee at Amelia Court House, following the highway along the Richmond & Danville railroad.

Reaching Farmville on the 6th, Lee found bread and meat for his men, whose principal subsistence since leaving Petersburg had been parched corn. On the 7th, four miles beyond Farmville, Lee formed line of battle in opposition to Crook's cavalry and the Federal Second corps and repulsed their attack.

From Farmville, Lee had turned northward to the old Richmond and Lynchburg stage road, on the north side of the Appomattox river, and on the 8th he was striving, by that circuitous way, to again get beyond Grant's advance and reach Lynchburg, which was now his objective point. Sheridan's cavalry, accompanied by Gibbon with the Twenty-fourth infantry corps, following the more direct and shorter road, secured possession of the Lynchburg road at Appomattox station in the afternoon of the 8th, and effectually blocked Lee's further progress toward Lynchburg.

On the morning of the 7th, from Farmville, Grant, as he says, "feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless," sent the following letter to General Lee:

GEN. R. E. LEE:

General: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Early on the morning of the 8th, while still at Farmville, Grant received the following reply, dated the 7th:

LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT:

General: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

To this Grant immediately sent the following reply:

GEN. R. E. LEE:

General: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT.

The Federal pursuit was resumed at the same time, Meade following Lee north of the Appomattox, while Sheridan, with the Twenty-fourth and Fifth corps, pushed

forward by the direct road to Appomattox station, where the stage road to Lynchburg, the one Lee was following, reaches and crosses the Southside railroad. Lee turned upon Meade with frequent contention, during the 8th, holding him back by his rear guard. Late in the afternoon Sheridan reached Appomattox station, drove away Lee's advance guard and "captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army," writes Grant in his report. About midnight of that day, April 8th, Grant, who accompanied Meade in following after Lee, received the following note from the latter:

LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT:

General: I received at a late hour your note of today. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think that the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 a. m. to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

R. E. LEE, General.

On the morning of the 9th of April, when Lee found that Grant's infantry had possession of the road he was following toward Lynchburg, he said, with suppressed emotion: "There is nothing left but to go to General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths." Then, after a thoughtful pause, he added: "How easily I could get rid of this and be at rest. I have only to ride along the line and all will be over. But it is our duty to live. What will become of the women and children of the South, if we are not here to protect them?" At about this time he received, in reply to his of the 8th, the following note, of the 9th, from General Grant:

GEN. R. E. LEE:

General: Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace the meeting proposed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertain the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the morning of Sunday, April 9th, just as Lee's advance was making a desperate charge in endeavoring to break through Sheridan's cavalry at Appomattox station, the Fifth and Twenty-fourth corps of Federal infantry advanced and drove back the Confederate charge. At about that time a white flag was sent, from the Confederate lines, "requesting a suspension of hostilities, pending negotiations for a surrender." Lee at this juncture, accepting the inevitable, addressed the following note to Grant:

LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT:

General: I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

After dispatching this reluctantly written note, General Lee exchanged his war-worn uniform for a new one that he had in his baggage, and rode to Appomattox Court House, where arrangements had been made for the solicited interview between General Grant and himself, at the house of a Mr. McLean, who had removed to this remote place from the battlefield of Manassas, in which he was living in July, 1861, only to have in his new house, four years later, the closing scene of the bloody drama of the great civil war.

The two great commanders soon met, and after a brief but courteous interview, the terms of surrender were agreed to and formulated in the following correspondence:

Appomattox Court House, Va., April 9, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE:

General: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate; the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865.

LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT:

General: I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.

The courtesy of General Grant, on this memorable and to Lee soul-trying occasion, could not have been surpassed. On the suggestion of General Lee that most of the horses of the Confederate privates were their personal property, Grant directed that they should be allowed to retain them; and on intimation that Lee's men were without rations, he promptly ordered that they should be abundantly supplied from the captured trains. He showed not the slightest spirit of exultation, in his demeanor, at the grand victory he had achieved, and quickly repressed a disposition, manifested by a portion of his army, to celebrate its triumph with salvos of artillery.

On the morning of the day of the surrender, Lee had, according to the reports of his ordnance officers, 7,892 organized infantry with arms, less than 2,100 effective cavalry, and but 63 pieces of artillery; a mere handful in contrast with the mighty host of 107,496 (reported as in Grant's command on the 10th of April) that surrounded him, and a portion of which his half-starved but ever heroic veterans, though few in number, were actually driving before them at the very moment he sent forward a flag of truce.

Dr. Henry Alexander White describes the feelings of Lee's veterans who were present at this time (in his *Life of R. E. Lee* in "The Heroes of the Nations" series), in these words:

Among the Confederate soldiers themselves there had been scarcely thought of surrender. When they saw their beloved leader riding back from the place of negotiations, their grief was well-nigh unspeakable. They halted his horse and gathered in clusters about him. Tears were running down every cheek as the grim, ragged veterans came up to wring his hand. Only sobs were heard, or prayers uttered in broken words, calling down the benedictions of Heaven upon Lee. The tears in his own eyes formed his answer to the agony of his men. He could only say, in a tone that trembled with sorrow, "Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best I could for you. My heart is too full to say more."



On the next day, Monday, April 10th, General Lee issued, to the survivors of the famous army of Northern Virginia, the following farewell order:

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 9.

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, April 10, 1865.

After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

By the terms of the agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged.

You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed; and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you His blessing and protection.

With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

R. E. LEE, General.

General Grant, in his official report, dated July 22, 1865, said: "General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers." After congratulating his soldiers for the success of their efforts, he concluded his report in these noble words: "Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor."

Leaving Maj.-Gen. John Gibbon at Appomattox, with the Fifth and Twenty-fourth army corps and McKenzie's cavalry, to complete the paroling of the surrendered army and take charge of public property, General Grant immediately ordered the rest of his army back to the vicinity of Burkeville, the junction of the Southside and the Richmond & Danville railroads. The losses of the Union army under Grant, from March 29th to April 9th, the period of the Appomattox campaign, were 10,780; numbers that attest the character of the last struggle of the army of Northern Virginia.

From "near Appomattox Court House," where he had tarried after the surrender, Gen. R. E. Lee, on the 12th

of April, 1865, made his last report of military operations of the army under his control, to President Davis, in these words:

Mr. President: It is with pain that I announce to Your Excellency the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia. The operations which preceded this result will be reported in full. I will therefore only now state that, upon arriving at Amelia Court House on the morning of the 4th with the advance of the army, on the retreat from the line in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and not finding supplies ordered to be placed there, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence for men and horses. This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved. The troops, wearied by continual fighting and marching for several days and nights, obtained neither rest nor refreshment; and on moving, on the 5th, on the Richmond & Danville railroad, I found at Jetersville the enemy's cavalry, and learned of the approach of his infantry and the general advance of his army toward Burkeville. This deprived us of the use of the railroad, and rendered it impracticable to procure from Danville the supplies ordered to meet us at points of our march. Nothing could be obtained from the adjacent country. Our route to the Roanoke was therefore changed, and the march directed upon Farmville, where supplies were ordered from Lynchburg. The change of route threw the troops over the roads pursued by the artillery and wagon trains west of the railroad, which impeded our advance and embarrassed our movements.

On the morning of the 6th, General Longstreet's corps reached Rice's station, on the Lynchburg railroad. It was followed by the commands of Generals Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon, with orders to close it as fast as the progress of the trains would permit, or as they could be directed on roads farther west. General Anderson, commanding Pickett's and B. R. Johnson's divisions, became disconnected with Mahone's division, forming the rear of Longstreet. The enemy's cavalry penetrated the line of march through the interval thus left and attacked the wagon train moving toward Farmville. This caused serious delay in the march of the center and rear of the column, and enabled the enemy to mass upon their flank. After successive attacks, Anderson's and Ewell's corps were captured or driven from their position. The latter general, with both of his division commanders, Kershaw and Custis Lee, and his brigadiers, were taken prisoners. Gordon, who all the morning, aided by Gen. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, had checked the advance of the enemy on the road from Amelia Springs and protected the trains, became exposed to his combined assaults, which he bravely resisted and twice repulsed; but the cavalry having been withdrawn to another part of the line of march, and the enemy massing heavily on his front and both flanks, renewed the attack about 6 p. m., and drove him from the field in much confusion.

The army continued its march during the night, and every effort was made to reorganize the divisions which had been shattered by the day's operations; but the men being depressed by fatigue and hunger, many threw away their arms, while others followed the wagon trains and embarrassed their progress. On the morning of the 7th, rations were issued to the troops as they passed Farmville. but the safety of the trains requiring their removal upon the ap-

proach of the enemy, all could not be supplied. The army, reduced to two corps, under Longstreet and Gordon, moved steadily on the road to Appomattox Court House; thence its march was ordered by Campbell Court House, through Pittsylvania, toward Danville. The roads were wretched and the progress slow. By great efforts the head of the column reached Appomattox Court House on the evening of the 8th. and the troops were halted for rest. The march was ordered to be resumed at 1 a. m. of the 9th. Fitz Lee, with the cavalry, supported by Gordon, was ordered to drive the enemy from his front, wheel to the left, and cover the passage of the trains; while Longstreet, who from Rice's station had formed the rear guard, should close up and hold the position. Two battalions of artillery and the ammunition wagons were directed to accompany the army, the rest of the artillery and wagons to move toward Lynchburg. In the early part of the night the enemy attacked Walker's artillery train near Appomattox station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and were repelled. Shortly afterward their cavalry dashed toward the Court House, till halted by our line. During the night there were indications of a large force massing on our left and front. Fitz Lee was directed to ascertain its strength, and to suspend his advance till daylight if necessary. About 5 a. m. on the 9th, with Gordon on his left, he moved forward and opened the way. A heavy force of the enemy was discovered opposite Gordon's right, which, moving in the direction of Appomattox Court House, drove back the left of the cavalry and threatened to cut off Gordon from Longstreet, his cavalry at the same time threatening to envelop his left flank. Gordon withdrew across the Appomattox river, and the cavalry advanced on the Lynchburg road and became separated from the army.

Learning the condition of affairs on the lines, where I had gone under the expectation of meeting General Grant to learn definitely the terms of the surrender of the army, I requested a suspension of hostilities until these terms could be arranged. In the interview which occurred with General Grant in compliance with my request, terms having been agreed on, I surrendered that portion of the army of Northern Virginia which was on the field, with its arms, artillery, and wagon trains, the officers and men to be paroled, retaining their side-arms and private effects. I deemed this course the best under all the circumstances by which we were surrounded.

On the morning of the 9th, according to the reports of the ordnance officers, there were 7,892 organized infantry with arms, with an average of seventy-five rounds of ammunition per man. The artillery, though reduced to sixty-three pieces, with ninety-three rounds of ammunition, was sufficient. These comprised all the supplies of ordnance that could be relied on in the State of Virginia. I have no accurate report of the cavalry, but believe it did not exceed 2,100 effective men. The enemy were more than five times our numbers. If we could have forced our way one day longer, it would have been at a great sacrifice of life, and at its end I did not see how a surrender could have been avoided. We had no subsistence for man or horse, and it could not be gathered in the country. The supplies ordered from Lynchburg could not reach us, and the men, deprived of food and sleep for many days, were worn out and exhausted.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

His Excellency Jefferson Davis.

R. E. LEE, General.

Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, who commanded the cavalry corps of the army of Northern Virginia during the Appomattox campaign, sent to Gen. R. E. Lee, from Richmond, April 22, 1865, a report of the operations of his command from the 28th of March to the 8th of April. Of the events near the time of the surrender, he wrote:

During the evening of the 8th I received orders to move the cavalry corps to the front and to report in person to the commanding general. Upon arriving at his headquarters I found General Longstreet there, and we were soon after joined by General Gordon. The condition of our situation was explained by the commanding general to us as the commanders of his three corps, and the correspondence between General Grant and himself, as far as it had then progressed, was laid before us. It was decided that I should attack the enemy's cavalry at daylight, then reported as obstructing our further march, Gordon was to support me, and in case nothing but cavalry was discovered we were to clear it from our route and open a way for our remaining troops; but in case they were supported by heavy bodies of infantry, the commanding general should at once be notified, in order that a flag of truce should be sent to accede to the only alternative left us. The enemy enabled to take position across our line of march by moving up from Appomattox station, which they reached earlier than our main advance, in consequence of our march being retarded by our wagon trains.

At daybreak on the 9th, Gordon's command, numbering about 1,600 muskets, was formed in line of battle a mile west of Appomattox Court House, on the Lynchburg road. The cavalry corps was formed on his right, W. H. F. Lee's division being nearest the infantry; Rosser's in the center, and Munford's on the extreme right, making a mounted force of about 2,400 men. Our attack was made about sunrise, and the enemy's cavalry quickly driven out of the way, with a loss of two guns and a number of prisoners. The arrival at this time of two corps of their infantry necessitated the retiring of our lines, during which, and knowing what would be the result, I withdrew the cavalry, W. H. F. Lee retiring toward our rear, and Rosser and Munford out toward Lynchburg, having cleared that road of the enemy. Upon hearing that the army of Northern Virginia had surrendered, the men were generally dispersed and rode off to their homes, subject to reassembling for a continuation of the struggle. I rode out in person with a portion of W. H. F. Lee's division, the nearest to me at that time, and previous to the negotiations between the commanders of the two armies. It will be recalled that my action was in accordance with the views I had expressed in the council the night before—that if a surrender was compelled the next day, I would try to extricate the cavalry, provided it could be done without compromising the action of the commanding general, but that I would not avail myself of a cessation of hostilities pending the existence of a truce. I had an understanding with General Gordon that he should communicate to you the information of the presence of the enemy's infantry upon the road in our front. Apart from the fond, though forlorn hope that future operations were still in store for the cavalry, I was desirous that they should not be included in the capitulations because the ownership of their horses was vested in themselves, and

I deemed it doubtful that terms could be offered allowing such ownership to continue. A few days convinced me of the impracticability of longer entertaining such hopes, and I rode into the Federal lines and accepted for myself the terms offered the officers of the army of Northern Virginia. My cavalry are being paroled at the nearest places for such purposes in their counties. . . .

I particularly regret not being able to do justice in this, the only way I can, to the many acts of gallantry performed by officers and men upon the memorable retreat; but such conduct is usually derived from the reports of subordinate officers, the absence of which will explain it. I testify, however, to the general conduct of my officers and men as highly creditable to themselves upon every occasion which called forth its display. They fought every day, from the 29th of March to the 9th of April, both inclusive, with a valor as steady as of yore, and whose brightness was not dimmed by the increasing clouds of adversity. I desire to call attention to the marked and excellent behavior of Generals W. H. F. Lee, Rosser, and Munford, commanding divisions. . . . The notice of the commanding general is also directed to Brig.-Gens. Henry A. Wise and Eppa Hunton, commanding infantry brigades, and who were more or less under my command until Amelia Court House was reached. The disheartening surrounding influences had no effect upon them; they kept their duty plainly in view, and they fully performed it. The past services of Gen. Henry A. Wise, his antecedents in civil life, and his age, caused his bearing upon this most trying retreat to shine conspicuously forth. His unconquerable spirit was filled with as much earnestness and zeal in April, 1865, as when he first took up arms four years ago, and the freedom with which he exposed a long life laden with honors proved he was willing to sacrifice it if it would conduce toward attaining the liberty of his country.

[After paying well-merited tributes to the officers of his staff, in the conclusion of his report, Gen. Fitz Lee has this to say of a typical young Virginian:] I deeply regret being obliged to mention the dangerous wounding of my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Charles Minnegarode, Jr. One of the last minie balls that whistled on its cruel errand over the field of Appomattox passed entirely through the upper part of his body. He fell at my side, where for three long years he had discharged his duties with an affectionate fidelity never exceeded, a courage never surpassed. Wonderfully passing unharmed through the many battles fought by the two principal armies in this State (for an impetuous spirit often carried him where the fire was hottest), he was left at last, writhing in his great pain, to the mercy of the victors upon the field of our last struggle. . . . Lieutenant Minnegarode combined the qualities of an aide-de-camp to a general officer in a remarkable degree. His personal services to me will forever be prized and remembered, whilst his intelligence, amiability and brightness of disposition rendered him an object of endearment to all.

Brevet Brig.-Gen. Charles A. Whittier, of the United States volunteers, in a paper read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, makes the following comments:

The army of Northern Virginia will deservedly rank as the best

army which has existed on this continent; suffering privations unknown to its opponents, it fought well from the early Peninsula days to the surrender of that small remnant at Appomattox. It seemed always ready, active, mobile; without doubt it was composed of the best men of the South, rushing to what they considered the defense of their country against a bitter invader; and they took the places assigned them, officer or private, and fought until beaten by superiority of numbers. The North sent no such army to the field, and its patriotism was of an easier kind; there was no rallying-cry which drove all the best—the rich and the educated—to join the fighting armies. All avocations here went on without interruption; the law, the clergy, educational institutions, merchants and traders, suffered nothing from a diminution of their working forces; we had loyal leagues, excellent sanitary and Christian commissions, great "war governors" (Andrew, Curtin and Morton), and secretaries, organizers of victory; we had a people full of loyalty and devotion to the cause, and of hatred for the neighbor who differed as to the way in which the war should be conducted, never realizing that the way was by going, or sending their best and brightest.

As a matter of comparison: We have lately read that from William and Mary's college, Virginia, thirty-two out of thirty-five professors and instructors abandoned the college work and joined the army in the field. Harvard college sent one professor from its large corps of professors and instructors!

We thought our own Massachusetts a pattern of loyalty and patriotism during the war. Read the "Record of Massachusetts Volunteers," as published by the State; the bounties paid (thirteen million dollars by the State, and more millions by the cities and towns—a worthless expenditure—to give Massachusetts a nominal credit, but of no service in sending good fighting men to the front); the desertions; the hosts of men who never joined their regiments; and there is so much to be ashamed of! An effort to fill the required quota, without reference to the good service to be rendered! The enlisting officers at one time put out their posters with something like this: "Enlist in the heavy artillery regiments. No marching, no fighting, comfortable quarters, etc.!" [General Whittier then furnishes a list of Massachusetts artillery and infantry regiments, containing 20,957 men, of which only 95 were killed in battle.] This does not indicate brilliant or useful service; and yet the material was probably better than that of any regiments of the State. The same class of men in the South was in the thickest of the fight, and their intelligence and patriotism did a great work. And what a power these twenty thousand men I have mentioned would have been, with a little discipline and drill, added to the army of the Potomac—an army corps of twenty thousand young men from Massachusetts alone! If it was so with us, it is reasonable to suppose that other Northern States pursued the same selfish policy.

## APPENDIX.

### LIST OF REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS FROM VIRGINIA IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES ARMY, 1861-65. COMPILED IN WAR RECORDS OFFICE, UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT.

First Artillery regiment (known as Hardaway's battalion, also as First Virginia battalion light artillery): Brown, J. Thompson, major, colonel; Cabell, Henry Coalter, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Coleman, Lewis M., lieutenant-colonel; Hardaway, Robert A., major, lieutenant-colonel; Moseley, Edgar F., major, lieutenant-colonel; Randolph, George W., colonel; Stribling, Robert M., major, lieutenant-colonel; Watson, David, major.\*

First Artillery battalion. (See First regiment.)

First Cavalry battalion (merged into Ninth Cavalry): Beale, Richard L. T., major; Johnson, John E., lieutenant-colonel.

First Cavalry battalion Local Defense Troops: Browne, William M., colonel.

First regiment Partisan Rangers. (See Sixty-second mounted infantry.)

First Cavalry regiment: Brien, L. Tiernan, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Carter, R. Welby, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Drake, James H., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Irving, Charles R., major, lieutenant-colonel; Jones, William E., colonel; Lee, Fitzhugh, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Morgan, William A., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Stuart, James E. B., colonel; Swann, Robert, major.

First Infantry battalion regulars (Irish battalion): Bridgford, D. B., major; Munford, John D., major; Seddon, John, major.

First Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops (Armory battalion): Ayres, Thomas H., major; Downer, William S., major; Ford, C. H., major.

First battalion Reserves: Duke, Richard Thomas Walker, lieutenant-colonel; Strange, James M., major.

First battalion Valley Reserves: Miller, W. A. J., major.

First Infantry Local Defense Troops: James, James F., colonel.

First Infantry regiment (Williams' Rifles): Dooley, John, major; Fry, William H., lieutenant-colonel; Langley, Frank H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Moore, Patrick T., colonel; Mumford, William P., major; Norton, George F., major; Palmer, William H., major; Skinner, Frederick G., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Williams, Lewis B., Jr., colonel.

First Infantry regiment State Line: Berkley, Henry M., lieutenant-colonel; Nighbert, James A., major; Radford, Richard C. W., colonel.

\* Names are arranged in alphabetical order.

First Militia regiment, Seventh brigade: Albert, H. St. George, colonel; Lutz, Levi P., major; Sipe, Emanuel, lieutenant-colonel.

First regiment Reserves: Averett, C. E., major; Boswell, T. T., major, lieutenant-colonel; Farinholt, Benjamin L., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

First regiment State Reserves, second-class militia: Danforth, John B., colonel; Spencer, Thomas J., lieutenant-colonel.

First Kanawha regiment Infantry (became the Twenty-second regiment, which see).

Second Heavy Artillery regiment (Home Artillery, or Virginia Home Artillery. Became Twenty-second battalion Virginia Infantry, May 23, 1862): Burwell, W. P., major; Pannill, Joseph, lieutenant-colonel; Tansill, Robert, colonel.

Second Cavalry battalion (transferred to Fifth Cavalry): Pate, H. Clay, lieutenant-colonel.

Second Cavalry regiment (also called Thirtieth regiment): Breckinridge, Cary, major, lieutenant-colonel; Graves, William F., major; Langhorne, John S., major; Munford, Thomas T., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Radford, Richard Carlton Walker, colonel; Watts, James W., lieutenant-colonel.

Second battalion Reserves: Cook, Edward B., major; Guy, John H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Scruggs, D. E., major, lieutenant-colonel; Waller, Richard P., lieutenant-colonel.

Second Infantry regiment: Allen, James W., colonel; Botts, Lawson, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Colston, Raleigh T., major, lieutenant-colonel; Jones, Francis B., major; Lackland, Francis, lieutenant-colonel; Moore, Edwin L., major; Nadenbousch, John Q. A., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Randolph, William Welford, lieutenant-colonel; Stewart, Charles H., major.

Second Infantry regiment Local Defense Troops: Scruggs, D. E., colonel; Tanner, William E., lieutenant-colonel.

Second Militia regiment, Seventh brigade: Buswell, Thomas, lieutenant-colonel; Finter, Cullen W., major; Reid, Peter C., major; Spittler, Mann, colonel.

Second regiment Reserves: Brockenbrough, colonel.

Second State Reserves. (See Nineteenth Militia.)

Second Kanawha regiment Infantry (became Thirty-sixth regiment, which see).

Second Infantry regiment State Line: Ball, Martin V., major; Harrison, James, lieutenant-colonel; Peters, William E., colonel.

Third Artillery Local Defense Troops: Dorman, James B., major; Porter, John C., colonel; Shields, John P., lieutenant-colonel.

Third Cavalry regiment: Carrington, Henry, major; Carter, William R., major, lieutenant-colonel; Feild, William M., lieutenant-colonel; Goode, Thomas F., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Johnston, Robert, colonel; Owen, Thomas H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Phillips, Jefferson C., major; Thornton, John T., lieutenant-colonel.

Third battalion Reserves: Archer, F. H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Bond, Thomas H., major; Hood, W. H., lieutenant-colonel; Jarvis, William H., major.

Third battalion Valley Reserves: McCune, Samuel, major.

Third Infantry regiment (formerly Third battalion): Callcote, Alexander D., major, lieutenant-colonel; Mayo, Joseph, Jr., lieutenant-



ant-colonel, colonel; Pryor, Roger A., colonel; Pryor, William H., lieutenant-colonel; Scott, Joseph V., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Third Infantry regiment Local Defense Troops (Departmental): Baker, Bolling, major; Henley, John A., major; Jamison, S. G., major; McAnerney, John, Jr., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Sutherland, S. F., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Third Militia regiment, Seventh brigade: Hottel, J. A., lieutenant-colonel; Newell, John H., major; Sibert, James H., colonel.

Third regiment Reserves: Booker, Richard A., colonel; Ewers, William M., major; Leftwich, Joel B., lieutenant-colonel.

Third Infantry regiment State Line: Breckenridge, P. G., major; Clarkson, John N., colonel; Swann, Thomas B., lieutenant-colonel.

Fourth Heavy Artillery regiment (ordered known as Thirty-fourth Virginia Infantry): Bagby, John R., major; Goode, John Thomas, colonel; Harrison, Randolph, lieutenant-colonel; Leigh, J. Wickham, major.

Fourth Cavalry regiment: Hobson, Alexander M., major; Lee, Stephen D., colonel (temporarily); Old, Charles, major, lieutenant-colonel; Payne, William H., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Randolph, Robert, major, lieutenant-colonel; Robertson, Beverly H., colonel; Utterback, Robert E., major; Wickham, Williams C., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Wooldridge, William B., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Fourth Infantry battalion: Tyler, Nat, lieutenant-colonel.

Fourth Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops (Naval battalion): Curlin, Martin W., major; Minor, R. D., major.

Fourth battalion Reserves: Godwin, D. E., major.

Fourth Infantry regiment: Bennett, Matthew D., major; Gardner, Robert D., lieutenant-colonel; Kent, Joseph F., major; Moore, Lewis T., lieutenant-colonel; Preston, James T., colonel; Pendleton, Albert G., major; Ronald, Charles A., colonel; Terry, William, major, colonel.

Fourth Militia regiment, Seventh brigade: Horn, O. P., major; Maupin, William A., colonel.

Fourth regiment Reserves (also called Fifth regiment): Poague, Alpheus W., major, lieutenant-colonel; Preston, Robert T., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Fourth Infantry regiment State Line: Hounshell, David S., colonel; Jackson, William A., lieutenant-colonel; Radford, John T., major.

Fifth Cavalry regiment, Provisional Army (disbanded?): Allston, Benjamin, major; Mullins, John, major.

Fifth Cavalry regiment (consolidated with Fifteenth Cavalry, November 8, 1864): Allen, James H., lieutenant-colonel; Boston, Reuben B., colonel; Douglas, Beverly B., major; Eells, John, major; Harding, Cyrus, Jr., major; Pate, H. Clay, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Fuller, John W., major; Rosser, Thomas L., colonel.

Fifth and Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry (consolidated November 8, 1864): Harding, Cyrus, Jr., major.

Fifth battalion Reserves: Henry, P. M., lieutenant-colonel.

Fifth Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops (Arsenal battalion): Brown, W. Le Roy, lieutenant-colonel; Ennis, Philip J., lieutenant-colonel; Vaughan, John B., major.

Fifth Infantry battalion: Archer, F. H., lieutenant-colonel; Foster, William R., major; Wilson, John P., Jr., major.

Fifth Infantry regiment: Baylor, William S. H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Harman, William H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Harper, Kenton, colonel; Koiner, Absalom, major; Newton, James W., major; Williams, Hazel J., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifth Infantry regiment State Line: Edmundson, David, lieutenant-colonel; Preston, C. H., major; Preston, Robert T., colonel.

Sixth Cavalry regiment: Cabell, J. Grattan, major, lieutenant-colonel; Field, Charles W., colonel; Flournoy, Thomas S., major, colonel; Flournoy, Cabell E., major; Green, John Shac., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Grimsley, Daniel A., major; Harrison, Julien, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Richards, Daniel T., lieutenant-colonel.

Sixth Infantry battalion: Wilson, John P., major.

Sixth Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops (Tredegar battalion): Tanner, William E., major.

Sixth battalion Reserves (also called Sixteenth): Smith, John H. A., major; Smith, Robert, lieutenant-colonel.

Sixth Infantry regiment: Corprew, Thomas J., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Lundy, William T., major, lieutenant-colonel; Mahone, William, colonel; Rogers, George T., major, colonel; Taylor, Robert B., major; Williamson, Henry W., lieutenant-colonel.

Seventh Cavalry regiment: Ashby, Turner, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Dulany, Richard H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Funsten, Oliver R., major; Hatcher, Daniel C., major; Jones, William E., colonel; Marshall, Thomas, major, lieutenant-colonel; McDonald, Angus W., colonel; Myers, Samuel B., major.

Seventh Infantry battalion (merged into Sixty-first regiment): Wilson, Samuel M., lieutenant-colonel.

Seventh Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops: Morton, B. C., major.

Seventh battalion Reserves: Chrisman, George, major.

Seventh Infantry regiment: Flowerree, Charles C., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Kemper, James L., colonel; Patton, Waller Tazewell, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Swindler, Aylett A., major; Williams, Lewis R., Jr., lieutenant-colonel.

Eighth Cavalry battalion (transferred to Tenth Cavalry): Davis, J. Lucius, lieutenant-colonel; Duffield, C. B., major.

Eighth Cavalry regiment: Bowen, Thomas P., major, lieutenant-colonel; Cook, Alphonso F., lieutenant-colonel; Corns, James M., colonel; Edmondson, P. M., major; Fitzhugh, Henry, major, lieutenant-colonel; Jenifer, Walter H., lieutenant-colonel; Jenkins, Albert G., lieutenant-colonel.

Eighth battalion Reserves: Miller, major.

Eighth Infantry regiment: Berkeley, Edmund, major, lieutenant-colonel; Berkeley, Norborne, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Berkeley, William N., major; Hunton, Eppa, colonel; Tebbs, Charles B., lieutenant-colonel; Thrift, James, major.

Ninth Cavalry regiment: Beale, Richard L. T., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Johnson, John E., colonel; Lee, William H. F., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Lewis, Meriwether, major, lieutenant-colonel; Swann, Samuel A., major; Waller, Thomas, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Ninth Infantry battalion (merged into Twenty-fifth regiment): Camden, G. D., Jr., major; Hansbrough, George W., lieutenant-colonel.

Ninth battalion Reserves: Taylor, Arch., major.

Ninth Infantry regiment: Crutchfield, Stapleton, major; Gilliam, James S., major, lieutenant-colonel; Godwin, David J., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Hardin, Mark B., major; Owens, John C., major; Phillips, James J., colonel; Preston, John Thomas Lewis, lieutenant-colonel; Richardson, William J., lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Francis H., colonel.

Ninth Militia regiment: Gresham, Thomas Robert, lieutenant-colonel; Saunders, William A., major.

Tenth Heavy Artillery battalion: Allen, William, major; Hensley, James O., major.

Tenth Cavalry regiment: Caskie, Robert A., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Clement, William B., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Davis, J. Lucius, colonel; McGruder, Zachariah S., lieutenant-colonel; Rosser, J. Travis, major.

Tenth battalion Reserves: Byrd, William W., major.

Tenth Infantry regiment: Coffman, Isaac G., major; Gibbons, Simeon B., colonel; Martz, Dorilas Henry Lee, lieutenant-colonel; Stover, Joshua, major; Walker, Samuel T., major, lieutenant-colonel; Warren, Edward T. H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Eleventh Cavalry battalion: Bradley, Benjamin F., major.

Eleventh Cavalry regiment (formed from Seventeenth battalion and two companies Fifth Virginia Cavalry): Ball, Matt Dulaney, major, lieutenant-colonel; Funsten, Oliver R., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Harness, William H., major; Lomax, Lunsford L., colonel; McDonald, Edward H., major.

Eleventh battalion Reserves: Bosang, William H., major; Wallace, Samuel M., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Eleventh Infantry regiment: Clement, Adam, major (appointment canceled); Funsten, David, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Garland, Samuel, Jr., colonel; Hutter, J. Risque, major; Harrison, Carter H., major; Langhorne, Maurice S., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Otey, Kirkwood, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Twelfth Artillery battalion: Boggs, Francis J., major.

Twelfth Cavalry regiment: Burks, Richard H., lieutenant-colonel; Harman, Asher Waterman, colonel; Knott, John L., major; Massie, Thomas B., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twelfth Infantry regiment: Brackett, Edgar L., major; Feild, Everard Meade, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Jones, Richard W., major; Lewellen, John Richard, major, lieutenant-colonel; May, John P., major; Taylor, Fielding L., lieutenant-colonel; Weisiger, David A., colonel.

Thirteenth Artillery battalion: Gibbes, Wade Hampton, major; King, J. Floyd, major, lieutenant-colonel; Owen, William Miller, major; Belsches, Benjamin W., major; Chambliss, John R., Jr., colonel; Gillette, Joseph E., major; Phillips, Jefferson C., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Savage, Alexander, lieutenant-colonel; Upshaw, Thomas E., major, lieutenant-colonel; Winfield, Benjamin F., major.

Thirteenth Infantry regiment: Crittenden, Charles T., major; Goodman, George Augustus, major, lieutenant-colonel; Hill, Ambrose P., colonel; Sherrard, John B., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Walker, James A., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Fourteenth Cavalry battalion (Chesapeake battalion. Transferred to Fifteenth Cavalry): Burroughs, Edgar, major.

Fourteenth Cavalry regiment: Bailey, Robert Augustus, lieutenant-

ant-colonel; Cochran, James, colonel; Eakle, Frank B., major; Gibson, John A., lieutenant-colonel; Jackson, George, major; Thorburn, Charles E., colonel.

Fourteenth Infantry: Evans, Moses F. T., major, lieutenant-colonel; Godwin, David J., lieutenant-colonel; Hodges, James G., colonel; Poindexter, Parke, lieutenant-colonel; Poore, Robert H., major; Shelton, William D., major; White, William, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Wood, William W., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fourteenth Militia regiment (Eighteenth brigade): Harness, William H., colonel.

Fifteenth Cavalry battalion (Northern Neck Rangers. Transferred to Fifteenth Cavalry): Critcher, John, major.

Fifteenth Cavalry regiment (consolidated with Fifth regiment, November 8, 1864): Ball, William B., colonel; Burroughs, Edgar, major; Collins, Charles Read, major, colonel; Critcher, John, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifteenth Infantry regiment: August, Thomas P., colonel; Clarke, Charles H., major; Crenshaw, James R., lieutenant-colonel; Morrison, Emmet M., major, lieutenant-colonel; Peyton, Thomas G., major, lieutenant-colonel; Tucker, St. George, major, lieutenant-colonel; Walker, John Stewart, major.

Sixteenth Cavalry battalion (transferred to Thirteenth Cavalry): Belsches, Benjamin W., major.

Sixteenth Cavalry regiment: Ferguson, Milton J., colonel; Graham, William L., lieutenant-colonel; Nounnan, James H., major.

Sixteenth Infantry regiment: Colston, Raleigh E., colonel; Crump, Charles A., colonel; Crutchfield, Stapleton, colonel; Ham, Joseph H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Holladay, Francis D., major; Page, John C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Parrish, Henry T., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Whitehead, Richard O., major, lieutenant-colonel; Woodhouse, John T., major.

Seventeenth Cavalry (transferred to Eleventh Cavalry): Funsten, Oliver R., lieutenant-colonel; Patrick, William, major.

Seventeenth Cavalry regiment (formed from French's Cavalry battalion): French, William H., colonel; Smith, Frederick F., major; Tavenner, William C., lieutenant-colonel.

Seventeenth Infantry regiment: Brent, George William, major; Corse, Montgomery D., colonel; Herbert, Arthur, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Marye, Morton, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Munford, William, lieutenant-colonel; Simpson, Robert H., major; Tyler, Grayson, major, lieutenant-colonel.

Eighteenth Artillery battalion: Hardin, Mark B., major.

Eighteenth Cavalry regiment: Beall, David Edward, lieutenant-colonel; Imboden, George W., colonel; Monroe, Alexander, major.

Eighteenth Infantry regiment: Carrington, Henry A., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Cabell, George C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Wall, Edwin G., major; Withers, Robert E., colonel.

Nineteenth Heavy Artillery battalion: Atkinson, John Wilder, major, lieutenant-colonel; Cary, N. R., major.

Nineteenth Cavalry regiment: Downs, George, major; Jackson, William L., colonel; Kesler, Joseph K., major; Thompson, William P., lieutenant-colonel.

Nineteenth Infantry regiment: Boyd, Waller M., major; Cocke, P. St. George, colonel; Ellis, John T., major, lieutenant-colonel;

Gantt, Henry, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Peyton, Charles S., major, lieutenant-colonel; Rust, Armistead Thomson Mason, colonel; Strange, John B., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Taylor, Bennett, major, lieutenant-colonel; Watts, William, major.

Nineteenth Militia regiment (afterward Second State Reserves): Evans, Thomas J., colonel; Powell, D. Lee, lieutenant-colonel; Pendleton, S. T., major.

Twentieth Artillery battalion (De Lagnel's battalion): De Lagnel, Johnston, major; Robertson, James E., major.

Twentieth Cavalry regiment: Arnett, William W., colonel; Evans, Dudley, lieutenant-colonel; Hutton, Elihu, major; Lady, John B., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twentieth Infantry regiment (disbanded): Crenshaw, James R., lieutenant-colonel; Pegram, John, lieutenant-colonel; Tyler, Nat., lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-first Cavalry regiment: Edmundson, David, lieutenant-colonel; Halsey, Stephen P., major; Peters, William E., colonel.

Twenty-first Infantry battalion (Pound Gap battalion. Merged into Sixty-fourth Virginia): Stemp, Campbell, lieutenant-colonel; Thompson, John B., major.

Twenty-first Infantry regiment: Berkeley, William R., major; Cunningham, Richard H., Jr., lieutenant-colonel; Gilham, William, colonel; Kelly, Alfred D., major; Moseley, John R., major; Moseley, William P., lieutenant-colonel; Patton, John M., Jr., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Shipp, Scott, major; Witcher, William A., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Twenty-first Militia regiment: Jones, Warner T., colonel; Seawell, William H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Taliaferro, Thomas S., major; Taylor, Fielding L., lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-second Cavalry regiment: Bowen, Henry S., colonel; Kendrick, Henry F., major; Radford, John T., lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-second Infantry battalion (formed from Second Virginia Artillery): Bowles, John S., major; Johnson, James C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Tayloe, Edward Poinsett, lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-second Infantry regiment (formerly First Kanawha regiment): Bailey, Robert Augustus, major; Barbee, Andrew R., lieutenant-colonel; Jackson, William A., lieutenant-colonel; McDonald, John C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Patton, George S., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Smith, Isaac N., major; Tompkins, Christopher Q., colonel.

Twenty-third Cavalry regiment (formed from consolidation, seven companies Forty-first battalion and two companies O'Ferrall's battalion): Calmese, Fielding H., major; O'Ferrall, Charles T., lieutenant-colonel; White, Robert, colonel.

Twenty-third Infantry battalion: Blessing, William, major; Cecil, William P., major; Derrick, Clarence, lieutenant-colonel; Hounshell, David S., major.

Twenty-third Infantry regiment: Camden, J. D., major; Coleman, Clayton G., Jr., major, lieutenant-colonel; Crenshaw, James H., lieutenant-colonel; Curtis, George W., lieutenant-colonel; Fitzgerald, John P., major, lieutenant-colonel; Pendleton, Joseph H., major; Richardson, Andrew J., major; Scott, Andrew V., major; Taliaferro, William B., colonel; Taliaferro, Alexander G., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Walton, Simeon T., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-fourth battalion Partisan Rangers (disbanded January 5, 1863): Scott, John, major.

Twenty-fourth Cavalry regiment: Barham, Theodore G., lieutenant-colonel; Robertson, John R., major; Robins, William T., colonel.

Twenty-fourth Infantry regiment: Bentley, William W., major; Early, Jubal A., colonel; Hairston, Peter J., Jr., lieutenant-colonel; Hamrick, Joseph A., major; Hammet, J. P., major; Maury, Richard L., major, lieutenant-colonel; Terry, William R., colonel.

Twenty-fifth Cavalry regiment: Edmundson, Henry A., lieutenant-colonel; Hopkins, Warren M., colonel; McConnell, Sylvester P., major.

Twenty-fifth Infantry battalion Local Defense Troops: Bossieux, Louis J., major; Elliott, Wyatt M., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-fifth Infantry regiment: Duffy, Patrick B., lieutenant-colonel; Harper, Wilson, major; Heck, Jonathan M., lieutenant-colonel; Higginbotham, John C., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Lilley, Robert D., major, lieutenant-colonel; Porterfield, George A., colonel; Rege, Albert G., major; Robinson, John A., major, lieutenant-colonel; Smith, George H., colonel; Thompson, William T., major.

Twenty-fifth Militia regiment: Arnold, Mark, colonel; Arnold, P. M., lieutenant-colonel; Lewis, H. B., major.

Twenty-sixth regiment Cavalry (formed from Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh Cavalry battalions): Kesler, Joseph K., lieutenant-colonel; Ruffner, Henry D., major.

Twenty-sixth Infantry battalion: Edgar, George M., major, lieutenant-colonel; Woodram, Richard, major; Council, James C., lieutenant-colonel; Crump, Charles A., colonel; Fitzhugh, Patrick H., major; Garrett, Joshua L., major; Page, Powhatan R., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Perrin, William K., major; Wheelwright, William H., major.

Twenty-seventh Cavalry battalion Partisan Rangers (Trigg's battalion. Transferred to Twenty-fifth Cavalry): Edmundson, Henry A., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-seventh Infantry regiment: Carpenter, Joseph, lieutenant-colonel (appointment declined); Echols, John, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Edmondson, James K., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Frazer, Philip F., major; Gordon, William W., colonel; Grigsby, Andrew J., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Haynes, Charles L., lieutenant-colonel; Paxton, Elisha F., major; Shriver, Daniel M., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Twenty-eighth Artillery battalion: Tabb, William B., major.

Twenty-eighth Infantry regiment: Allen, Robert C., major, colonel; Paul, Samuel B., lieutenant-colonel; Preston, Robert T., colonel; Spessard, Michael P., major; Watts, William, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Wingfield, William L., lieutenant-colonel; Wilson, Nathaniel C., major.

Twenty-ninth Infantry battalion. (No field officers given. Most of line officers found in Sixty-fourth Infantry.)

Twenty-ninth Infantry regiment: Bruster, Ebenezer, major; Giles, James, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Haynes, Alexander, major, lieutenant-colonel; Horne, William R. B., major; Leigh, William, lieutenant-colonel; Moore, Alfred C., colonel; Smith, Edwin R., major, lieutenant-colonel; White, Isaac, major.

Thirtieth Cavalry regiment. (See Second Cavalry regiment.)

Thirtieth battalion Sharpshooters: Clarke, J. Lyle, lieutenant-colonel; Otey, Peter, major.

Thirtieth Infantry regiment: Barton, William S., major; Cary, R. Milton, colonel; Chew, Robert S., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Gouldin, John Milton, major, lieutenant-colonel; Harrison, Archibald T., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Peatross, Robert O., major.

Thirty-first Light Artillery battalion: Nelson, William, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Thirty-first Infantry regiment: Arbogast, James C., major; Boykin, Francis M., lieutenant-colonel; Chenoweth, Joseph H., major; Cooper, William P., major; Iffoffman, John S., major, colonel; Jackson, Alfred H., lieutenant-colonel; Jackson, William L., colonel; McCutchen, J. S. Kerr, major, lieutenant-colonel; Reynolds, Samuel H., colonel.

Thirty-first Militia regiment: Baldwin, Robert F., colonel; Denny, W. R., lieutenant-colonel; McCooles, Thomas E., lieutenant-colonel; Moore, L. T., colonel; Riely, J. C., major; Washington, B. B., major.

Thirty-second Cavalry battalion (consolidated with Fortieth Cavalry battalion): Robertson, John R., major.

Thirty-second Infantry regiment (formed from Montague's and Goggin's Infantry battalions): Cary, John B., lieutenant-colonel; Ewell, Benjamin S., colonel; Goggin, James M., major; Lee, Baker P., Jr., major; Montague, Edgar B., colonel; Sinclair, Jefferson, major; Willis, William R., lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-second Militia regiment: Coiner, David W., lieutenant-colonel; McCune, Samuel, colonel; Wilson, William M., major.

Thirty-third Cavalry battalion (transferred to Seventeenth Cavalry): Armesy, Thomas D., major.

Thirty-third Infantry regiment: Cummings, Arthur C., colonel; Golladay, Jacob B., major; Grace, Philip T., major; Holliday, Frederick W. M., major, colonel; Huston, George, major, lieutenant-colonel; Jones, John R., lieutenant-colonel; Lee, Edwin G., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Neff, John F., colonel; Spengler, Abraham, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Thirty-fourth Cavalry battalion: McFarlane, John A., major; Straton, William, major; Witcher, Vinson A., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-fourth Infantry regiment (Fourth Heavy Artillery prior to March 8, 1864): Bagby, John R., major; Goode, John Thomas, colonel; Harrison, Randolph, lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-fourth Militia regiment: Deatherage, W. W., colonel; Haddox, C. B., major; Kinsey, Benjamin F., lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-fifth Cavalry battalion: Ferneyhough, George M., major; Myers, Franklin M., major; White, Elijah V., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-fifth Infantry regiment. (No rolls or roster.)

Thirty-sixth Cavalry battalion: Sweeney, James W., major.

Thirty-sixth Infantry regiment (formerly Second Kanawha regiment): Fife, William E., major, lieutenant-colonel; Linkons, Benjamin R., lieutenant-colonel; McCausland, John A., colonel; Reid, L. Wiber, lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Thomas, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Thirty-seventh Cavalry battalion: Claiborne, James R., major; Dunn, Ambrose C., lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-seventh Infantry regiment: Carson, Robert P., lieutenant-colonel; Fulkerson, Samuel V., colonel; Terry, John F., lieutenant-colonel; Williams, Titus V., major, colonel; Wood, Henry C., major.

Thirty-seventh Militia regiment: Coles, Thomas R., major; Downing, Joseph, major; Littrell, Leroy N., lieutenant-colonel; Straughan, Samuel L., colonel.

Thirty-eighth Artillery battalion: Blount, Joseph G., major; Dearing, James, major; Read, John P. W., major; Stribling, Robert M., major.

Thirty-eighth Infantry regiment: Cabell, Joseph R., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Carrington, Isaac H., major; Edmonds, Edward C., colonel; Griggs, George K., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Lee, Henderson L., major; Martin, George A., lieutenant-colonel; Whittle, Powhatan Bolling, lieutenant-colonel.

Thirty-ninth Cavalry battalion: Richardson, John H., major.

Thirty-ninth Infantry regiment (disbanded January 25, 1862): Cary, N. R., major; Finney, Louis C. H., lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Charles, colonel.

Thirty-ninth Militia regiment: Davenport, John M., lieutenant-colonel.

Fortieth Cavalry battalion (consolidated with Thirty-second battalion to form Forty-second battalion): Robins, William T., lieutenant-colonel; Wren, John F., major.

Fortieth Infantry regiment: Brockenbrough, John M., colonel; Cox, Fleet W., major, lieutenant-colonel; Cunningham, Arthur S., lieutenant-colonel (temporary command); Stakes, Edward T., major; Taliaferro, William T., major; Walker, Henry H., lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-first Cavalry battalion (transferred to Twenty-third Cavalry): White, Robert, major, lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-first Infantry regiment: Blow, George, Jr., lieutenant-colonel; Chambliss, John R., Jr., colonel; Etheridge, William H., major; Minetree, Joseph P., major, lieutenant-colonel; Parham, William Allen, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Smith, Francis W., major.

Forty-first Militia regiment: Garland, William D., lieutenant-colonel; McClanahan, Meredith M., major; Oldham, Thomas, major; Rains, William W., major.

Forty-second Cavalry battalion (transferred to Twenty-fourth Cavalry): Robertson, John R., major; Robins, William T., lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-second Infantry regiment: Adams, P. B., major; Burks, Jesse S., colonel; Deyerle, Andrew J., colonel; Lane, Henry, major; Langhorne, Daniel A., lieutenant-colonel; Martin, William, lieutenant-colonel; Penn, John E., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Richardson, Jesse M., major; Saunders, Samuel H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Withers, Robert W., lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Forty-third Cavalry battalion: Chapman, William H., major; Mosby, John S., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Forty-third Infantry regiment. (No rolls, no roster.)

Forty-third Militia regiment: Wright, John A., lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-fourth Infantry battalion: Batte, Peter V., major.

Forty-fourth Infantry regiment: Anderson, David W., major; Buckner, Thomas R., lieutenant-colonel; Cobb, Norvell, major, colonel; Hubbard, James L., lieutenant-colonel; Jones, A. C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Scott, William C., colonel.



Forty-fifth Infantry battalion: Beckley, Henry M., lieutenant-colonel; Woodson, Blake L., major.

Forty-fifth Infantry regiment: Browne, William H., colonel; Davis, Alexander M., major; Ficklin, Benjamin F., lieutenant-colonel; Harman, Edwin H., lieutenant-colonel; Heth, Henry, colonel; Peters, William E., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Sanders, William C., major; Werth, William H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Wharton, Gabriel C., major.

Forty-sixth Cavalry battalion (consolidated with Forty-seventh battalion to form Twenty-sixth Cavalry): Kesler, Joseph K., lieutenant-colonel; Ruffner, Henry D., major.

Forty-sixth Infantry regiment: Davis, J. Lucius, colonel; Duke, Richard Thomas Walker, colonel; Fry, Hugh Walker, Jr., major; Harrison, Randolph, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Hill, James C., major; Richardson, John H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Wise, Peyton, major, lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-sixth Militia regiment: Johnson, John H., colonel.

Forty-seventh Cavalry battalion (consolidated with Forty-sixth battalion to form Twenty-sixth Cavalry): Harman, William N., major.

Forty-seventh Infantry regiment: Bruce, James D., major, lieutenant-colonel; Green, Charles J., major; Green, William J., lieutenant-colonel; Lyell, John W., lieutenant-colonel; Mayo, Robert M., major, colonel; Richardson, George W., colonel; Tayloe, Edward Poinsett, major.

Forty-seventh Militia regiment: Harris, Benjamin J., major.

Forty-eighth Infantry regiment: Campbell, James C., major; Campbell, John A., colonel; Dungan, Robert H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Faris, Wilson, major; Garnett, Thomas S., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Stewart, D. Boston, major; White, Oscar, major, lieutenant-colonel.

Forty-ninth Infantry regiment: Christian, Charles B., major, lieutenant-colonel; Gibson, John Catlett, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Murray, Edward, lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Caleb, major; Smith, William, colonel.

Fiftieth Infantry regiment: Finney, William W., lieutenant-colonel; Perkins, Lynville J., major; Poage, Thomas, colonel; Reynolds, Alexander W., colonel; Salyer, Logan H. N., major, lieutenant-colonel; Thorburn, Charles E., major; Vandeventer, Alexander, lieutenant-colonel, colonel.

Fifty-first Infantry regiment: Akers, William T., major; Cunningham, George A., lieutenant-colonel; Dickey, Stephen M., major; Forsberg, Augustus, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Graham, David P., major; Hounshell, David S., major; Massie, James W., lieutenant-colonel; Reynolds, Samuel H., lieutenant-colonel (declined); Wharton, Gabriel C., colonel; Wolfe, John P., major, lieutenant-colonel; Yonce, William A., major.

Fifty-first Militia regiment: Glass, William W., major, lieutenant-colonel; Pritchard, Solomon S., lieutenant-colonel; Shryock, Charles E., colonel; Wotring, Daniel E., major.

Fifty-second Infantry regiment: Baldwin, John B., colonel; Harman, Michael G., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Lilley, John D., major, lieutenant-colonel; Ross, John D. H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Skinner, James H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Watkins, Thomas H., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifty-second Militia regiment: Carter, Hill, colonel; Christian, Bat. D., major; Valden, Vulosko, major.

Fifty-third Infantry regiment (formed from Tomlin's and Montague's battalions and Company A of Waddill's battalion): Aylett, William R., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Edmundson, Henry A., major; Grammer, John, Jr., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Leigh, William, major; Martin, Rawley White, major, lieutenant-colonel; Montague, Edgar B., lieutenant-colonel; Stevenson, Carter L., colonel; Timberlake, John C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Tomlin, Harrison B., colonel; Waddill, George M., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifty-third Militia regiment: Adams, H. W., colonel.

Fifty-fourth Infantry regiment: Deyerle, John S., major; Edmundson, Henry A., lieutenant-colonel; Harman, Austin, major; Shelor, William B., major, lieutenant-colonel; Taylor, James C., major; Trigg, Robert C., colonel; Wade, John J., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifty-fourth Militia regiment: Robinson, E. C., colonel.

Fifty-fifth Infantry regiment: Archer, Robert H., lieutenant-colonel; Burke, Thomas M., major; Christian, William S., major, lieutenant-colonel; Fauntleroy, Robert B., major; Lawson, Charles N., major; Mallory, Francis, colonel; Rice, Evan, major, lieutenant-colonel; Saunders, Andrew D., major; Ward, William N., major.

Fifty-sixth Infantry regiment: Green, William E., major, lieutenant-colonel; McPhail, John B., major; Slaughter, Philip Peyton, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Smith, Timoleon, major, lieutenant-colonel; Stuart, William D., colonel.

Fifty-seventh Infantry regiment (formed from Keen's Infantry battalion): Armistead, Lewis A., colonel; Carr, George W., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Dyer, David, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Fontaine, Clement R., major, colonel; Hanes, Garland B., major; Heckman, David P., major; James, Waddy T., lieutenant-colonel; Keen, Elisha F., major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Magruder, John Bowie, major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Ramsey, William H., lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Andrew J., major; Wade, Benjamin H., major, lieutenant-colonel.

Fifty-seventh Militia regiment: Kamey, Sanford J., colonel.

Fifty-eighth Infantry regiment: Board, Francis H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Booker, George E., major; Crutchfield, Stapleton, major, lieutenant-colonel; Goode, Edmund, colonel; Kasey, John G., major, lieutenant-colonel; Letcher, Samuel H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Walker, Edward T., major.

Fifty-ninth Infantry regiment: Anderson, Frank P., lieutenant-colonel; Henningsen, Charles F., colonel; Jones, Joseph, lieutenant-colonel; Lawson, John, major; Mosby, Robert G., major; Tabb, William B., colonel.

Fifty-ninth Militia regiment: Copeland, John R., colonel.

Sixtieth Infantry regiment: Corley, James L., lieutenant-colonel; Gilliam, William A., lieutenant-colonel; Hammond, George W., major, lieutenant-colonel; Jones, Beuhring H., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Rowan, William S., major; Spaulding, J. W., lieutenant-colonel; Starke, William E., colonel; Summers, John C., major, lieutenant-colonel; Swank, William A., lieutenant-colonel (acting); Sweeney, James W., major; Taylor, Jacob N., major.

Sixty-first Militia regiment: Billups, Robert S., major; Bohannon,

John G., colonel; James, Lemuel, lieutenant-colonel; Shipley, James S., major.

Sixty-first Infantry regiment (formed from Seventh battalion): Groner, Virginius D., colonel; McAlpine, Charles R., major; Niemeyer, William F., lieutenant-colonel; Stewart, William H., major, lieutenant-colonel; Wilson, Samuel M., colonel.

Sixty-second Mounted Infantry regiment (also called First Virginia Partisan Rangers): Doyle, Robert L., lieutenant-colonel; Hall, Houston, major; Imboden, George W., major; Lang, David B., major, lieutenant-colonel; Smith, George H., colonel; Imboden, John D., colonel.

Sixty-third Infantry regiment: Dunn, David C., lieutenant-colonel; French, James M., major, colonel; Lynch, Connally H., lieutenant-colonel; McMahon, John J., colonel.

Sixty-fourth Mounted Infantry regiment (formed from Twenty-first [Pound Gap] battalion): Gray, Harvey, major; Pridemore, Auburn L., lieutenant-colonel, colonel; Richmond, James B., major, lieutenant-colonel; Slemper, Campbell, colonel.

Sixty-fourth Militia regiment: Dillard, John L., colonel.

Sixty-seventh Militia regiment: Cunningham, John F., major; Robinson, Israel, lieutenant-colonel; Sencendiver, Jacob, colonel.

Seventy-seventh Militia regiment: McDonald, Edward H., colonel; Simms, Gilmore F., lieutenant-colonel; Smith, Abraham, major; Vandiver, Joseph L., major.

Eighty-second Militia regiment: Blankenbeker, E. Finks, major; Carpenter, Simeon, lieutenant-colonel; Troyman, James W., colonel.

Eighty-fourth Militia regiment: Dennis, Thomas C., colonel.

Eighty-seventh Militia regiment: Gresham, Thomas Robert, colonel; Saunders, William A., major.

Eighty-eighth Militia regiment: Antrim, C. W., major; Carver, D. C., lieutenant-colonel; McKennie, M., colonel.

Eighty-ninth Militia regiment: Davison, Samuel, major; Flagg, John S., lieutenant-colonel; Johnston, Samuel, colonel; Rider, E. C., major.

Ninety-first Militia regiment: Crenshaw, John B., major.

One Hundred and Eighth Militia regiment: Rowan, John M., colonel.

One Hundred and Ninth Militia regiment: Jones, E. P., colonel.

One Hundred and Tenth Militia regiment: Lavender, J. G., major.

One Hundred and Fourteenth Militia regiment: Monroe, Alexander, colonel.

One Hundred and Fifteenth Militia regiment: Mallory, Charles K., colonel; Smith, M. B., major; Wray, George, major.

One Hundred and Twenty-first Militia regiment: Sperry, J. G., colonel.

One Hundred and Twenty-second Militia regiment: Dearmont, W., colonel.

One Hundred and Fifty-sixth Militia regiment: Adams, T. C., major; Bennett, Thomas F., colonel; Ross, D. Lee, lieutenant-colonel; Taylor, James A., major.

One Hundred and Fifty-seventh Militia regiment: Terril, George P., colonel.

One Hundred and Sixty-second Militia regiment: Fleisher, H. H., lieutenant-colonel; Abbitt, Wyatt, colonel.

One Hundred and Seventy-ninth Militia regiment: Morris, Robert F., colonel; Richardson, John H., colonel.

One Hundred and Eighty-fifth Militia regiment: Darst, James H., major.

One Hundred and Eighty-ninth Militia regiment: Rowan, John M., colonel.

One Hundred and Ninety-eighth Militia regiment: Compton, John R., colonel.

Botetourt regiment (Home Guard): Aunspaugh, Charles, major; Burks, Richard H., colonel; Burks, Robert S., lieutenant-colonel.

Cohoon's Infantry battalion (see also Sixth battalion North Carolina Infantry): Cohoon, John T. P. C., lieutenant-colonel.

French's Cavalry battalion (merged into Thirty-second regiment): Goggin, James M., major.

Harris' Heavy Artillery battalion (disbanded June 10, 1862): Harris, N. C., lieutenant-colonel.

Henry's regiment Reserves: Henry, P. M., colonel; Hobson, Joseph A., lieutenant-colonel; Reynolds, A. D., major.

Jackson's Cavalry battalion (afterward Jackson's Tenth Cavalry): Jackson, William L., lieutenant-colonel.

Jackson Hospital battalion: Scott, H. C., major.

Keen's Infantry battalion (merged into Fifty-seventh regiment): Keen, Elisha F., major.

Montague's Infantry battalion (attached temporarily to Thirty-second regiment, August 19, 1861. Afterward, November 9, 1861, merged into Fifty-third regiment): Montague, Edgar B., major.

Mosby's regiment Partisan Rangers: Chapman, William H., lieutenant-colonel; Mosby, John S., colonel; Richards, A. E., major.

Morris' Independent Infantry battalion: Morris, Z. F., acting major.

O'Ferrall's Cavalry battalion (merged into Twenty-third Cavalry): O'Ferrall, Charles T., major.

Richmond Howitzers (also called Richmond battalion): Randolph, George W., major.

State Line Artillery: Jackson, Thomas E., colonel.

Stuart Horse Artillery battalion: Beckham, R. F., major; Pelham, John, major; Williams, S. C., lieutenant-colonel.

Swann's Cavalry battalion: Swann, Thomas B., lieutenant-colonel.

Tomlin's Infantry battalion (merged into Fifty-third Infantry): Tomlin, Harrison B., major.

Waddill's Infantry battalion (Company A of this battalion went into Fifty-third Infantry): Waddill, George M., acting major.

Wade's regiment Reserves. Wade, James M., colonel.



## APPENDIX II.

### COL. JOHN S. MOSBY AND HIS COMMAND.

John Singleton Mosby, one of the greatest scouts of history, was the life of his command, the genius that inspired all its achievements and maintained the organization throughout the changes of its personnel. He was in his twenty-eighth year when the State seceded, had married a daughter of a distinguished Kentuckian, member of congress and diplomat, and was practicing law at Bristol and Abingdon, in southwest Virginia. He went to Harper's Ferry as a private in the cavalry company of William E. Jones, and was first in the field as a member of Stuart's cavalry regiment about Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley. He attracted Stuart's attention, after the battle of First Manassas, by his ability as a scout while the cavalry was on outpost duty before Washington, and during the withdrawal from the Rappahannock line. While General Jones was colonel of the regiment, Mosby was adjutant, and after that he was detailed as a scout at brigade headquarters. He suggested and led a raid on the enemy's line on the Totopotomoy, which circumstances developed into the famous ride around McClellan's peninsular army, and made Stuart a major-general.

It was not until the close of 1862, after the battle of Fredericksburg, that Mosby began his career as a partisan leader. At that time Stuart, whom he had accompanied through the Maryland campaign, made a raid into Loudoun county, and the young lieutenant obtained permission to remain for a few days with nine men. Riding into Fairfax county, he attacked the outposts of Col. Percy Wyndham, commanding the Federal cavalry brigade in front of Washington, capturing more than his own number of men. In Fairfax he was joined by John Underwood, his trusted scout. Stuart then detailed Mosby fifteen men, with seven of whom he attacked Wyndham and one hundred cavalry at Middleburg. During the winter "he kept things lively and humming," as he described it in his Reminiscences. "Old men and boys joined my band. Some had run the gauntlet of Yankee pickets, and others swam the Potomac to get to me. I mounted, armed and equipped my command at the expense of the United States government." The status of Mosby's command in the Confederate forces at this time is clearly indicated in General Orders No. 27, of Gen. R. E. Lee, dated February 28, 1863, in which he says: "Lieutenant Mosby, with his detachment, has done much to harass the enemy, attacking him boldly on several occasions, and capturing many prisoners." The latter were regularly sent in to General Stuart.

The Confederate army at this time was south of the Rappahannock. Mosby and his men were north of it, in the Piedmont region of Fauquier and Loudoun counties, thereafter known as "Mosby's Confederacy," to the rear of the main Federal strength, and between that force and the one in the lower Shenandoah valley. On the east stretched the Federal line of communication, through the plains of Manassas, to Washington, and to the north were the Poto-

mac river and the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. From this point of vantage Mosby could strike with equal freedom toward Washington or Harper's Ferry, and by incessant and worrying attacks compel the enemy greatly to contract his lines or reinforce the guards of his communications, either of which would be to the advantage of the Confederate army.

Mosby's men had no superiors in the saddle, and were expert pistol shots. They were never very numerous, but what they lacked in numbers was more than compensated by high individual intelligence, reckless daring and love of adventure. Among them were some who deserve to rank among the heroes of romance. The captains were heroes of as brilliant forays as those led by Mosby himself. Four men particularly conspicuous in the earliest operations were Fount Beattie, Dick Moran, John Underwood and "Major" Hibbs, the latter a brawny blacksmith, over fifty years of age. "Around this triumvirate," Mosby afterward wrote, "recruits gathered as iron filings cluster around a magnet. They were the germs from which my command grew and spread like a banyan tree. Beattie, always my faithful Achates, had been captured [at Middleburg], but was soon afterward exchanged." Others notable at this period were Sergeant Ames, a deserter from a New York regiment, Frank Williams, Joe Nelson, and Walter Frankland, afterward quartermaster.

On February 28th, 1863, Mosby had the pleasure of reporting to General Stuart that he had 27 men, and that with them on the 26th he had attacked a cavalry outpost of 50, routed them out of log houses near Germantown, killed 4 and captured 5 men, and taken 39 horses, without loss to his band. By March he had the rank of captain of partisan rangers, and had become so troublesome that a strong Federal detachment of cavalry was sent into Loudoun county to put an end to his operations. Failing to find any trace of the band, they arrested and started back with a number of old men from Middleburg. Mosby pursued with 17 men, and attacked the rear guard of 57 while feeding horses at Aldie, routed them, captured 17 men, including a captain, and released all the prisoners. The Federal commander was cashiered and the fame of Mosby's men spread through the North and South.

But a still more brilliant exploit speedily followed. At Fairfax Court House, within fifteen miles of Washington, were the headquarters of Brigadier-General Stoughton and Colonels Wyndham and Johnstone, cavalry commanders especially charged to attend to Mosby. On Sunday night, March 8th, it being dark and rainy, Mosby and his men set out with the audacious plan of capturing these officers. They reached the town early next morning, quietly seized the few guards on duty, and then separated, different parties seeking the Federal officers. Unfortunately Wyndham was absent, and Johnstone escaped in a state of nudity in the cold night, but Stoughton was found in bed and made a prisoner. The daring raiders came back with two captains and 30 prisoners, besides their brigadier, and 58 horses, on the way passing so close to the Federal entrenchments at Centerville that the sentinels hailed them.

About a week later they attacked a body of cavalry at Herndon Station, Fairfax county, and brought off a major, a captain, 21 men and 26 horses, without loss to themselves. When pursuit was made the rear guard repulsed it. The report of this exploit was sent to

Richmond with commendatory endorsements, including this: "Respectfully forwarded for the information of the department, and as an evidence of the merit and continued success of Captain Mosby. (Signed) R. E. LEE, General." On March 26th General Stuart transmitted to General Lee another report that caused the great leader to exclaim: "Hurrah for Mosby! I wish I had a hundred like him." He forwarded the intelligence to Adjutant-General Cooper in these words: "On the 25th instant Capt. John S. Mosby attacked and routed a body of the enemy's cavalry on the Little River turnpike, near Chantilly. He reports 10 killed and wounded, and a lieutenant and 30 men, with their horses, arms and equipments, captured. He sustained no loss." On this raid the company had a new recruit, Captain Hoskins, an English soldier of fortune, who, because he would fight with his sword only, lost his life a few weeks later. In the first set of fours that led the decisive charge were James W. Foster, Thomas W. Richards, and William L. Hunter, who gained commissions by their gallantry, and afterwards won honorable positions in civil life.

On April 1st the daring scouts had a memorable experience and narrow escape. They had been ordered to Dranesville by Stuart, and finding the enemy had fallen back, were early that morning feeding their horses in an enclosure, at Miskel's house, when six companies of the First Vermont cavalry charged in upon and surrounded them. Mosby ordered an attack, and 20 of his men instantly responded, while the others joined as rapidly as possible. The countercharge was so fierce and unexpected that the Federals broke in confusion and were driven for seven miles. Their commander and 8 others were killed, 15 badly wounded, and besides these 82 were made prisoners. Mosby had about 65 men in the fight, of whom Privates R. A. Hart, Ned Hurst, Keyes and Davis were wounded, the latter fatally. Lieut. William H. Chapman, afterward second in command, Sergeant Hunter, and Privates Sam Chapman, Wellington, Welt and Harry Archer, Tom Turner, Wild, Sowers, Ames and Sibert were commended for gallantry. Mosby's report of this affair was characteristic. The story was told in a matter-of-fact way, without rhetoric or exaggeration, and with a frank confession that he had not sufficiently guarded himself against surprise. But it was so evident that victory had been won by his coolness and the splendid audacity of his men, that to honor him and further dignify his command, Stuart transmitted the report with a recommendation for promotion, and Secretary Seddon indorsed upon it: "ADJUTANT GENERAL: Nominate as major if it has not been previously done."

Soon after this, Major-General Stahel, who, according to his own statement, was promoted to that rank in order to take command before Washington and relieve the capital from fear of Mosby's men, as well as save the communications of Hooker's army from continual disturbance, sent out two brigades of cavalry and a battery of artillery to gather in the raiders as a prelude to the Chancellorsville campaign, but this formidable force did hardly more than capture a few non-combatants at Middleburg.

Quiet followed in the Mosby country until the battle of Chancellorsville. Then, while the guns were booming on the other side of the Rapidan, Mosby, with 70 or 80 men, looking for a field of usefulness, surprised the First Virginia cavalry dismounted near Warrenton



Junction, drove them into houses, and had taken their surrender, when heavy reinforcements arrived, and the squadron was compelled to retreat, leaving one man, Templeman, killed, and about 20 captured. Mortified, but not discouraged, Mosby collected 30 or 40 men a few days later, burned two railroad bridges in the Federal rear, and rode as far as Dumfries, where they had another fight with superior numbers at Frying Pan church and saved themselves as they did at Chantilly, by retreating and, when the enemy was scattered, turning rapidly and attacking as if supported by reinforcements. They never had them, but the effect was the same. It conveyed the idea of "ambush," the suspicion of which had a demoralizing effect upon their antagonists.

Stuart, now, at Mosby's request, sent him a mounted howitzer, for more effective work on the railroad. This was turned over to Sam Chapman, an ex-theological student, and a reckless fighter, and supported by about forty men, was used on May 30th, to capture and burn a train loaded with sutler's goods, near Catlett's Station, in hearing of the Federal bugles. On the retreat, attacked by De Forest's cavalry brigade, Mosby's men made a desperate fight to save their howitzer, repulsing several charges, but finally lost it, with Sam Chapman, Robert P. Mountjoy, and Beattie, as prisoners, and Captain Hoskins, killed. This was a disaster to the command, but so demoralizing was the effect upon the Federal transportation that Stuart promptly sent word that they might sell another gun at the same price.

On June 10th the first company of the battalion was organized in regular form, with James William Foster as captain, and Thomas Turner, William L. Hunter and George Whitescarver, lieutenants. On the same day the command started for the Potomac river, and crossing into Maryland, had a brisk fight at Seneca Creek, in which Alfred Glasscock was wounded, and Lieutenant Whitescarver and Captain Brawner were killed. A number of prisoners and horses were taken, and the North alarmed regarding the possible extent of these forays.

The opposing armies were now maneuvering preparatory to the Gettysburg campaign, and Mosby and his men were indefatigable in the work of procuring information.

Among the many prisoners taken was Hooker's chief signal officer, bearing dispatches from which Stuart and Lee learned the strength and plans of the enemy. On the 22d they varied their work by capturing a wagon train, and Hooker, greatly annoyed, withdrew Stahel's division from an important movement already ordered against Richmond to break Lee's communications, in order to drive Mosby from within the Federal lines. Rejoining Stuart, Mosby found Lee anxious for definite information as to whether the Federals had yet crossed the Potomac, and went back in Hooker's lines with two companions, obtained the information, and on his return rode through a Federal column of cavalry, disguised only by a waterproof cloak, with two prisoners!

When Stuart started out on his raid into Pennsylvania Mosby and his men were to accompany him, but were cut off by Hancock's column, and compelled to go north through the Shenandoah valley. For a time they were obscured by the great events of the Gettysburg campaign, but after the army was back again in Virginia, their forays were resumed with the same old daring and success. As

expedition of cavalry and infantry was soon sent against them, with the usual result. The story was told in Mosby's report to Stuart, July 28th: "GENERAL: I send you, in the charge of Sergt. F. Beattie, 141 prisoners which were captured from the enemy during their march through this county (Fauquier). I also sent you 45 several days ago. . . . I also captured 123 horses, 12 wagons, 50 sets of fine harness, arms, etc."

On August 24th, with 27 men, Mosby was looking for unguarded brigades near Annandale, and had a serious fight at Gooding's Tavern, in which he was shot through the side and thigh. At the same time the gallant Lieutenant Shriver and Norman E. Smith were killed. Lieutenant Turner, conspicuous for bravery, during Mosby's absence led attacks upon the outposts near Waterloo and Warrenton. In September Mosby was again in the saddle and conducted raids along the Federal lines of communication, near Alexandria capturing Colonel Dulaney, aide to the Federal governor of Virginia. Company B was now organized, with William R. Smith, of the Black Horse cavalry, as captain, and Frank Williams, Abner Wren and Robert Gray, lieutenants; and in December Company C was organized, with William H. Chapman, captain, and A. E. Richards, Frank Fox, and Yager, lieutenants.

Among the later exploits in 1863 was an attack, October 26th, with 50 men, on a long and heavily guarded wagon train, near New Baltimore, bringing off many prisoners, horses and mules. Nearly 300 more prisoners were taken by the end of the year. Captains Smith, Chapman and Turner, commanding detachments, did brilliant service. As a result Gregg's entire cavalry division guarded the Federal rear, sentinels were stationed all along the railroad in hailing distance, and the railroad trains were heavily guarded. General Lee, looking out for opportunities for still greater influence for the squadron, advised General Imboden to send a force east of the Blue Ridge to assist Major Mosby in breaking up the railroad north of the Rappahannock, in case the Federals should advance.

By the beginning of 1864 Mosby's command was regularly enrolled as the Forty-third Virginia cavalry battalion, and on January 21 General Lee recommended his promotion to lieutenant-colonel, which was granted. Company D was organized in May, 1864, with Robert P. Mountjoy, of Mississippi, as captain, and Alfred Glasscock, Charles E. Grogan and William Trunnell, lieutenants. The company was mainly Marylanders. Company E was organized July 28th, with Sam Chapman as captain, and Fount Beattie, Ben Palmer and Martin as lieutenants. Two of the company commanders distinguished themselves early in the year: Capt. William R. Smith on the 1st, at Rectortown, by an attack with 35 men upon 78, of whom he killed and wounded 57; and Lieut. W. T. Turner, by a successful onslaught upon a post near Warrenton. Both these gallant soldiers lost their lives, however, on the 9th of the same month, in a night attack upon Maryland troops on Loudoun Heights. William E. Colston, W. H. Turner and Robertson were also killed in that fight. At Dranesville, on February 22d, with 160 men, a spirited and successful little battle was fought in which Mosby's officers, Mountjoy, Chapman, Hunter and Williams won special commendation. Fifteen Federals were killed, 70 prisoners were taken, and some of those who escaped were chased into the Potomac. Mosby's men lost 1 killed and 4 wounded.

Lieut. A. E. Richards, on March 10th, with a detachment of 30 men, surprised an outpost near Charlestown, killing the major commanding and bringing off several prisoners, thus opening operations in the lower Shenandoah valley, which were maintained throughout the year, without neglecting Fairfax county and the Maryland border. When Grant crossed the Rapidan, Mosby with forty men started down the Rappahannock, while two other detachments, under Richards and Chapman, were sent to embarrass Sigel. The latter field of operations was found the most promising, for though Mosby was able to capture an ambulance train and 40 prisoners near Belle Plain, the line was so heavily guarded that his efforts were of slight avail. Meanwhile, in the valley, Captains Richards and Chapman had been seriously disturbing the enemy and Mosby repaired to that quarter, captured a cavalry outpost at Front Royal, and about May 20th, with 150 men, made a daring attack upon a wagon train guarded by 700 troops. While little was accomplished in the way of captures, large forces of men were kept from the front to guard the trains, and only one more wagon train was sent up the valley to Hunter.

In the latter part of June, after an excursion to Centerville, the battalion took Duffield's Depot, on the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, capturing 50 prisoners and a large amount of stores. At the same time, Lieutenant Nelson, guarding the flank, routed a Federal expedition from Harper's Ferry, taking 19 prisoners. General Early was now coming down the valley, Hunter having retreated across West Virginia, and Mosby's command, to co-operate with Early, crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks. A Federal force was ready to dispute his crossing, but this was scattered by artillery. Captain Richards led a charge across the river, and under heavy fire from a redoubt, drove the enemy from camp. The use of a howitzer on this occasion was the source of greatly magnified reports of Mosby's strength, which spread alarm through the North. Early then invaded Maryland, and Mosby crossed lower down the river, and raided towards Frederick City. To interrupt these movements Federal cavalry was sent out from Falls Church, which Mosby promptly hastened to meet and completely routed at Mount Zion church, near Aldie, July 7th, the Federals losing 40 killed and wounded besides 57 prisoners. Of his own command one was killed and 6 wounded. According to the Federal official reports only one officer returned to camp that evening, and 33 men, out of the party of 150. Major Forbes and two lieutenants were captured. Captain Stone and Lieutenant Schuyler, of New York, were badly wounded, and 12 killed and 37 wounded were found on the field. Col. Charles R. Lowell said of the opposing commands, "there was not enough difference in numbers to talk about," but Major Forbes made a faulty movement by the right flank, "the rebels saw their chance, gave a yell, and our men, in the confusion of the moment, broke."

Sheridan was soon in the Shenandoah valley. On August 13th Mosby gave the new commander notice of his presence by attacking a supply train at Berryville, guarded by several hundred infantry and cavalry under Brigadier-General Kenly, capturing 200 prisoners, destroying 75 loaded wagons, and taking over 200 beef cattle and 500 mules and horses. This was one of the most brilliant achievements of Mosby's battalion. It had 300 men engaged and lost but 2 killed and 3 wounded.

On the 16th General Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: "The families of most of Mosby's command are known and can be collected. I think they should be taken and kept at Fort McHenry or some secure place as hostages for the good conduct of Mosby and his men. When any of Mosby's men are caught, hang them without trial." This severe order was based on the understanding, prevalent among Northern soldiers and citizens alike, that Mosby and his men were guerrillas. It was followed on the same day by an order to send a division of cavalry through Loudoun county "to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms."

The work of devastation was already begun in the valley, and Mosby's men endeavored to prevent it. Captain Chapman, in the language of Colonel Mosby, "coming upon a portion of the enemy's cavalry which was burning houses, attacked and routed them. Such was the indignation of our men at witnessing some of the finest residences in that portion of the State enveloped in flames that no quarter was shown, and about 25 of them were shot to death for their villainy. About 30 horses were brought off, but no prisoners." Mosby's men were never more active than in this period of deadly struggle. The fortune of war was varying. Capt. Sam Chapman defeated the Sixth New York cavalry at Berryville, but with serious loss to his own command. Lieutenant Glasscock with 10 men rode through Sheridan's camps as a provost guard, and brought out 18 mounted prisoners. Capt. A. E. Richards was specially successful in the valley. In Fairfax county, while scouting, Mosby was severely wounded. In the course of his operations Sam Chapman charged into the advance guard of one of General Torbert's brigades, and six of his men were captured. These six prisoners were executed at Front Royal, September 23d. In retaliation 6 Federal prisoners were hung by Mosby's orders in sight of the Federal camp near Berryville.

In the latter part of September Merritt's and Custer's divisions were sent around through the Piedmont, and every foot of the territory known as "Mosby's Confederacy" was swept by them. From the Blue Ridge mountains some of Mosby's men watched the work of destruction, and Major Richards has described the scene in these words: "As far as the eye could see the whole country east of the mountains was lit up by the destroying flames, and the glare was reflected from the sky above. It was a sublime sight to the eye, but a sickening one to the heart. Our one battalion of cavalry was powerless to prevent these two divisions of the enemy from executing their orders."

On September 19th, 1864, Gen. R. E. Lee summarized the work of Mosby as follows: "With the loss of little more than 20 men, he has killed, wounded and captured during the period embraced in the report (from March 1st), about 1,200 of the enemy, and taken more than 1,600 horses and mules, 230 beef cattle, and 85 wagons and ambulances, without counting many smaller operations. The services rendered by Colonel Mosby and his command in watching and reporting the enemy's movements have also been of great value. His operations have been highly creditable to himself and his command."

In October, Mosby's battalion performed one of its most notable feats, preventing the rebuilding of the Manassas Gap railroad, an

enterprise intended to furnish a shorter line of communication between Grant and Sheridan. A thousand Federal soldiers went up the road with railroad material, but Mosby's men destroyed their camp at Salem, put them in a state of siege at Rectortown and destroyed the communications in their rear. About ten days later, October 14th, occurred Mosby's famous "Greenback Raid," in which a Baltimore & Ohio military train was destroyed at Duffield's and two paymasters were captured with \$168,000 in currency.

Company F was now organized, with Walter Frankland, captain, and Walter Bowie, Ames and Frank Turner, lieutenants, and the command was divided in two squadrons, Companies A and B under Capt. A. E. Richards, and the others under Capt. W. H. Chapman.

Late in December Mosby was promoted to colonel, Chapman to lieutenant-colonel and Richards to major. Notable among the events toward the close of 1864 were a disastrous fight at Upperville, late in October; the defeat and capture of Captain Brasher, a famous and gallant Federal scout, by Captain Richards in November; the death of Captain Mountjoy near Leesburg in the same month, and the desperate wounding and capture of Mosby himself near Rector's Cross-roads, December 21st. Fortunately the wounded colonel gave his captors a false name, and they left him at a farm house, whence his men rescued him and saved him from recapture though the country was scoured by several thousand Federal cavalry.

Notwithstanding the devastation in "Mosby's Confederacy," the families were not deported and imprisoned, as ordered, and the battalion found shelter during the winter. In February, 1865, a Federal force of 224 cavalry was sent into Loudoun county to disturb the men, and the official reports show that a remnant returned with a tale of a mysterious panic, with Mosby's cavalry emptying their cartridges into a mass of disorganized Federal soldiery, and then beating them over the heads with empty pistols, a flight for safety, and the major and 78 men missing. Major Richards led the fight and reported 100 Federals killed, wounded and captured. Thus the battalion held its ground to the last. A new company, H, was organized April 5th, 1865, with George Baylor as captain, and Edward Thompson, James Wiltshire and Franklin Carter as lieutenants, which at once went out and stormed Bolivar Heights, capturing 77 horses and 47 men. On March 21st Mosby had defeated Colonel Reno and the Twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry, at Hamilton, and about the time of Appomattox, there were active operations in Fairfax, the valley and Northern Neck.

After the surrender a Federal force was sent up the valley to parole detachments of the Confederates under the terms of the capitulation of the army of Northern Virginia. Mosby was at first excepted, under orders from the war department at Washington, but General Grant interfered and directed General Hancock to tender parole to Mosby and his battalion. After considerable negotiation the command was assembled at Salem, for the last time, April 21st, and Colonel Mosby issued his farewell order, in which he said: "I disband your organization in preference to surrendering it to our enemies. I am no longer your commander." The main body, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, was paroled, and Colonel Mosby himself, as soon as assured of personal security, also availed himself of the tendered parole, and the history of his famous command was at an end.

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MAJOR-GENERALS AND BRIGADIER-GENERALS, PRO-  
VISIONAL ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES,  
ACCREDITED TO VIRGINIA.

Brigadier-General Joseph Reid Anderson, of Virginia, was a graduate of the United States military academy, class of 1836. He was appointed to a lieutenancy in the Third artillery. He served for a time as assistant engineer in the engineer bureau at Washington, and on July 1, 1837, was transferred to the corps of engineers as brevet second lieutenant. In this line of duty he assisted in the building of Fort Pulaski, at the entrance of the Savannah river. He resigned his commission September 30, 1837, to accept the position of assistant engineer of the State of Virginia; was chief engineer of the Valley turnpike company, 1838-41, and subsequently, until the outbreak of war, was head of the firm of Joseph R. Anderson & Co., proprietors of the Tredegar iron works and cannon foundry at Richmond. Entering the Confederate army, he was commissioned brigadier-general in September, 1861, and was assigned to command of the Confederate forces at Wilmington, N. C. Early in the spring of 1862, he was called to Virginia, and on April 25, 1862, he was ordered with his brigade to the vicinity of Fredericksburg, where General Field was then stationed, and instructed by General Lee to assume command in that quarter, attack the enemy or confine his field of operations. Fredericksburg was occupied by McDowell's Federal troops, and Anderson commanded the Confederate force confronting him during the Peninsula operations under Johnston. He was then assigned to a new division formed under A. P. Hill, and in command of the Third brigade of Hill's light infantry, he participated in the battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill and Frayser's Farm. In the latter he was particularly distinguished in the gallant action of his Georgia brigade, and was seriously wounded. He resigned July 19, 1862. Subsequently he gave his attention to the management of the Tredegar iron works. His death occurred at the Isle of Shoals, N. H., September 7, 1892.

Brigadier-General Lewis Addison Armistead was born at New Bern, N. C., February 18, 1817, a son of Gen. Walker Keith Armistead, who, with four brothers, served in the war of 1812. He was appointed a cadet in the United States military academy in 1834, and on July 10, 1839, he became second lieutenant in the Sixth United States infantry. In March, 1844, he was promoted first lieutenant, and in this rank entered the war with Mexico, in which he was distinguished, receiving the brevet rank of captain for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and brevet major for his services at Molino del Rey. He continued in the army until the beginning of the Confederate war, serving for some time against the Indians on the border, and being promoted captain in 1855. He was given the rank of major, Confederate States army, to date from March 16, 1861, and later in the same year became colonel of the Fifty-seventh Virginia regiment, which he commanded in the neighborhood of Suffolk and in the defense of the Blackwater in the following winter. April 1, 1862, he was promoted brigadier-general, and in this rank he was assigned to the command of a brigade in the division of Benjamin Huger. At Seven Pines, on the first day, he was distinguished for personal bravery, making a heroic stand with a small part of his men against an entire brigade of the enemy until reinforced by Pickett. On June 25th, he was stationed about 5 miles from Richmond, between York River railroad and the Williamsburg road, where he was engaged in continual skirmishing until the advance to Malvern hill. In this latter battle he was ordered by General Lee to "charge with a yell" upon the enemy's position, after the action of the artillery had been shown to be effective. "After bringing on the action in the most gallant manner by repulsing an attack of a heavy body of the enemy's skirmishers," General Magruder reported, "he skillfully lent support to the contending troops" in front of his position. After this campaign he was identified with the excellent record of R. H. Anderson's and Pickett's divisions, commanding a brigade consisting of the Ninth, Fourteenth, Thirty-eighth, Fifty-third and Fifty-seventh Virginia regiments. On September 6th, at the outset of the Maryland campaign, he was assigned to the duty of provost marshal-general of the army, considered by General Lee at that



Brig.-Gen. L. A. ARMISTEAD.  
Brig.-Gen. TURNER ARBRY.  
Brig.-Gen. JAS. DEARING.  
Brig.-Gen. JOHN ECHOLS.

Brig.-Gen. R. H. CHILTON.  
Brig.-Gen. P. ST. GEO. COCKE  
Brig.-Gen. M. D. CORSE.  
Brig.-Gen. J. R. CHAMBLISS.

Brig.-Gen. JOS. R. ANDERSON.  
Brig.-Gen. R. L. T. BEALE.  
Brig.-Gen. R. E. COLSTON.  
Brig.-Gen. S. M. BARTON.



juncture of the greatest importance, and in that capacity he brought up the rear of the army as it advanced. He participated in operations of General McLaws against Harper's Ferry, and after the retreat was left at Shepherdstown to guard the ford. He continued with Pickett's division throughout its subsequent duty. Reaching the battlefield of Gettysburg on the 3d of July, he formed his men in the second line of assault against Cemetery hill. "Conspicuous to all, 50 yards in advance of his brigade, waving his hat in the air, General Armistead led his men upon the enemy with a steady bearing which inspired all with enthusiasm and courage. Far in advance of all, he led the attack till he scaled the works of the enemy and fell wounded in their hands, but not until he had driven them from their position and seen his colors planted over their fortifications." This was the testimony of Colonel Aylett, who succeeded to the immediate command of the remnant of the brigade that was led into action. General Lee wrote in his report, "Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett and Semmes died as they had lived, discharging the highest duties of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that shrank from no danger."

Brigadier-General Turner Ashby, a hero of the South whose memory is cherished with peculiar tenderness by the people of the Shenandoah valley, was born at Rose Hill, Fauquier county, in 1824. He was a grandson of Capt. John Ashby, of the revolutionary war. At the time of John Brown's raid he was captain of a volunteer cavalry company, which he led to the scene of trouble. On the 16th of April, 1861, he was at Richmond, with other bold spirits, and took part in the planning of the capture of Harper's Ferry. The next morning, the day of the passage of the ordinance of secession, he went to his home to call out his cavalry company. His brief career from that time was of the most romantic nature, and he speedily became the idol of the volunteer troopers who rallied at Harper's Ferry in April and May, to recruit Jackson's forces. He was assigned to command of the Confederate post at Point of Rocks, where his activity and alertness were of great value. In June he was in command of a troop of Col. Eppa Hunton's regiment, but obtained permission to rejoin his own regi-

ment, Col. Angus McDonald's legion, and McDonald recommended him to promotion as lieutenant-colonel, speaking of him at this early date, June 25th, as "already known as one of the best partisan leaders in the service." Meanwhile Ashby, in addition to his other duties, had attracted attention by his daring in making a trip to Chambersburg, Pa., disguised and unattended, and obtaining complete information regarding the Federal force under Patterson. He was soon promoted lieutenant-colonel, and the rank of colonel followed in a few months. While Johnston was moving to Manassas, to the support of Beauregard, Ashby and Stuart, with their cavalry commands, were very successful in masking the transfer of the troops until it was too late for Patterson to have any influence upon the battle of July 21st. In October, General Jackson was assigned to the Valley district, and Ashby, as colonel of the Seventh Virginia cavalry, was put in command of the cavalry. In February he was authorized by the war department to raise cavalry, infantry and heavy artillery. During one of the engagements of 1861, his brother, Capt. Richard Ashby, to whom he was tenderly attached, had been slain by the enemy, and the circumstances of the death so affected him as to give to his natural heroism an extraordinary enthusiasm. Turner Ashby was of striking aspect and splendid personality when he came to take command of Jackson's cavalry. In form he was trimly built, in movement graceful, and when mounted on his splendid horse, he appeared a chevalier of romance. The attachment of his men to him was displayed on all occasions, and his own devotion to Jackson was so great that he was accustomed to say, "I would follow him or go where he commanded without knowing anything except that it was Stonewall Jackson's order." His faith in Jackson was like Jackson's faith in Lee. It is this trust of the army in its leaders reciprocated by the faith of the leaders in the army which makes heroes in battles. In March he withdrew with Jackson from Winchester, before the advance on Banks, but on the 22d returned and by an audacious attack drove in the enemy's outposts. The battle of Kernstown immediately followed, in which Ashby, with his cavalry and artillery, and an infantry support, rendered effective service upon the Confederate right. After this Jackson was rapidly reinforced, and

Ashby's force was recruited to the dignity of a brigade, though his commission as brigadier-general was not issued until May 23d. He pursued the Federals after the battle of McDowell, played a prominent part in the rout of the Federals at Middletown, and defended the rear during the Confederate retreat up the Valley early in June. On the 3d his horse was shot under him while his men were burning the bridge over the Shenandoah. "Ashby has infernal activity and ingenuity in this way," Shields reported to Washington. On June 6th, near Harrisonburg, he repulsed an attack, capturing the Federal commander, Sir Percy Wyndham. He immediately planned an ambush of the pursuing Federal advance, and a fierce combat ensued. As Ashby led the attack, his horse was shot under him, and he rushed forward on foot, urging his men to charge, when a ball pierced his breast and he fell forward dead. His death was felt as a severe loss to the army. Jackson wrote to General Imboden: "Poor Ashby is dead. He fell gloriously. I know you will join with me in mourning the loss of our friend, one of the noblest men and soldiers in the Confederate army." In his official report he wrote: "As a partisan officer, I never knew his superior. His daring was proverbial, his powers of endurance almost incredible, his tone of character heroic, and his sagacity almost intuitive in divining the purposes and movements of the enemy." In October, 1866, his body was reinterred with impressive ceremonies in the Stonewall cemetery at Winchester, where the anniversary of his death is annually commemorated by the strewing of flowers upon the graves of the unknown dead.

Brigadier-General Seth Maxwell Barton was one of four sons of Thomas Bowerbank Barton, a lawyer of Fredericksburg, Va., all of whom served in the Confederate States army. He was graduated at the United States military academy in 1849, and promoted brevet second lieutenant, Third infantry. After serving a year at Fort Columbus, N. Y., he was promoted second lieutenant, First infantry, and assigned to duty in the Southwest, where he served mainly until 1861, winning promotion to first lieutenant in 1853 and captain in 1857. He was stationed during most of this period at the Texas forts, was adjutant of his regiment, 1855 to 1857, fought against the Comanche Indians in 1857, and in 1861



participated in the march to Fort Leavenworth. After his resignation, which took effect June 11, 1861, he entered the Confederate service, with the rank of captain of infantry, C. S. A., and became lieutenant-colonel of the Third Arkansas regiment, Col. Albert Rust, which constituted part of the command of Gen. Henry R. Jackson, in the West Virginia campaign of 1861. He fortified Camp Bartow, on the Greenbrier, and in command of his regiment participated in the heroic defense of the works in October, at which the enemy met with his first repulse in that region. He subsequently acted as chief engineer of the army during the Bath and Romney expedition, winning special mention by Stonewall Jackson. When Gen. E. Kirby Smith was assigned to the department of East Tennessee, Barton was sent to his assistance, with promotion to brigadier-general. During the Cumberland Gap campaign he commanded the Fourth brigade, consisting of Alabama and Georgia regiments and Anderson's Virginia battery. Subsequently, with Stevenson's division, he took part in the defense of Vicksburg. At the time of Sherman's advance by way of Chickasaw bayou late in December, 1862, he commanded the Confederate center, his troops bravely holding their ground under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, which continued for three days, and repulsing five assaults on the 29th. The siege of Vicksburg followed, and he was surrendered July 4, 1863, but soon afterward exchanged. He was then given command of Armistead's brigade, Pickett's division; was stationed at Kinston, N. C., during the latter part of the year, and was the leader of one of the columns in the demonstration against New Bern about February 1, 1864. On May 10th he participated in the battle of Drewry's Bluff, against Butler, fighting bravely in the midst of his men, and being the first to take possession of the guns from which the enemy were driven. Immediately after this he was relieved from command by Gen. Robert Ransom. His restoration was petitioned for twice by the regimental officers of the brigade, who expressed entire confidence in his skill and bravery. General Ransom himself admitted that the personal gallantry of General Barton could not be questioned. Though feeling that injustice had been done him, he remained in the service, and accepted command of a brigade for the defense of

Richmond, comprising artillery and reserve infantry, under Lieutenant-General Ewell. He served at Chaffin's farm until the evacuation of Richmond, and then joined in the retreat of Custis Lee's command, as far as Sailor's creek, where he was captured April 6, 1865. Since the war General Barton has made his home at Fredericksburg, Va.

Brigadier-General Richard L. T. Beale was born at Hickory Hill, Westmoreland county, Va., May 22, 1819, and was educated at Northumberland academy and Dickinson college, Pa. Then taking up the study of law, he was graduated by the law department of the university of Virginia in 1838. Subsequently he was engaged in the practice of his profession and attained prominence in the political field. From 1847 until 1849 he represented his district in Congress, to which he declined re-election. He was a delegate to the State reform convention in 1850, and was elected to the State senate in 1857. Upon the secession of Virginia he enlisted in the cavalry service, and being promoted captain and then major, was put in command at Camp Lee, near Hague, on the lower Potomac, where his intelligence and excellent judgment were of much value. Subsequently he served under Col. W. H. F. Lee, in the Ninth cavalry regiment until Lee was promoted brigadier-general, when he was advanced to the rank of colonel and given command of the regiment. In December, 1862, he attracted attention and much favorable comment by a bold expedition into Rapahannock county, in which the Federal garrison at Leeds was captured, without loss. On April 16, 1863, he won the praise of J. E. B. Stuart for his heroic service in meeting and repelling the threatened raid of Stoneman's cavalry division, and during the renewed movement by Stoneman at the close of the month, he was for a week in almost constant fighting, his regiment everywhere behaving valorously and capturing many prisoners. At the battle of Fleetwood he led the Ninth in the brilliant charge in which Gen. W. H. F. Lee was wounded and Colonel Williams killed. He participated in Stuart's raid through Maryland, fought at Gettysburg, and rendered faithful service in the cavalry affairs during the return to Virginia. During the fight at Culpeper Court House he was in command of W. H. F. Lee's brigade. In March, 1864, having been stationed on the Northern

Neck, he made a forced march to intercept Dahlgren and his raiders, and a detachment of his regiment under First Lieut. James Pollard, Company H, successfully ambushed the Federals, and aided by other detachments captured about 175 men and killed Dahlgren. The papers found upon Dahlgren's person, revealing a design to burn Richmond and kill President Davis and cabinet, were forwarded by Colonel Beale, through Fitz Lee, to the government. A correspondence with the Federal authorities followed, in which they disavowed all knowledge of such a design. He participated in command of his regiment in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James, was distinguished in the fighting at Stony creek, and toward Reams' Station, in July, capturing two Federal standards; and in August, upon the death of General Chambliss, was given command of the brigade. February 6, 1865, he was promoted brigadier-general, and in this rank he served during the remainder of the struggle.

Brigadier-General John Randolph Chambliss was born at Hicksford, Greenville county, Va., January 23, 1833; was graduated at the United States military academy in 1853, and being promoted to brevet second lieutenant, mounted riflemen, served at the cavalry school at Carlisle, Pa., until the following spring, when he resigned. He then returned to his home at Hicksford, where his father was a wealthy planter, and was engaged in agriculture until the spring of 1861. Meanwhile his military education was called into service by the State, and he held the position of aide-de-camp to the governor, with the rank of major, 1856-61; also commanded as colonel a regiment of Virginia militia, 1858-61, and was brigade inspector for the State two years. His father was a delegate to the convention of 1861, and he himself manifested hearty allegiance to Virginia throughout that momentous period. He was commissioned colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia cavalry regiment in July, 1861, and until the fall of 1862 was under the orders of Gen. D. H. Hill, in the department south of the James river. During the Maryland campaign he was put in command of the forces on the Rappahannock, between Warrenton and Fredericksburg, with his own regiment, the Second North Carolina cavalry, and the Sixty-first Virginia infantry. He performed his duties with such vigilance

and activity as to receive the warm commendation of Gen. R. E. Lee. In November he was assigned with his regiment to W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigade, with the gallant record of which he was identified, as one of the bravest and ablest of its officers, until he gave his life for the cause which he had served with entire fidelity and self-sacrificing devotion. In April, 1864, when the cavalry corps of the Federal army proposed to cross the Rappahannock and cut off Lee's communications with Richmond, Chambliss was particularly prominent in the defeat of the movement by Lee's brigade. At Beverly ford with 50 men he drove two Federal squadrons into the river, capturing a number of prisoners. He and his men were commended both by Generals Lee and Stuart as deserving the highest praise for distinguished bravery. In the famous battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863, after W. H. F. Lee was wounded and Col. Sol Williams killed, Chambliss took command of the brigade, and served in that capacity during the fighting about Aldie and Middleburg. Then riding with Stuart into Pennsylvania, he made a brilliant attack upon Kilpatrick at Hanover, driving him through the town and capturing his ambulances and a number of prisoners. His brigade and Fitz Lee's reached Gettysburg late on July 2d, and on the 3d he engaged in the fierce cavalry fight on the left of the Confederate line, between the York pike and Hanover road. Upon the retirement of the army, he aided efficiently in the protection of the Confederate trains. During the Bristoe campaign, still in command of the brigade, he reinforced Lomax at Morton's ford and defeated the enemy; and at Brandy Station the same two brigades fought with the utmost gallantry under their intrepid leaders, Chambliss winning anew the commendation of Stuart. Promoted brigadier-general in December, 1864, he continued in command of the brigade which he had led so long, through the cavalry fighting from the Rapidan to the James, gaining fresh laurels in the defeat of the enemy at Stony creek. Finally, in a cavalry battle on the Charles City road, on the north side of the James, he was killed while leading his men, August 16, 1864. His body was buried with honor by the enemy,

and soon afterward delivered to his friends. General Lee wrote that "the loss sustained by the cavalry in the fall of General Chambliss will be felt throughout the army, in which, by his courage, energy and skill, he had won for himself an honorable name."

Brigadier-General Robert Hall Chilton, of Virginia, was born about 1816, and entered the military academy at West Point in 1833, where he was graduated in 1837, and promoted second lieutenant of the First dragoons. He served on frontier duty at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; in the Osage country, among the Choctaws, in the Indian Territory, and at various other frontier posts, until 1844, when he was sent into Texas, on the expedition to the Falls of the Brazos. Meanwhile he had been promoted first lieutenant, and during the Mexican war he received promotion to captain, and brevet major for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of Buena Vista. Subsequently he returned to frontier duty, from which he was transferred in 1854 to the pay department at Washington, with the rank of major. He served in this capacity at New York, Detroit and San Antonio, Tex., until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and entered the Confederate service as lieutenant-colonel in the adjutant-general's department, soon being promoted colonel. When General Lee took command of the army of Northern Virginia, he applied to Gen. Samuel Cooper for a suitable officer for chief of staff, and Colonel Chilton was at once assigned to that important position. General Lee had served with him in Mexico and Texas, and later in the progress of the war took occasion to write General Chilton that he had always been zealous and active in the discharge of his official duties, and never known to be actuated by any other motive than the interests of the service. With promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, and appointment to the position of inspector-general of the army of Northern Virginia, October 28, 1862, Chilton served in the conspicuous position of chief of staff through all the campaigns and battles of the army of Northern Virginia, from June 1, 1862, until April 1, 1864, when he resigned. After the close of hostilities he made his home at Columbus, Ga., where he became interested in manufacturing and resided until his death, in 1879.

Brigadier-General Philip St. George Cocke was born in Virginia in the year 1808. He was educated at the United States military academy, and graduated in 1832 with the rank of brevet second lieutenant, and was soon assigned as second lieutenant to the artillery then stationed at Charleston, S. C. He served here during the exciting years of 1832-33, becoming adjutant of the Second artillery, July 13, 1833. On April 1, 1834, he resigned, and from that time until the outbreak of the Confederate war lived the life of a planter in Virginia and Mississippi. He devoted his energies and talents to agricultural pursuits, published a book on "Plantation and Farm Instruction," in 1852, and from 1853 to 1856 was president of the Virginia State agricultural society. He was prominent in Virginia councils during the momentous month of April, 1861, and on April 21st, having been appointed brigadier-general in the State service, he was assigned to command of the important frontier military district along the Potomac river. Three days later, from his headquarters at Alexandria, he reported to General Lee, stating that he had but 300 men in sight of an enemy of 10,000 rapidly increasing. Lee commended the policy Cocke had pursued, and advised him to make known that he was not there for attack, but that an invasion of Virginia would be considered an act of war. Cocke made his headquarters at Culpeper, April 27th, and on May 5th Alexandria was evacuated. He was given charge of the mustering of volunteer troops in a large part of the State, with rendezvous at Leesburg, Warrenton, Culpeper, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, and he issued a proclamation urging rapid enlistment in defense of the State, not for aggression. In the Confederate States service he was given the rank of colonel, and in the army of Beauregard was assigned to command of the Fifth brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eighth and Forty-ninth Virginia regiments. For ability shown in strategic movements at Blackburn's ford he was officially thanked by Beauregard. On July 20th he was stationed at Ball's ford, on Bull run, and in the Confederate preparations for the battle of the 21st, he was given command also of Evans' brigade and various unassigned companies, including cavalry and artillery. The contemplated advance which he was to make against Centreville was abandoned on account of the Federal

flank movement, and while Evans, reinforced by Bee and Bartow, opposed the enemy in that quarter, he sustained the attack in the vicinity of the stone bridge, with his headquarters at the Lewis house, until at 2 p. m., about an hour before the arrival of Elzey, he led his brigade into action on the left with "alacrity and effect." This was his last battle. After eight months' service, during which he was promoted brigadier-general in the provisional army, he returned home, shattered in body and mind, and his life was terminated December 26, 1861.

Brigadier-General Raleigh Edward Colston was born at Paris, France, of Virginia parentage, October 31, 1825. When seventeen years old he came to America with a passport, as a citizen of the United States, issued by Minister Carr, and entering the Virginia military institute, was graduated in 1846. He remained at the institute as a professor until April, 1861, when he marched to Richmond in command of the corps of cadets. In May he was commissioned colonel of the Sixteenth Virginia regiment of infantry, at Norfolk, and was later assigned to command of a brigade and a district on the south side of the James river, with headquarters at Smithfield. He was promoted brigadier-general December 24, 1861. In the spring of 1862 he moved his brigade, composed of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth North Carolina and Third Virginia regiments, to Yorktown, and participated in the defense of that post, and after the retreat to Williamsburg, in the battle there and at Seven Pines. He was then disabled by illness until December, 1862, when he was assigned to command of a brigade in the department of Southern Virginia and North Carolina, and from January to March, 1863, was in command at Petersburg. After the battle of Fredericksburg he was assigned, at Stonewall Jackson's request, to the Third brigade of Jackson's old division, and previous to the battle of Chancellorsville was given command of the division, which was distinguished for heroism on the 2d and 3d of May, participating, under his command, in the onslaught made in the evening of Saturday, and fighting desperately during the storm of battle which swayed to and fro over the Federal works on Sunday morning. On Sunday afternoon he made an advance toward the United States ford, in which his division, suffered severely. His divi-

sion lost at Chancellorsville 1,860 men out of about 6,000, including 8 brigade commanders, 3 of whom were killed. General Colston rendered especially valuable services in rallying the men under the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery, after Jackson fell, and again on Sunday morning after the Federal forces had reoccupied their intrenchments. In the latter part of May, on account of the objection of the colonels of North Carolina regiments to service under a Virginia brigade commander, General Lee put a Marylander, George H. Steuart, in command, and General Colston was ordered to report to General Cooper at Richmond. In October he was assigned to command at Savannah, Ga. In April, 1864, he returned to Virginia, and was assigned by General Wise to provisional command at Petersburg. On the night of June 8th-9th the lines were threatened by the Federal cavalry, and the alarm bells called out the home guards, old men and boys, the regular troops having been transferred to Lee's army. Immediately offering his services to General Wise he was ordered to take command on the line of lunettes, which then constituted the major part of the defenses, with the injunction to hold out until Wise could bring up his reserves. Colston joined Major Archer, who had less than 200 at the point attacked, and skillfully directed the desperate defense, holding his position until almost surrounded, when he made an orderly retreat, in which he seized a musket and fought with his men. The time gained by this gallant resistance enabled Graham's battery and Dearing's cavalry to come up in time to rout the Federal column, which was about to occupy the city. In July, General Colston was assigned to command of the post at Lynchburg, where he remained until the surrender. Subsequently he was engaged in lecturing and in the conduct of a military academy at Wilmington, N. C., until 1873, when he entered the military service of the Khedive of Egypt, in which he remained until 1879, meanwhile conducting two important exploring expeditions to the Soudan. During his last expedition he was paralyzed, and was carried hundreds of miles across the desert on a litter. Returning to Virginia he engaged in literary work and lecturing, and from 1882 to 1894 held a position in the war department at Washington. He passed the remainder of his days in the Soldiers' home at Richmond, and died July 29, 1896.



Brigadier-General Montgomery D. Corse was born at Alexandria, D. C., March 14, 1816, and after receiving an academic education entered business with his father at his native city. Taking a prominent part in the organization of local militia at the time of the Texas troubles, he served through the Mexican war as captain of Company B, First regiment Virginia volunteers. Early in 1849 he sailed to California, and during the opening of the gold fields was occupied there in various ways, including service as captain of the Sutter Rifles, of Sacramento city, until 1856, when he returned to Alexandria and formed a partnership with his brother in the banking business. In 1860 he organized the "Old Dominion Rifles" at Alexandria, and later in the year became major of the battalion which included the Alexandria Riflemen, Capt. Morton Marye, the Mount Vernon Guard, his own company under Capt. Arthur Herbert, and the Alexandria artillery, Capt. Delaware Kemper. Major Corse served as assistant adjutant-general until the evacuation of Alexandria, and was then assigned with his battalion to the Seventeenth Virginia regiment, of which he was promoted colonel. In Longstreet's, later Kemper's brigade, he took part in the affair at Blackburn's ford and the battles of Manassas, Yorktown, Williamsburg, Seven Pines, and the Seven Days' fighting before Richmond. In the second battle of Manassas he commanded the brigade, and was slightly wounded, but continued on duty; fought at Boonsboro, receiving a second wound; and led the remnant of his regiment, 56 men, in the battle of Sharpsburg. The story of their devotion is told by the fact that but seven remained in the ranks at the end of the fight—Maj. Arthur Herbert, Lieut. Thomas Perry, and five privates. Colonel Corse was severely wounded and for a time lay within the enemy's lines, but was recovered by an advance of the Confederate troops. In October, General Kemper forwarded to the secretary of war two battle-flags captured by the Seventeenth regiment, asking that they be preserved with some honorable mention of the brave men commanded by Colonel Corse, "by whose splendid gallantry the trophies were captured." Upon this communication General Longstreet endorsed: "Colonel Corse is one of the most gallant and worthy officers in this army. He and his regiment have been distin-

guished in at least ten of the severest battles of the war." R. E. Lee added: "This regiment and its gallant colonel challenge the respect and admiration of their countrymen." November 1, 1862, he was promoted to brigadier-general and assigned to the command of Pickett's old brigade. While in winter quarters he obtained leave of absence and was married to Elizabeth Beverly; but was soon afterward called to Fredericksburg to take command of a new brigade of Virginians for Pickett's division, composed of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Thirtieth and Thirty-second regiments, to which the Twenty-ninth was added later. During the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863 he was on duty with his brigade at Hanover Junction. Rejoining the army near Winchester, he moved in advance as Lee fell back toward the Rappahannock, and rendered valuable service in driving the enemy from Chester and Manassas gaps. In the fall and winter of 1863-64 he took his brigade to southwest Virginia and east Tennessee, co-operating with Longstreet; engaged the enemy at Dandridge in January, and then returned to Petersburg. Ordered at once to Kinston, N. C., he took part in the operations against New Bern until called to the defense of Richmond. He and his brigade were distinguished in the defeat of Butler at Drewry's bluff, May 16th. He shared the service of Pickett's division during the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. In the spring of 1865 Corse and his men fought bravely at Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks, and ended their military career with honor at Sailor's creek. After the surrender by Ewell, General Corse was conveyed to Fort Warren, and there confined until August, 1865. He left Washington on his way to Fort Warren on the day that Lincoln was assassinated, and he and the fourteen generals accompanying him narrowly escaped the violence of a mob at a town in Pennsylvania, on the next morning. Nothing saved them that day but the pluck and determination of the small guard of Union soldiers and officers who had them in charge. After his release from Fort Warren he returned to Alexandria and engaged in the banking business with his two brothers, J. D. and William Corse. He was very seriously injured in the fall of a part of the capitol at Richmond. It is probable that the injuries received on this occasion caused in part the blindness from which he suffered for

some years. With the exception of poor eyesight he was in the best of health until about a year before his death, which occurred February 11, 1895, after a short illness.

Brigadier-General James Dearing, of Virginia, was born in Campbell county, April 25, 1840. He was a great-grandson of Col. Charles Lynch, of revolutionary fame, who, through his summary way of treating the Tories, gave his name what is now known as "lynch law." He was educated at Hanover academy, Virginia, and was appointed a cadet in the United States military academy. He resigned as soon as the adherence of Virginia to the Confederacy was determined upon, and entered the Confederate army. He chose the artillery service at the outset, becoming a lieutenant of the Washington artillery, of New Orleans, a fine organization which created much enthusiasm on its arrival in Virginia. His brilliant service in the artillery led to his promotion to captain of a battery attached to Pickett's division. As lieutenant and captain he participated in the principal battles of the army of Northern Virginia until after Chancellorsville, when he was promoted major, and put in command of a battalion of eighteen guns in the reserve artillery of Longstreet's corps. He reached the battlefield of Gettysburg with Pickett's division, and took part in the tremendous artillery duel which followed on the third day. In the winter of 1863-64, Pickett, having been assigned with the remnant of his division to the district of North Carolina, with headquarters at Petersburg, Va., found himself in need of cavalry, and collecting various companies of mounted men, he wrote to the secretary of war, "I shall assign them to the command of Major Dearing, and ask that he may be ordered to the command of these troops, with the temporary rank of colonel. He is a young officer of daring and coolness combined, the very man for the service upon which he is going, a good disciplinarian, and at the same time generally beloved by his men. I am not saying too much in his absence in assuring you that General Longstreet would strongly endorse his claims to promotion had he the opportunity." Dearing was at once given this command, though Lee wrote a few days later, in ordering the New Bern expedition, "I propose Major Dearing for the command of the artillery of this expedi-

tion." The appreciation of his service in the artillery was still further shown on April 5, 1864, when Lieutenant-Colonel Dearing was ordered to report to General Lee for assignment to command of the horse artillery of the army of Northern Virginia. Dearing's service, however, was from the beginning of 1864 in the cavalry. The regiment collected for him by Pickett was called Dearing's Confederate cavalry, and other cavalry commands were put in his charge during the New Bern expedition, in which he was distinguished, and was promoted brigadier-general. Early in May he was called to the Petersburg lines, on account of the opening of Grant's campaign. At first stationed on the Weldon railroad, and in command of a brigade consisting of his regiment, a Georgia regiment and two other North Carolina regiments of cavalry, a Virginia battalion and Graham's light artillery, he was soon called to the line of Swift's creek and Drewry's bluff, to meet the advance of Butler. On June 9th his command engaged Grant's cavalry at Reservoir hill, and drove the enemy from the field by an impetuous charge. On the 15th of June, Grant's whole army now being south of the James, Dearing's regiment made a gallant stand against the advance, which Beauregard reported as of incalculable advantage to his command. Subsequently he commanded a brigade of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division, and shared the duties of that command throughout the remainder of the war. During the retreat in April, 1865, he was mortally wounded in a remarkable encounter with Brig.-Gen. Theodore Read, of the United States army. The two generals met on the 5th of April at High Bridge on the Appomattox, at the head of their forces, and a duel with pistols ensued. General Read was instantly killed, but General Dearing lingered for a few days after the surrender of General Lee, when he died in the old City hotel at Lynchburg.

Brigadier-General John Echols was born March 20, 1823, at Lynchburg, Va., and was educated at the Virginia military institute, Washington college and Harvard college. Entering upon the practice of law at Staunton he soon attained distinction. He was a man of magnificent figure, standing 6 feet 4 inches, and his mental qualities fully sustained his physical capacity for

leadership. After taking a prominent part in the Virginia convention of 1861, he offered his military services, and was promptly commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and ordered by General Lee to call out and muster in the volunteer forces in the vicinity of Staunton, including the mountain counties, for Johnston's army. This work done he was assigned to the Twenty-seventh regiment, which he commanded at First Manassas, where he had a gallant part in earning the title of the "Stonewall brigade." He was soon afterward promoted colonel, and in this rank served with Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah valley through the winter and spring of 1861-62. In Jackson's report of the battle of Kernstown he related that "Col. John Echols with his regiment, with skirmishers thrown forward, kept in advance and opened the infantry engagement, in which it was supported by the Twenty-first. Well did these two regiments do their duty, driving back the enemy twice in quick succession. Soon a severe wound compelled the noble leader of the Twenty-seventh to leave the field." This wound, received March 23d, disabled him for some time. His gallantry was recognized by promotion to brigadier-general in April, 1862, and a few months later he was assigned to command of a brigade of the army of Western Virginia, with which he was afterward prominently identified. He participated as a brigade commander in Loring's occupation of the Kanawha valley in September, and after Loring had withdrawn to the mountains, Echols was assigned to the command of the army of the department of Western Virginia, superseding Loring. He promptly reoccupied Charleston, but was again compelled to retire before superior forces. He resigned his department command in the spring of 1863, and during the following summer served upon the court of inquiry held at Richmond to investigate the cause of the fall of Vicksburg, Gens. Howell Cobb and Robert Ransom being the other members. Later in the year he commanded the Confederate forces in the battle of Droop Mountain, West Virginia, a hard-fought contest, in which his command, though forced to retire, gave an effectual check to the Federal plans. In May, 1864, he commanded Breckinridge's right wing at the successful battle of New Market, in the Valley, and was then called with his brigade to Lee's army on the Cold Harbor line, where he

served with credit. On August 22, 1864, he was given charge of the district of Southwestern Virginia, and on March 29, 1865, was ordered to the command of the western department of Virginia, relieving General Breckinridge. On April 2d he began a march to unite with Lee, and reached Christiansburg on the 10th, where he received a telegram announcing the surrender at Appomattox. It was a terrible blow to his little army of 6,000 or 7,000 men, and caused indescribable consternation. At a council of war it was determined to march to unite with Johnston's army, and Echols set out at the head of Vaughn's and Duke's brigades on the 11th. Subsequently he accompanied President Davis to Augusta, Ga., and was for a short time in command at that place. After the close of hostilities he re-entered the law practice at Staunton, also exerted a beneficent influence in public affairs as a member of the committee of nine, in restoring Virginia to its proper relations with the general government, and as a member of the Virginia legislature. He was one of the early members of Stonewall Jackson camp, Confederate veterans, at Staunton, and was always faithful to the soldiers of the Confederacy. He was very successful both in law and in business, displaying great executive ability; became president of the Staunton National Valley bank, and receiver and general manager of the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern railroad. The duties of the latter office required his residence in Kentucky during the last ten years of his life. He was twice married, first to a sister of Senator Allen T. Caperton, of West Virginia, and after her death to Mrs. Mary Cochrane Reid, of New York. He died at the residence of his son, State Senator Edward Echols, at Staunton, May 24, 1896.

Brigadier-General John B. Floyd, of Virginia, was born at Blacksburg, Pulaski county, June 1, 1801. He was the son of Hon. John Floyd, a Democratic statesman of the old school, who served in Congress for several terms, was governor of the State, and in 1852 was a candidate for the presidency of the United States. Young Floyd was educated at the college of South Carolina, with graduation in 1826, after which he studied law and was admitted to practice. Turning to the West for a field of effort, he removed to Arkansas, but three years

later again made his home in Virginia. He resumed the practice of his profession in Washington county, and took an active and prominent part in the political affairs of the day. After serving three terms in the legislature he was elected governor of Virginia in 1850. In 1853 he was again elected to the legislature, and in 1856 he was a delegate to the national Democratic convention. In the ensuing campaign he supported Buchanan, and when that gentleman was inaugurated president he called Floyd to his cabinet as secretary of war, where he served until the latter part of December, 1860. After the secession movement had begun in the South it was charged by Floyd's political opponents in the North that he had been secretly aiding in advance the Confederate cause by dispersing the army to distant points on the frontier, by shipping an undue proportion of arms and munitions to Southern posts, and that he was privy to the abstraction of \$870,000 in bonds from the department of the interior. He was indicted accordingly at Washington, but he promptly met the charges, appeared in court and gave bail, and demanded trial. In January, 1861, the charges were investigated by a committee of congress, and he was completely exonerated. After leaving Washington he returned home and remained there until the spring of 1861, when he was commissioned brigadier-general in the Confederate army, May 23d. In command of his brigade he participated in the West Virginia campaign, joining General Wise in the Kanawha valley and taking command in that district August 12th. On the 26th he defeated Colonel Tyler, of Rosecrans' command, at Carnifax Ferry, but from lack of co-operation was unable to follow up his success. Here he fought a battle with Rosecrans in September, and at Gauley Bridge had another engagement in October. He was subsequently assigned to the army under Albert Sidney Johnston, in command of a brigade of Virginia troops, the Thirty-sixth, Fiftieth, Fifty-first and Fifty-sixth and Virginia artillery. In the organization of the Central army of Kentucky he commanded one of the three divisions. When Grant advanced from Cairo, Johnston intrusted the defense of Fort Donelson to Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner, Floyd taking general command by virtue of seniority. He withstood an assault by both the land and naval forces of the enemy on February 13th and

14th, and on the next day, believing his position untenable, ordered an attack in the hope of cutting a path of retreat through the investing lines. A fierce and stubborn battle followed, in which Pillow was successful in gaining possession of the Charlotte road and Buckner was equally successful on the Wynn's Ferry road. Floyd then "started for the right of his command to see that all was secure there," his intention being to hold the positions gained and immediately move out the entire army. During his absence a change was made in the disposition of the troops by General Pillow, and the enemy pressed forward, and with the help of reinforcements regained so much of their lost ground that it became necessary to withdraw to the original Confederate position. A council of war followed, in which the generals were united that resistance was useless against the great investing force, but both Pillow and Floyd declared that they would not surrender, and General Buckner assumed that responsibility. Forrest took out his cavalry through the submerged river road, and General Floyd, with a large part of his brigade, embarked on the river transportation and reached Nashville in safety. He subsequently had command of the "Virginia State Line," operating in southwestern Virginia, finally retiring to his home at Abingdon, Va., where he died August 26, 1863.

Brigadier-General Samuel Garland was born at Lynchburg, Va., December 16, 1830, of an old Virginia family, his great-grandmother having been a sister of President Madison. His father, Samuel Garland, Sr., a well-known lawyer, died when his son was five years old. He entered a classical school at the age of seven years, and was graduated at the Virginia military institute, where he was the founder and president of the first literary society of that institution. In 1851 he was graduated in law at the university of Virginia, and he at once entered upon the practice of the profession at Lynchburg. His career during the period before the war was one of worthy prominence, and he became widely esteemed as a skillful lawyer and polished gentleman. In 1859, after the affair at Harper's Ferry, he organized the Lynchburg Home Guard, of which he was the first captain. He was not by inclination a military man, entering the service both in 1859 and 1861 as a matter of duty; but when enlisted



in the fight, no labor was too fatiguing and no peril too hazardous for his devoted and intrepid spirit. On April 23, 1861, he left home with his well-drilled and disciplined company, and proceeded to Richmond, where his men were mustered into the service of Virginia, as Company G of the Eleventh Virginia infantry, on the following day. Of this regiment, composed of four Lynchburg companies and commands from other Virginia towns, he was placed in command as colonel, a few days later. He took his regiment to camp at Manassas, where it joined the brigade of General Longstreet. In the fight at Blackburn's ford the regiment was distinguished, and Colonel Garland was mentioned by General Longstreet, with others, as having "displayed more coolness and energy than is usual amongst veterans of the old service." In the famous battle of the 21st, the regiment was intended to take an active part, but the Federal flank movement caused the fight to open in another quarter. After the engagement Colonel Garland was detailed to collect the spoil of battle on the field. In the fight at Dranesville, in December, he was reported as behaving with great coolness. In the absence of orders he held his line until the rest of the Confederate force was entirely withdrawn from the field. In February, 1862, he was commended by General Johnston as fully competent to command a brigade. In March he moved with his regiment to the Peninsula, where the brigade came under the command of A. P. Hill. In the battle of Williamsburg, the most severe loss was sustained by the Eleventh regiment, and Hill reported that "Colonel Garland, though wounded early in the action, refused to leave the field, and continued to lead his regiment until the battle was over, and his example had a most happy effect in showing his men how to win the battle." Immediately after this Garland was promoted brigadier-general, and was assigned to the command of a brigade of D. H. Hill's division, which after Seven Pines was composed of the Fifth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-third North Carolina regiments. He was distinguished for gallant conduct in the heat of the fight at Seven Pines; at Gaines' Mill, asked permission and made a flank attack at an opportune juncture, which decided the fate of the day, his men cheering and charging and driving the enemy; and he was in the attacking columns

at Malvern Hill. During the Second Manassas campaign he was with Hill's division, holding McDowell in check at Fredericksburg, after which he joined the army in the Maryland campaign. At Fox's gap, on South mountain, his North Carolinians, scarce 1,000 in all, sustained the first attack of Cox's corps of McClellan's army on September 14th. They held their ground with wonderful heroism in the face of a furious attack. With them, where the fight was hottest, stood General Garland, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Colonel Ruffin. It was to him the post of duty. On one side lay McClellan with 30,000 men; on the other was the short road to Harper's Ferry, beleaguered by Jackson. The enemy must be held back a day, or the Federals, under an active commander, could overwhelm the divided Confederates. In this position, early in the fight, he received a mortal wound, from which he died on the field. "Had he lived," wrote Gen. D. H. Hill, "his talents, pluck, energy and purity of character must have put him in the front rank of his profession, whether in civil or military life."

Brigadier-General Richard Brooke Garnett, a cousin of Gen. R. S. Garnett, was a native of Virginia and a graduate of the same West Point class in which his cousin was a member. Promoted second lieutenant of the Sixth infantry on graduation, he began his services in the field in the Florida war of 1841-42. He subsequently served in garrison at Jefferson barracks, Mo., and on frontier duty at Fort Towson, Indian Territory, and Fort Smith, Ark., and as aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Brooke at New Orleans. He was promoted first lieutenant in February, 1847, and continued in service, at San Antonio, Tex., and at Fort Pierre, Dak., where he was promoted captain. He assisted in quelling the Kansas disturbances in 1856-57, was detailed to escort the southern boundary commissioners in 1857, served again in Kansas, and was engaged in the Utah expedition and the subsequent march to California. In the latter territory and in New Mexico he served until he resigned to offer his services to the Confederate States. He was commissioned major, corps of artillery, C.S.A., and in November, 1861, promoted brigadier-general. Jackson, then in the Shenandoah valley with a small force, was reinforced soon afterward, and Garnett went with these forces, and

at the battle of **Kernstown, March 23, 1862**, he commanded the Stonewall brigade. During the Maryland campaign he commanded Pickett's brigade. In the westward movement on September 14th, with his brigade he reached Boonsboro after a hot and tiresome march over the mountains, to which he was ordered to return that afternoon to dispute the mountain pass with the Federal army. His troops, almost exhausted, took a position before Turner's gap, on the eastern slope of the South mountain, under artillery fire, and sustained for some time a fierce attack from Reno's corps of McClellan's army. On the 17th, Garnett and his men fought to the southeast of Sharpsburg village, in support of the Washington artillery, and later in the day in conjunction with S. D. Lee's battalion, and were distinguished for bravery. General Garnett was subsequently identified with the record of Pickett's division, in command of his brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eighth and Fifty-sixth Virginia regiments, which he finally led into action during the memorable charge on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg. The brigade moved forward in the front line, and gained the enemy's strongest line, where the fighting became hand to hand and of the most desperate character. The brigade went into action with 1,287 men and 140 officers, and after the struggle about 300 came back slowly and sadly from the scene of carnage. General Garnett's part in this fatal action is thus reported by his successor in command, Maj. Charles S. Peyton: "Of our cool, gallant, noble brigade commander it may not be out of place to speak. Never had the brigade been better handled, and never has it done better service in the field of battle. There was scarcely an officer or man in the command whose attention was not attracted by the cool and handsome bearing of General Garnett, who, totally devoid of excitement or rashness, rode immediately in rear of his advancing line, endeavoring, by his personal efforts and by the aid of his staff, to keep his line well closed and dressed. He was shot from his horse while near the center of the brigade, within about 25 paces of the stone wall."

Brigadier-General Robert Selden Garnett, born in Essex county, Va., December 16, 1819, was graduated at the United States military academy in 1841, and pro-

moted second lieutenant of artillery. He served at the West Point academy from July, 1843, to October, 1844, as assistant instructor of infantry tactics. In 1845 he was assigned to duty as aide-de-camp to General Wool, and in this capacity rendered conspicuous service in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, winning promotion to the rank of first lieutenant of the Fourth artillery. He subsequently served as aide-de-camp to General Taylor, and participated in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista, where he won the brevets of captain and major. After peace was declared he was transferred to the infantry and promoted captain. In 1852-54 he was commandant corps of cadets and instructor in infantry tactics at West Point. Receiving promotion to major in March, 1855, he commanded the troops sent against the Indians on Puget sound in the far northwest, and remaining there was in charge of the Yakima expedition in 1858. Subsequently he traveled in Europe on leave of absence until the year 1861, when he returned, resigned his commission, and entered the Confederate army. He was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, C. S. A., to date from March 16th, and served as adjutant-general under Gen. R. E. Lee, in command of the Virginia forces. Early in June he was commissioned brigadier-general and ordered to proceed to Staunton and assume command of the troops to operate in northwestern Virginia. In a few days he was engaged in the unfortunate campaign in West Virginia, where his life was sacrificed. It was very early in the war; he found difficulty in obtaining supplies, clothing and shelter for his men; the sentiment in that vicinity was against the Confederacy, and he was confronted by overwhelming odds. Without a trace of faintheartedness, he established his headquarters at Laurel hill, and there and at Rich mountain intrenched his troops. On June 10th, Pegram was dislodged from Rich mountain, and a superior force compelled Garnett to abandon Laurel hill and fall back. He was pursued by the Federals, and a brisk action occurred on the Cheat river, at Carrick's ford, July 13th. At the next ford on the same day, while with his rear guard, he was instantly killed by a volley of the enemy, falling, as President

Davis wrote, in exemplification of the "highest quality of man, self-sacrifice for others." His body, kindly cared for by General McClellan, was subsequently transferred with tokens of respect to the hands of his friends.

Brigadier-General David Bullock Harris, a distinguished military engineer, was born at Fredericks hall, Louisa county, Va., September 28, 1814. He was graduated at the United States military academy in 1833, with promotion to brevet second lieutenant of First artillery, and a year later was called to the position of assistant professor of engineering at West Point. On August 31, 1835, he resigned from the army and entered the profession of civil engineering, for some time being employed on the James river and Kanawha canal. Subsequently he became a planter and exporter of tobacco and flour. Early in 1861 he was commissioned captain of engineers of the Virginia forces, and was assigned to the staff of General Beauregard, with whom he was associated from that time until the end of the war. He was the first to reconnoiter the line at Bull run, planned and constructed the works for the defense of Manassas Junction, and in the heat of the fight of July 21st, at the critical moment when Elzey led his brigade upon the field, he guided that officer into position. He accompanied Beauregard to the Mississippi valley, and after inspecting the defenses at Columbus, Ky., was intrusted with the construction of works at Island No. 10 and vicinity, to which the artillery was removed from the Columbus fortifications. After the fall of New Orleans he located and constructed fortifications for heavy guns at Vicksburg, and thence he went with Beauregard in 1863 to Charleston, S. C. Of his work here, Beauregard wrote, "My best and almost only assistant for planning the construction of batteries and making the selection of sites on which they were to be erected was Maj. D. B. Harris, the chief engineer of the department, on whom I placed the utmost reliance, and who always thoroughly understood and entered into my views." Early in May, General Beauregard was at Petersburg, in command of the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, and here Harris, now promoted colonel, found immediate field for work at Drewry's bluff, where his services and

advice contributed greatly to the successful defense of the Confederate lines. He continued on duty in the defense of Petersburg, with promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, until his death, October 10, 1864.

Major-General Henry Heth was born in Chesterfield county, Va., December 16, 1825. He is the son of John Heth, of the Black Heth estate, in that county, who served as a colonel in the volunteer forces of Virginia, and as an officer in the United States navy in the war of 1812, when he was captured with Decatur and taken to Bermuda, whence he escaped with two comrades in an open boat. An uncle of his, Col. William Heth, fought at Quebec under General Montgomery and was distinguished in the revolutionary war. Henry Heth was educated at the United States military academy, and graduated in 1847 with the rank of brevet second lieutenant of the Second infantry. His first service was in the war with Mexico, when he was made second lieutenant of the Eighth infantry. He was engaged in the skirmish at Matamoros and at Galaxara in 1847-48, and in 1848 at the evacuation returned to Jefferson barracks. On the Indian frontier he was on duty at Fort Atkinson, Fort Kearny and Fort Laramie, taking a conspicuous part in many Indian fights, and winning a first lieutenancy in June, 1853, with promotion to adjutant in November, 1854, and to captain, Tenth infantry, in March, 1855. Soon after the latter promotion he led a detached company, mounted as cavalry, in the Sioux expedition under General Harney, which ended in the victory at Blue-water. In 1857 he was assigned to special duty in preparing target practice for the army, and in 1858 he rejoined his regiment in Utah, where he remained until the latter part of 1860, when he returned to Virginia on leave of absence. When coercion seemed inevitable he resigned his Federal commission, served on the staff of General Taliaferro at Norfolk, as captain, and accepted the duty of organizing the quartermaster's department at Richmond. He was commissioned major, C. S. A., and soon promoted colonel of the Forty-fifth Virginia regiment, in which capacity he organized General Floyd's command at Wytheville, for the West Virginia campaign, and after participating in the battle of Carnifax Ferry, conducted Floyd's retreat from Cotton Hill. In January,

1862, he was promoted brigadier-general, and assigned to the command in West Virginia, where he fought in May of that year the battle of Giles Court House, in which he was opposed to Col. R. B. Hayes, and later the battle of Lewisburg. In June he joined Gen. Kirby Smith at Knoxville, Tenn., and accompanied him in the movement into Kentucky. After reaching Lexington he was given charge of a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, and moved against Cincinnati, some of his troops, on September 6th, reaching the suburbs of Covington, but he was withheld from an attack by positive orders. In February, 1863, he joined the army of Northern Virginia, and was assigned to the command of Field's brigade, of which he had charge in the battle of Chancellorsville. On the wounding of A. P. Hill in the first day's fight, he succeeded to command of the division but was himself wounded in the opening of the fight next day, which General Lee noted with regret in his dispatch to President Davis. He was promoted major-general and placed in command of a division of General Hill's corps, consisting of the brigades of Pettigrew, Brockenbrough, Archer and Davis. Engaging in the Pennsylvania campaign, he moved to Cashtown, and thence sent Pettigrew's brigade to Gettysburg to procure a supply of shoes. The brigade returned with information of Federal advance. Heth attacked the Federals under Reynolds the next day, and fought a desperate battle, a worthy opening of the great three days' struggle, in which he lost in twenty-five minutes 2,700 out of 7,000 men, and half his officers, and was himself severely wounded. He was subsequently engaged in the affair at Falling Waters, and in the following October, with two brigades attacked Warren's corps of Meade's army, fighting the battle of Brietoe Station. After wintering at Orange Court House, he commanded the advance of Hill's corps, marching on the plank road to resist Grant's flank movement on May 5th. He replied for three hours to the attacks of General Hancock on the Brock road; was distinguished for intrepid fighting about Spottsylvania on the 10th, 11th and 12th of May, and a few days later engaged General Warren at Nowell's Turnout. June 3d he took part in the battle of Bethesda Church. During the siege of Petersburg he served on the lines from July, 1864, until the evacuation, occupying the extreme right

of Lee's lines during September, October and November. He fought gallantly on the Weldon railroad August 18th, 19th and 20th; at Reams' Station captured 2,000 men, 9 pieces of artillery and many flags; at Burgess' Mill in November, 1864, and in all the struggles on the right, and lastly commanded at Burgess' Mill when the Confederate lines were broken. He conducted his division on the retreat and surrendered with the army on April 9th. During the following years he gave his attention to mining for a time, and then engaged in insurance at Richmond, Va.

Brigadier-General Eppa Hunton was born September 23, 1823, in Fauquier county, Va. The Huntons originally settled in New England, but the ancestor of General Hunton removed at an early period to Lancaster county, Va., where his great-grandfather, William Hunton, married Judith Kirk, and afterward made his home in Fauquier county. From him the descent is through his fourth son, James, and through the latter's second son Eppa. The senior Eppa Hunton was in the service of his country during the war of 1812, at Bladensburg and Craney island, and as a brigade inspector of the Virginia militia. His wife, the mother of General Hunton, was Elizabeth Marye, daughter of William Brent, who removed his family from Dumfries to Fauquier county during the revolutionary war, in which he served with distinction as a captain of infantry. The ancestors of this patriot came over with Lord Baltimore; one of his grandsons, Col. George W. Brent, was a gallant Confederate soldier. After the early death of his father, General Hunton was reared by his devoted mother, and aided by his uncle, the distinguished Charles Hunton, for four years president of the State senate, he studied under the Rev. John Ogilvie, and subsequently he taught school for three years, at the same time pursuing the study of law under the guidance of the late Judge John Webb Taylor. Admitted to the bar in 1843, he began practice at Brentsville, the county seat of Prince William county. In this period his military inclinations, doubtless inherited from his father, were manifested by his acceptance of the colonelcy of the Prince William regiment, and four years later of the rank of general, commanding the brigade. In 1848 he married Lucy Caro-



line, daughter of Robert and Clara B. Weir, through her mother connected with the Wallers of Virginia. The only child of this union surviving is Eppa Hunton, Jr., a distinguished lawyer of the Warrenton bar, who married Erva Winston, daughter of the gallant Gen. William H. Payne. In 1849 General Hunton was elected commonwealth's attorney for Prince William county, and was continued in this office by popular vote until he relinquished it for other duties in 1861. In the campaign of 1860 he was an elector on the Breckinridge ticket, and missed success by the misspelling of his name on a few ballots. In the famous Virginia convention of 1861 he took the peculiar position of favoring secession for the sake of the Union, arguing that if all the Southern States promptly withdrew, war would be avoided, and reconstruction on favorable and lasting terms would soon follow. After the passage of the ordinance he was placed upon the military committee, to recommend measures of defense; but feeling that his proper place was in the field, he resigned his commission in the State militia, and as a result of an application drawn up by his friend, Hon. Ballard Preston, and signed by every member of the convention, he was appointed colonel of the Eighth Virginia regiment, which he was ordered to organize and equip. This was rapidly accomplished at Leesburg, where he collected a body of as brave men (as he himself declared) as ever fought for liberty. They won imperishable renown upon every famous field of the army of Northern Virginia. Arriving at Manassas three days before the great battle of 1861, he was able on account of his familiarity with the country, to grasp the importance of the blind road from Centreville to Sudley, and he placed there a picket of five mounted men, from whom he received and transmitted to Beauregard the first intelligence of McDowell's flank movement. In the fight his regiment won special mention for gallantry. Subsequently General Hunton was severely afflicted physically, and underwent several surgical operations. In this condition he was hauled to the battlefield of Ball's Bluff in a spring wagon, and commanded his regiment, selecting a position which he maintained for many hours against five regiments of the enemy, repulsing their assault. Finally charging, with another regiment, he drove the Federals over the bluff and captured their guns

and many prisoners. After this his regiment joined the main army at Centreville and was attached to Pickett's brigade, then commanded by Gen. Philip St. George Cocke. In 1862 General Hunton was on sick leave at Lynchburg when Lee was about to attack the Federals before Richmond, and against the protests of his physician he rejoined his beloved regiment and commanded it through the Seven Days, so glorious in the history of the army. At the battle of Gaines' Mill, where Pickett's brigade made a brilliant assault and carried the three fortified lines of the enemy, before the assistance from Jackson came up, Pickett was wounded early in the assault, and Hunton, as senior colonel, carried on the successful action, which was never officially reported, owing to Pickett's severe wounds, and General Hunton's continued ill health, on account of which he was sent back to Lynchburg by General Longstreet. Again with his regiment and Pickett's division, at Gettysburg, he was wounded and his horse killed while leading his command in the charge against Cemetery hill, where his men were nearly all killed or wounded or captured, some of them beyond the stone fence, the first line of the enemy. His promotion to brigadier-general, well deserved and nobly won, but long delayed, as President Davis expressed to him after the war, on account of his reported feeble health, was dated from Gettysburg. His brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eighth and Fifty-sixth regiments of Virginia infantry, he was ordered to recruit at Chaffin's farm on James river. Early in the spring of 1864 he brought his command into the campaign against Grant, and served with conspicuous gallantry throughout, the brigade suffering particularly heavy losses at Cold Harbor, where General Hunton lost his adjutant-general and warm friend, Captain Linthicum. While Grant was preparing to cross the James, Lee was planning to fight at Malvern hill, and with his cavalry on the north side of the river he was not advised of Grant's movement until Beauregard was compelled to abandon the Howlett house line and Drewry's bluff, and rush to the defense of Petersburg. At this juncture Pickett's division was ordered from Malvern hill to retake Beauregard's position, General Hunton to take the lead toward Drewry's bluff. Making one of the most rapid marches of the war, he found the position still in our hands, and

he then marched toward Petersburg with the Eighth deployed as skirmishers, until he struck the enemy, and after a hot fight, drove the Federals across Beauregard's lines to their own. This very important duty was so brilliantly performed as to elicit the enthusiastic praise of General Lee. During subsequent movements in the long siege, Hunton's brigade became separated from its division. On the last of March, 1865, he was ordered with his own and two other small brigades to hold the White Oak road on the left of Five Forks, where Pickett and Fitz Lee confronted Sheridan's cavalry. His line had hardly been formed when a division of Warren's infantry corps advanced and was immediately attacked by Hunton and driven back to Gravelly run. With reinforcements the Federals were able to push Hunton back to the fortified lines, but the delay that had been caused greatly embarrassed Sheridan and led to Warren's unjust suspension from command. Two days later the retreat began, and Hunton's brigade marched with Wise's brigade, and Fitz Lee's cavalry in the rear. On this mournful march it was a continual conflict with the enemy's rapid advance. On one occasion in crossing a bridge, General Hunton found it necessary to form his brigade to meet the enemy from all sides while the cavalry and other troops crossed over, which he did with wonderful skill and courage. Next day he united his command with Pickett's division, and though sick, he remained with his men. At Sailor's creek the division recaptured Huger's artillery and repulsed the assaults of Custer. General Hunton soon comprehended that these charges were to prevent his retreat until the Federal infantry could surround him, but his superior officers were unable to meet the movement. The gallant men fought to the last, and many broke their muskets rather than surrender them, but were soon overpowered. Only eight men of Hunton's old regiment escaped. General Hunton was now suffering severely with physical illness, and was kindly cared for by the gallant Custer at his headquarters. He was thence carried to Petersburg, passed through Washington a few hours before the assassination of President Lincoln, and remained in prison at Fort Warren, where he was kindly treated and won the admiration of his guards, until the latter part of July. During the war his home, at Brentsville, had been destroyed, and his wife

and son had taken refuge at Lynchburg, where Federal General Turner took command after the surrender. He had faced General Hunton on the Howlett house lines, and immediately ordered that his former enemy's family should be supplied with every comfort, a courteous act which General Hunton gratefully acknowledged. On his return to civil life, he resumed the practice of law at Warrenton. It was a time of great privation, but he had confidence in his strength. An incident of this period of struggle was his refusing to sell his war-horse, "Old Morgan," for \$500, a princely sum just then; but his family sustained him in keeping the faithful horse. With renewed health, and a brave and confident spirit, fortune soon smiled again, and he became independent and prosperous. Before his political disabilities were removed he was elected to Congress from the Eighth Virginia district. By successive re-elections until he voluntarily retired, he sat in Congress eight years, rendering valuable and important services. In the Forty-third Congress, his first, he joined in the memorable struggle under Samuel J. Randall, for two days and two nights, against the passage of a "force bill." In the Forty-fourth, under Democratic control, he was chairman of the committee on revolutionary pensions, second on the judiciary committee, member of other committees, and as chairman of the sub-committee which investigated the famous charges against James G. Blaine, demonstrated his ability and fairness, and had occasion to encounter the highly gifted Republican leader in the committee room and on the floor of the House, and always with credit. During the proceedings in Congress which followed the contested election of Samuel J. Tilden, General Hunton was a member of the special committee that framed the electoral commission bill, but refused his signature to the report until the last moment. He was elected one of the five who represented the House upon that commission, becoming one of the judges of the highest court the world had ever known. He labored earnestly for the success of Tilden before this tribunal, and his anxiety and the disappointment at the result caused him a severe attack of illness. As a member of the District of Columbia committee in the Forty-fifth and its chairman in the Forty-sixth Congress, he and the Hon. J. C. S. Blackburn framed the present form of administration of that

district, under which the Federal government bears an equal share of its expenses. Through the wise provisions of Blackburn and Hunton the city of Washington has wonderfully developed, realizing the dreams of its great founder. General Hunton resumed the practice of law after March 4, 1881, forming a partnership with the Hon. Jeff Chandler at Washington city, and enjoyed an extensive and lucrative business. In May, 1892, he was appointed United States Senator for Virginia, by Governor McKinney, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the lamented Barbour, and this was confirmed by the legislature. He served until March 4, 1895, holding places on the committees on the District of Columbia, postoffices and post roads, and the chairmanship of the committee to establish a State university, a project which he advocated in an elaborate and able speech. While in the Senate he favored earnestly the repeal of the "Sherman silver law," with the understanding that free coinage of silver should follow; and voted for the Wilson tariff bill after an income tax had been added, as the best legislation that could be obtained. He left the Senate with a fine reputation for solid sense, capacity for hard work, and adherence to the tenets of his party. In 1896 he was prominent in the Virginia campaign in behalf of the candidacy of William J. Bryan. In appearance General Hunton is striking and impressive. He is a man of full stature, and a face and head that are indicative of massive strength, which, morally and mentally, is his distinctive characteristic. In the excitement of battle his bearing was superb. In the contests of the forum, the Senate, or the hustings, he was calm, earnest and impressive, and uniformly fair to his opponent. In repartee his play is vigorous, and those who play with him are not unlikely to receive a bruise, but if he knows it, it hurts him more than it does them. Finally, he is a gentleman upon whose integrity and moral character no scrutiny can develop the vestige of a stain.

Brigadier-General John D. Imboden, at the time of the passage of the ordinance of secession of Virginia, was a resident of Staunton, in the Valley. He had been a candidate for a seat in the convention, but was defeated by the candidate of the Union party. The policy he advocated was independent secession, and the maintenance

of an independent State which could mediate between the North and South and lead in the formation of a new Union, with local rights more clearly defined. Holding the position of captain of the Staunton artillery, a natural leader, and influential among the younger men, he at once took an important part in the action which secured Harper's Ferry to the State. He was called to Richmond a day or two before the ordinance was passed, and with other commanders of volunteer companies, under the leadership of ex-Governor Wise, arranged for a concentration of State forces at Harper's Ferry as soon as the action of the convention could be surely predicted. He called out his company by telegraph, and at sunrise following the momentous day, April 17th, was with his command at Manassas. He and other young and enthusiastic leaders were the forerunners of the spirit which was to dominate Virginia for four years, but at that moment they were coldly received by the majority of the people, not yet aroused. Proceeding to Harper's Ferry, he equipped his battery partly at his private expense, his men making caissons from carts found at the armory. Under the command of Col. T. J. Jackson he was posted at the Potomac bridge at Point of Rocks, and by the order of that afterward famous commander, captured and sent to Winchester a number of Baltimore & Ohio railroad trains. After the organization of the army in the Valley under General Johnston, he was attached to Bee's brigade, with which the Staunton artillery went into the battle at Manassas, July 21st, 1861. He was just in time to take a good position near the Henry house as the Federal attack fell upon the Confederate flank, and immediately became engaged with the famous batteries of Ricketts and Griffin. For half an hour after the Confederate infantry were driven across Young's branch, Imboden's battery fought alone, finally retiring and taking a new position supported by Stonewall Jackson, where it was in action until the ammunition was exhausted. Subsequently Captain Imboden, Lieut.-Col. Robert B. Lee and Maj. W. L. Cabell constituted a board of investigation, which reported in explanation of the failure to pursue McDowell to Washington that the food and transportation were inadequate. During Jackson's Valley campaign, 1862, Imboden, with a commission as colonel, was engaged in organizing a command at Staunton. In

charge of artillery and cavalry detachments, he held a bridge at Mount Crawford during the battle of Cross Keys, and participated in the battle of Port Republic. When Jackson left for Richmond, Imboden's little force, Robertson's cavalry and Chew's battery, were left in the Valley, and Imboden continued the organization of his force there and in the mountain counties. His command was known as the First Virginia partisan rangers, under the orders of General Jackson, but early in 1863 it was mustered in as the Eighteenth Virginia cavalry. In January, 1863, General Lee wrote him: "I hope you will meet with speedy success in filling up your command to a brigade, when I shall take great pleasure in recommending your promotion." He was soon afterward promoted to brigadier-general, and the Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first and Sixty-second Virginia infantry, and McClanahan's battery, were assigned to his command, for operations in northwest Virginia and the Valley, reporting directly to Gen. Robert E. Lee. With this force he made a successful expedition in northwest Virginia in April and May. During the Gettysburg campaign he raided on the left flank of Lee's army, and on the retreat his services were of great value. General Lee attached to his command eight guns of the famous Washington artillery, Major Eshelman, and other artillery. He made a splendid fight at Williamsport, holding out against the attack of 7,000 men until Fitzhugh Lee came up, saving the trains and the wounded of Lee's army. On July 21st General Imboden was assigned to command of the Valley district, Stonewall Jackson's old district. When General Lee made his Bristoe campaign of October, 1863, Imboden was instructed to advance down the Valley and guard the mountain passes. He captured the garrison at Charlestown on the 18th, for which he was complimented by Lee. Early in May, 1864, he marched from Mount Crawford to meet the invasion under Sigel, and held the Federals in check until, reinforced by Breckinridge, the successful battle of New Market was fought. Breckinridge being called again to Lee, Imboden's small command was pushed back to Mount Crawford, where he was reinforced by Vaughn, and W. E. Jones took command, to meet with serious defeat at Piedmont. General Imboden then, in command of his own, Jackson's and McCausland's brigades, fought Hunter's advance



Brig.-Gen. THOS. JORDAN.  
Brig.-Gen. HENRY A. WISE.  
Brig.-Gen. JULIUS A. DELAONEL.  
Brig.-Gen. WM. L. JACKSON.

Brig.-Gen. WALTER H. STEVENS.  
Maj.-Gen. HENRY HETH.  
Brig.-Gen. ROGER A. PRYOR.  
Brig.-Gen. E. F. FAXTON.

Brig.-Gen. THOS. T. MUNFORD.  
Brig.-Gen. JAMES A. WALKER.  
Brig.-Gen. JOHN McCABLAND.  
Brig.-Gen. JOHN R. JONES.





until Early came to Lynchburg. Subsequently he participated in the advance upon Washington, and Early's campaign against Sheridan, and was on duty in the Valley until the close of hostilities.

Major-General Edward Johnson was born in Kentucky, April 16, 1816, and was graduated at the United States military academy in 1838 and promoted second lieutenant of the Sixth infantry, U. S. A. He served during the operations against the Florida Indians from 1838 to 1841, and subsequently was on duty in the southwest. He rendered honorable service during the war with Mexico, taking part in the siege of Vera Cruz in March, 1847, the battle of Cerro Gordo, the skirmish at Amazogue and the battle of Churubusco; earned the brevet of captain at Molino del Rey, and was brevetted major for gallant and meritorious conduct at Chapultepec. He also participated in the assault and capture of the Mexican capital. Subsequently he was on duty at the frontier, being stationed at various posts in Kansas, Dakota and California. He was also for a time with the garrison at Fort Columbus, N. Y. Early in 1861 he resigned his Federal rank of captain, and was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, corps of infantry, C. S. A. As colonel of the Twelfth Georgia infantry he was called to Virginia and sent to the relief of Garnett, but was not able to reach that officer before his death. Falling back he occupied Alleghany mountain, and two Virginia regiments were added to his command. In December he defeated an attack by Milroy, his troops fighting splendidly under his inspiring leadership, and he was at once promoted brigadier-general. In May, 1862, with his command, the army of the Northwest, he defeated Milroy at McDowell. This battle was fought under his direction and by his own command, reinforced by Taliaferro. Stonewall Jackson commended his "skill, gallantry and presence of mind." Near the close of the battle Johnson was severely wounded. In February, 1863, he was promoted major-general, and at the reorganization following the death of Jackson he was put in command of a division of the Second corps of the army of Northern Virginia, under Lieutenant-General Ewell, comprising Steuart's, Nicholls', J. M. Jones' and the Stonewall brigades. Soon afterward he was conspicuous in his third defeat of

Milroy. Deploying his division east of Winchester, he masked the operations of Early, and after that officer had captured the Federal works, he cut off the retreat of the enemy, inflicting great loss and demoralizing his forces. Then marching to Carlisle, Pa., he reached the battlefield of Gettysburg on the evening of the first day's fight. He was ordered to the attack upon Culp's hill on the second day and was successful in carrying the enemy's intrenchments, where the fight was renewed, and raged with great fierceness, on the morning of July 3d. During the operations on the Rapidan in November, 1863, he fought successfully at Payne's farm. At the Wilderness, May 4, 1864, he took position on the Orange turnpike with his division and sustained the attack of Warren's corps, which opened the bloody fighting of that campaign. On the 12th of May, he held the "bloody angle" at Spottsylvania, and having been weakened by the withdrawal of artillery to meet an anticipated flank movement, was overwhelmed by a morning attack of Hancock's corps, in which he and a large part of his command were captured. After his exchange he was assigned, September, 1864, to command of Anderson's division of the army of Tennessee. In the corps of Gen. S. D. Lee he took part in Hood's Tennessee campaign, commanding the advance and occupying Florence, Ala., October 30th. He led a desperate charge in the battle of Franklin, and fought at Nashville, December 15th and 16th; on the latter day being captured, with a large part of his division, in the general defeat of Hood's army. After the close of the war he retired to his farm in Chesterfield county, Va., and resided there until his death, February 22, 1873.

Brigadier-General John Marshall Jones was born at Charlottesville, Va., July 26, 1820, and was educated for the profession of arms at West Point, graduating and receiving the rank of brevet second lieutenant of infantry in 1841. His first service was at Fort Mackinac, Mich. In 1843-45 he was stationed successively at Detroit, in Florida and in Texas, with the army of occupation; but he did not participate in the Mexican war, during that period and until 1852, being on duty at the military academy as an instructor in infantry tactics. He was promoted first lieutenant, Seventh infantry, in 1847. After this, with the exception of some time spent as a member

of a board of revision of tactics, he was on duty in the west, escorting Whipple's topographical party, on the Utah expedition and the march to New Mexico, and in garrison duty, until he was granted leave of absence in 1861. He was promoted captain in 1855, and held this rank when he resigned to enter the Confederate service. He was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, corps of artillery, C. S. A., and in September was assigned to duty as adjutant-general, on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. Participating in this capacity in the battles of Front Royal, Winchester, Cross Keys and Port Republic, of the Valley campaign, he was commended in each report of General Ewell for the coolness and efficiency with which he performed his duties. He was with General Ewell through the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, at Cedar mountain, and Groveton, where Ewell was wounded, and subsequently being appointed inspector-general of the division, was commended for gallantry on the field of Fredericksburg by General Early. After participating in the battle of Chancellorsville he was promoted brigadier-general in May, and assigned to the command of the old Second brigade of Jackson's division, now Edward Johnson's division, Ewell's corps. He reached the field of Gettysburg with his brigade about sunset July 1st, and on the following day took part in the assault upon Culp's hill, but fell with a dangerous wound when near the first line of the enemy's intrenchments. The brigade was commanded during the remainder of the battle by Lieut.-Col. R. H. Dungan. Returning to his brigade in September, he commanded it during the operations on the Rappahannock and Rapidan, and led the advance of his division on November 27th, to Payne's farm, where he received a serious wound in the head, early in the fight, while gallantly exposing himself at the front. Notwithstanding his hurt, he reported for duty a few days afterward, when a general engagement was supposed to be imminent. On May 5, 1864, Jones' brigade opened the terrific struggle in the Wilderness, driving back the Federal flanking skirmishers early in the day. He sustained the first attack by Warren's corps, the enemy suddenly striking his right flank and driving his men back in confusion. In a desperate attempt to rally his brigade, the brave commander and his aide-de-camp, Captain R. D. Early, were killed. General Ewell, in his

report of the campaign, alluding to the fact that out of his fourteen generals, three had been killed, four wounded and two captured, said of General Jones: "I consider his loss an irreparable one to his brigade."

Brigadier-General John R. Jones entered the Confederate service as captain of a company of the Thirty-third Virginia regiment, Stonewall brigade, and shared the services of that command at First Manassas and in the Valley campaign of May and June, 1862, winning promotion to lieutenant-colonel of his regiment. On June 23, 1862, he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the command of the Second brigade of Jackson's division. In this capacity he served at Cold Harbor and Malvern hill, until wounded in the night following the latter battle. His command in this campaign was composed of the Forty-eighth, Forty-second and Twenty-first Virginia regiments, the First Virginia battalion, the Hampton artillery and Jackson's battery. He resumed command of his brigade, which had fought under Bradley T. Johnson at Second Manassas, after it had reached Frederick in the march through Maryland. He then assumed command of Jackson's division, and was in charge of it at Harper's Ferry. After the surrender of that post he marched at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of September to reinforce Lee at Sharpsburg. There he took position on the extreme left. His brigade and Winder's (Stonewall) formed his front line, and the two, numbering less than 400 men, attacked at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, held back the enemy for nearly an hour, then retired to the second line, and after remaining for half an hour under a terrific storm of shot and shell, advanced and repulsed the enemy. Jones, disabled by the explosion of a shell above his head, early in the battle turned over the command to Brig.-Gen. William E. Starke, who fell in the fight, leaving Col. A. J. Grigsby in command of the Stonewall division. Jones' own brigade was successively commanded by Capts. John E. Penn, A. C. Page and R. W. Withers, the first two of whom each lost a leg. The division numbered about 1,600 at the beginning of the fight, and lost about 700 in killed and wounded. He commanded his brigade at Fredericksburg, and at Chancellorsville, on the first day, where the Second and Third brigades, Jackson's

division, were the first to charge upon and capture the first line of intrenchments of the enemy, in an open field beyond Wilderness church. On account of his disability the brigade was commanded next day by Col. T. S. Garnett until the latter was killed, when Col. A. S. Vandeverter succeeded him.

Major-General Samuel Jones was born in Virginia in 1820, and was graduated at West Point, with promotion to a lieutenancy in the artillery, in 1841. He served on the Maine frontier, during the boundary dispute, until 1843; in Florida, 1845-46; and from 1846 to 1851 was on duty at the United States military academy, as assistant professor of mathematics and instructor of infantry and of artillery. Then having been promoted first lieutenant First artillery, he was on various duty, at New Orleans, at Fort McHenry, on the Texas frontier, etc., with promotion to captain in 1853, until November, 1858, when he became assistant to the judge-advocate of the army. He remained in that position, at Washington, until April, 1861. On entering the Confederate service he was commissioned major, corps of artillery, C. S. A., and with promotion to lieutenant-colonel, was appointed assistant adjutant-general of the Virginia forces. During the organization of Beauregard's army and the battle of First Manassas, he served as chief of artillery and ordnance, and his services were gratefully acknowledged by the general commanding. Promotion to colonel was accorded him during this service, and he was promoted brigadier-general to date from the day of victory. He was on duty in the Potomac district, in command of a brigade of Georgia regiments subsequently under George T. Anderson, until January, 1862, when he was put in command of the army of Pensacola, relieving General Bragg. On March 3d he assumed command of the department of Alabama and West Florida, with headquarters at Mobile. In April, being promoted brigadier-general, he was assigned to command of a division of the army at Corinth under General Van Dorn, including the brigades of Rust, Maury and Roane, and in June he was put in command of Hindman's division. Later he was in charge at Chattanooga, and in September was stationed at Knoxville in command of the department of East Tennessee. From December 4, 1862, until March 4, 1864, he commanded

the department of Western Virginia, with headquarters at Dublin, Va., and in general charge of the operations in defense of the Virginia & Tennessee railroad and the salt mines. Subsequently he was in command of the department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida until succeeded by General Hardee in October. During this period Charleston harbor was defended, and the Federal expedition in Florida was defeated at Olustee. He commanded the district of South Carolina until January, 1865, and the department of South Georgia and Florida until May 10, 1865, when he surrendered at Tallahassee. Then retiring to private life he was engaged in farming, with his residence at Mattoax, Va., from 1866 until 1880, when he was appointed to a position in the office of the adjutant-general at Washington. In 1885 he was transferred to the office of the judge-advocate-general. His death occurred at Bedford Springs, Va., July 31, 1887.

Brigadier-General William E. Jones was born near Glade Spring, Washington county, Va., in May, 1824. He was educated at Emory and Henry college and at West Point, and began service in the United States army with the rank of brevet second lieutenant in the class of 1848. In 1847 he had received from Emory and Henry college the degree of master of arts. His connection with the old army continued until his resignation in 1857, he then having the rank of first lieutenant, mounted rifles. During this period he first served in Missouri and Kansas, marched to Oregon in 1849, remained there and in Washington Territory until 1851, and after that was mainly on duty in Texas. After his retirement he was engaged in farming in his native county until 1861. Upon the passage of the ordinance of secession he had ready a company of cavalry, the Washington Mounted Rifles, with which he joined Stuart in the Valley and took part in the First Manassas campaign. At this time Gen. J. E. Johnston declared that his company was the strongest in the First Virginia cavalry regiment, "not surpassed in discipline and spirit by any in the army," and recommended that Stuart be given brigade command and that Jones, "skillful, brave and zealous in a very high degree," should succeed to the colonelcy, with Fitzhugh Lee as lieutenant-colonel. Consequently he became colonel of the First, upon the

organization of Stuart's brigade, and in the spring of 1862 was intrusted by Stuart with important duties in watching the enemy from the Blue ridge to the Potomac. He was watchful and vigorous and made the enemy feel his presence. Soon afterward, being displaced by a regimental election, he was assigned to the Seventh regiment, Robertson's brigade. Rejoining Stuart in August he was distinguished in the Second Manassas campaign, his regiment fighting splendidly at Brandy Station, and winning commendation on several other occasions. He participated in the raid around McClellan's army following the battle of Sharpsburg, and on November 8th, having been promoted brigadier-general, was assigned to command of Robertson's, or the "Laurel brigade," largely composed of the men who followed Ashby in the valley. December 29th he was assigned to command of the Valley district, including his brigade and all other troops operating in that region, being selected for this post by Stonewall Jackson. With the co-operation of General Imboden he made, in April and May, 1863, a very successful raid upon the Baltimore & Ohio railroad west of Cumberland, destroying an immense amount of public and railroad property. Then joining Stuart with his splendid brigade, he bore the first shock, and both in morning and evening the brunt of battle, in the famous cavalry fight of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863, his brigade ending the fight with more horses and more and better small-arms than at the beginning, and capturing two regimental colors, a battery of three pieces and about 250 prisoners. During the advance of Lee into Pennsylvania, Jones, who had been pronounced by Stuart "the best outpost officer" in the cavalry, was depended upon mainly to cover the rear and flank of the army. He defeated a Federal cavalry regiment at Fairfield, Pa., and after the retreat of Lee was begun pushed forward rapidly to protect the wagon trains of Ewell's division. Hurrying on with his staff on the night of July 4th, he found Emack's Maryland company with one gun, holding at bay a Federal division, with only half the train gone by. He joined in the desperate fight in person and with his companions until his command was scattered by a charge of cavalry. Separated from his followers, he made his way alone to Williamsport and organized all the men he could gather in the confusion for the defense of the place before the



arrival of Imboden. Then, with half a dozen companies, he made his way through the enemy's lines to his command, and returned with it to participate in the attacks on Kilpatrick at Hagerstown and on Buford at Williamsport. During the campaign, he reported, his brigade fought in three battles and the affair at Boonsboro, and captured over 600 prisoners. Soon afterward an unfortunate break in his relations with General Stuart, which had existed since the fall of 1861, became so intensified as to have serious results. Col. O. R. Funsten was given temporary command of the brigade, and on October 9th General Jones was ordered to report for duty in southwest Virginia. There he organized an excellent cavalry brigade, with which he co-operated with Longstreet in east Tennessee, and in November defeated the enemy near Rogersville. At Saltville, Va., in May, 1864, with Gen. John H. Morgan, he foiled Averell's designs against that post, defeated the Federals at Wytheville, and pursued them to Dublin. On May 23d he was assigned to command of the department of Southwest Virginia in the absence of General Breckinridge. It was at that moment a position of great importance, as the district was in a turmoil on account of the incursions of Averell and Crook and Sigel, and Hunter was preparing to advance on Lynchburg. Early in June three strong columns of the enemy were marching against him, and he made a stand with his own brigade, Imboden's and Vaughn's before Hunter, at Piedmont. In the desperate fight which followed, June 5th, he was killed and his body fell into the hands of the enemy.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan was born in Luray valley, Va., September 30, 1819. He was graduated at the United States military academy in 1840, and entered the active service as second lieutenant of the Third infantry, in garrison at Fort Snelling, Minn. Taking part in the Seminole Indian war, he was among those who surprised and captured the chief, "Tiger Tail," near Cedar Keys, in November, 1842. Subsequently he served on frontier duty until 1846, when he was promoted first lieutenant. In the Mexican war he served creditably at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, and being promoted captain and quartermaster in 1847, he remained at Vera Cruz for a year after the war. His services from that

time, in the United States army, were rendered in the Southern garrisons and on the Pacific coast. May 21, 1861, he resigned and was commissioned captain, corps of infantry, C. S. A. He was with the forces first collected at Manassas Junction as lieutenant-colonel and staff officer, and when Beauregard took command there he was promoted colonel and made chief of staff and adjutant-general of that army. During the battle of July 21st he was intrusted with the important duty of directing from the rear the disposition of reinforcements, and after the fight he accompanied President Davis to the field. His assistance in the organization of the forces there was gratefully acknowledged by Beauregard, whom he subsequently accompanied to the west. He inspected the forces at Columbus, Ky., and advised their withdrawal, and during the advance from Corinth rendered important service in the preparation for the battle of Shiloh. In this famous conflict he was very active along the line, giving orders as occasion required in the name of General Johnston, and at one time having with him and under his direction the chiefs of staff of the different corps commanders. For his invaluable services on this field he was promoted brigadier-general, April 14, 1862. Subsequently he served as chief of staff with General Bragg until after the Kentucky campaign. When Beauregard was called to the defense of Charleston, he joined his old commander as chief of staff of that department. In May, 1864, he was assigned to the command of the Third military district of South Carolina. After the restoration of peace in the United States, General Jordan became chief of the general staff of the Cuban insurgent army. In May, 1869, he landed at Mayari with 300 men, and ammunition and supplies for 6,000, and in December of the same year succeeded to the chief command of the army of independence. He gained a signal victory over superior forces of the enemy at Guaimaro in January, 1870, but on account of a want of supplies he soon resigned and returned to the United States. Of recent years he has resided at New York, and edited the *Mining Journal*. In 1868 he published, in association with J. B. Pryor, a valuable work on "The Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," and his minor contributions to Confederate history have been numerous and interesting.

Major-General James Lawson Kemper was born in Madison county, Va., June 11, 1823, of a family descended from John Kemper, of Oldenburg, who settled in Virginia in 1714, in the "Palatinate Colony." He was educated at the Virginia military institute and Washington college, where he took the degree of master of arts, and his subsequent study of the law was pursued at Charleston, Kanawha county. In 1847 he was commissioned captain in the volunteer army by President Polk, and he joined General Taylor's army after the battle of Buena Vista. Subsequently he became prominent in the political life of the State, and served ten years as a member of the house of delegates, two years as speaker, and for a number of years as chairman of the committee on military affairs. He was also president of the board of visitors of the Virginia military institute. On May 2, 1861, he was commissioned colonel of Virginia volunteers and assigned to the command of the Seventh regiment of infantry. Joining his regiment at Manassas he rendered efficient special service to General Beauregard in procuring him 200 wagons. He was in battle at Blackburn's ford, and on July 21st, assigned to the brigade commanded by Col. Jubal A. Early, he aided in striking the final blow on the extreme left of the Federal line, which immediately preceded the rout of McDowell's forces. Three days after this battle his regiment was assigned to the brigade commanded by General Longstreet, and subsequently by A. P. Hill, under whom Colonel Kemper, with the Seventh regiment, was in the hottest of the fight at Williamsburg. Immediately after this he was given command of the brigade which had been successively under Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill, and he fought his regiments with distinguished skill and courage during the first day at Seven Pines and throughout the Seven Days' fighting before Richmond. At Frayser's he made a gallant advance over difficult ground, broke the enemy's line and captured a battery. With Longstreet's corps he reached the scene of battle at Manassas, August 29, 1862, and in the subsequent fighting served in command of a division consisting of his own, Jenkins', Pickett's and N. G. Evans' brigades. At South mountain he commanded his brigade, and in conjunction with Garnett, the two commands not exceeding 800 men, met Hatch's force of 3,500 before Turner's

Gap. This little force of Confederates performed prodigies of valor, causing General Doubleday to report that he had engaged 4,000 or 5,000 men under the immediate command of Pickett, and Hooker reported that Hatch, after a "violent and protracted struggle" in which he was "outnumbered and sorely pressed," was reinforced by Christian's brigade, in spite of which the resistance of the enemy was continued until after dark. It was by such self-sacrificing bravery that McClellan's army was delayed until Lee could concentrate at Sharpsburg. In the latter battle he commanded his brigade, also at Fredericksburg, his brigade meanwhile having been assigned to Pickett's division of Virginians. Before the battle of Chancellorsville he was detailed to operate near New Bern, N. C., where he rendered efficient service but fought no important battles. He rejoined Pickett before Suffolk, and marched with him into Pennsylvania. On the third day of the fighting at Gettysburg he led his brigade in the heroic charge upon Cemetery hill. As the division concentrated in making the final assault, Kemper fell desperately wounded, his brother brigadiers, Garnett and Armistead, being killed a few moments later. He was brought off the field, but subsequently fell into the hands of the Federals. After three months' imprisonment and when it seemed unlikely that he would recover, he was exchanged for General Graham, of the United States army. His injuries prevented further service in the field, but his gallant deeds were rewarded by promotion to major-general, and he was given command of the reserve forces of Virginia, until the close of the war. He then returned to Madison county, cultivated his land and resumed the practice of law, also taking an active part in the political movement which resulted in the formation of the Conservative party in Virginia, which he earnestly aided by voice and pen. In this work he was so conspicuous as to be a candidate for elector-at-large for the State in 1872, and in the following year he was nominated and elected governor. He served in this honored position for four years from January 1, 1874. General Kemper died April 7, 1895.

Brigadier-General Edmund G. Lee was born at "Lee-land," Va., May 25, 1835. He was educated at Hallowell's school at Alexandria, and at William and Mary

college, and then entered the profession of the law. With the earliest volunteers for the defense of the State he went to the front as second lieutenant of the Second Virginia regiment. Soon promoted first lieutenant, he was appointed aide-de-camp on the staff of Stonewall Jackson, of whose brigade the Second formed a part at First Manassas. Of the Thirty-third regiment, same brigade, he was promoted major, and later lieutenant-colonel; and in this rank he participated in the Valley campaign of 1862, and the subsequent operations of that year. At Fredericksburg, having been promoted colonel, he commanded his regiment. Early in 1863, on account of ill health, he retired from the service, but in the fall of the same year he returned to active duty and in June, 1864, was assigned to temporary command at Staunton, Va., with orders to do all in his power to organize the local forces and aid in the defense of the Valley. But the Confederates met with a serious reverse at that point immediately afterward; Gen. W. E. Jones was killed, and Staunton was occupied by the Federals. On September 20, 1864, Colonel Lee was promoted brigadier-general, and he was subsequently sent to Canada on secret service for the government. After the war his ill health compelled him to spend the winters in the far South. He died at Yellow Sulphur Springs, Va., August 24, 1870.

Major-General Fitzhugh Lee was born at Clermont, Fairfax county, Va., November 19, 1835. He is the son of Sydney Smith Lee, who was a brother of Robert E. Lee, and son of Gen. and Gov. Henry Lee. Sydney Smith Lee had a distinguished naval career for over forty years, beginning as a midshipman when fourteen years of age. He commanded a vessel at Vera Cruz, was three years commandant at Annapolis, and for the same period in charge of the Philadelphia navy yard; commanded Commodore Perry's flagship in the Japan expedition, and when the first Japanese ambassadors came to America, he was associated with Farragut and D. D. Porter in a committee for their reception and entertainment. He resigned his position as chief of the bureau of coast survey to join the Confederacy, and was on duty at Norfolk; in command of fortifications at Drewry's bluff; chief of the bureau of orders and detail,

and in command of fortifications on the James during the siege of Richmond. Fitzhugh Lee was graduated at the United States military academy in 1856, and after serving until January 1, 1858, in the cavalry school at Carlisle, Pa., as an instructor, he was assigned to frontier duty in Texas with his regiment, the Second cavalry. He served at several Texas posts, and on May 13, 1859, in a fight with Comanche Indians was shot through the lungs with an arrow, and his life despaired of. In 1860 he was ordered to report to West Point as instructor of cavalry. In 1861 he resigned his commission as first lieutenant, and tendered his services to his native State. He was commissioned first lieutenant, corps of cavalry, C. S. A.; promoted lieutenant-colonel, First Virginia cavalry (Stuart's regiment), August, 1861, and colonel, March, 1862. His first service was rendered in staff duty, under General Beauregard at Manassas, and as adjutant-general of Ewell's brigade during the battle of First Manassas. In the spring of 1862, with his regiment, he aided in covering the retreat from Yorktown, and in the raid of the cavalry under Stuart, around McClellan's peninsular army, he was particularly distinguished in the capture of the camp of his old Federal regiment, and in the defense as rear guard while Stuart's other commands built a bridge over the Chickahominy, which he was the last man to cross. He was recommended by Stuart for promotion to brigadier-general, which soon followed, and at the organization of the cavalry division, July 28th, he was put in command of the Second brigade, consisting of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Virginia regiments and Breathed's battery. He took an active part in the cavalry operations in August, connected with Jackson's advance northward, and in the capture of Manassas depot; participated in Stuart's advance into Maryland, screening the movements of the army, and after McClellan could no longer be held in check at South mountain, his brigade covered the retreat through Boonsboro, where there was a fierce and protracted fight. He succeeded in delaying the enemy through the greater part of September 16th, and then joined the army before Sharpsburg. In November his brigade was reorganized. He served on the Confederate left above Fredericksburg in December, took part in the raid on Dumfries and Fairfax Station, and in February,

1863, moved to Culpeper to guard the upper Rappahannock, giving battle to Averell at Kellysville, an action which Stuart reported as "one of the most brilliant achievements of the war," which he took "pride in witnessing." At the field of Chancellorsville he led the advance of the flank movement, rode with Jackson to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and commanded the cavalry in the Sunday battle. During Stuart's raid of June, 1863, he captured part of Custer's brigade at Hanover, and reached Gettysburg in time for a fierce hand-to-hand cavalry fight on July 3d. During the retreat he rendered distinguished service. He was now promoted major-general and in September took command of one of the two cavalry divisions, with which, when R. E. Lee decided to push Meade from his front on the Rapidan, he held the lines while the main army moved out on the enemy's flank. He fought about Brandy Station and encountered Custer at Buckland Mills. After the contest with Grant in the Wilderness his division, thrown in front of the Federal advance toward Spottsylvania, engaged in one of its most severe conflicts. The Confederate troopers were a terrible annoyance to the Federals, "swarming in the woods like angry bees," and Sheridan started on a raid to Richmond to draw them off. At the resulting battle of Yellow Tavern, where Stuart was fatally wounded, at Hawes' Shop and Cold Harbor, and at Trevilian's, he contested with Sheridan the honors of the field, and August, 1864, found him again opposed to that famous Federal officer in the Shenandoah valley. Here he commanded the cavalry of Early's army. He fought the spirited battle of Cedarville, and at Winchester, September 19th, displayed great courage and energy in attempting to save the field. In the midst of a terrible artillery fire his famous horse "Nellie" was shot, and at the same time he received a wound in the thigh which disabled him for several months. On recovering he made an expedition into northwestern Virginia in the following winter. Upon the promotion of Hampton to lieutenant-general, Lee became chief of the cavalry of the army of Northern Virginia, and commanded that corps at Five Forks. After rendering invaluable service on the retreat, he was ordered to make an attack, on April 9th, at Appomattox, supported by Gordon, and in this movement, which met overwhelming

opposition, his cavalry became separated from the main body. He participated in the final council of war, and after the surrender returned to Richmond with Gen. R. E. Lee. He then retired to his home in Stafford county, and resided later near Alexandria. In 1874 he delivered an address at Bunker Hill which greatly aided the restoration of brotherly feeling. He was a conspicuous figure at the Yorktown centennial, and at the Washington centennial celebration at New York city, at the head of the Virginia troops, he received a magnificent ovation. In 1885 he was nominated for governor by the Democratic party and made a memorable and successful campaign against John S. Wise. After serving as governor until 1890, he became president of the Pittsburg & Virginia railroad. In 1896 he was sent to Cuba as consul-general at Havana, under the circumstances one of the most important positions in the diplomatic service. In this he represented the United States with such dignity and ability that he was retained in the place after the inauguration of President McKinley, through all the trying difficulties preceding the war with Spain. After the outbreak of war he was made a major-general of volunteers in the United States army, and at the close of hostilities was appointed military governor of the province of Havana.

Major-General William Henry Fitzhugh Lee, the second son of Gen. Robert E. Lee, was born at Arlington, Va., May 31, 1837. He was educated at Harvard college, where he was graduated in 1857. In the same year he was appointed second lieutenant of the Sixth infantry, United States army, and in this rank he served in the Utah campaign under Albert Sidney Johnston, and subsequently in California. Early in 1859 he resigned his commission and took charge of his farm, the historic White House, on the Pamunkey river. He was heartily in sympathy with the Confederate cause, and organized a cavalry company early in 1861, becoming one of the leading spirits in the formation of the gallant body of troopers which were subsequently distinguished in the history of the army of Northern Virginia, and contributed so effectively to its successes. In May he received the rank of captain, corps of cavalry, C. S. A., and in the same month was promoted major in the regular



army. During the West Virginia campaign he acted as chief of cavalry for General Loring. In the winter of 1861-62 he was ordered to Fredericksburg, Va., and was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of the Ninth Virginia cavalry regiment, promotion to the colonelship following in March. With his regiment he was attached to the cavalry brigade of J. E. B. Stuart, and shared its operations during the retreat from Yorktown toward Richmond. In the famous raid around McClellan's army Stuart's men were led by the three colonels, Fitz Lee, W. H. F. Lee and W. T. Martin; the artillery under Breathed. His troopers defeated the enemy's cavalry at Hawes' Shop, June 13th, during this expedition. Upon the organization of the cavalry division in the following month, his regiment was assigned to the brigade of Fitzhugh Lee, and he participated in the operations of this command in the campaign of Second Manassas. After serving on the advanced line before Washington, during the advance into Maryland, he was particularly distinguished in the rear-guard fighting after the action at Turner's pass. Squadron after squadron of his regiment bore the brunt of the attacks of the Federal advance until they were the last to enter Boonsboro. At this point Colonel Lee was unhorsed and run over in crossing a bridge; and severely bruised and at first unconscious, lay by the roadside for some time in full view of the passing enemy. He managed to escape and finally reached the army on the Antietam, where he was welcomed as one from the dead. Subsequently he commanded a detachment of Lee's brigade during the Chambersburg raid, and held the advance during the return movement in the rear of McClellan's army. His intrepid conduct and coolness in demanding the surrender of a largely superior force of the enemy which held White's ford on the Potomac, caused the withdrawal of this obstacle which might have been fatal to the safe return of Stuart's command to Virginia. At the reorganization in November he, having been promoted brigadier-general, was given command of the brigade of cavalry consisting of the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Fifteenth Virginia and Second North Carolina. During the operations preceding and following the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville he was frequently engaged, and during the combats with Pleasanton's cavalry before the



Maj.-Gen. L. L. LOWMY.  
 Brig.-Gen. R. D. LILLEY.  
 Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. STUART.  
 Brig.-Gen. K. L. PAGE.

Maj.-Gen. WM. SMITH.  
 Brig.-Gen. H. H. WALKER.  
 Brig.-Gen. A. W. REYNOLDS.  
 Brig.-Gen. EPPA HUNTON.

Maj.-Gen. SAMUEL JONES.  
 Brig.-Gen. JNO. B. FLOYD.  
 Brig.-Gen. J. D. IMBODEN.  
 Brig.-Gen. W. C. WICKHAM.

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Gettysburg campaign he fought at Fleetwood Hill and Brandy Station, where he engaged the enemy in a series of brilliant charges with his regiments, in one of the last of which he received a severe wound through the leg. General Stuart reported "the handsome and highly satisfactory manner" in which he handled his brigade, and the deplorable loss "for a short time only, it is hoped, of his valuable services." But, in his helpless condition, he was taken prisoner by Federal raiders and carried to Fortress Monroe, where, and at Fort Lafayette, he was held until March, 1864. On his return to the army he was promoted major-general and assigned to the command of a division of the cavalry. He participated in the operations of the cavalry from the Rapidan to the James in 1864; was at Malvern hill when Grant crossed the river; opposed Wilson's raid against the Weldon railroad in June; commanded the cavalry at Globe Tavern, August; at Five Forks held the right of the Confederate line; and during the retreat to Appomattox, aided Gordon in repulsing repeated assaults. After the surrender he retired to his plantation, and resided there until his removal to Burke's Station in 1874. He was president for a time of the State agricultural society, served one term in the State senate, and sat in the Fiftieth, Fifty-first and Fifty-second Congresses as representative of the Eighth Virginia district. He died at Alexandria, October 15, 1891.

Brigadier-General R. D. Lilley entered the Confederate service in the spring of 1861 as captain of the Augusta Lee Rifles, a volunteer company, which marched through the mountains under Col. J. M. Heck, after the battle of Philippi, to recruit the forces in western Virginia. At Huttonsville, General Garnett ordered two regiments to be formed from the volunteer and militia organizations, and the Rifles was assigned to the Twenty-fifth Virginia infantry, under Colonel Heck. This regiment occupied Rich mountain, and there Captain Lilley, in command of his company, took part in the defense of Camp Garnett. During the night retreat from that post, he and part of his company followed the lead of Major Hotchkiss, over the mountain, and reached Beverly in safety; but the remainder of the column became separated and were captured by McClellan. He remained with the

army of the Northwest through the fall and winter of 1861, and shared its valorous service in the defeats of the Federals at the Greenbrier river and Alleghany mountain, and at McDowell in May, 1862. Subsequently his regiment was attached to Early's brigade of Ewell's division, and he was identified with the career of that famous brigade throughout 1862. At the battle of Cedar Mountain he attracted the attention of General Early by his gallantry in advancing among the foremost, with a small body of men, including the color-bearer, after the regiment had been thrown in disorder by a rear attack. At Second Manassas he again won commendation for his gallantry in driving back a column of the enemy while in command of the brigade skirmish line. He was promoted major in January, 1863. In April and May, the Twenty-fifth was with Imboden in western Virginia, and rejoining the army was assigned to J. M. Jones' brigade of the Stonewall division. Major Lilley won high praise by his services in command of the skirmish line of this brigade at Gettysburg, and was promoted lieutenant-colonel. He served with distinction at Mine Run, and after the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the command of Early's old brigade. In this capacity he served in the expedition through Maryland against Washington. Soon after his return to the Valley he was severely wounded and captured at a battle near Winchester, July 20, 1864, but was recaptured four days later. On November 28, 1864, he was given command of the reserve forces of the Valley district, where he served during the remainder of the war. General Lilley died November 12, 1886.

Major-General Lunsford Lindsay Lomax, a distinguished officer of the Confederate States provisional army, who rose from the rank of captain to that of major-general in the army of Northern Virginia, was born at Newport, R. I., the son of Mann Page Lomax, of Virginia, a major of ordnance in the United States army. His mother, Elizabeth Lindsay, was a descendant of Captain Lindsay, who commanded a company in the light horse cavalry of Harry Lee during the Revolution, and lost an arm in the war for independence. His father, also, was of an old Virginia family. Young Lomax was educated in the schools

of Richmond and Norfolk, and was appointed cadet-at-large, July 1, 1852, to the military academy at West Point, where he was graduated July 1, 1856, and promoted to a brevet lieutenancy in the Second cavalry. He served on frontier duty in Kansas, Nebraska and that region, with promotion to second lieutenant of the First cavalry, September 30, 1856, and first lieutenant, March 21, 1861, until the secession of his State from the United States. Resigning April 25, 1861, he offered his services to Virginia, and was appointed captain in the State forces April 28th. He was at once assigned to the staff of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, as assistant adjutant-general, and later was transferred to the field of operations beyond the Mississippi, as inspector-general upon the staff of the gallant Texan, Brigadier-General McCulloch, who commanded a division of Van Dorn's army. After McCulloch fell he was promoted inspector-general on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He served in this capacity from July, 1862, until October, when he was made inspector-general of the army of East Tennessee. While with the western armies he participated in the battles of Pea Ridge, Ark., Farmington and Corinth, Miss., the first defense of Vicksburg from siege, Baton Rouge, La., Spring Hill and Thompson Station, Tenn. On February 8, 1863, he was promoted colonel and called to the eastern campaigns. As colonel of the Eleventh Virginia cavalry, in W. E. Jones' brigade, he participated in the raid in West Virginia, and the subsequent Pennsylvania campaign, including the battles of Brandy Station, Winchester, Rector's Cross-roads, Upperville, Gettysburg and Buckland. On July 23, 1863, he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the command of a brigade of cavalry organized for him of the Fifth, Sixth and Fifteenth Virginia regiments, and the First Maryland cavalry. Under his command this brigade was one of the principal factors in the subsequent operations of Fitz Lee's division, including the fighting at Culpeper Court House, Morton's Ford, the second encounter at Brandy Station, Tod's Tavern, the Wilderness campaign, Cold Harbor, Yellow Tavern, Reams' Station and Trevilian's. His gallant and cool leadership in these important engagements led to his promotion, August 10, 1864, to the rank of major-general. He was given command of a

division composed of the cavalry brigades of Bradley T. Johnson, W. L. Jackson, Henry B. Davidson, J. D. Imboden and John McCausland, and rendered prominent and distinguished service in the Valley campaign of the army under General Early, at the battles of Winchester, Tom's Brook and other encounters. At the battle of Woodstock, October 9th, he was made a prisoner by Torbert's cavalry, but made his escape about three hours later by personally overthrowing his captor. On October 31st he was assigned to the command of the cavalry wing of the army under Early, and on March 29, 1865, was put in entire command of the Valley district of the department of Northern Virginia. After the fall of Richmond he moved his forces to Lynchburg, and when Lee surrendered sent the news to General Echols, with whom he endeavored to form a junction with the remnants of his own, Fitz Lee's and Rosser's divisions. He succeeded in joining the army in North Carolina, and surrendered his division with Johnston, at Greensboro. Thence he returned to Caroline county, Va., and engaged in farming, to which he quietly devoted himself during the succeeding years until 1889, when he was called to the presidency of the college at Blacksburg. He resigned this position after five years' service. For several years he has been engaged in the official compilation of the records of the war, at Washington, D. C.

Brigadier-General Armistead Lindsay Long was born in Campbell county, Va., September 13, 1827. He was educated at the United States military academy, with graduation in the class of 1850, and promotion to brevet second lieutenant of artillery. He served in garrison at Fort Moultrie until 1852, and on frontier duty in New Mexico, with promotion to first lieutenant, Second artillery, until 1854. His subsequent service was at Fort McHenry and Barrancas barracks, until 1855, when he was again ordered to the frontier. With the exception of a period at Fortress Monroe he was on duty in Indian Territory, Kansas and Nebraska until 1860. When the crisis arrived between the North and South he was stationed at Augusta arsenal, Ga., but was transferred to Washington, where he served as aide-de-camp to General Sumner until his resignation, which took effect June 10, 1861. Repairing to Richmond he accepted the com-

mission of major of artillery in the Confederate service, and soon accompanied Gen. W. W. Loring, assigned to the command of the army of Western Virginia, as chief of artillery. He served in the Trans-Alleghany, performing the duties of inspector-general in addition to those of his regular position, during the summer and fall of 1861, and was then ordered to report to Gen. R. E. Lee in the department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. The association with the future commander-in-chief of the Confederate armies, begun amid the mountains of West Virginia, was continued throughout the four years' war, with intimate friendship and confidence. When Lee was given command of the army of Northern Virginia, Long was appointed military secretary with the rank of colonel. During the subsequent campaigns he rendered valuable service upon the field, especially in posting and securing the artillery. His efficiency in the disposition of artillery was particularly shown upon the fields of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. In September, 1862, he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the duty of chief of artillery of the Second corps of the army. He was actively engaged during the Bristoe and Mine Run campaigns, and throughout the severe fighting of 1864 managed his artillery with vigor and unflinching judgment, sharing the battles of Ewell's corps until disabled by illness. He organized the artillery which accompanied Early in his campaign against Washington. Throughout the disasters which befell Early's army in the Shenandoah valley, subsequently, his artillery corps behaved with a steadfast gallantry and unfaltering courage that elicited the unbounded praise of the lieutenant-general commanding. General Long was with the Shenandoah army at the final disaster at Waynesboro and afterward accompanied Gordon's corps in the withdrawal from Richmond, participated in its engagements in April, 1865, and finally was surrendered and paroled at Appomattox. After the war closed he was appointed chief engineer of the James River & Kanawha canal company. Soon afterward he lost his eyesight by reason of exposure during his campaigns. He then removed to Charlottesville, where he passed the last twenty years of his life in total darkness. During this period his active mind was much employed in recalling the incidents of the war, and it was then that he wrote



the Memoirs of Gen. R. E. Lee, a model of biographical history, containing a very clear and most intelligent account of the military operations of the army of Northern Virginia. This book was published in 1886. He also prepared reminiscences of his army life, and a sketch of Stonewall Jackson, which so far has not been published. By reason of his infirmity he was compelled to use a slate prepared for the use of the blind, and to depend on members of his family and on friends for much assistance. Under all these disadvantages he worked along uncomplainingly, drawing his interest and delight from what was most pleasant in his past life, cheerful, and always with placid courage looking forward to the end of his sad but honored career. He died April 29, 1891, leaving a wife and two children, Virginia L. and E. McLean.

Major-General John Bankhead Magruder, conspicuous in the early operations in Virginia, was born at Winchester, Va., August 15, 1810. He was graduated at the West Point military academy in 1830, with the brevet of second lieutenant, Seventh infantry, and was assigned to the artillery school at Fort McHenry, Md. He subsequently served in various garrisons, on recruiting service and in the occupation of Texas. On March 31, 1836, he was commissioned first lieutenant of artillery. In the Mexican war he commanded the light battery attached to General Pillow's division, and after gallant service at Palo Alto was made captain of the First artillery. At Cerro Gordo he won the brevet rank of major, and he afterward participated in the skirmish of La Hoya, Ocalaca, the storming of Chapultepec and the capture of the city of Mexico. After the close of this war he served in Maryland and California and was in command of Fort Adams at Newport, R. I. At the formation of the Confederacy he promptly tendered his services and was commissioned colonel, C. S. A., March 16, 1861. Promotion rapidly followed to brigadier-general, June 17th, and major-general, October 7, 1861. He was assigned to command of the artillery in and about Richmond on April 29th, and soon afterward was given charge of the Virginia State forces in that locality. Put in command of the district of Yorktown in May, he defeated a Federal force at Big Bethel, the first battle of the war, in which his success gave confidence to the Confederate soldiers

everywhere, and correspondingly depressed the Northern troops. He remained in this command until February, 1862. Stationed at Yorktown, with about 12,000 men, confronting McClellan's great army of invasion, he demonstrated his remarkable ability as a master of ruse and strategy, causing McClellan to believe that a force superior to his own disputed his advance. Magruder was not actively engaged at Seven Pines, but after General Lee took command, he was put in charge of the left wing of the Confederate army, and during the operations north of the Chickahominy was left before Richmond to engage the attention of the Federals. No one could have better performed this feat than "Prince John," as he was known in the old Federal army, on account of his lordly air and brilliant ability to bring appearances up to the necessities of occasion. During the retreat of McClellan his troops made a spirited attack at Savage Station, and at Malvern Hill nine brigades under his orders made a heroic charge against the Federal position, but were repulsed with fearful slaughter. At this time the Confederate government determined to prosecute more vigorously the war in the West and attempt to recover lost territory in Missouri and Louisiana, and a department was formed of the Trans-Mississippi, and General Magruder sent to its command, with the understanding that Generals Hindman, Taylor and Price would report to him. If this plan had been carried out, doubtless the history of the war in that region would have been other than it is, but there was a change before Magruder could reach the field, and he was recalled to Richmond, and subsequently assigned to the district of Texas. He directed his attention at once to the defenseless condition of the coast, and caused the equipment of two cotton clad gunboats, and when the Federals attempted to occupy Galveston he recaptured the town January 1, 1863, made prisoners of the garrison, and caused the whole Federal blockade fleet to hoist the white flag, although the uninjured vessels afterward escaped. He continued in command, the district being enlarged to include New Mexico and Arizona, and in March, 1864, sent most of his forces to reinforce General Taylor against Banks. After the close of hostilities he went into Mexico and entered the army of Maximilian with the rank of major-general, serving until the downfall of the emperor. Then returning to the United

States he lectured for a time upon his Mexican experience, at Baltimore and other cities, finally settling at Houston, Tex., in 1869. He died at that city, February 19, 1871.

Major-General William Mahone was born at Monroe, Southampton county, Va., December 1, 1826. His family in Virginia was descended from an Irish progenitor of the Colonial period. Both his grandfathers served in the war of 1812, and his father commanded a militia regiment during the Nat Turner insurrection. He was graduated at the Virginia military institute in 1847, after which he taught two years at the Rappahannock military academy. He then entered upon a career as civil engineer in which he became distinguished, engaging in the construction of new railroads in Virginia, notably the Orange & Alexandria and Norfolk & Petersburg lines. Overcoming obstacles that had been pronounced insuperable in the construction of the latter line, he subsequently became president of the railroad company. He then conceived his great project of consolidating various roads into a system from Norfolk to Bristol, Tenn., with the ultimate object of extending connections to the Mississippi and to the Pacific coast. But these enterprises were brought to a sudden check by the political events of 1860-61. He promptly offered his services to Virginia, was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and soon promoted colonel of the Sixth Virginia regiment. Serving first at Norfolk, he was promoted brigadier-general November 16, 1861. After serving in the defense of Drewry's bluff, he fought his brigade in Huger's division at Seven Pines, where his men and Armistead's struck the enemy a telling blow on the second day. He participated in the Seven Days' battles before Richmond, and in Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps conducted his brigade into action at the battle of Second Manassas with conspicuous gallantry, receiving a severe wound which prevented his participation in the Maryland campaign, though his famous brigade was distinguished in the valorous defense of the South mountain passes. Returning to his command, he served through the succeeding struggles on the Rappahannock and in Pennsylvania, and during the first day's fighting in the Wilderness was intrusted with the command of his own,

Wofford's, Anderson's and Davis' brigades, in an attack on the flank and rear of Grant's advance, which rolled Hancock's command back in confusion and promised to repeat the victory of Chancellorsville, when Longstreet fell, as Jackson had fallen on the former field. When his division commander was called to fill Longstreet's place, Mahone was given command of Anderson's division, and Longstreet added his voice to that of A. P. Hill in recommending the promotion of the dashing infantry chieftain. As a division commander, though without the official rank, he was distinguished in a successful attack upon Hancock, May 10th, and the severe repulse and almost capture of a portion of Warren's corps on the North Anna. Before Petersburg he brilliantly defended the Weldon railroad, and at the time of the breaking of the Confederates lines by the explosion of a mine, July 30th, he was specially distinguished. Moving promptly with his division to the relief of Gen. Bushrod Johnson's men, he engaged in repeated desperate charges, which finally resulted in the utter repulse and terrible slaughter of the enemy. Here the tardy promotion arrived, he being promoted major-general on the field by General Lee, which was promptly confirmed by the President and Congress. Of Mahone's part in the battle of the Crater, Col. W. H. Stuart, of the Sixty-first Virginia, has said: "The whole movement was under his immediate and personal direction, and to him, above all, save the brave men who bore the muskets, belong the honor and credit of recapturing the Confederate lines." To the last he held his men together in a remarkably spirited and unified organization, which was inspired with a strong *esprit du corps*, and distinguished for readiness to take all chances in either defense or assault. He surrendered at Appomattox, and returned to the railroad management from which he had been called four years before. Becoming president of the two lines extending from Petersburg to Bristol, Tenn., he consolidated the three companies into the Atlantic, Mississippi & Ohio railroad company, which he managed until the financial crisis of 1873, when a foreign combination gained control and the system became known later as the Norfolk & Western. Though defeated in this great enterprise he managed that upon the sale of the lines \$500,000 was paid to the State of Virginia for her claim, the whole amount of

which he subsequently caused to be appropriated for educational purposes. Before the close of the war General Mahone had served in the Virginia senate in addition to his duties in the field, and during the reconstruction period he exerted a very powerful influence toward the comparatively peaceful restoration of home rule which was brought about in his State. In 1878 he was defeated in a contest for the Democratic nomination for governor. In 1879, under his leadership, the "Readjuster" party was formed in Virginia, which for a time controlled the State, and General Mahone was elected to the United States Senate, where he soon became identified with the Republican party, which through his efforts carried the State elections in 1881. He led Virginia delegations to the Republican national conventions of 1884 and 1888, and in 1889 was nominated for governor by his party, but defeated. He continued to retain political leadership, and in his later years made his home at Washington, where he died October 8, 1895.

Major-General Dabney Herndon Maury was born at Fredericksburg, Va., May 20, 1822, the son of Capt. John Minor Maury, United States navy, whose wife was the daughter of Fontaine Maury. His descent is from the old Virginia families of Brooke and Minor, and the Huguenot emigrés, the Fontaines and Maurys. He was educated at the classical school of Thomas Harrison, Fredericksburg, studied law at the university of Virginia, and was graduated at West Point in 1846, with the rank of brevet second lieutenant in the mounted rifles. A theater for active service in his profession was awaiting him in Mexico, where he was at once ordered. He conducted himself with soldierly valor in this war, particularly at the siege of Vera Cruz and the battle of Cerro Gordo, where he was severely wounded, and received the brevet of first lieutenant for gallantry. In further recognition of his services he was presented with a sword by the citizens of Fredericksburg and the legislature of Virginia. For several years subsequent to the Mexican war he was detailed for service at the United States military academy, first as assistant professor of geography, history and ethics, and afterward as assistant professor of infantry tactics. In 1852 he was transferred to frontier duty in

Texas, in which he continued, with promotion to first lieutenant mounted rifles, until 1858, when he was appointed superintendent of the cavalry school at Carlisle, Pa. From April 15, 1860, until the outbreak of the Confederate war he was assistant adjutant-general, with the rank of brevet captain, in New Mexico. He promptly acted with his State in 1861, and was commissioned captain, corps of cavalry, C. S. A., to date from March 16th. Subsequently he was promoted colonel, was appointed adjutant-general of the army at Manassas, and when Gen. Earl Van Dorn was assigned to command the Trans-Mississippi department, early in 1862, he became his chief of staff and adjutant-general. In his report of the battle of Elkhorn Tavern, General Van Dorn wrote: "Colonel Maury was of invaluable service to me both in preparing for and during the battle. Here, as on other battlefields where I have served with him, he proved to be a zealous patriot and true soldier; cool and calm under all circumstances, he was always ready, either with his sword or pen." Maury was promptly promoted brigadier-general. He accompanied Van Dorn to the consultation with A. S. Johnston and Beauregard at Corinth previous to the battle of Shiloh, and subsequently was transferred with the main Confederate force east of the Mississippi, where his service was afterward given. When Price took command of the army of the West at Tupelo, he commanded one of its two divisions, including the brigades of John C. Moore, W. L. Cabell and C. W. Phifer, and the cavalry of F. C. Armstrong. Little of Maryland, commanding the other division, fell at Iuka, where Maury was held in reserve, and afterward served as rear guard, repelling pursuit. About a fortnight later he commanded the center in the battle of Corinth, against Rosecrans, and gallantly engaged the enemy, who was driven from his intrenchments and through the town. During the subsequent retirement he defended the rear, fighting spiritedly at Hatchie's bridge. He was promoted major-general in November, 1862, and on December 30th, arrived before Vicksburg from Grenada, to support S. D. Lee, who had repulsed Sherman's attack at Chickasaw bayou, and was assigned to command of the right wing. He continued in service here, his troops being engaged at Steele's bayou and in the defeat of the Yazoo Pass expedition, until he was ordered to Knoxville, April 15th, to

take command of the department of East Tennessee. A month later he was transferred to the command of the district of the Gulf. In this region, with headquarters at Mobile, he continued to serve until the end of the war. During the siege of Atlanta, in command of reserve troops, he operated in defense of the Macon road. In August, 1864, in spite of a gallant struggle, the defenses of Mobile bay were taken, and in March and April, 1865, Maury, with a garrison about 9,000 strong, defended the city against the assaults of Canby's army of 45,000 until, after heavy loss, he retired without molestation to Meridian. But the war was now practically over, and on May 4th, his forces were included in the general capitulation of General Taylor. Subsequently he made his home at Richmond, Va. He has given many valuable contributions to the history of the war period, and in 1868 organized the Southern historical society, the collections of which he opened to the government war records office, securing in return free access to that department by ex-Confederates. In 1878 he was a leader in the movement for the reorganization of the volunteer troops of the nation, and until 1890 served as a member of the executive committee of the National Guard association of the United States. In 1886 he was appointed United States minister to Columbia, a position he held until June 22, 1889. Since then he has been occupied in literary pursuits, being the author of a school history of Virginia, and other works.

Brigadier-General Patrick T. Moore was born at Galway, Ireland, September 22, 1821, son of John Moore, who removed to Canada with his family in 1835, and soon after was appointed consul at Boston. Coming to Richmond at the age of twenty-nine years, General Moore engaged in business as a merchant, until the outbreak of war, when, having been for some time a captain of militia, he offered his services to the State. In the spring of 1861 he was commissioned colonel of the First regiment, Virginia infantry, which was assigned to Longstreet's brigade of the army under Beauregard at Manassas. He participated in the affair at Blackburn's ford and the battle of Manassas, in the latter action being one of the Confederates who paid the penalty of glorious victory, receiving a severe wound in the head while leading his regi-

ment. His conduct received the generous recognition of Generals Longstreet and Beauregard in their official reports. During the Seven Days' campaign before Richmond he served upon the volunteer staff of General Longstreet, but his wound prevented further service at the head of his regiment. In May, 1864, he was temporarily assigned to duty in organizing and placing in the field the reserve forces of Virginia, under General Kemper, and was put in command of the rendezvous of reserves at Richmond. Later in the year, being promoted brigadier-general, he was given command of the First brigade, Virginia reserves, part of the force of Lieutenant-General Ewell, in command of the department of Richmond. After the close of the struggle he returned to Richmond, and all the fruits of his former business success having been swept away, he engaged in insurance agency, which was his occupation until his death, February 20, 1883.

Brigadier-General Thomas Taylor Munford, a distinguished cavalry officer of the army of Northern Virginia, was born at the city of Richmond, in 1831, the son of Col. George Wythe Munford, for twenty-five years secretary of the commonwealth. He was graduated at the Virginia military institute in 1852, and until the outbreak of the war, was mainly engaged as a planter. He went into the Confederate service as lieutenant-colonel of the Thirtieth Virginia mounted infantry, organized at Lynchburg, May 8, 1861, and mustered in by Col. Jubal A. Early. This was the first mounted regiment organized in Virginia, and under the command of Col. R. C. W. Radford, was in Beauregard's army at the battle of First Manassas. Subsequently it was entitled the Second regiment of cavalry, General Stuart's regiment being numbered First, at the reorganization under Stuart, when Munford was promoted colonel of the regiment. On the field of Manassas he had commanded three squadrons composed of the Black Horse, Chesterfield, and Wise troops, the Franklin rangers, and three independent companies, and pursued the enemy further than any other command, capturing many prisoners and ten rifled guns, which he turned over to President Davis at Manassas. His career as a cavalry officer thus brilliantly begun continued throughout the war, and was notable for faithful service in whatever command was allotted him. In the spring



of 1862, attached to Ewell's command, he skirmished in Rappahannock county, and then joined Jackson in the Valley. Upon the death of General Ashby he was recommended by Gen. R. E. Lee as his successor. In this capacity he participated in the battle of Cross Keys, and captured many prisoners at Harrisonburg. With his regiment he led Jackson's advance in the Chickahominy campaign, and on the day of battle at Frayser's farm, his men were the only part of the corps to cross the river and attack the Federals at White Oak swamp. He joined Stuart's command in the Manassas campaign, leading the advance of Ewell's division, and received two saber wounds at Second Manassas. In September, assigned to the command of the brigade, he took part in the Maryland campaign, in which his men sustained the main losses of the cavalry division, fighting at Poolesville, Monocacy church, Sugar Loaf mountain, Burkittsville and Crampton's gap. At the latter pass of the South mountain, with about 800 men, dismounted, he made a gallant defense against the advance of a Federal corps. At Sharpsburg he was actively engaged on the 17th and 18th, on Lee's right wing, guarding the lower fords of the Antietam, crossed the Potomac in the presence of the enemy, and defended the retreat from Boteler's ford. In October, when the Federal army advanced in Virginia in two columns, he was put in command of one division of the cavalry to confront Hancock's troops. Subsequently he was transferred to Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, which he commanded after Chancellorsville at Beverly's ford and Aldie. He took part in the Gettysburg campaign, the Bristoe campaign, and the cavalry operations in the spring of 1864 under Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, participated in the Valley campaign with Early, and being promoted brigadier-general in November, 1864, was assigned to the command of Fitzhugh Lee's division. In this rank he made a gallant fight at Five Forks, and on the retreat from Richmond was associated with General Rosser in the defeat of the Federals at High Bridge, capturing 780 prisoners; also in the battle of April 7th, when the enemy was again defeated and Federal General Gregg was captured. At Appomattox, at daybreak of April 9th, he commanded the cavalry on the right of the Confederate line, in the attack, and driving the enemy from his front, moved toward Lynchburg. After the sur-

render of Lee he endeavored to collect the scattered Confederate bands and make a junction with Johnston's army, but after the latter command capitulated he disbanded his men late in the month of April. In his final report Gen. Fitzhugh Lee called attention to the excellent service of General Munford as a division commander. With the close of the war he retired to his home, and since then has been engaged in the management of agricultural interests in Virginia and Alabama, with his home at Lynchburg. He has served two terms as president of the board of visitors of the Virginia military institute.

General Richard L. Page, distinguished in the naval and military history of the Confederate States, was born in Clarke county, Va., in 1807. The worthy Virginia family to which he belongs is descended from John Page, an immigrant from England in early days, one of whose descendants, John Page, wedded Jane Byrd of Westover. Their son, Mann Page, was father to William Byrd Page, born at North End, Gloucester county, in 1768, who was a farmer by occupation, and died at Fairfield, Clarke county, in 1812. He married Ann Lee, who was born at Leesylvania, Prince William county, in 1776, and died at Washington, D. C. She was a daughter of Henry Lee, and sister of Gen. Henry Lee, the famous cavalry officer, known as "Light Horse Harry," father of Gen. Robert E. Lee. Another brother, Charles Lee, was attorney-general of the United States in Washington's administration. Richard L. Page, son of William Byrd and Ann Page, became a midshipman in the United States navy March 12, 1824, being first assigned to the sloop-of-war John Adams, of the West Indies squadron, Commodore Porter, making two short cruises. In 1825 he was ordered to the frigate Brandywine to convey General La Fayette to France under Commodore Morris. In the Mediterranean he was transferred to the frigate Constitution. He returned to the United States in 1828 in the Constitution, after which he was ordered to the frigate Constellation, Commodore Wadsworth, and was detached from her at New York to prepare for his examination. From 1830 to 1834 he was attached to the sloop-of-war Concord as passed midshipman and sailing master, which ship, after conveying John Randolph as minister to Russia, joined the squadron in the Mediterranean. March 26, 1834, he

was commissioned lieutenant and ordered to the *Enterprise* on the Brazil station, was then transferred to the Ontario, afterward served as executive officer of the schooner *Enterprise* on the East India station, was transferred to the sloop-of-war *Peacock*, and returned to the United States in her the fall of 1837, having circumnavigated the globe, when he was given two years' leave of absence to visit Europe. Subsequent duty was as ordnance officer in the Norfolk navy yard, then to the frigate *Macedonia* in the West Indies for two cruises of one year each, with Commodores Wilkinson and Shubrick; next two years at the Norfolk naval rendezvous; then as executive officer of the sloop-of-war *Fairfield* of the Mediterranean squadron in 1844 and 1845. Returning in the *Fairfield* to the United States, he was ordered to the receiving battleship *Pennsylvania* at Norfolk in 1845. He was executive officer, and for two years lieutenant commanding the frigate *Independence*, flagship of Commodore Shubrick, during the Mexican war. Returning home in 1849, he was ordered on ordnance duty at Norfolk navy yard. In 1852-54, in command of the United States brig *Perry*, he served with the African squadron, and following that cruise became executive officer at the Norfolk navy yard, and a member of the Retiring board. He was promoted commander September 14, 1855. As assistant inspector of ordnance he remained at Norfolk until the spring of 1857, when he was given command of the sloop-of-war *Germantown* and attached to the East India squadron, returning to the United States in her in 1859. At the outbreak of the war of the Confederacy he was on duty at Norfolk as ordnance officer, to which he had been recalled a year previous. As soon as Virginia seceded he resigned his rank and office, and was appointed aide-de-camp on the staff of Governor Letcher of Virginia, with special duties in the organization of a State navy. He superintended the erection of the fortifications at the mouth of the James river, and those on the Nansemond river and Pagan creek. On June 10, 1861, he entered the navy of the Confederate States, with a commission as commander. Until the evacuation of Norfolk he served as ordnance officer at the navy yard, and during the actions of the Virginia in Hampton Roads he served as a volunteer in firing the 11-inch gun at Sewell's point against the Federal vessels. With the



Brig.-Gen. W. H. PAYNE. Brig.-Gen. G. C. WHARTON.  
 Brig.-Gen. RICHARD B. GARNETT. Brig.-Gen. JOHN M. JONES. Brig.-Gen. ROBERT S. GARNETT.  
 Maj.-Gen. FITZHUON LEE. Maj.-Gen. JAS. L. KEMPER. Brig.-Gen. D. B. HARRIS.  
 Brig.-Gen. A. L. LONG. Brig.-Gen. WM. E. STARKER.



machinery and mechanics removed from Norfolk at its evacuation, Commander Page, having been promoted to captain, established the ordnance and construction depot at Charlotte, N. C., which he managed with such efficiency that the works became indispensable to the Southern Confederacy. In this important duty he was engaged for about two years, except the period of his assignment to the command of the naval forces at Savannah, and with Commodore Tattnall on the gunboat Savannah at the naval battle of Port Royal. March 1, 1864, he was commissioned brigadier-general in the provisional army and assigned to the command of the outer defenses of Mobile bay. He established his headquarters at Fort Morgan, where, on August 8th, he was summoned to surrender by Farragut's flag lieutenant and General Granger's chief of staff. Although he had but about 400 effective men and twenty-six serviceable guns to oppose 10,000 troops and over 200 guns of the attacking forces, he gallantly replied that he would defend the post to the last extremity. During the succeeding two weeks the enemy was busy advancing his lines on the land side, meantime keeping up a desultory fire day and night, and on the morning of August 22d a furious bombardment began. The heavy guns on Mobile point were trained at a distance of only 250 yards, and the enemy's navy took station at convenient points, the ironclads at close range, and an incessant fire followed. During twelve hours 3,000 shells were thrown into the fort. But General Page and his heroic men kept up the fight with all their power; the citadel of the fort took fire at 9 o'clock at night; the walls of the fort were repeatedly breached, and the best guns disabled. Serving the guns that were left and spiking those dismounted, fighting the fire which was threatening the magazine, and throwing into the cisterns all powder not immediately needed, the garrison fought all night in a storm of shot and shell, until, with no means of defense, they were compelled to capitulate on the following morning, August 23d, with all the honors of war. The defense of Fort Morgan under the command of General Page is one of the most celebrated instances of heroism in the history of the war. After the capitulation, General Page was held as a prisoner of war until September, 1865. Since that date he has resided at Norfolk, where he now enjoys the esteem and honor due his long and distinguished public

services. For nearly seven years of this time he served with marked efficiency as superintendent of the public schools of Norfolk. In 1841 he married Miss Alexina Taylor, of Norfolk, Va.

Brigadier-General Elisha Franklin Paxton, who fell at Chancellorsville while leading the Stonewall brigade, was a native of Rockbridge county, Va., of Scotch-Irish and English descent. His grandfather, William Paxton, commanded a company from Rockbridge at the siege of Yorktown in 1781. His father, Elisha Paxton, served in the war of 1812. General Paxton was educated and graduated at Washington college, Va., and at Yale college, and in 1849, at the head of his class in the university of Virginia, was graduated in law. This profession he practiced with much success at Lexington until 1860, when failing eyesight compelled him to seek other occupation. He was engaged in farming near Lexington when the political campaign of 1860 was in progress, and his ardent temperament and strong convictions did not permit him to remain an indifferent spectator of the important events of that year. After the election he advocated the immediate secession of Virginia, and when that action was finally decided upon he sustained his words by deeds of self-sacrifice. He was first lieutenant of the Rockbridge rifles, the first of ten companies to go from that county, and left his home April 18, 1861, for Harper's Ferry. His company was attached to the First Virginia brigade, under Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, and at the first battle of Manassas, it formed a part of the Fourth Virginia regiment. In that memorable fight Lieutenant Paxton attracted attention by the conspicuous gallantry which ever afterward distinguished him as a soldier. Subsequently his company was assigned to the Twenty-seventh infantry, of which he was promoted major in October, 1861. In the following spring he became a member of General Jackson's staff, and later was appointed adjutant-general and chief of staff, Jackson's corps, army of Northern Virginia. On September 27, 1862, Jackson, having well tested his courage and ability, manifested great confidence in him by recommending the volunteer soldier for promotion to brigadier-general and assignment to command of the Stonewall brigade. The appointment was made by President Davis, and General Paxton took

charge of the brigade November 15, 1862. His letters show that owing to a deep sense of the responsibilities of the rank and a modest estimate of his own qualifications, he accepted the command with much reluctance; but his subsequent record vindicated Jackson's judgment. He commanded the brigade in but two great battles, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. At the former engagement he handled his troops with skill and promptness, and during part of the 13th occupied the front line of the division of General Taliaferro, by whom he was particularly mentioned in official report. On May 2, 1863, during Jackson's flank movement he was stationed to guard an important point, the Germanna junction, from which he was called to the main line the following night, after Jackson had fallen and the command had devolved upon Stuart. Early in the morning of Sunday, May 3d, the attack was renewed with irresistible vigor, and Paxton led his men through the dense woods against the Federal position. Dismounting, he marched on foot in the front line of his brigade until they came within the enemy's fire, when he was instantly killed by a shot through the breast. Dr. R. L. Dabney relates that when the news of General Paxton's death was conveyed to General Jackson, then on his deathbed, the great commander showed much emotion, "and spoke in serious and tender strain of the genius and virtues of that officer." His loss was mentioned with appreciative reference to his ability and courage in the official report of General Lee. At the time of his death he was thirty-five years of age. His remains now lie within a few feet of his chief in Lexington cemetery.

Brigadier-General William Henry Fitzhugh Payne, a distinguished cavalry commander of the army of Northern Virginia, was born at Clifton, the homestead of his family in Virginia, January 27, 1830. His family, prominently associated with the history of the Old Dominion, was founded in America by John Payne, who with his brother William came to the colony in 1620. Fourth in descent from John Payne was Capt. William Payne, who was born in 1755 at Wakefield, Westmoreland county, the birthplace of George Washington. He did an extensive business as a merchant at Falmouth and Fredericksburg, served three years in the Continental army, includ-



ing the battles of Guilford Court House and Yorktown, and died at Clifton in 1837. By his second marriage, to Marian Morson, of Scottish descent, he had one son, Arthur A. M. Payne, born at Clifton in 1804, who was a prominent man, and widely known as a breeder of fine horses, among them Passenger. He married Mary Conway Mason Fitzhugh, daughter of Judge Nicholas Fitzhugh, of the District of Columbia, and granddaughter of Augustine Washington. The eldest of their six children is General Payne, who has well sustained the ancestral reputation of worthy citizenship, and faithful service, both in civil and military life, in the best interests of the community and the commonwealth. After completing his education in the university of Virginia and preparing himself for the practice of law, he formed a partnership for professional work with Samuel Chilton, at Warrenton. In 1856, at the age of twenty-six years, the ability he had demonstrated warranted his election to the office of commonwealth's attorney, which he continued to fill with satisfaction to the public until 1869, except during the period he passed in the military service. He was among the first to answer the call of the State immediately after the passage of the ordinance of secession, and as a private participated in the occupation of Harper's Ferry. Soon after his arrival there he was promoted to a captaincy in the Black Horse cavalry, a rank which he held from April 26th to September 17, 1861, when he was promoted major and assigned to the Fourth Virginia cavalry. With this command he participated in the early operations of the Peninsular campaign. In the battle of May 5th at Williamsburg, Colonel Robertson being sick and Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham having been wounded on the previous day, he commanded the regiment in a fierce fight on the Telegraph road, and received, as stated in General Stuart's report, "a very severe, and I fear, mortal wound in the face." His capture followed and he was held as a prisoner of war two or three months. As soon as exchanged, though not yet fully recovered, he returned to duty early in September, 1862, and being promoted lieutenant-colonel, was assigned to the temporary command of the Second North Carolina regiment of cavalry, with which he held Warrenton, Va., with about 3,000 wounded Confederate soldiers, also capturing a number of Federal prisoners. In November he was ordered into hospital at

Lynchburg, but on his application was given command of the troops at that post. In February, 1863, he was able to rejoin the Fourth regiment, and held command, in the absence of Colonel Wickham, until March 20th, when he was again given command of the Second North Carolina. The gallant Col. Sol Williams, the regular commander, returned to his men on June 8th, but on the next day, in the battle of Brandy Station, lost his life, and Payne continued to lead the regiment, and in that capacity took part in Stuart's Pennsylvania raid. When Stuart was confronted by Kilpatrick, Payne with his regiment was thrown against the rear of Farnsworth's brigade at Hanover, Pa. So gallant was the charge that one Federal regiment was scattered, and Kilpatrick's command might have been routed had adequate support been at hand. But here Colonel Payne's horse was killed under him, and he himself, with a severe saber cut in the side, again fell into the hands of the enemy. After a long imprisonment at Johnson's island, Ohio, he was exchanged, and being promoted brigadier-general, commanded a brigade of three cavalry regiments, the Fifth, Sixth and Fifteenth Virginia, in Early's campaign in the Shenandoah valley, including the battles of Winchester, Fisher's Hill and Cedar Creek. He was next transferred to Richmond and remained there during the siege, in the final operations commanding a brigade composed of the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Virginia cavalry and Thirty-sixth Virginia battalion, in Munford's division. At the battle of Five Forks, April 1st, he was again badly wounded, and was sent to Richmond to rejoin the army. During the evacuation he failed to reach his corps and took refuge near his old home, where he was captured on the night of Lincoln's assassination. Carried into Washington the next day, he narrowly escaped violence at the hands of the populace, blindly enraged by the terrible crime of the night before. He again suffered prison life at Johnson's island, after the actual close of the war. Since the return of peace he has devoted himself to the practice of law, also serving in the legislature of Virginia in the session of 1879-80. He was married in May, 1852, to Mary Elizabeth Winston Payne, daughter of Col. W. Winter Payne, who represented the Sumter district of Alabama in Congress in 1841-48. Ten children were born to this union, of whom eight survive.

Major-General John Pegram was born in Virginia, January 24, 1832. He was appointed a cadet from Virginia in the United States military academy, and was graduated in 1854, with promotion to brevet second lieutenant of dragoons. He served on frontier duty, first at Fort Tejou, Cal., and afterward at Fort Riley, Kan., where he was commissioned second lieutenant of dragoons, and at Forts Lookout and Randall, Dak. His duties in the west were relieved for a time in 1857, by assignment as assistant instructor of cavalry. Promoted first lieutenant of the Second dragoons, he became adjutant of that regiment, and resumed his frontier service until 1858, when he was given leave of absence for two years for a tour of Europe. On his return he continued in the United States army until May 10, 1861, when he resigned. He was commissioned captain, corps of cavalry, C. S. A., and was promoted rapidly to higher grades. As lieutenant-colonel he participated in the operations of General Garnett's command about Beverly, W. Va., in the summer of 1861, and when confronted by the Federal forces in overwhelming numbers under McClellan and Rosecrans, Pegram was intrusted by Garnett with the command of one of the two bodies in which he divided his forces. A rear attack by Rosecrans compelled him to withdraw after a gallant fight, from Rich mountain, and two days later he was compelled to surrender with half his command. After his return to the army he was assigned to the staff of General Bragg at Tupelo, Miss., as chief of engineers, July, 1862, and later became chief of staff of Gen. E. Kirby Smith, in command in east Tennessee. In that capacity he participated in the Kentucky campaign and the battle of Richmond, where his services were gratefully recognized in the report of the general commanding. In November he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the command of a cavalry brigade of Tennesseans in Smith's army. With his brigade he participated in the battle of Murfreesboro, and subsequently was upon outpost duty and various active operations until the battle of Chickamauga, where he commanded a division of Forrest's cavalry corps. Subsequently he was transferred to the army of Northern Virginia and the infantry service, being given command of a brigade in Early's division of the Second corps, composed of the Thirteenth, Thirty-first, Forty-ninth, Fifty-

second and Fifty-eighth Virginia regiments. With this gallant body of veterans he was in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James, and was particularly distinguished during the second day of the fight in the Wilderness, when his brigade repelled the persistent assaults of the Federals, determined to turn the flank of Ewell's corps. In command of Early's division he took part in the campaign against Sheridan in the Shenandoah valley in the fall of 1864, and after the return of these forces to the Petersburg lines he was promoted major-general and continued in command of the division, a part of Gordon's corps, throughout the winter. On February 6, 1865, he moved from camp to reconnoiter and was attacked by the enemy in heavy force on Hatcher's run. His men were pressed back in spite of a brave resistance until reinforced by the division of C. A. Evans, when the enemy was in turn forced to retire. After meeting a second check the Confederates reformed and charged again, driving the Federals, and in this moment of success General Pegram fell mortally wounded. His death occurred on the same day.

Brigadier-General William Nelson Pendleton, of Virginia, like Bishop Polk, of the Western army, entered the service of the Confederacy from the service of the church. He was born at Lexington, Va., December 23, 1809, and was appointed to the United States military academy in 1826, where he formed a close friendship with R. E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. He was graduated in 1830 and began service in the garrison at Augusta, Ga., with the rank of second lieutenant of artillery. Subsequently he served one year as assistant professor of mathematics at West Point, and with the artillery at Fort Hamilton, until 1833, when he resigned and became professor of mathematics in Bristol college, Pa., later becoming connected with the faculty of Delaware college. In 1837 he became a clergyman in the Episcopal church, in which he continued with distinction during the remainder of his life, receiving the degree of doctor of divinity. During the period of 1861-65, however, his talents were given to the defense of Virginia and the Confederacy. He entered the service as captain of a Lexington company, and in a few weeks was commissioned captain, corps of artillery, C. S. A. He served in command of

the Rockbridge artillery until a short time before the battle of First Manassas, when he was promoted colonel and made chief of artillery of the army under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Arriving on the field of Manassas with Johnston's command, he promptly brought his artillery into action in support of the Confederate left, where the battle was raging the hottest, and rendered effective service. It is told that he paused before his first order to fire to say with solemn reverence, "Lord, have mercy on their souls." From this time he continued in command of the artillery under Johnston, with promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, and after Lee took charge of the army of Northern Virginia, he served under him in the same capacity until the close of the war. Before the Pennsylvania campaign he had given the artillery an excellent organization, and under his direction it rendered telling service in the great artillery duels at Gettysburg. Through the remainder of the struggle he did his duty with devotion, and in the final retreat from Petersburg brought off his guns, making gallant stands against the enemy at Rice's Station and Farmville. During the night of April 8th, part of his command, under General Walker, was captured. On the 9th the artillery took part in a spirited attack upon the enemy, but hostilities were soon arrested, and he, with General Longstreet and General Gordon, represented the Confederate army in arranging the details of the surrender. Meanwhile, General Pendleton had continued to hold his ministerial charge at Lexington, and while on military duty had exercised his spiritual privileges. After the war he resumed his post at Lexington, where General Lee was a vestryman of his parish. He represented Virginia in the general convention of his church, both before and after the war, and received the degree of doctor of divinity in 1868. His only son, Col. "Sandie" Pendleton, was a member of Stonewall Jackson's staff, and fell mortally wounded at the battle of Winchester, in September, 1864. General Pendleton passed away January 15, 1883.

Major-General George Edward Pickett was born at Richmond, Va., January 25, 1825, son of a planter of Henrico county. He was graduated at the United States military academy in the class of 1846, which included George B. McClellan, J. L. Reno, Thomas J. Jackson,

George Stoneman, Dabney H. Maury, D. R. Jones, C. M. Wilcox, S. B. Maxey and others who attained prominence in the war of the Confederacy. Going into the war with Mexico he was promoted second lieutenant, Second infantry; was transferred to the Seventh and finally to the Eighth infantry, and participating in all the important engagements of Scott's army, was brevetted first lieutenant for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco; earned the brevet of captain at Chapultepec, and finally took part in the capture of the Mexican capital. He subsequently served with the Eighth infantry on frontier duty in Texas until 1855, when he was promoted captain Ninth infantry, and given a year's assignment to Fortress Monroe. He was afterward on duty in Washington territory, until the spring of 1861. In 1856 he occupied San Juan island with sixty men, and forbade the landing of British troops, winning the thanks of the territorial legislature for his gallant and firm discharge of duty, and the commendation of General Harney for "cool judgment, ability and gallantry." His loyalty and firmness saved the rights of the United States until the title to the island was confirmed by international arbitration, and "Fort Pickett" guarded one end of the island until the British finally retired. His first commission in the Confederate service was as major of artillery, regular army. On July 23, 1861, as colonel in the provisional army, he was assigned to temporary command on the lower Rappahannock, with headquarters at Fredericksburg, and on February 28, 1862, being promoted to brigadier-general, he was ordered to report to General Longstreet. Commanding a brigade of Longstreet's corps, he won commendation for "using his forces with great effect, ability and his usual gallantry," at Williamsburg. On the second day of the battle of Seven Pines he was particularly distinguished for his good generalship during an attack by Hooker's command. An order to withdraw was received, which was obeyed by the other brigade commanders after the repulse of the first attack; but "Pickett, the true soldier," as Longstreet writes, "knowing that the order was not intended for such an emergency, stood and resisted the attack," holding his ground against odds of ten to one for several hours longer. The enemy attempted to creep up quietly and capture the Virginians, but they met him with a fearful fire that drove him back

to the bushes, which ended the battle. At Gaines' Mill, fighting on the right with Longstreet, his brigade broke Porter's line just west of the Watts house, attacking with such vigor as almost to gain possession of the Federal reserve artillery. In this assault Pickett fell severely wounded, and he was for some time absent from his brave command, which under his leadership had won the title of "the gamecock brigade." In October, 1862, he was promoted to major-general and assigned to a division of Longstreet's corps, composed of his old brigade under Garnett, and the brigades of Armistead, Kemper and Corse, all Virginians, and Micah Jenkins' South Carolina brigade. Though there were five or six other Virginia brigades, in other divisions, this was distinctively "the Virginia division" of the army, and comprised all the Virginia brigades in Longstreet's corps except Mahone's. He held the center of the line at Fredericksburg, and after that battle was sent with his division to Richmond, which was supposed to be threatened by the Federal movements. He was reinforced by Hood's division, and General Longstreet, in command, operated against Suffolk. Pickett went into the Gettysburg campaign with three brigades, Garnett's, Kemper's and Armistead's, and Dearing's artillery. He reached the battlefield with his men on the forenoon of the third day of battle, and was selected to make the attack upon the Federal center on Cemetery hill, Heth's division under Pettigrew to form the left of the line, which should be supported by Pender's division under Trimble. The attack was to be made after the enemy's artillery had been weakened by the massed fire of the Confederate artillery, which began at 2 o'clock. After a terrific artillery battle there was a lull in the Federal fire, and the Confederate ammunition being near exhaustion, General Alexander sent a note to Pickett: "For God's sake, come quick. The eighteen guns are gone; come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly." Pickett handed the note to Longstreet, who had strongly objected to the proposed assault with the forces available. To Pickett's question, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet said nothing, but nodded his head. Pickett then accepted the duty with apparent confidence and "rode gaily to his command," before going into the fight writing on the envelope of a letter to his betrothed:

If Old Pete's nod means death, then good-bye and God bless you, little one." The story of the charge has been often eloquently related. The Federal artillery was supplied with ammunition in time to work havoc in the Confederate ranks—the shattered lines closed up and gained the summit of the ridge and planted the stars and bars in the Federal lines—and disappeared in a tornado of fire. Very few came back unhurt. In September, 1863, Pickett was assigned to command of the department of North Carolina, embracing Petersburg and Southern Virginia. He made a demonstration against New Bern in the latter part of January, 1864. In May he joined Lee on the North Anna, and from that time commanded his old division, Armistead's, Pickett's, Corse's and Kemper's brigades, now under Barton, Hunton, Corse and Terry, until the close of hostilities. On June 16th, Lee arrived at Drewry's bluff with Pickett's division, and witnessed the gallant recapture of the Confederate lines from Butler. He wrote to Longstreet: "We tried very hard to keep Pickett's men from capturing the breastworks of the enemy, but could not do it." He remained before Bermuda Hundred until March, 1865, when he was sent to Lynchburg to oppose Sheridan's raid, and then marched with Longstreet north of Richmond in an attempt to intercept the Federal cavalryman, whom he finally met on March 31st and April 1st at Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks. In these hard-fought battles Pickett commanded the infantry, Fitzhugh Lee the cavalry, and as Longstreet writes: "His execution was all that a skillful commander could apply. Though taken by surprise, there was no panic in any part of the command. Brigade after brigade changed front to the left and received the overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until crushed back in the next. In generalship, Pickett was not a bit below the 'gay rider.'" Reinforced too late to avoid defeat, he rallied and checked the cavalry pursuit at Amazon creek, preventing worse disaster. Here again, as at Gettysburg, he had been fated to make the decisive fight, with insufficient forces, and the inevitable followed. He marched with his division from Petersburg, escaped from the disaster at Rice's Station with 600 men of his splendid division, and finally was surrendered April 9, 1865, with the last of the army of North-



ern Virginia. Subsequently he engaged in business at Richmond, but did not survive the first decade following the war, dying at Norfolk, July 30, 1875.

Brigadier-General Roger Atkinson Pryor was born near Petersburg, Va., July 19, 1828, and was graduated at Hampden-Sidney college in 1845, and at the university of Virginia in 1848. Subsequently he prepared for the legal profession, and was admitted to the bar, but relinquished the practice on account of delicate health, and entered journalism. After an association with the Washington Union he became editor of the Richmond Enquirer in 1853, and rapidly attained prominence. In 1855, at the age of twenty-seven years, he was sent to Greece by President Pierce, as special commissioner for the adjustment of certain difficulties with that government. On his return he established a political journal at Richmond, called *The South*, in which he presented with great vigor the most radical opposition to encroachments upon the local rights and industrial methods of the South. He was elected to Congress in 1859, to fill a vacancy, and was re-elected in 1860. While in Congress his aggressiveness and passionate oratory gave him national prominence, and led to several duels. He took a prominent part in the proceedings of the Charleston Democratic convention in 1860, and after the presidential election ardently advocated the formation of the Southern Confederacy and the union with it of Virginia. Repairing to Charleston, S. C., he became a member of the volunteer staff of General Beauregard, and with his comrade, A. R. Chisholm, accompanied Aide-de-camps James Chestnut and Stephen D. Lee in the visit to Fort Sumter April 12th, notifying Major Anderson that fire would be opened on the fort. Thence they went by boat to Fort Johnson, where Capt. George S. James was ordered to open the fire. James, who was a great admirer of Pryor, offered the honor to him, as General Lee relates, but he replied, with much the same emotion as had characterized Anderson's receipt of the notice of bombardment, "I could not fire the first gun of the war." From their boat midway between Johnson and Sumter, he witnessed the opening of the bombardment. After the flag on Sumter was shot down he was sent with Lee to offer assistance in subduing the fire in the fort, and discovered

that Colonel Wigfall had made arrangements for surrender. Soon afterward he was assigned as colonel to the command of the Third Virginia regiment, stationed at Portsmouth and vicinity, and later in the year was elected a member of the First Confederate congress, in which he served with prominence as a member of the military committee. Continuing in military command, he moved his regiment to Yorktown in March, 1862, and engaged in battle at Yorktown and Williamsburg, after which he was promoted brigadier-general. In this rank he participated in the battle of Seven Pines, and was particularly distinguished, his men fighting bravely and with heavy loss, in the victories won at Gaines' Mill and Frayser's Farm. With Longstreet's corps he took part in the second battle of Manassas, and shared the distinction won by Anderson's corps at Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg. In November General Lee requested Pryor to return to Richmond and organize a brigade to operate south of the James river. He rendered valuable services in that field until his resignation, August 26, 1863. In 1864 he was captured by the United States troops and for a time confined at Fort Lafayette. Upon the close of hostilities he urged a policy of quiet acquiescence in the results of the war, but did not long remain in the South, removing to New York city, and embarking in the practice of law, in which he attained great distinction. The degree of LL. D. was conferred upon him by Hampden-Sidney college.

Brigadier-General Alexander Welch Reynolds was born in Clarke county, Va., in August, 1817, and was graduated at the United States military academy in 1838, in the class of Generals Beauregard, Hardee, Edward Johnson and Stevenson. He was promoted second lieutenant First infantry on graduation, and first lieutenant a year later; served in the Florida war as adjutant of his regiment in 1838-40, and again in 1840-41; subsequently was on frontier duty in the northwest, and then on recruiting service until 1847, when he was promoted captain and assigned to quartermaster duty. In the latter capacity he served at Philadelphia, in the Mexican war, and in Indian Territory and New Mexico. He was on duty as a quartermaster at various points, mainly in Texas, from 1857, until he left the United States service

to enter the Confederate army, in which he received the rank of captain of infantry. In July, 1861, he was commissioned colonel of the Fiftieth Virginia infantry, Floyd's brigade, with which he participated in Floyd's campaign in West Virginia. He was in command of the post at Lewisburg during the winter following. After the men had returned from the Fort Donelson campaign, Colonel Reynolds was ordered in April to collect his regiment and go to the support of Gen. E. Kirby Smith, at Knoxville. A few weeks later, he was in command of a brigade composed of the Thirty-ninth and Forty-third Georgia infantry, to which was added Latrobe's Maryland battery. With this command he was sent to Chattanooga, and thence to Vicksburg, where he was assigned to Stevenson's division, in command of a brigade of four Tennessee regiments. He was commended officially for his faithful service during the siege of Vicksburg. Being exchanged in July, 1863, he resumed command of his brigade, when it was restored to the service, with the rank of brigadier-general. After the battle of Chickamauga he was assigned to a brigade composed of the Fifty-eighth and Sixtieth North Carolina and the Fifty-fourth and Sixty-third Virginia, which he commanded in the battle of Missionary Ridge. Subsequently his brigade was attached to Stevenson's division, Hardee's corps, with which he was actively engaged in the Atlanta campaign, until painfully wounded at New Hope church. Upon the close of hostilities he went to Egypt, and in 1866 was appointed a brigadier-general in the army of the khedive. After serving in the Abyssinian war he resided for a time at Cairo, and died at Alexandria, Egypt, May 26, 1876.

Brigadier-General Beverly Holcombe Robertson, a native of Virginia, was graduated at the United States military academy in 1849, and promoted to brevet second lieutenant of the Second dragoons. After a year at the cavalry school at Carlisle, Pa., he was promoted second lieutenant, and ordered to the West. He served in New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska, participating in battle with the Apache Indians at Jornada del Muerto, and with the Sioux at Blue Water, and earning promotion to first lieutenant, until 1859, when, being ordered to Utah, he became adjutant of his regiment.

and acting assistant adjutant-general of the department of Utah. He was promoted captain March 3, 1861, but in August, having severed his connection with the United States service, he accepted a commission as colonel, Virginia volunteer cavalry. In the cavalry brigade organized by General Stuart in the latter part of 1861, he commanded the Fourth regiment, Virginia cavalry. After Yorktown had been abandoned, and the Federal lines were close to Richmond, he made a gallant fight at New Bridge, in an attempt to repossess Mechanicsville, exercising brigade command in the action. In June, Jackson having concluded his Valley campaign, Robertson was promoted brigadier-general and sent to Mount Jackson to take command of Ashby's cavalry, and protect that region. From Ashby's command was organized the Seventh cavalry regiment, Col. W. E. Jones; the Twelfth regiment, Col. A. W. Harman; and the Seventeenth battalion (later the Eleventh regiment), Maj. O. R. Funsten. These, with the Sixth regiment, Col. P. S. Flournoy, and the Second regiment, Col. T. T. Munford (which had accompanied Jackson), constituted Col. Robertson's brigade when he rejoined Stuart on the Rapidan river in August. Very soon afterward he participated in the victory at Brandy Station, and was congratulated by Stuart upon the superior discipline and stability of the command he had organized. During the battle of Groveton he was in command on the right holding back Porter, and on the 30th of August, made a handsome cavalry fight against Buford's brigade, on the Federal left flank, driving the enemy and capturing 300 prisoners. On September 5th, General Robertson was ordered to the department of North Carolina for the organization and instruction of cavalry troops. In this capacity he displayed excellent ability, also participating in the demonstration against New Bern in March, 1863. Of his brigade he led two regiments, the Fourth and Fifth North Carolina cavalry, to reinforce Stuart in May, 1863; took an important part in the fight at Upperville, and during the Gettysburg campaign, commanded the cavalry division left with the main army, with orders to watch the enemy, and follow in the rear of Lee, after Stuart started on his raid through Maryland. This division consisted of his North Carolina brigade and his former Virginia brigade, now commanded by W. E.

Jones. On the last day of the Gettysburg battle his command fought a cavalry battle near Fairfield, and during the retreat was engaged in repeated skirmishes, particularly at Funkstown and Hagerstown. After the return to Virginia, his two regiments having been reduced to 300 men, he asked to be transferred to another field, and was assigned in October to the command of the Second district of South Carolina. In this field he remained, with enlarged command, during the remainder of the war, defeating the Federal attempt to possess John's island in July, 1864, commanding the cavalry forces which covered the retreat of Hardee from Charleston, and participating in several engagements with Sherman's troops. General Robertson is now engaged in the insurance business at Washington, D. C.

Major-General Thomas Lafayette Rosser was born upon a farm in Campbell county, Va., October 15, 1836, the son of John and Martha M. (Johnson) Rosser. The family removed from Virginia to Texas in 1849, and from that State Rosser was appointed to the United States military academy in 1856. The course of study being then five years, he was in the graduating class when it was ordered into the field by President Lincoln. He immediately resigned, and proceeding to Montgomery was commissioned first lieutenant in the regular army of the Confederate States. Being assigned as instructor to the Washington artillery of New Orleans, he commanded the Second company of that organization at the battles of Blackburn's Ford and Manassas in July, 1861, and with Stuart at Munson's hill and the battle of Lewinsville. His success in shooting down McClellan's observation balloon won him promotion to captain, and in this rank he commanded his battery in the defense of Yorktown and on the retreat up the peninsula. At the battle of Mechanicsville he was severely wounded, and was soon promoted to lieutenant-colonel of artillery, and a few days later to colonel of the Fifth Virginia regiment of cavalry. Thus began his career as a cavalryman, in which he won great distinction as a dashing, intrepid and skillful officer. He commanded the advance of Stuart's expedition to Catlett's Station, in the campaign against Pope, and captured the latter's orderly and horses; in the fight at Groveton, Va., August 28, 1862, commanded



Brig.-Gen. P. T. MOORE.  
 Maj.-Gen. WM. MAHONE.  
 Brig.-Gen. W. E. JONES.  
 Maj.-Gen. G. W. C. LEE.

Brig.-Gen. DANIEL RUGGLES.  
 Maj.-Gen. W. H. F. LEE.  
 Brig.-Gen. D. A. WEISIGER.  
 Maj.-Gen. GEO. E. PICKETT.

Maj.-Gen. EDWARD JOHNSON.  
 Maj.-Gen. CARTER L. STEVENSON.  
 Brig.-Gen. R. LINDBRAY WALKER.  
 Brig.-Gen. EDWIN G. LEE.





the only cavalry with Jackson; and confronted and held in check the forces of Fitz John Porter on August 29th. At South Mountain he commanded the only cavalry at Crampton's gap, and with Pelham's artillery took a prominent part in the gallant fight. He participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, and subsequently for a time led Fitzhugh Lee's brigade during the fighting against Pleasanton. At the opening of the battle at Kelly's ford, he was upon court-martial duty, with Stuart and Pelham, but rode immediately to the front with those officers, and finding his regiment in the rear, charged with it upon the enemy who was crowding back the Confederate front, and drove him back some distance. The Federals, reaching a wood, dismounted and opened a heavy fire, in which Rosser fell severely wounded, and Pelham was killed while leading his regiment in another charge. Rosser was disabled until the Pennsylvania campaign, when he rode with Stuart around Hooker and Meade, and participated in the three days' fight at Gettysburg. After this battle he was promoted to brigadier-general, and assigned to the old brigade of Turner Ashby, "the Laurel brigade." With this gallant command he was conspicuous in the campaigns of 1864. On May 5th, the opening day in the Wilderness, "a large force of cavalry and artillery on our right flank was driven back by Rosser's brigade," and on June 2d he "fell upon the rear of the enemy's cavalry" near Hanover Court House, and "charged down the road toward Ashland, bearing everything before him," quoting the telegraphic reports of Gen. R. E. Lee. At Trevilian's station he drove Custer back against Fitz Lee and captured many prisoners, but was painfully wounded while leading a charge at the head of his brigade. He also took part in the famous "cattle raid," while Grant was about Petersburg. He won all the distinction possible in the desperate struggle against Sheridan's overwhelming forces in the Shenandoah valley, and in command of Fitzhugh Lee's division saved Early's army at the battle of Cedar Creek, holding the line and checking the enemy's pursuit until 9:30 p. m., then taking position in the works at Fisher's hill, and safely conducting Early's retreat to New Market next day. He was promoted major-general in November, 1864. He conducted the successful expedition against New Creek, W. Va., taking many prisoners and great quanti-



ties of stores, and in January, 1865, with 300 men, crossed the mountains in deep snow and bitter cold, and surprised and captured two infantry regiments in their works at Beverly, W. Va. Returning to the vicinity of Petersburg in the spring of 1865, he commanded a division of cavalry during the remainder of the struggle, fighting with honor at Five Forks, and at High Bridge, April 6th, defeating and capturing the entire command of General Read, who fell in combat with General Dearing. On April 7th, Rosser captured General Gregg, and rescued a wagon train near Farmville, and in the last hour of battle at Appomattox, a little after daylight April 9, 1865, charged the Federal cavalry and escaped from the fatal field with his command. Under directions from the secretary of war, he began a reorganization of the scattered troops of the army of Northern Virginia, but was made a prisoner about the time of Johnston's surrender. After the return of peace he was for a time superintendent of the National express company under General Johnston, was assistant engineer in the construction of the Pittsburg & Connellsville railroad, and in the spring of 1870 became connected with the construction of the Northern Pacific railroad. Beginning in an humble capacity he became chief engineer of the eastern division in 1871, and built the main part of the road. Later he was chief engineer of the Canadian Pacific, and located and built the road west of Winnipeg. Since 1886 he has resided near Charlottesville, Va.

Brigadier-General Daniel Ruggles, a native of Massachusetts who tendered his services to Virginia at the beginning of the great war, was born January 31, 1810, and was graduated at the United States military academy in the class of 1833. His military service was rendered mainly with the Fifth infantry in the Northwest until the Florida war of 1839-40, in which he participated with the rank of first lieutenant. He was then stationed in Wisconsin and Michigan until 1845, when he took part in the military occupation of Texas. Going into the Mexican war next year, he took part in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, and won promotion to captain. In 1847 he served at Vera Cruz, San Antonio and Molino del Rey, and was promoted brevet major for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and brevet lieu-

tenant-colonel for his services at Chapultepec. From the close of that war until 1858 he was on duty mainly in Texas. After taking part in the Utah expedition, he was on sick leave of absence until the outbreak of the Confederate war, when he resigned from the United States army. He was commissioned brigadier-general of Virginia volunteers in April, and assigned to the command of the State forces along the line of the Potomac from Mount Vernon south, and in May was put in command of troops from the counties surrounding Fredericksburg, where he was stationed. His rank then became that of colonel in the provisional army. The troops under his command repulsed the attacks of Federal vessels at Aquia creek and Mathias point in June, 1861. In August following he was commissioned brigadier-general, provisional army, Confederate States, and ordered to Pensacola, Fla., and two months later to New Orleans, where he organized a brigade which was sent to Corinth early in 1862, General Bragg desiring the benefit of the experience and soldierly ability of Ruggles in that quarter. He reported the landing of Grant's army at Shiloh, March 16th, and in the great battle which followed, in April, he commanded the first division of Bragg's corps, consisting of the brigades of Anderson, Gibson and Pond, and was conspicuous through the two days' fight for the skill and gallantry with which he handled his troops. After he had driven the enemy from his front, a rally was made, which would have resulted disastrously to the Confederates if Ruggles had not made a rapid and masterly concentration of artillery at a point enfilading the right flank of Prentiss' division. The artillery, thus admirably placed, worked havoc in Prentiss' command, and drove back the reinforcements coming to his assistance, so that within an hour the entire command surrendered to the infantry attack, in which Ruggles' men had an important part. During the next day his troops fought valiantly, and he shared their danger, on one occasion leading the charge of the Seventeenth Louisiana, with its regimental flag in his hand. He fought the successful battle of Farmington, May 9th, and continued in division command during the siege of Corinth, but on June 26th was assigned to the district comprising the gulf counties of Mississippi and Louisiana east of the river. He commanded the left wing of Breckinridge's army in the successful battle of

Baton Rouge; in August was put in command at Port Hudson, and later was given command of the First military district of Mississippi, with headquarters at Jackson. In April, 1864, he made his headquarters at Columbus, where he had a force of about 3,000 men, and was in the field opposing various Federal expeditions during the Vicksburg campaign. Subsequently he remained for some time unassigned, though anxious for duty in spite of his advanced age, but finally accepted the post of commissary-general of prisoners of war. After the close of hostilities he resided at Fredericksburg, Va., except four years when in charge of a large estate in Texas. He was a member of the board of visitors of the United States military academy in 1884. His death occurred at Fredericksburg in 1897.

Brigadier-General James E. Slaughter, a native of Virginia, entered the military service of the United States in April, 1847, as second lieutenant of Voltigeurs. He was transferred to the First artillery in June, 1848, and was an officer of that command until the formation of the Confederate States, with promotion in 1852 to the rank of first lieutenant. He received a commission as first lieutenant, corps of artillery, Confederate States army, and became inspector-general on the staff of General Beauregard after the transfer of the latter to the department of Alabama and West Florida. After the bombardment at Pensacola, in which Lieutenant Slaughter rendered valuable service under fire, General Beauregard reported that to him, probably more than to any one else in the command, he was indebted for patient labor and unceasing vigil given to the organization and instruction of the troops. Beauregard earnestly recommended his promotion to brigadier-general, which was bestowed in the spring of 1862. In May he was appointed chief of the inspector-general's department of the army of the Mississippi, under General Bragg. In this duty he continued through the Kentucky campaign, and was then assigned to the charge of the troops of Mobile, that port being threatened by Federal invasion. Thence he was transferred in April, 1863, to Galveston, Tex., as chief of artillery for General Magruder. Later in the year he was given charge of the eastern sub-district of Texas, and command of all the troops of the Second

division. During the remainder of the war period he played an important part in Confederate affairs in Texas, for some time performing the duties of chief of staff.

Brigadier-General William E. Starke went to the assistance of Gen. R. S. Garnett at Laurel hill, early in July, 1861, as colonel, and served as his aide-de-camp in the disastrous retreat on the Cheat river. His coolness and judgment in the midst of the confusion that followed the death of General Garnett were highly commended by Colonel Taliaferro, who succeeded to command. Subsequently he was put in command of the Sixtieth Virginia regiment, and sent to Lewisburg, to the support of General Floyd, whence, in December, he was ordered to accompany General Donelson's brigade to Bowling Green, Ky. It appears, however, that he was instead, attached to General Wise's command, stationed at Goldsboro, N. C. During the Seven Days' campaign in Virginia he commanded his regiment in Field's brigade, and was commended for gallantry, and his promotion to brigadier-general followed early in August, 1862. Reporting for duty to General Jackson, he was assigned to command of the Second Louisiana brigade and marched with it to Manassas. In that campaign he took command of the Stonewall division, after General Taliaferro was wounded on the 28th. He was with Jackson at the capture of Harper's Ferry, and at Sharpsburg was called on again to take command of the division, after the fall of J. R. Jones. Soon afterward he himself fell mortally wounded, pierced by three minie balls, and survived but an hour. Gen. Bradley T. Johnson, in reporting the battle of Second Manassas, said: "I cannot forbear doing but scant justice to a gallant soldier now no more. It was my fortune during the two days of battle, during which he commanded the division, to be thrown constantly in contact with Brigadier-General Starke. The buoyant dash with which he led his brigade into the most withering fire on Friday, though then in command of the division; the force he showed in the handling of this command; the coolness and judgment which distinguished him in action, made him to me a marked man, and I regretted his early death as a great loss to the army and the cause." His name deserves lasting remembrance in association with the Stonewall division.

Brigadier-General Walter Husted Stevens, whose Confederate service was rendered in Virginia, was born at Penn Yan, N. Y., August 24, 1827. He was appointed from New York to the United States military academy, where he was graduated fourth in the class of 1848, and promoted in the army to brevet second lieutenant, corps of engineers. After a short service at Newport harbor, R. I., he was assigned to the repair of fortifications, defending the approaches to New Orleans until 1853, when he was put in charge of the survey of the rivers and harbors of Texas. From 1853 to 1857 he served as lighthouse inspector on the coast of Texas, with the rank of second lieutenant until 1855, when he was promoted first lieutenant. He was superintending engineer of the construction and repair of fortifications below New Orleans, 1854-60, superintended the construction of the custom house and the fortifications at Galveston, and was a member of the special board of engineers for Gulf defenses. Entering the service of the Confederate States in May, 1861, he accompanied General Beauregard to Virginia, as a member of his staff, and with the rank of captain, corps of engineers. He served with the advance forces at Fairfax Court House for some time before the battle of Manassas, and laid out the works there in an admirable manner, General Beauregard reporting that he had "shown himself to be an officer of energy and ability." General Bonham commended him for his indefatigable labors, and constant attention to execution of orders, in camp and field, and Gen. J. E. Johnston especially mentioned his valuable services during the battle of July 21st. He was promoted major, and appointed chief engineer of the army of Northern Virginia, under Johnston, and was commended for his skillful and devoted services both in his own profession and as a member of the general staff at Seven Pines. After General Lee came into command of the army, he was succeeded by Colonel Gilmer, and with promotion to colonel was given charge of the defensive works around Richmond. In command of the troops and defenses of Richmond in 1863-64, he participated in the operations against Kilpatrick's and Dahlgren's raid, and rendered valuable assistance to General Beauregard when the city was threatened by Butler. In August, 1864, he was

promoted brigadier-general and assigned to his former position of chief engineer of the army of Northern Virginia. After the close of the war he went to Mexico and became superintendent and constructing engineer of the railroad from Vera Cruz to the capital, the property of which he skillfully preserved from damage during the war of that period. He died at Vera Cruz, November 12, 1867.

Major-General Carter L. Stevenson, a Virginian distinguished in the western armies throughout the war, was a graduate of the National military academy, of the class of 1838. He went into the United States army with the rank of second lieutenant, and was assigned to the Fifth infantry. He served on frontier duty in Wisconsin, and was promoted first lieutenant September 22, 1840. His principal service after this was rendered in the Florida war and in the military occupation of Texas, until the Mexican war. He participated with distinction in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma as well as other events of this struggle, and in June, 1847, was promoted captain in the Fifth infantry. He served for a time as aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Brady; was in garrison at East Pascagoula, Miss.; on frontier duty at Fort Gibson, I. T., and Fort Belknap, Tex.; and while engaged in Pacific railroad exploration, skirmished with the Apache Indians. He took part in the Seminole war of 1856-57, fighting at Big Cypress swamp and near Bowleytown, and marched in the famous Utah expedition; subsequently continuing on frontier duty until 1861, when, obeying the call of his State, he tendered his services for her defense. He received the commission of lieutenant-colonel, corps of infantry, C. S. A., and with the rank of colonel took command of the Fifty-third Virginia infantry. When Beauregard was transferred to the west, he recommended the promotion of Stevenson, among others, to brigade and division command of the western troops, and Stevenson was accordingly made brigadier-general in February, 1862. On March 15th, he was ordered to report to General Huger for assignment on the Weldon railroad, but soon after was transferred to the department of East Tennessee, and given command of a division of troops. After the Federal General Morgan seized Cumberland Gap, he was in command of the Con-

federate force which threatened that position and compelled Morgan's withdrawal. After July 17th he pursued the Federal forces into Kentucky, and there made a junction with Kirby Smith, with whom he served during the return to Murfreesboro. In October he was promoted major-general. In December, 1862, he was sent by Bragg from Murfreesboro with 10,000 men to reinforce Pemberton at Vicksburg, already threatened by the Federal army. He reached the field of battle at Chickasaw bluffs just after the repulse of Sherman, and by reason of his rank was assigned to the command of the forces in front of the enemy. He was subsequently in command of a division under Pemberton, and during the unfortunately planned operations against Grant, bore the brunt of the battle at Champion's hill, and after the defeat at Big Black bridge was left in charge of the retreating columns, while Pemberton hastened to Vicksburg. During the long siege he took a conspicuous part as commander of the right of the Confederate lines. After the surrender of Vicksburg he was for a time under parole, but he returned to the army before Chattanooga and was given a division of Hardee's corps, with command on the right, including Lookout mountain, from which he withdrew just before the battle of Missionary Ridge to reinforce the main line on the ridge. He took part in this battle, and was subsequently identified with the army of Tennessee as a division commander until the close of the war. During the Atlanta campaign he had a division of Hood's corps, and led his troops in brilliant action at Resaca, Kenesaw mountain and elsewhere. After the promotion of Hood he held temporary command of the corps. During the Tennessee campaign he commanded a division of the corps of S. D. Lee, which, holding the center of the line before Nashville, earned distinction by stubborn fighting despite the general disaster, and after the wounding of Lee he had the immediate command of the division covering the retreat, a trust which was ably performed. With his division of the army of Tennessee, reduced to 2,600 men, he participated in the operations in the Carolinas against Sherman, and surrendered with Johnston in April, 1865. After the war he was occupied as a civil and mining engineer until his death in Caroline county, Va., August 15, 1888.

Major-General James Ewell Brown Stuart, chief of cavalry of the army of Northern Virginia, was born in Patrick county, Va., February 6, 1833. His ancestry in America began with Archibald Stuart, who sought refuge from religious persecution in western Pennsylvania in 1726, and subsequently removed with his family to Augusta county, Va., about 1738. The next generation was distinguished by the services of Maj. Alexander Stuart, who fell dangerously wounded while commanding his regiment at Guilford Court House. John Alexander, son of the latter, spent part of his life in the West, serving as Federal judge in Illinois and Missouri, and as speaker of the house in the latter State. His son, Archibald Stuart, lawyer, soldier of 1812, representative in Virginia legislatures and conventions, married a descendant of the distinguished Letcher family, and their son became the brilliant Virginia cavalry leader. General Stuart pursued his youthful studies at Emory and Henry college, and then entering the National military academy, was graduated in 1854, and was commissioned second lieutenant in October of that year. He served in Texas against the Apaches with the mounted riflemen until transferred to the new First cavalry in May, 1855, with which he served at Fort Leavenworth. November 14, 1855, he was married at Fort Riley to the daughter of Col. Philip St. George Cooke, and in the following month he was promoted first lieutenant. He remained on the frontier and in Kansas, and was wounded at the Indian battle of Solomon's River in 1857. At Washington, in 1859, he carried secret instructions to Col. R. E. Lee, and accompanied that officer as aide, against the outbreak at Harper's Ferry, where he read the summons to surrender to the leader, theretofore known as "Smith," but whom he recognized at once as "Ossawatimie" Brown of Kansas. Lieutenant Stuart received a commission as captain from Washington in April, 1861, but he had decided to go with Virginia, and tendered her his services as soon as his resignation was accepted, May 7th. He was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of Virginia infantry, May 10, 1861, with orders to report to Jackson at Harper's Ferry, and was promoted colonel July 16th. With about 350 cavalymen he at once assumed the duties which distinguished his service throughout the war. He became the eye of the army under Jackson and



Johnston, so effectually that Johnston afterward wrote him from the West: "How can I eat, sleep or rest in peace without you upon the outpost." He screened Johnston's movement to Manassas, and in the fighting of July 21st made an effective charge, of which Early wrote: "Stuart did as much toward saving the battle of First Manassas as any subordinate who participated in it." He pursued the Federals twelve miles and subsequently held the heights in sight of Washington, with headquarters on Munson's hill. September 24, 1861, he was promoted brigadier-general in the Confederate army. He encountered the enemy before Munson's hill and at Dranesville, and being transferred to the Peninsula early in 1862, covered the retreat from Yorktown, opening the fighting at Williamsburg; and after the Federals had approached Richmond he won the admiring attention of both nations by his brilliant ride around McClellan's army. On July 25, 1862, he was promoted major-general. There followed his raid to the rear of Pope's army, capturing a part of the staff of the Federal general and his headquarters at Catlett's station; the raid in conjunction with General Trimble, in which the Federal depot at Manassas Junction was destroyed. Subsequently he was in command before Washington, screening the movement into Maryland, his gallant troopers being engaged in frequent skirmishes and fighting most gallantly in the battles at the South Mountain passes. At Sharpsburg he covered the left flank, and with his famous horse artillery repulsed the advance of Sumner's corps. In October occurred his daring raid to Chambersburg, Pa., returning between McClellan's army and Washington, evading numerous Federal expeditions against him, and losing but one man wounded. His success demoralized the Federal cavalry, and did much to render halting and impotent the subsequent movements against Lee, in opposition to which his command was almost constantly engaged. About midnight of May 2d, after Jackson and Hill had fallen, Stuart took command of the First corps of the army, at Chancellorsville, and on the 3d, with splendid personal courage and brilliant generalship, continued to drive the Federals by an audacious attack of 20,000 against 80,000, until he had gained Chancellor's house and a safe position. He remained in command of the corps until Hooker had retreated across the river.

After several brilliant encounters with the enemy's cavalry during the subsequent maneuvers, he set out again between the Federal army and Washington, with orders to meet Early at York, Pa. After eight days and nights of steady marching, and the last three in almost constant fighting, he reached Gettysburg with a large train of Federal supplies, and on the third day of the battle made a fierce attack upon the enemy's right. His cavalry saved the Confederate trains at Williamsport, on the retreat. In the spring of 1864 he conducted the advance of A. P. Hill's corps against Grant on May 5th, and giving Lee notice of the movement to Spottsylvania, hastened to throw his cavalry before the enemy's advance. Then being called southward by Sheridan's raid, he interposed his cavalry between the Federals and the Confederate capital at Yellow Tavern, where, on May 11th, he received a wound from which he died at Richmond on the following day. The death of Stuart produced a gloom in the South, second only to that which followed the loss of Jackson. His characteristics were such as to make him a popular hero. Personally he was the embodiment of reckless courage, splendid manhood, and unconquerable gayety. He could wear, without exciting a suspicion of unfitness, all the warlike adornments of an old-time cavalier. His black plume, and hat caught up with a golden star, seemed the proper frame for a knightly face. A laugh was always at his lips, and a song behind it. He would lead a march with his banjo-player thrumming at his side. As he rode down the lines at Chancellorsville, the commander of an army, and the successor of Stonewall Jackson, whose fall had torn the hearts of his soldiers, he sang in a rollicking way: "Old Joe Hooker, come out of the Wilderness." As a soldier he was a born leader. He demonstrated his ability to direct an army after the wounding of Jackson, and Jackson, who knew before the trial, sent word to him: "Tell General Stuart to act on his own judgment and do what he thinks best. I have implicit confidence in him." On other fields he had shown the brilliancy of a Napoleon in the management of artillery. Thus in all arms of the service he had won the highest honors. In emergency he was calm, quiet, and perfect master of all his resources. A boy in camp, and a lover of fun, he was a daring sabreur in the fight, and always fully

awake to the demands of duty. He had the instinctive knowledge of the situation that belongs to the soldierly genius, and the constant readiness to act on the instant that wins battles against inertia and slothfulness. But he was never known fully while he lived. He was careless of how lightheartedness and gayety may be misjudged, and it was left to his friends after his death to tell that he indulged in none of the vices supposed to be habitual with soldiers, was never profane, and even abstained from card-playing. He was a faithful husband and father, and altogether one of the purest of men, as well as the bravest. One of these true friends, John Esten Cooke, in describing his last moments, has written: "As his life had been one of earnest devotion to the cause in which he believed, so his last hours were tranquil, his confidence in the mercy of heaven unfailing. When he was asked how he felt, he said, 'Easy, but willing to die, if God and my country think I have done my duty.' His last words were: 'I am going fast now; I am resigned. God's will be done.' As he uttered these words he expired."

Major-General William Booth Taliaferro, a representative of an old and famous Virginia family, was born at Belleville, Gloucester county, Va., December 28, 1822. He was educated at Harvard college and William and Mary, being graduated at the latter institution in 1841. His activity was directed to a military channel by the Mexican war, and on April 9, 1847, he became captain of a company of the Eleventh United States infantry. He was promoted major August 12th, and held this rank during the following year, his command being disbanded August, 1848. He then returned to the pursuits of civil life, and was one of the Democratic presidential electors in 1856, but continued to be prominent in military affairs and commanded the State forces at the time of John Brown's raid. As major-general of Virginia militia, he took command at Norfolk on April 18, 1861, and later with the rank of colonel was assigned to the post and troops at Gloucester point, opposite Yorktown. Subsequently he marched with the Twenty-third Virginia regiment to reinforce General Garnett in West Virginia. During the retreat from Laurel hill, Colonel Taliaferro was in command of the rear guard which gallantly contested the

enemy's pursuit at Carrick's ford, just before Garnett was killed. At the battle on Greenbrier river, October 3d, he commanded a brigade, consisting of his own regiment, the Twenty-fifth and Forty-fourth Virginia regiments, and contributed largely to the victory by his cool and gallant conduct. On March 4, 1862, he was promoted brigadier-general. He joined Jackson in the Valley early in December, and with a brigade composed of the Tenth, Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia, took a prominent part in the defeat of the Federals at McDowell, where he was in immediate command on the field after Edward Johnson was wounded, and participated in the victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic. Continuing in command of Jackson's Third brigade, he fought at Cedar mountain, August 9th, and after the death of General Winder was given charge of Jackson's division. In this command he continued during the subsequent operations about Manassas, participated in the maneuvers around Pope's army, and on August 28th, when Jackson determined to strike the enemy as he moved along the Warrenton pike, he immediately ordered Taliaferro to take his division and attack. In the fierce fight which followed, sustained on the Confederate side by Taliaferro and Ewell, both those commanders were seriously wounded. He was able to return to the field in time to participate in the battle of Fredericksburg, where he rendered efficient service in repelling the Federal force which secured temporary lodgment in the Confederate lines. His subsequent military career was in the department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, to which he was assigned in March, 1863, as commander of the district of Savannah. During the famous assault on Battery Wagner, July, 1863, he had charge of the defenses and troops on Morris island, and next month he took command of a division on James island. February 20, 1864, he was given temporary command of all troops in the district of East Florida, which embraced the forces that day engaged at Olustee. Returning March 5th to James island, in May he was assigned to the Seventh district of South Carolina, and the entire State was put under his military charge in December of that year. When Sherman's army reached Savannah, he exercised command to the north of that city, with the forces of Jenkins, Harrison and Chestnut, at Coosawhat-

chie and Pocotaligo, guarding the route of escape for Hardee. In the latter part of December he was given command of a division made up of Elliott's, Rhett's and Anderson's brigades, with which he participated in the subsequent movements, being promoted on January 1, 1865, to the rank of major-general. After the surrender of Johnston's army, he returned to Gloucester, Va., where he completed his long career of honor and usefulness. He served ten years in the State legislature, and rendered good service in the cause of education as a member of the board of visitors of the Virginia military institute, William and Mary college and other State institutions. His death occurred at his home in Gloucester county, February 27, 1898.

Brigadier-General James B. Terrill, a brave Virginia soldier, never wore the title which is here given him, but won it by his bravery and devotion, and fell in battle upon the day his promotion was confirmed by the Congress of the Confederate States. He was born at Warm Springs, Bath county, February 20, 1838, and was educated at the Virginia military institute. In 1858 he began the study of law with Judge Brockenbrough at Lexington, and two years later entered upon the practice of his profession at his native town. He was among the first to enter the military service in 1861, and in May was elected major of the Thirteenth Virginia infantry regiment, of which A. P. Hill was colonel. He served with his regiment under Jackson in the lower Shenandoah valley and at First Manassas, and at Lewinsville commanded the infantry in the gallant fight under Col. J. E. B. Stuart. Promoted lieutenant-colonel he served with credit in the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862, winning honorable mention at Cross Keys and Port Republic. He was commended in general orders for gallantry at Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas. At Fredericksburg he commanded his regiment, and took an active part in driving back the column of Federals which succeeded in penetrating the first line on the right. He continued in command of his regiment, sharing the operations of Early's division, until his death, contributing in no slight degree to the remarkable efficiency of his command, of which it was said that "the Thirteenth was never required to take a position that they did not

take it, nor to hold one that they did not hold it." After participating in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania he was killed in an encounter with Warren's corps, near Bethesda church, May 30, 1864, and was buried by the enemy.

Brigadier-General William Terry, whose worthy record is identified with that of the Stonewall brigade, which he commanded in 1864 and 1865, was born in Amherst county, Va., August 14, 1824. He was educated at the university of Virginia and graduated in 1848. The next three years he devoted to teaching and the study of law. After his admission to the bar in 1851, he made his home at Wytheville, and was engaged in the practice during the succeeding decade, also for a time editing the Wytheville Telegraph. He was lieutenant of the Wythe Grays at the time of the John Brown affair at Harper's Ferry, to which point he went with his company in 1859. In April, 1861, he was again at Harper's Ferry, and was assigned to the Fourth Virginia regiment, Jackson's brigade, as first lieutenant of his company. He participated in the brilliant service of his regiment at the first battle of Manassas, and in the spring of 1862 was promoted major, in which rank he served with credit on the fields of Gaines' Mill and Malvern Hill. He was with Jackson's corps in the famous campaign against Pope, was wounded in the battle of Second Manassas, July 28th, and was mentioned for gallantry in the report of General Taliaferro. In the same rank he commanded the Fourth regiment in the battle of Fredericksburg, after the wounding of Colonel Gardner; also at Chancellorsville, where his command lost 140 men out of a total of 355; and at Gettysburg and Payne's Farm. Promotion rapidly followed, to colonel of the Fourth regiment to date from September, 1863, and to brigadier-general after the Wilderness and Spottsylvania campaign, in which he participated with credit. On May 21st he was assigned to the command of a brigade formed from the survivors of the Stonewall brigade and the brigades of J. M. Jones and G. H. Steuart, who had escaped from the disaster of May 12th at the "bloody angle." In this capacity he took part in the fighting on the Cold Harbor line, and the defense of Petersburg, and commanded his brigade during Early's campaign in the Shenandoah valley, partici-

pating in the defeat of the Federals at Shepherdstown August 25th, and fighting gallantly at Winchester, where he was one of the seven distinguished Confederate generals who fell killed or wounded. He returned with his brigade to the Petersburg lines, and on March 25, 1865, was again wounded while leading his command in the sortie of Gordon's corps against Fort Stedman. During the retreat of the army to Appomattox, he was at home disabled by wounds, but when the news of the surrender reached him, he mounted his horse, with indomitable courage, and started out to join the army in North Carolina. He subsequently resumed his law practice at Wytheville, and in 1868 was nominated for Congress, but could not make the race on account of political disabilities. Upon the removal of these he was elected to the Forty-second and Forty-fourth Congresses. On September 5, 1888, he was drowned while attempting to ford a creek near his home. By his marriage to Emma, daughter of Benjamin Wigginton, of Bedford county, in 1852, there are four sons and three daughters, who survive.

Brigadier-General William Richard Terry was born at Liberty, Bedford county, Va., March 12, 1817. After his graduation by the Virginia military institute in 1850, he devoted himself to agricultural and commercial pursuits until the secession of Virginia, when he promptly entered the military service as captain of a company of cavalry organized in Bedford county. He led his men to Manassas, and after serving at Fairfax Court House, participated in the cavalry charge which demoralized the broken right wing of the Federal army on the night of April 21st, continuing until midnight in pursuit of the enemy. His conduct at the battle of First Manassas won the attention of his commanders, and in September following, at the request of General Early, he was promoted colonel and assigned to the command of the Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry, from which Early had been promoted to brigadier-general. In May, 1862, at the battle of Williamsburg, the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina regiments made a brilliant and heroic charge upon the enemy's position, and Terry, leading his regiment, fell severely wounded, but earned a reputation as an inspiring and irresistible leader in assault



Brig.-Gen. A. G. JENKINS.  
 Maj.-Gen. JOHN PERAM.  
 Brig.-Gen. J. A. TERRILL.  
 Brig.-Gen. W. N. FENDLETON.

Maj.-Gen. J. B. MAGRUDER.  
 Maj.-Gen. D. H. MAURY.  
 Maj.-Gen. W. B. TALLIAFERRO.  
 Brig.-Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON.

Brig.-Gen. SAMUEL GARLAND.  
 Brig.-Gen. WM. TERRY.  
 Maj.-Gen. THOS. L. ROSSER.  
 Brig.-Gen. J. E. SLAUGHTER.







that he fully maintained throughout the war. Longstreet and D. H. Hill both praised the men and their gallant leaders, the latter expressing the opinion that the caution exhibited by the Federals in their subsequent movements "was due to the terror inspired by the heroism of those noble regiments. History has no example of a more daring charge." Hancock, who bore the brunt of the attack, declared that the two regiments deserved to have the name "Immortal" inscribed on their banners. Under Terry's leadership the regiment fought with the same heroism at Second Manassas, and after the wounding of Colonel Corse, then commanding Kemper's brigade, Colonel Terry succeeded him in temporary command. He was with his regiment in all its battles, and was seven times badly wounded. One of the most desperate of his wounds was received at Gettysburg, in the memorable assault of Pickett's division. He commanded Kemper's brigade from the fall of 1863 until nearly the close of the war, with promotion to brigadier-general in May, 1864. Assigned to the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia with Pickett, he took part in the expedition against New Bern, and in May, 1864, bore a worthy part in the gallant stand made against Butler at Drewry's bluff. Throughout the long defense of Richmond and Petersburg he was one of the trusted brigadiers of Pickett's division, and finally, on March 31, 1865, just before the abandonment of the Confederate capital, he fell severely wounded near Dinwiddie Court House, leading his men in the successful fight of Pickett's division, which preceded the disaster at Five Forks. After the close of the war he served eight years in the Virginia senate, held the office of superintendent of the State penitentiary two terms, and from April, 1886, to 1893, was superintendent of the Soldiers' Home at Richmond. This office he was forced to surrender by failing health, which continued until his death, March 28, 1897, at his home in Chesterfield county. He was married in young manhood to Miss Pemberton, of Powhatan, who, with two sons and three daughters, survived him.

Brigadier-General Henry Harrison Walker, a native of Virginia, was appointed from that State to the United States military academy in 1849, and was graduated in 1853 with the brevet of second lieutenant of infantry.

His service with the United States army was rendered first in barracks at Newport, Ky., and then until 1855 in New Mexico. He became second lieutenant, Sixth infantry, in 1855, and first lieutenant in 1857, and in the latter year was appointed aide-de-camp to Governor Walker of Kansas. After assisting in quelling the disturbances in that State, he served upon the staff of General Clarke, at San Francisco, three years. The secession of Virginia called him from frontier duty at Fort Churchill, Nev., to offer his services to his native State. He received at first a commission as captain of infantry in the regular army of the Confederate States. Subsequently he was promoted lieutenant-colonel of the Fortieth Virginia infantry regiment, Field's brigade. At Gaines' Mill he was twice wounded, and was mentioned by General Field as "a gallant and meritorious officer," and by Gen. A. P. Hill as one of those deserving especial mention for conspicuous gallantry. In July, 1863, after having been in charge of a convalescent camp, he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to the command of his old brigade, which had meanwhile been under the leadership for some time of Gen. Henry Heth and Colonel Brockenbrough. He served creditably as a brigade commander in the battles of Bristoe Station and Mine Run, in the latter affair his brigade being the first infantry to meet the enemy and check his advance. In December he was ordered to the Shenandoah valley to reinforce Early, and was recalled from that region in March, 1864, to the main army. He did good and brave service through the bloody battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House, until severely wounded on May 10, 1864. On November 10th he was assigned to duty as a member of the general court-martial of the department of Richmond, and his brigade, much reduced, was consolidated with Archer's.

Brigadier-General James A. Walker, now living in Wytheville, Va., is the son of Alexander Walker and Hannah Hinton, whose ancestors were among the early Scotch-Irish settlers of the valley of Virginia. He was born in Augusta county on the 27th of August, 1832. After receiving the best elementary education that the schools of the neighborhood afforded, he entered the fourth class at the Virginia military institute in 1848.

Here he remained until the spring of 1852, and was in the graduating class of that year, when he took offense at some remark made to him by Stonewall Jackson (then Professor Jackson), in the lecture room, and a passage of sharp words took place between the two. Cadet Walker, feeling that he had been publicly insulted and wronged by Professor Jackson, sent him a challenge to fight a duel. It is related of Jackson by one with whom he consulted on the occasion, that, notwithstanding he was a grave professor and the challenger a mere boy, he for a considerable time, debated in his mind the propriety of accepting the challenge, expressing a serious wish that it was possible to do so. Walker's rebellion in the class-room was a grave offense, at an institution where strict military discipline is maintained; but the sending of a challenge to one of the principal officers and professors was a crime not to be overlooked or forgiven, and though Walker stood high in his class, and was popular with all who knew his honest heart and chivalric qualities, he was court-martialed and dismissed from the institution. In after years, when Jackson and Walker met, as officers in the field, and the former saw his wayward pupil in the front of every fight, always prompt, never shirking the most arduous duties, nor flinching in the most trying and dangerous situations, he freely blotted from his remembrance all thought of the occurrence between them at the institute, and pushed him for promotion whenever there was an opportunity to do so. They became friends and no officer in the army stood higher in the esteem of Jackson than Walker. After the war General Walker's diploma was sent to him by order of the board of visitors, and he is enrolled as a graduate of the Virginia military institute. After leaving the institute, Walker accepted a position in the engineer corps, then engaged in locating the line of the Covington & Ohio (now Chesapeake & Ohio) railroad, from the Big Sandy river to Charlestown, and in this rough and unexciting life he spent eighteen months. He then resigned and returned to his home in Augusta county. Shortly afterward he began to read law in the office of Col. John B. Baldwin, at Staunton. During the session of 1854-55 he took a law course at the university of Virginia, and immediately afterward began to practice his profession at Newbern, Pulaski county, Va. In 1860 he

was elected commonwealth's attorney of that county and filled that position until the spring of 1863. Immediately after the John Brown raid, Walker organized a local militia company, the Pulaski Guards, and being elected their captain, drilled them so faithfully that when Governor Letcher called for troops from Virginia, his was one of the best companies mustered into the service. In April, 1861, Captain Walker and his company were ordered to report for duty at Harper's Ferry, and there joined Stonewall Jackson's command. Captain Walker remained with the Fourth regiment until after the skirmish at Falling Waters, and for conspicuous gallantry and exhibition of high soldierly qualities, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and assigned to duty in the Thirteenth Virginia infantry, of which A. P. Hill was colonel. Hill was made brigadier in March, 1862, and soon afterward Walker was made full colonel. When General Jackson left Manassas for Yorktown, Colonel Walker's regiment formed part of General Ewell's division. Later he joined Jackson's command, and participated in the battles of the famous Valley campaign. Colonel Walker commanded a brigade nearly all the year of 1862. At Sharpsburg he commanded Trimble's brigade, and at Fredericksburg, Early's. In the spring of 1863 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and by the request of Stonewall Jackson was ordered to take command of the old Stonewall brigade. At the head of this famous body of soldiers he fought at Winchester, Gettysburg, Mine Run, Fredericksburg, Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House, and at the latter place, the 12th of May, 1864, received a musket ball in the elbow of the left arm, which caused an excessively painful wound, which compelled resection of the bones and his temporary retirement from service. In July, 1864, with his arm still in a sling and his health feeble, he was again called into service and assigned to the defenses of the Richmond & Danville and "Southside" railroads, these roads covering Lee's main line of communication and supplies. He was successful in holding back the raiding cavalry, and in keeping the railroad communications open with the south and west, and for this service received the warm commendations of his superior officers. In February, 1865, General Walker asked leave to return to the front once more, and solicited the favor of taking charge of the

brigade, which, by the death of the gallant Pegram, was left without a brigadier, and in which was his old regiment, the Thirteenth Virginia, a body of troops than whom, he has often been heard to say, no braver ever fought in all the famous armies of the world. His request was granted. Being the senior brigadier, during Early's absence in the valley of Virginia, with an independent command, he led two brigades of the division in a successful attack on Hare's hill. Still at the head of this division General Walker retreated, with General Lee, fighting by the way at Sailor's creek, High Bridge and Farmville, to Appomattox, where he surrendered himself and about 1,500 officers and men to Grant. The war over, General Walker returned to his home in Pulaski county, and immediately went to work putting out a crop of corn, with the two mules he had brought home from the army with him. As soon as possible he began to practice law, and gave his entire time to his profession until the summer of 1868. In that year, without any solicitations on his part, he was nominated as the conservative candidate for lieutenant-governor, and had canvassed several counties before the election was postponed by order of the military authorities, and Congress commenced reconstructing the State. When later it was found expedient to nominate a Northern Democrat and Gilbert C. Walker's name was mentioned, General Walker withdrew his name and canvassed the State for Walker against Wells. In 1871 he was elected to the house of delegates. In 1876 he was made lieutenant-governor on the ticket with Governor Holliday. During the debt controversy in Virginia, General Walker sided actively with the debt-paying element. After his term as lieutenant-governor expired, he took, for several years, little part in State politics, being kept busy by the demands of a large law practice. He was also much interested and very active in the development of the mineral resources of Virginia. While studying the interests of his section of the State, he became an enthusiastic "Protectionist" in politics, and, at that time, indeed, the Democratic party in southwestern Virginia was pronounced in its advocacy of protection principles. When, a year or two later, Mr. Cleveland avowed his free trade policy and became the Democratic leader and their candidate for President, General Walker severed his connec-

tion with that party, and has since been a Republican in principle and affiliation. He was elected to Congress from the Ninth district of Virginia by the Republicans in 1894, and was re-elected in 1896. In July, 1898, he was a third time nominated. In the official records of the civil war, published by the government, General Walker's name, coupled with honorable mention for gallant conduct or faithful services, occurs a number of times in the reports of Confederate officers. One interesting fact connected with him is this, that he is the only officer who ever commanded the Stonewall brigade who survived the war. All of the others, Generals Jackson, Winder, Garnett and Paxton, were killed in battle. Colonels Allen, Botts and Baylor, while temporarily in command of the Stonewall brigade, also fell at the head of their troops. As the sole surviving commander of this famous brigade, General Walker has been an object of much interest in the North and West, and in the last ten years has been a number of times invited to make addresses on commanders of the civil war and kindred subjects, in the cities of those sections. He has in this way been one of those ex-Confederate officers who have had much to do with the present era of good feeling between the sections. Like Wheeler and Lee and others, he has long been broad-minded enough to see that loyalty to the "lost cause" is entirely consistent with loyalty to the government under which he lives and from which he claims protection.

Brigadier-General Reuben Lindsay Walker was born at Logan, Albemarle county, Va., May 29, 1827. His father was Capt. Lewis Walker, and his early home was in a part of the State noted for wealth and refinement, the prominent families of which were connected with his by blood and affinity. He was graduated in 1845 at the Virginia military institute, where his popularity among his fellow cadets is one of the pleasant traditions of the school. After graduation he adopted the profession of civil engineer, and became employed upon the extension of the Chesapeake & Ohio railroad. In 1857 he married a daughter of Dr. Albert Elam, of Chesterfield county, and a few years later engaged in farming in New Kent county. He was sergeant-at-arms of the memorable Virginia convention of 1861, and immediately after the

passage of the ordinance of secession he applied to Governor Letcher for commission and permission to organize an expedition to surprise and capture Fortress Monroe. The governor denied him this opportunity, but his ability was recognized by a commission as captain and assignment to command of the Purcell battery, the first company of that arm to leave Richmond. He was stationed with this company on the Potomac near Aquia creek, and from that region he reached the field of First Manassas in time to shell the retreating Federals with his six Parrott guns. He subsequently was in action at Potomac creek, Aquia creek, Marlborough point, Free Stone point and Evans' point during the summer and fall of 1861. March 31, 1862, he was promoted major, and in this rank he served as chief of artillery of A. P. Hill's division. During the Seven Days' battles he was sick at Richmond, but after that he was identified with the operations of A. P. Hill's command until the close of the war. During the reduction of Harper's Ferry, in the Maryland campaign, he crossed the Shenandoah with several batteries and secured a position on Loudoun heights that commanded the enemy's works. At Fredricksburg Hill reported that Lieutenant-Colonel Walker "directed the fire from his guns with admirable coolness and precision." Promotion to colonel rapidly followed, in which rank he fought at Chancellorsville, and when Hill was called to command the Third army corps, Colonel Walker was appointed chief of artillery of that command. At Gettysburg he commanded sixty-three guns and handled them with skill and effect, and later in 1863 he took part in various minor engagements. In the campaign of 1864 he served in all the principal battles, beginning with the Wilderness and closing with Reams' Station. In January, 1865, he was promoted brigadier-general and assigned to command of the Third artillery corps, still attached to Hill's army corps. Of the conduct of his command in the final days at Petersburg, it was reported: "The conduct of officers and men was worthy of all praise, and that of the drivers and supernumeraries of the artillery, who had been by General Walker armed with muskets, deserves special mention. Those in Fort Gregg fought until literally crushed by numbers, and scarcely a man survived." On the retreat he reached with his artillery a point between Appomattox



tox Court House and Station, where he was attacked by Custer's cavalry division on April 8th. The dashing Federal general reported: "The enemy succeeded in repulsing nearly all our attacks, until nearly 9 o'clock at night, when by a general advance along my line he was forced from his position." On the next day the army was surrendered, and General Walker retired to private life, with a record of participation in sixty-three battles and combats. In 1872, after some years devoted to farming, he removed to Alabama, as superintendent of the Marion & Selma railroad, but four years later returned to Virginia. He was connected with the Richmond & Danville railroad, later had charge of the Richmond street railways, took part in the construction of the Richmond & Alleghany railroad, and was superintendent of the building of the women's department of the State penitentiary. In 1884 he became superintendent of construction of the Texas State capitol and resided at Austin until 1888. Subsequently he lived upon his farm at the confluence of the James and Rivanna rivers, until his death, June 7, 1890.

Brigadier-General Daniel Adams Weisiger, in early manhood was a resident of Petersburg, Va., where he engaged in mercantile pursuits until November, 1846, when, the State of Virginia being called upon for a regiment for service in Mexico, he volunteered and aided in recruiting a company of 85 men, of which he was elected senior second lieutenant. He was finally promoted to the adjutancy of the regiment, which office he held until the close of the war, and his regiment was mustered out at Fort Monroe, in August, 1848. He returned to Petersburg and was again engaged in business until April, 1861. In May, 1853, he was unanimously elected colonel of the Thirty-ninth "regiment of Virginia militia," which he commanded until 1860, when a battalion of volunteers, uniformed, armed and fully equipped for active service, was formed, and he was unanimously tendered the command. On April 20th he was ordered to move with his command to Norfolk. With his command and a battery of artillery, he arrived there in the afternoon of that day, and witnessed the evacuation of the navy yard that night. On May 9, 1861, he was appointed colonel in the Confederate States service, and his battalion of five

companies was soon recruited to a full regiment, and designated as the Twelfth Virginia regiment. Upon the reorganization of the army in May, 1862, he was re-elected colonel without opposition. After the evacuation of Norfolk, he and his regiment took a position at Drewry's bluff, and there acted in support of the fort during the attack by the Federal gunboats, which was handsomely repulsed. Soon afterward the regiment was ordered to Richmond, and became a part of the army of Northern Virginia. Leading the Twelfth, Colonel Weisiger participated in the battle of Seven Pines, and on June 25th was engaged in a heavy skirmish at French's farm on the Charles City road. This proved to be the commencement of the Seven Days' battles around Richmond, which culminated in the battle of Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862. In that combat Weisiger's regiment was on the extreme right of the lines, occupied the last ridge in front of McClellan's army, and held that position during the night when the Federal army retreated to Harrison's landing on James river. Late in the month of August, 1862, the Twelfth was ordered to join the army of Northern Virginia. On August 30th they arrived at the field of Second Manassas, early in the morning, and were held in reserve until the afternoon, when they were ordered to the front and placed on the right of the line of battle. After passing over a burning rail fence, causing some confusion, which was soon rectified, the regiment encountered a heavy artillery fire in which Adj.-Gen. William E. Cameron was severely wounded by a piece of shell. In a very short time Brig.-Gen. William Mahone was wounded and carried from the field, and the brigade came under the command of Colonel Weisiger. About this time Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright, of Georgia, reported that he was hard pressed and wanted Weisiger's assistance. The latter immediately complied, but in the movement was caught under a heavy fire and dangerously wounded and taken from the field. In consequence he was disabled for duty in the field. On May 6, 1864, the second day of the fighting in the Wilderness, General Longstreet was wounded and was succeeded by Gen. R. H. Anderson, he by General Mahone, and Colonel Weisiger was placed in command of the Virginia brigade as Mahone's successor. He commanded the brigade thenceforward, in the battles of the campaign from

the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, and in nearly every battle around Petersburg from June 20, 1864, until the evacuation. When the Federal troops occupied the gap in the Confederate works made by the terrific mine explosion of July 30th, he led his Virginia brigade, only 800 strong, against about 5,000 of the enemy, with such gallantry and success that he was promoted to brigadier-general, to date from the battle of the Crater. During his military career he participated in over twenty battles and skirmishes, was wounded three times, and two horses were shot under him. He finally led his brigade on the march to Appomattox, and was surrendered with the army.

Brigadier-General G. C. Wharton was elected major of the Forty-fifth regiment, Virginia infantry, in July, 1861, this being one of the regiments organized by General Floyd in southwest Virginia. A month later he became colonel of the Fifty-first regiment, which he led through the Western Virginia campaign of General Floyd during the summer and fall of 1861. Accompanying Floyd to Kentucky early in 1862, he was assigned at Fort Donelson to the command of a brigade composed of his own and the Fifty-sixth Virginia regiment. In his report of the battle, General Pillow particularly commended the gallantry of Colonel Wharton and his brigade, who, after being under fire or fighting in the ditches four days, advanced and drove the enemy from their front on February 15th. On the next day, surrender having been decided upon, a considerable part of Floyd's command was brought away in safety, and Wharton rendered valuable service in preserving the government stores at Nashville. Subsequently returning to southwest Virginia, he defeated a Federal regiment at Princeton, May 17, 1862, and in September participated in Loring's occupation of the Kanawha valley, as commander of the Third brigade of the army of Western Virginia. Subsequently he was in command at the Narrows of New river, with his own and Echols' brigade, until February, 1863, when he was stationed in the neighborhood of Abingdon. When Gen. Sam Jones was ordered in July to send troops to Lee's army, Wharton was detached, and Jones sent word to Lee, "He is an admirable officer, has commanded a brigade for eighteen months.

Let him command my troops until I come." He was stationed at Winchester, and was temporarily in charge of the Valley district. Soon afterward he was promoted brigadier-general, and in August returned to his former station on the Virginia & Tennessee railroad. Later he was transferred to General Longstreet's command in east Tennessee, until April, 1864, when he was ordered to report to General Breckinridge. In command of his brigade of veterans he took a conspicuous part in the defeat of Sigel at New Market, and served with honor in the Confederate lines at Cold Harbor. Returning toward the southwest for the defense of Lynchburg, he took part in the pursuit of Hunter down the valley and the expedition through Maryland to Washington. During the Shenandoah campaign he commanded a division comprising the infantry brigades of the old army of Western Virginia. After suffering severely during the valley battles of 1864, the division was badly cut up in the fight at Waynesboro, March 2, 1865. After the close of the war General Wharton lived at Radford.

Brigadier-General Williams Carter Wickham was the son of William Fanning Wickham and Anne Carter, and the great-grandson of Gen. Thomas Nelson, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the commander-in-chief of the Virginia Line in the Revolutionary army. He was born at Richmond, Va., September 21, 1820, moved with his parents to Hanover county in 1827; was educated at the university of Virginia, and admitted to the bar in 1842. He practiced in a country circuit for a few years, and then gave up the law for the life of a Virginia planter. On January 11, 1848, he married Lucy Penn Taylor, great-granddaughter of John Penn, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence from North Carolina. He was elected to the Virginia house of delegates in 1849; was presiding justice of the county court of Hanover county for many years. In 1858 he was commissioned captain of Virginia volunteer cavalry, and in 1859 was elected to the State senate from the district composed of Hanover and Henrico, as a Whig. In 1861, elected by the people of Henrico to the State convention as a Union man, he was bitterly opposed to the war and voted against the ordinance of secession, but immediately upon the secession of Virginia,

he determined to share the fortunes of his people, and took his company, "the Hanover dragoons," into active service. He participated in the first battle of Manassas and the preceding outpost skirmishes, and in September, 1861, was commissioned by Governor Letcher, lieutenant-colonel of the Fourth Virginia cavalry. On May 4, 1862, he received a severe saber wound in a cavalry charge at Williamsburg, which prevented him from participating in the battles around Richmond. While wounded he was taken prisoner at his home on McClellan's advance, paroled, and speedily exchanged by special cartel for his wife's kinsman, Lieut.-Col. Thomas L. Kane, of the Pennsylvania "Bucktails." In August, 1862, he was commissioned colonel of the Fourth Virginia cavalry, and in that rank he participated in the battles of Second Manassas, Boonsboro, Sharpsburg and the frequent engagements of the cavalry under General Stuart. During the advance of the army of the Potomac into Virginia, after the battle of Sharpsburg, he was again wounded, by a piece of shell, in the neck, while temporarily in command of Fitz Lee's brigade at Upperville. Recovering from this wound, he regained his command in time to take part in the battle of Fredericksburg, December 12, 1862. When the army went into winter quarters, he was on the picket lines on the Rappahannock river from Fredericksburg to a point above the junction of the Rapidan, and was on those lines when Burnside made his unsuccessful attempt to cross the river again. In the spring of 1863, he and his command participated actively in the outpost conflicts preceding the battle of Chancellorsville, and was posted on the right flank during that battle. Prior to the opening of the campaign in 1863, while in command of his regiment at the front, he announced himself a candidate for the Confederate Congress from the Richmond district, and without going into the district was elected shortly after the battle of Chancellorsville, by an unparalleled majority. He, however, remained at his post in the army, leaving his seat in Congress vacant until the fall of 1864. On the advance into Pennsylvania Colonel Wickham's command formed a part of the force which Stuart took on his raid around Meade's army, rejoining the army of Northern Virginia on the eve of the battle of Gettysburg, was posted on the extreme left flank during that engagement, and

aided in covering the retreat. On September 9, 1863, he was commissioned brigadier-general, and put in command of Wickham's brigade of Fitzhugh Lee's division. The cavalry of both armies had frequent encounters during the following months, the engagements at Bristoe, Brandy Station and Buckland Mills being the most serious until February, 1864, when the fighting to repel Kilpatrick's raid upon Richmond, and Custer's attack on Charlottesville was very desperate. In March and April, 1864, General Wickham and his brigade were again on guard on the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. He took part in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House, and when Sheridan moved on Richmond, he was with Stuart on May 11th at Yellow Tavern. "Order Wickham to dismount his brigade and attack," was the last order given by General Stuart to a brigade of cavalry. Subsequently he was actively engaged in the battles of Totopotomay, Cold Harbor, Trevilian's, Reams' Station and many of the lesser cavalry engagements. On August 10, 1864, he and his command were ordered from the south side of the James river to join Early's army in the valley of Virginia, Fitzhugh Lee being in command of the cavalry corps with General Wickham in command of Lee's division. At the battle of Winchester on September 19, 1864, General Wickham covered the retreat. Rallying his men with great ability, General Early again sustained a terrific reverse at Fisher's hill, September 22d, and his army was saved from destruction by the successful defense of the Luray valley by Lee's cavalry division under the command of General Wickham, against the advance of Torbert's corps on which Sheridan relied to intercept the retreat of Early at New Market in the main valley. Rejoining General Early at Brown's gap, Wickham was ordered to guard Rockfish gap, and on arriving at the foot of the mountain attacked the Federal cavalry at Waynesboro, driving them back. The next day the enemy retreated down the valley, and the lines of the armies were established at Bridgewater. General Wickham resigned his commission in the Confederate army on October 5, 1864, transferred his command to General Rosser, went to Richmond and took his seat in Congress when the session opened. It took him but a few days after the assembling of the Confederate Congress to ascertain that the end of

the Confederacy was drawing near, and for a brief period he had the hope that reunion could be brought about upon a basis which, while it would in no way tarnish the honor of the armies or people of the South, would save the lives of thousands of noble men, and preserve some of their property from the wreck of war. After the failure of the Hampton Roads conference, he continued at his post in Richmond, awaiting the end. After the surrender of the armies, General Wickham addressed himself to the effort to restore friendly relations between the sections of the Union; to reorganize on a mutually satisfactory basis the labor necessary for the farming operations of the country, and to induce his fellow-citizens to accept the situation. The condition of the South was terrible. General Wickham stood side by side with his old constituents and shared their fate. He had been educated a Whig and a Union man. When the war ended, his political faith remained unchanged, and as the Whig party had disappeared, he adopted the principles of the party which he regarded as its legitimate successor. On April 23, 1865, in an open letter, he aligned himself with the Republican party. This step estranged very many of his old associates from him. In November, 1865, he was elected president of the Virginia Central railroad company; in November, 1868, president of the Chesapeake & Ohio railroad company, and in 1869 was made vice-president of the company with C. P. Huntington as president, and continued as such until 1875, when he was appointed its receiver, which position he held until July 1, 1878, when he became its second vice-president and so continued until his death. He was elected chairman of the board of supervisors of Hanover county in 1871, and was continuously re-elected as long as he lived. In 1872 he was a member of the electoral college of Virginia, and cast his vote for General Grant. In 1880 he was honored by a tender of the secretaryship of the navy by President Hayes, but declined on account of business engagements. In 1881 he was tendered the nomination for governor of the State by the Republican convention, but declined to accept it. Opposing the "readjuster party" in 1883, he again became a member of the State senate, and was the chairman of the finance committee of that body until his death, although he occupied an independent position and declined to go into any caucus.

While not an impassioned speaker, he was brave and calm and cool, and possessed in a remarkable degree the capacity to arouse manifestations of enthusiasm and personal attachment. On the 23d of July, 1888, he died in his office in Richmond of heart failure. The men of his old command, from many of whom he had become politically estranged, resolved that "in the camp and on the field of battle, in the fatigue of the march, in the gloom of the hospital, under the depression of the waiting and in the glory of the charge, he was the friend, the comrade, the guardian, the leader of his men, the beau-ideal of a soldier and of a commander," and they organized to perpetuate his memory in bronze. In 1890 the general assembly of Virginia provided for a site on the capitol grounds for the statue of General Wickham, which was unveiled on October 29, 1891, the oration being delivered by Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.

Brigadier-General Henry Alexander Wise was born at Drummondtown, Accomack county, December 3, 1806, a descendant of John Wise, who came to Virginia from England about 1650, and was a man of influence in the colony. Maj. John Wise, father of General Wise, clerk of Accomack county and twice speaker of the Virginia senate, died in 1812, and his wife, Sarah Corbin, in 1813. Young Wise was cared for by his kinsmen, and educated at Washington college, Pa. After his graduation in 1825, he studied law three years with Henry St. George Tucker, and in 1828 removed to Nashville, Tenn., for the practice of his profession. Returning to Accomack in 1831, he soon became prominent politically, and in 1833, as a supporter of Jackson, was elected to Congress, the contest at the polls being followed by a duel in which his opponent for Congress was wounded. He was re-elected in 1835 and again in 1837, and was a zealous advocate of the admission of Texas. In 1837 he acted as second in a duel between William J. Graves, of Kentucky, and Jonathan Cilley, of Maine, both congressmen, in which Cilley was killed, and Wise was made to suffer much of the opprobrium of the unfortunate affair. He was very influential in causing the nomination of John Tyler for vice-president and exerted considerable power under his administration. Tyler appointed him minister to France, but the Senate objecting, he



was appointed to Brazil in 1844, and remained there until 1847. He was a Democratic elector in 1848 and 1850, and a member of the constitutional convention of 1850. In 1855 he made a brilliant campaign for the governorship against the Know-Nothing party and was elected. In 1859 he published a treatise on territorial government, upholding the doctrine of congressional protection of slavery in the new territories. The execution of the servile insurrectionist, John Brown, December 2, 1859, was one of the last events of his administration. In 1861 he sat in the Virginia convention, and as a member of the committee on federal relations, presented one of the three reports upon the position Virginia should take in the crisis. He entered heartily into the military defense of the State, and obtained permission to raise an independent partisan command. In May he was advised by President Davis to take a commission as brigadier-general of provisional forces with command in the Kanawha valley. Reaching Charleston from a sick bed, in June, he completed the organization of Wise's Legion, in command of which, with the Kanawha volunteers, he endeavored patriotically to withstand the superior forces sent against him. He fought with intelligence and skill in the vicinity of Charleston, and selected the position at Sewell mountain, where Lee took command, confronting Rosecrans until that officer retreated. In the fall of 1861 he was assigned to command at Roanoke island, N. C., where, in his absence, many of his legion were captured, and his son, Capt. O. Jennings Wise, of the Richmond Light Infantry Blues, was mortally wounded. His feeble health now kept him from the field for some time, but in 1863 he was given command of the district between the Mattaponi and the James, with his brigade, the Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fourth and Forty-sixth infantry, a battalion of artillery and a squadron of cavalry. While at Chaffin's farm, he conducted some gallant attacks upon the enemy, and recovered Williamsburg from General Dix. He subsequently served under Beauregard at Charleston, with his command drove the enemy from John's island, and took part in two battles in Florida. Returning to Virginia in May, 1864, on June 1st he was assigned to command the First military district, including Petersburg. He participated in the defeat of Butler at Drewry's bluff, and on June 15th his brigade alone held

at bay the army corps of A. J. Smith, until Lee could cross the James. Faithful to the last, he commanded his brigade in Anderson's corps during the siege of Petersburg, gallantly fought in the front line of battle March 29 and 31, 1865, and during the retreat, on April 6th, made a gallant and successful charge against the enemy. In Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's report of the final operations, he wrote most fitly: "The past services of Gen. Henry A. Wise, his antecedents in civil life, and his age, caused his bearing upon this most trying retreat to shine conspicuously forth. His unconquerable spirit was filled with as much earnestness and zeal in April, 1865, as when he first took up arms four years ago, and the freedom with which he exposed a long life laden with honors proved he was willing to sacrifice it if it would conduce toward attaining the liberty of his country." After the war he engaged in the practice of law at Richmond. His death occurred September 14, 1876. His sons who survived him were Richard Alsop, a distinguished physician, and John Sergeant, captain Richmond Light Infantry Blues, and after the war a congressman from Virginia.

Julius Adolphus De Lagnel, the hero of Rich Mountain, commissioned brigadier-general in the provisional army of the Confederate States, was born in New Jersey, and was appointed from Virginia to the United States army on March 8, 1847, as second lieutenant of the Second infantry. In January, 1849, he was promoted first lieutenant. Resigning his commission upon the formation of the Confederacy, he tendered his services to the new government, and was commissioned captain, corps of artillery, C. S. A. Going into western Virginia with General Garnett, he became his chief of artillery, and was stationed at Rich mountain, with the command of General Pegram. When the latter officer perceived that McClellan intended to flank his position by taking possession of the crest of Rich mountain, he sent DeLagnel with several companies of infantry and one piece of artillery to defend the mountain to the last extremity. Here he withstood the attack of a largely superior force under Rosecrans, making a desperate fight until his men were forced back by the heavy fire of musketry and artillery.

